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# The Indonesian Military as a Professional Organization: Criteria and Ramifications for Reform

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## Abstract

As parallel and co-dependent entities, Indonesia's civil government and military (TNI) defy many of the most basic precepts of conventional civil-military relations theory. By analyzing the unique Indonesian relationship between these two entities, this essay supplements conventional theory. Judging the TNI against three criteria-responsibility, expertise, and corporateness-

reveals a potent, fiercely independent institution with a powerful sense of duty. However, TNI capabilities are undermined by a lack of expertise, a factionalized corporate body, and a membership which pursues excessive self-interest. Such analysis confirms that for democracy to thrive in Indonesia the TNI must "professionalize," but reform must be accompanied by the strengthening of civil institutions' abilities to both provide for the nation and protect the TNI's material and ideological interests.

## Introduction

Ever since its establishment in 1945, the Indonesian military (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or TNI), has played an exceptional role in Indonesian politics. Addressing the crowd assembled to celebrate the TNI's fiftieth birthday, the President of Indonesia, General Suharto, described the distinctive nature of the Indonesian military:

> ... the role played by [TNI] is different from those of other militaries?. There are no other armed forces in advanced countries that we could use for comparison. We have to develop our own doctrine, strategies, tactics, and techniques on the basis of our own ideals and experiences.[1]

Although he overstates the uniqueness of the Indonesian military, Suharto correctly identified the atypicality of the TNI. In fact, the peculiarity of the TNI limits the utility of many of the standard assumptions normally made by students of civil-military relations, the field within political science and sociology that discusses how militaries relate to the political affairs of greater society. Therefore, those studying the TNI's contributions to modern Indonesia must first adapt their perspectives to examine it. This essay seeks to understand the TNI's institutional behavior by evaluating it as a professional organization. The point is not to determine whether or not the TNI is professional, but to judge the TNI against the three key professional criteria originally laid out by Samuel Huntington in his classic political science text, *The Soldier and the State*. These criteria are: responsibility, expertise, and corporateness. Looking at the TNI through these criteria reveals a strong, independent institution with a powerful sense of duty. However, the ability to fulfill its duty is undermined by a lack of expertise, factionalism, and the excessive pursuit of self-interest. Such an elucidation of the TNI's institutional behavior contributes to understanding its behavioral choices in the democratization process.

## Civil-Military Relations and Military Professionalism

The analysis of civil-military relations began with classical scholars including Plato, Socrates, Asoka, Confucius, and Sun Tzu. The field has remained salient because the civil-military *problematique* is a simple paradox inherent to civilization: "The very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity" (Feaver, 1999: 314). Since World War II, standing militaries of post-colonial states have shown a significant propensity to intervene in political affairs. This has renewed attention to the field and

contributed to a blossoming of the literature, especially that which applies specifically to the developing world.

Any examination of civil-military relations should start with a definition of terms, but the difficulty of formulating a precise definition of "military" has led contemporary thinkers to focus on identifying the attributes that they regard as central characteristics of militaries. Harold Lasswell describes the military as a body composed of men skilled in the "management of violence" (Huntington, 1957: 11). Morris Janowitz adds that militaries are official bureaucracies legitimized by the national state (Janowitz, 1977: 15). Samuel Huntington combines both of these concepts when he points out, "The skill of the [military] officer is the management of violence; his responsibility is the military security of his client, society," and, "The military profession exists to serve the state" (Huntington, 1957: 15, 73).

Like "military," the commonly used term "profession" is difficult to define. Social scientists have expended considerable efforts defining professions as a particular subset of vocations. In the opening pages of *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington offers a classic synthesis of this literature, "A profession is a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics." Those characteristics are expertise, responsibility, and corporateness (Huntington, 1957: 7-10).

The expertise of professionals lies in their possession of unique specialized skills which can only be acquired through extended education and experience. Unlike other crafts, which can be mastered by learning the techniques only as they exist in the present, professional knowledge must be intellectual in nature, build upon its own history, and be preserved in writing. Professions therefore require their own institutions to record, develop, and pass on knowledge. When the professional fields of practice and education are separated, contact between the two is maintained through meetings, conferences, journals, and the circulation of members between training and operational roles.

As professionals maintain a monopoly on vital expertise, they also have a responsibility to practice their skills in order to benefit society. When they fail to meet this responsibility they can no longer practice within that profession. Furthermore, because those skills are so valuable, pure economics cannot determine the professional's compensation for service. Rather than desire for economic gain, a sense of service and duty to community must provide the primary motive for entering and practicing a profession. Finally, the profession itself must develop an ethos for fulfilling its responsibility and dealing with its clients.

Corporateness is the third criteria for professionalism. All members of a profession must imagine themselves as part of a single community sharing a collective sense of responsibility, mutual educational experiences, and the bond of common labor. The community manifests itself as a professional organization which is responsible for regulating the profession. Being a member of the organization is a criterion for being a member of the profession. Thus, the organization has the power and responsibility to decide who can join the profession, enforce collective responsibility, and purge those who fail to meet their professional responsibility.

Building on this conception of professionalism, Huntington argues that the military does its best work as an "expert advisor" on security matters and therefore military officers are most effective when completely apolitical. He states, "Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism" (Huntington, 1957: 71). Thus Huntington argues that military professionalism is not directly linked to military intervention in civilian politics, but that the most important causes of military intervention are the political and institutional structure of society (Huntington, 1968: 194).

Huntington's argument provides the standard reference for what military historian Eliot Cohen calls the "normal view" of civil-military relations (Cohen, 2002: 226-34). However, Huntington's views also provoked a variety of criticisms. Readers of civil-military relations literature quickly become aware that "most of what has been written since has been an explicit or implicit response to his argument" (Feaver, 1999: 212). S.E. Finer argues that militaries are motivated to involve themselves in politics primarily to support their organizational ideology or interests (1962: 32-60). Morris Janowitz adds that professional soldiers are by necessity political because to be effective they must not only master the art of managing violence, but also be able to argue their cases within the civil context and deal with the ambiguous politico-military nature of the security environment (Sarkesian, 1984: 156). In addition, Eric Nordlinger tells us that "the armed forces of all countries exert considerable political influence," and argues that studying the political sociology of an officer corps gives valuable clues as to the role it will elect to play in policymaking (1977: 3, 31). While acknowledging that the social structure of a state cannot be ignored, these authors agree that the professional characteristics of a military also have a great deal of influence on its political behavior (Berghahn, 1981: 73-5). In fact, these authors clearly demonstrate that professionalism does not necessarily serve to constrain the political role of a military. In fact profession may, under certain circumstances, do the opposite, that is, encourage militaries to intervene. Therefore it is important to not only measure but also to analyze a military's professionalism in order to predict its likely political behavior.

Specialists of Southeast Asia draw on both Huntington and his critics when discussing civil-military relations in the region. Harold Crouch demonstrates that military involvement in politics stems from both the internal characteristics of the military institution and the external environment in which it operates (1985: 288). Similarly, Ulf Sundhaussen looks at characteristics both internal and external to the military when naming the preconditions for a military's withdrawal from politics: 1) internal consensus within the military, 2) safeguards for military interests, and 3) strong civil governance (1985: pp. 274-5). Bilveer Singh builds upon these authors' work to demonstrate that contemporary civil-military relations discourse draws on baseline assumptions regarding political structures inherent to Western nation-states that may not always be present in the developing world. Therefore, Singh argues that the models available in this discourse are generally ineffective for understanding developing states. He insists that the political role of a military must be evaluated in terms of the country's historical development, national traditions, and military doctrine (2001: 43-5).

## Indonesian Civil-Military Relations

The Indonesian case defies much of the conventional civil-military discourse at its most fundamental level. Contrary to the civil-military *problematique* which assumes that military organizations are legitimized by states, the TNI believes it was created by the people directly and regards itself as an institution separate from the state. This argument is not unreasonable since it can be credibly argued that the Indonesian military created and legitimatized the state, rather than vice versa. Since the TNI has independently weathered various regime changes, one can even imagine the TNI's survival in the wake of a total collapse of the Indonesian civil government. For example, in 1945 when militant youths, unsatisfied with the progress of civilian negotiations with the Dutch government, kidnapped the nationalist leaders and forced them to declare Indonesian independence. Soon afterwards various militant groups organized themselves into the TNI and elected its leaders without consulting the civilian leadership. According to their own teaching of history, the TNI formed because the Republican Government refused to raise an army to fight the returning Dutch colonial officials. The military then became the most adamant supporter of the revolutionary cause. Throughout the revolution it barred civilian initiatives for negotiated settlements with the Dutch and continued to fight even when the civilian leaders allowed themselves to be captured in 1948. As a result of these experiences, the TNI has not only always been highly distrustful of the civilian elite, but has also considered itself the true creator of sovereign Indonesia.

To argue that the Indonesian state is more a construct of the TNI than the TNI a construct of the state is not to say that the Indonesian state lacks its own intrinsic legitimacy. Although both underpinned and constrained by the TNI's ability to use coercive force, the state also has it own institutional independence. Most significantly, it represents the national population, holds the bulk of Indonesia's *de jure* authority, and receives the recognition of the world community. Furthermore, the TNI voluntarily surrendered a portion of its own autonomy to the state by acceding to the 1945 Constitution's principles of presidential control (Chapter III, Article 10) and the rule of law over defense (Chapter XII, Article 30).[2]

Following independence, the TNI continued to fulfill its political function. Although during certain periods it has disinvolved itself from practical politics and left policymaking primarily to the civilians, the TNI has always at a minimum played the role of "guardian," guaranteeing that Indonesia continues to function as a unitary Pancasila state (Kingsbury, 2003: 6, 10 and Crouch, 1998: 27). Pancasila is the ideological basis of the Indonesian state which includes among its core principles the "Belief in the One and Only God," and the "Unity of Indonesia." "Belief in the One and Only God," also embodied in Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution, ensures that all Indonesians must be religious, but leaves flexibility for religious minorities to practice their faiths among an Islamic majority. The "Unity of Indonesia" demands both territorial sovereignty and the equal treatment of ethnic groups as enshrined in the slogan, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, or "Unity in Diversity" (Anwar, 1999: 201). As guarantor of the Pancasila state, the TNI not only responds to threats, but independently decides what constitutes a security threat. To this end, the TNI has not only sought to counter external threats and separatist movements, but also delimits the boundaries for government reform. Most importantly, the military opposes any government plans that threaten to break up the state's sovereign territory or disrupt the ethnic

and religious balance embodied by Pancasila.

In the post-Suharto era, the popular outcry of anti-militarism and the TNI's voluntary reforms have served to strengthen the civil government and have removed TNI officers from the parliament and other fields of practical politics. These reforms, however, have neither curtailed the TNI's independence nor eliminated its socio-political function. Although the TNI has given civilians great latitude to institute reforms, it remains distrustful of the civilian elite. Events such as the 2001 impeachment of President Abdurrahman Wahid have only reinforced the impression that civilian leadership may not be up to the task of leading Indonesia. Furthermore, the 2002 constitutional amendments reinforce the TNI's guardian role by tasking it with "defending, protecting and preserving the unity and sovereignty of the State." But this amendment never defined the body which should identify threats, leaving military commanders greater latitude in determining when and how it should act to fulfill its constitutionally sanctioned role as defender of Indonesia's Pancasila Democracy.

Indonesian history dictates that the military and the civil government must be seen as parallel entities, inextricably linked and co-dependent, but also unable to fully subvert one another (Kingsbury, 2003: 7). "Normal view" civil-military relations theory seeks to determine the circumstances under which militaries interfere in affairs of the state. In the case of Indonesia, it is just as pertinent to determine the circumstances under which the state will exercise greater control over the military and the affairs which the TNI views as within its own domain such as promotion policies, business activities, and training standards. In order to understand this relationship it is a useful exercise to examine the TNI's institutional behavior and the template of "professionalism." However, given the difficulties of applying the conventional models of military sociology to the TNI, it is also necessary to evaluate the TNI against the three baseline characteristics of professionalism-expertise, responsibility, and corporateness-that are appropriate standards for evaluating any vocation, rather than the more specific criteria found in the literature discussing "military professionalism."

## Professional Responsibility

### Role and Mission

The TNI's social responsibility is clearly enshrined in ideology, doctrine, and propaganda. Unlike officers in the professional militaries of the West, whose burdens are limited to the management of violence in order to guarantee security, TNI doctrine clearly gives its members the additional responsibility of serving the nation as a manager and guide with regard to socio-political affairs.[3] Although the level of its direct involvement in political affairs has varied over time and is currently relatively low, the TNI has consistently considered itself to be the guardian of national unity, development, and cohesion. Takashi Shiraishi describes this belief as the TNI's "self-image as the irreplaceable backbone of the nation" (Shiraishi, 1999: 74).[4]

The concept that the TNI holds both security and socio-political functions dates to the war for independence period when the guerilla resistance blurred the distinction between military and

political roles. The doctrine was later formally enunciated by Army Chief of Staff General Abdul Haris Nasution in 1958 when he developed the concept of the "middle way" arguing that the TNI was neither an "instrument of government" nor a military regime, but an independent force responsible to and a part of the people. In 1965, the "middle way" evolved into the doctrine of "Dual Function" which affirmed that the TNI should function both as a "military force" and as a "social-political force" and placed military officers in prominent government positions including the cabinet, parliament, the bureaucracy, and regional administration.

In August 1998, Dual Function was officially replaced with the "New Paradigm" which removed the TNI from its direct role in politics and shifted the TNI's focus towards external defense and the preservation of unity.[5] The New Paradigm reforms have been a mixed success. The TNI has given up its seats in the parliament, severed its direct ties with the Golkar political party, removed most references to social-political roles from its doctrine, and espoused an apolitical stance. However, the reforms have neither diminished the political influence of the territorial commanders nor reduced the involvement of the TNI in local affairs (Kingsbury, 2003: 173). For example, the TNI retains its territorial development role that includes improving social conditions and can involve the mending of domestic ethnic and religious divides. In any case, even if it were to be fully implemented, the New Paradigm is not synonymous with a complete disengagement of the military from politics or submission to unquestioned civilian control. The TNI continues to affirm its professional responsibility to actively defend the unitary Pancasila state against all threats and instill patriotism in the Indonesian citizenry.[6]

The TNI ideological commitment to national unity is clearly exemplified by its *Sapta Marga* or Seven Oaths of the Armed Forces, a creed which has not been modified in the democratic era. The first two oaths are, "We are citizens of the unitary Republic of Indonesia that pivots on Pancasila" and "We are Indonesian patriots, supporters and defenders of the National Ideology, that have responsibility and cannot know surrender."[7] By design, the wording gives the TNI an uncompromiseable responsibility to counter any attacks on the unitary Pancasila state, including those posed by civilian leaders (Jenkins, 1984: 10). In the post-Suharto era, continued adherence to Pancasila was demonstrated by the TNI's 1998 proposal that the political parties include loyalty to Pancasila as central to their platforms (Mietzner, 1999: 93).

## Economic and Financial Interests

The civil government does not provide the TNI with adequate resources necessary for even its most basic functions. Although a lack of transparency makes the shortage difficult to quantify, it is estimated that the official defense budget covers less than one-third of the TNI's operational expenses. Official salaries are small for officers and, for junior enlisted men, insufficient for basic sustenance (Rebasa and Haseman, 2002: 71). Therefore, in order to sustain itself and fulfill its responsibilities, the TNI is expected by the civil government to acquire resources independently of the state financial system. In fact, since the military took control of Dutch-owned enterprises in 1957, business management has been central to the TNI's role and ethos (Crouch, 1988: 358-9).

TNI officers assigned to the management of state enterprises have been directed to divert profits to the military. Furthermore, TNI-managed cooperatives and foundations function at both the national and command levels to supplement operational and personnel costs not covered by the official budget. Many individual officers are also involved in private businesses which rely on either military resources or the coercive power which is associated with the military in order to sustain profitability.[8] Although such activities are often technically illegal, they are commonplace. At all levels there is relatively little distinction between public and private funds. Regardless of the sources of funding, officers consider both conducting operations and providing for the families of their soldiers as part of their professional responsibility.

Business activities are not only necessary for the TNI to fulfill its responsibilities, but have also been legalized by the state and are generally accepted by society. Therefore, although they are out of bounds for the professional militaries of the West, properly managing these businesses in support of the military's role and mission is a legitimate part of the TNI's professional responsibility. The more difficult question to assess is the appropriate volume of resources which are diverted for personal use by members of the military. If the soldiers are in fact free to determine their own salaries, then at what point do those salaries become excessive and undermine professionalism?

## Self-Interest

Although TNI officers are ideologically and legally bound to fulfill a social responsibility, many officers use their position in furtherance of their personal political or economic interests. In order to evaluate the ramifications of such activity on the TNI's professionalism it is not enough to evaluate behavior against either Indonesian legal codes or against the norms of Western societies. Instead, behavior must be judged in terms of its support of or interference with the fulfillment of responsibility to society.

Western cultures tend to draw clear lines between individuals' professional and private lives, and there is a clear sense of legitimate and illegitimate uses of power derived from a vocation. However these delineations are vague or non-existent in Indonesian culture, particularly among the Javanese to whom power is not seen as being derived, but as simply "being" (Anderson, 1990: 22). As powerful individuals always have access to that mystical force which is power, little distinction can be drawn between that person's "occupational" and "personal" life. Such concepts are clearly reflected within the TNI where distinctions between both public and private duty and personal and military resources are weak. Furthermore, the traditional patronage system expects those with power to accumulate personal wealth not only to provide for their subordinates, but also to demonstrate the extent of their power (Crouch, 1979: 571-9).

These concepts do not absolve TNI officers from responsibility or condone behavior which is detrimental to society. Since Indonesian ethical behavior is that which provides for both personal interest and the interests of society as a whole, behavior which results in excessive personal profit to the distress of others is unacceptable (Magnis-Suseno, 1977: 220-4). Considering the social expectation for TNI officers to accumulate wealth, "excess" is the best

standard with which to measure the pursuit of self-interest against the officers' professionalism. As it is a relative term, exactly what constitutes "excess" is difficult to define, but a general consensus exists within TNI that during the New Order the accumulation of excessive wealth became commonplace. In comparison, members of the contemporary military elite seem far more concerned with the negative ramifications of unrestricted pursuit of self-interest at the expense of society and have taken steps to constrain its members. Despite these efforts, excessive pursuit of personal gain continues to plague the professionalism of the TNI.

Professional Responsibility: Summary TNI doctrine and ideology clearly define social responsibility which includes significant security, socio-political, and business roles. Although such responsibility goes beyond the parameters of conventional military professionalism, it does fulfill the professional criteria. Furthermore, professional education, doctrine, and ideology have imbued the TNI leadership with a strong sense of duty. However, professionalism is clearly undermined by TNI actions motivated by self-interest especially when excessive behavior harms society. The underlying importance for Indonesian civil-military relations is the fact that members of the TNI is strongly motivated to preserve the well being of both itself and of Indonesia society as a whole, because members of the TNI believe that their personal well-being and that of Indonesia as a unitary state are equally rooted in Pancasila.

## Professional Expertise

### Educational and Professional Institutions

TNI officers are drawn from three educational streams, but regardless of the recruitment path, all TNI officers receive an intense period of initial training that not only focuses on academic and technical subjects but emphasizes socio-political indoctrination and institutional cohesion. The most important of these is the military academy in Magelang. The cadets study not only military skills, but also receive a broad-based education originally modeled on the curriculum of the U.S. Military Academy, to which large doses of Indonesia-specific socio-political indoctrination have been added (Evans, 1989: 39). After initial education, officer careers rotate between professional work and training. Continued training is an important factor in advancement and the officers with whom I have spoken estimate that about twenty percent of successful careers are spent training.[9] Some of these training programs focus on technical skills while others offer more broadly based professional education focused on enabling the officer to deal with greater responsibility. Such professional courses include the branch basic officer courses, company commander courses, Staff and Command School (SESKO), and the National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas).

SESKO administers one of the TNI's most important training courses and the one best known to foreign observers. During the reformation period, the SESKO curriculum was revised to reflect the TNI's withdrawal from politics and courses now emphasize the non-participatory role of the TNI. However, the curriculum continues to place heavy emphasis on indoctrination and loyalty to the Pancasila ideology and still includes course work which is more socio-political than security-orientated in nature. Furthermore, unrealistically high standards for assignments

dealing with technical subjects coupled with a tradition of leniency with regard to plagiarism ensure that many students do not master even the basics of the material assigned.[10] In contrast to the academic work, building solidarity is an important part of the curriculum which includes daily formation, student confinement to barracks except on weekends, and core course goals which include "attitude development." The result is a program which, in contrast to the school of a Western professional military, focuses less on purely military subjects than on activities designed to "reinforce solidarity and loyalty to the institution and nation" (Rebasa and Haseman, 2002: 59).

### Security Expertise

The TNI's security responsibility includes both external and internal defense. The TNI's conventional warfare expertise is difficult to assess empirically, because Indonesia has not come into military conflict with another state for nearly thirty years and does not face either a short- or mid-term threat from a foreign adversary. However, foreign military observers and open source intelligence reports agree that the TNI is ill-prepared to defend Indonesia against any significant external threat, not only because it lacks the resources, equipment, and organization to effectively fight a foreign military, but because it also lacks the expertise to do so.[11]

In contrast, the TNI has been much more active in countering internal security threats and much of its doctrine and training focuses on this mission. The TNI has demonstrated great ability to gather intelligence on internal threats and to use that information at the operational level (Lowry, 1996: 147-78). However, much criticism is leveled at TNI repression as being unnecessarily brutal and thus strategically counterproductive.[12] Indeed, while the TNI has proven itself expert at administering violence to put down rebellions, it lacks the civil-military ability necessary to build the stable social structures needed to ultimately resolve conflict (Lowry, 1996: 180). While the blame for recurrent instability in certain areas must be shared by the civil government, this lack of TNI expertise helps explain why so many internal threats continue to linger and reemerge whenever immediate pressure is removed. Policy Expertise

As a socio-political force committed to the modernization and development of a unified Indonesia, the TNI has been relatively successful. Indeed it has been the periods when the military has been the most involved in government that Indonesia has progressed most rapidly. During the New Order, the TNI not only ensured the stability necessary to attract foreign investment, but provided leaders to the cabinet, parliament, bureaucracy, and all levels of regional administration. During this period, members of the TNI, working alongside their civilian counterparts, achieved considerable success. Hal Hill writes,

> ... public administration and economic management of a poor, ethnically diverse archipelagic state such as Indonesia is a daunting task, and the essential recipe is one in which the government has got its policies "right" more often than it has not, and has displayed political will to take tough and unpopular decisions when necessary (Hill, 1994: 55).

During the New Order, real per capita income trebled, industrial output increased tenfold, rice yields improved, poverty and infant mortality showed significant declines, and transportation and education opportunities increased for every social stratum (Hill, 1994: 56-61, 105-14). However, it cannot be assumed that it was necessarily TNI expertise which fostered these achievements. Instead, credit is due to foreign investment, to Indonesia's vast natural resources, and to civilian technocrats. The TNI's contribution came in its provision of stability, its setting of boundaries for acceptable political and economic programs, and its permitting those programs to be designed and implemented by the experts. The TNI has realized its policymaking shortcomings and leaders cite those shortcomings as key motivators behind their withdrawal from practical politics and the handover of public functions to those with greater expertise. Rather than improving their skills in order to fulfill their social responsibility, the TNI is professionalizing by narrowing its role to those areas where it has, or hopes to develop, greater expertise.

### Business Expertise

Although TNI officers are expected to administer military-owned businesses as a part of their official duties, few officers have significant expertise in business affairs. Business topics are given minimal attention in professional education; instead officers are expected to learn on the job. Many military businesses have generated substantial profits (despite terrible mismanagement and corruption) by capitalizing on opportunities to exploit Indonesia's abundant resources, fortuitous government licensing opportunities, and the ability to coerce suppliers, buyers, and competitors (Liem, 2002: 220). As an example of such an operation, one military officer interviewed operates an import business that has secured lucrative contracts supplying alcohol to several large Bali resorts. Without commenting on a particular firm, one bar manager explained to the author that he generally selects suppliers not based on cost or service, but in order to avoid "unfortunate ramifications."

### Professional Expertise: Summary

Although TNI officers possess complex skills which are developed in specialized institutions, these institutions also devote extraordinary resources to strengthening feelings of duty and loyalty, limiting the emphasis on building technical expertise. As a result, TNI expertise is often insufficient to fulfill its social responsibilities. Its ability to protect Indonesia from external threat is limited and it has demonstrated little ability to achieve lasting victories when facing domestic unrest. Although skilled at repression, the TNI lacks the know-how needed to "win the peace." As a policymaking body, the TNI contributed to the New Order economic successes, but its current leaders realize that its lack of expertise and poor public relations inhibit its effectiveness in the public sector. The TNI's recognition of these shortcomings has played a major role in its post-New Order decisions to disengage from practical politics and focus on improving its war-making abilities, especially those related to external defense.

## Professional Corporateness

## Institutional Independence

TNI officers form a highly independent body and conceive of themselves as being united by common experience, work, responsibility, and outlook. Although formally accepting of the role of the President as the Commander-in-Chief under the terms of the 1945 Constitution, the institutional culture is highly distrustful of civilian leadership and regards itself as accountable to the people and Pancasila ideology rather than to the civilian government. During the "17 October Affair" of 1952, the army prominently demonstrated its opposition to what it viewed to be civilian interference in the military's internal affairs. The clearest example of the TNI institutional independence and its capability to develop its own agenda in the post-Suharto period was the 1999 East Timor crisis. Although the President had decided that a referendum should decide the future of the territory, members of the TNI acted in accordance with their ideology to preserve the unity of the state. Rather than challenge the President directly, they sought to undermine his decision by instigating tremendous amounts of violence in the region. Since then, TNI resistance to civil government initiatives has been less profound. For example, when President Wahid removed General Wiranto from power, he openly resisted, but did not resort to force and the subsequent 74-officer reshuffle was grudgingly accepted.

## Factionalism

Factionalism has plagued the TNI since its foundation as an assemblage of militant groups each with its own interests and ideology. In the Sukarno era, the factions looked to align themselves with sources of power outside the military when under threat. Later, under the strong leadership of Suharto, the factional struggles were kept within the military and external structures had little power to lend. However, in the late-Suharto era a deep split in the military emerged as factions were able to call upon ties to the Suharto family and political Islam for assistance. Following the fall of Suharto, the ouster of General Prabowo and dispersion of his faction stabilized the organization, but the TNI's chain-of-command remains weak and "rogue elements" continue to operate. This factionalism is exacerbated by a number of factors including the competition of politicians for supporters drawn from the TNI ranks, financial incentives to use covert force, the TNI's internal patronage system, and competing business interests. Factionalism in the TNI undermines professionalism by contributing to corporate inability to adequately maintain professional standards among its members.

## Maintenance of Standards

Despite the TNI's strong institutionalism and independent nature, the TNI inadequately fulfills the standards of professionalism because it insufficiently polices itself. The excessive corruption and patronage which are prevalent throughout the TNI are not just tolerated but often intrinsically endorsed by the corporate body. Unprofessional activities such as the payment of bribes for assignments are widespread. For example, recruits pay more than twenty million rupiah to enter the military, believing that the financial rewards of a military career will easily repay the "investment." Similarly, officers seek out patrons to place them in "wet" versus "dry" regions where business possibilities and profit are better. Even very serious transgressions of

professional responsibility, including refusal to obey orders, planning mutinies, and using force against civilians without authorization, rarely earn punishment greater that demotion or transfer to positions with limited political influence or poor financial opportunities. Failure to punish officers involved in the most heinous of crimes is most clearly exemplified by the fact that no officers have been formally punished for their roles in orchestrating the September 1999 violence in East Timor. In fact, many of those involved have continued to rise through the ranks. For example, Human Rights Watch notes that Major-General Mahidin Simbolon, promoted in 2001 to Regional Commander for Papua, played an significant role in the creation and direction of militias responsible for multiple attacks on civilians (*Human Rights Watch*: 2004).

### Professional Corporateness: Summary

The TNI exhibits a far stronger sense of corporate community than is required for a group to be considered a profession. In fact, the TNI officer corps' strong sense of group identity polarizes its members apart from civil society. The TNI is so fiercely independent of civil authority that professional self-regulation is the only effective mechanism for protecting the public from the excesses of military units or individuals. However, control over membership and the mechanisms to police its members and to ensure that they fulfill their professional responsibilities are weak. The high degree of factionalism and the limited actions taken to control corruption and misbehavior among officers seriously undermines accountability.

## Conclusion

Utilizing the three criteria of professionalism as a template to examine the TNI as an institution reveals a powerful, fiercely independent, but factionalized body with little expertise in military fields other than brutal repression. TNI officers have a strong sense of duty, but institutional checks on their misuse of power are weak. In the democratic era, officers have demonstrated their desire to withdraw from policymaking and practical politics, but this withdrawal should not be confused with transformation into an apolitical body. The TNI still sees itself as the guardian of Indonesia as a unitary Pancasila state and will likely intervene to counter any perceived attack on Indonesia.

Commentators on Indonesian politics frequently mention the need for the TNI to "professionalize" as a part of the reform process. A more professional military would have greater corporate cohesion, improved military expertise, and behave less out of self-interest and more out of its sense of social responsibility. This would mean less corruption and less abuse of its powers, but it would also make the TNI increasingly likely to intervene directly in politics if it perceives the unitary Pancasila state as being under threat.

If true democracy is to succeed in Indonesia, it will not be enough for the TNI to professionalize; it will also have to accept a position truly subservient to the state. For this to happen, not only must the TNI sustain its internal desire to reform, but civilian leaders must demonstrate that they have the capability to preserve the strength of Indonesia, provide for the needs of the

people, and protect the military's interests. The TNI has a genuine desire to reform itself, but will only give up its mantle of guardian of the state if it believes another body is ready and able to fulfill that responsibility.

## Notes

[1] As quoted by *Jakarta Post*, 6 Oct 1995, p. 1.

[2] The official English translation of the Indonesian Constitution is available from the Indonesian foreign ministry website http://www.deplu.go.id/

[3] A classic example of a document reflecting such doctrine is the booklet *The Indonesian Military as a Social Force and Principles of Policy in the Framework of Protecting and Improving the Integration of the Military with the People*, Department of Defense and Security, 1979.

[4] More recent publications such as Rebasa and Haseman, 2002 and Kingsbury, 2003 have described similar self-images. Personal interviews with TNI officers, Indonesian civilian leaders, and closely involved foreign observers conducted in Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Washington D.C. and Singapore between March 2002 and July 2004, confirm that these observations remain valid today.

[5] New Paradigm doctrine usually emphasizes the importance of external defense. However, given the scale of military operations in regions such as Papua, Maluku, and Aceh, demonstrate firm retention of national unity function.

[6] Interviews with TNI officers and foreign TNI observers, Yogyakarta, Bandung, Jakarta, Washington D.C., and Singapore, 2002-2004.

[7] "Kami warga Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang bersendikan Pancasila. Kami Patriot Indonesia, pendukung serta pembela Ideologi Negara, yang bertanggung jawab dan tidak mengenal menyerah."

[8] For example, in the East Java village of Karangploso, military trucks are used to haul the produce of a private quarry to market for resale. Personal observation, August 2002.

[9] The interviews were numerous and included ones with a training officer stationed in East Java (November 1995) and SESKO students (Aug 2002).

[10] TNI graduates from SESKO describe lengthy assignments which they believed they had neither the understanding of the material nor the time necessary to complete. As a result, they report having either plagiarized the work of a previous student or paid individuals from outside of the school to complete it for them.

[11] See for example, see Lowry, 1996, pp. 222-4 and "The Indonesian Military as a Social Force and Principles of Policy in the Framework of Protecting and Improving the Integration of the Military with the People " *Indonesian Armed Forces*, GlobalSecurity.org. Available: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/abri.htm 3.

[12] See for example, International Crisis Group, 2003.

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Contents Editorial Article 1 Article 2

# The Moral Imperative and the Politics of Confucianism in French Indochina: Vietnamese Strategies of Resistance, Appropriation and Transformation

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## Abstract

The subject of this paper is Confucianism as a political ideology that operated within complex strategies of assimilation, resistance and appropriation in French Indochina. Through an exploration of the ways in which Confucianism was interpreted and appropriated, by both the colonizers and the colonized, I will illustrate how morality, and claims to morality, became political currency for both French imperialist and Vietnamese nationalist and communist endeavors. Fundamental social, ideological, imperial, national and political tensions are implicit

in the vacillating and contradictory policies and attitudes vis-àvis Confucianism. Nevertheless, I maintain that the moral imperative became an indispensable part of both French imperial and Vietnamese revolutionary rhetoric.

The first half of the paper addresses imperial policies of assimilation, association, collaboration and *mise-en-valeur*, as well as Vichyite federalism and traditionalism, particularly with regard to education. I will examine these in light of their implications for Confucian institutions and ideology. The second half of the paper addresses the intersection of Confucianism with Vietnamese Communism. Continuity and symbiosis, both as ideology and as social import, are given particular emphasis.

## Introduction

The subject of this paper is a utilitarian understanding of Confucianism in the context of late 19th and early 20th century French Indochina. Through exploring the various and contradictory ways in which the Confucian ideology was employed, both by the colonizers and the colonized, I shall illustrate the processes and interests whereby claims to morality became used as political currency. The moral imperative became an indispensable part of both French imperial and Vietnamese revolutionary rhetoric as imperial apologias and communist iconoclasm. It is my contention that Confucianism in colonial Vietnam was as much a political as a moral ideology and that it became an integral part of political strategies of assimilation and exclusion - a bulwark of the status quo and a rallying call for change.

The historian of French Indochina and the 1945 Revolution, Pierre Brocheux, asserts that Ho Chi Minh was not so much a Communist or a Nationalist as a Confucian, but rather that he was a Confucian Communist and Nationalist. This brings to the fore the ambiguous and multifarious uses and meanings of "Confucianism." It is this fluidity of meaning, in its intellectual, historical and political manifestations, that has made Confucianism key to the multiple levels of power-politics associated with French colonial rule and the Vietnamese struggle for national emancipation.

Confucianism has variously been lauded and denounced by both French colonists and Vietnamese nationalists. As part of the justification for *la mission civilatrice*, or the French "civilizing mission," Confucian institutions and systems (most visibly manifested by civil-service examinations and village educational structures) were subject to hostile French policies which sought to undermine and diminish their influence. As a conservative social force and bulwark of the imperial status quo, Confucianism and the class of mandarins were appropriated and co-opted into official ideology and strategies such as "divide-and-rule" by the French ruling elite. The policies and ideas of Admiral Decoux's Vichy regime are particularly revelatory, both of existing strategies and as a reorientation of French policy which nevertheless sought many of the same goals as Republican France. Similarly, the history of Vietnamese nationalism and identity with regard to Confucian ideology, institutions and structures has always been fraught with ambiguities. Representations of Vietnamese Communism as an exercise in anti-Confucianism fail to accord with the composition of Vietnamese Communist leadership, the majority of whom

were derived from the scholar-gentry elite of Vietnamese society, who were the keepers of the Confucian canon of the Sino-Vietnamese tradition.[1] Vietnamese Communism was arguably as much in the tradition of the Vietnamese Confucian scholar-patriot as it was a reproduction of Marxist-Leninism. Through an analysis of the ways in which Confucianism was interpreted and appropriated, both by the colonizers and the colonized, a political discourse emerges that posits morality within broader strategies of political legitimacy and nation-building. Just as Confucianism and French Imperialism were not always diametrically opposed, so Confucianism and Communism could make co-operative bed-fellows.

## Confucianism and French Imperialism

The French colonial project in Southeast Asia was characterized by inherent, destabilizing contradictions which found expression in the quick turnover of official policies and ideologies over the relatively short period of French imperial rule from the mid 19th to mid 20th centuries. The educational policies of the French colonial regime, vis-à-vis policies of assimilation, association, *mise-en-valeur* and the Vichyite National Revolution, are particularly illuminating with regard to the "tensions of empire" which anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler describes as a relationship of "inclusionary impulses and exclusionary practices."[2]

Film critic and social historian Panivong Norindr writes of the discrepancies between the Enlightened ideals of the French Republic and the prerogatives of imperial France. The contradiction between the liberal aspiration to "raise all peoples to an equality of mind" and pedagogical practices predicated on exclusion were not lost on those defending French colonialism in Southeast Asia. Norindr writes: "the only solution was to provide natives ... with a different type of education, one that would not foster liberal ideas."[3] The internal contradictions of colonial education represent the self-defeating justifications of and rationales for French imperialism. Immediately following the period of conquest and pacification (1860-1890), France sought a broader, more appealing and ethically sound basis for its imperial power than physical might and international power-politics.[4] Nicola Cooper writes of the "French colonial ideal .. [as] a conception of colonial expansionism which sought to coincide and accord with Republicanism and humanitarianism, whilst simultaneously ... [renewing] French grandeur and prestige."[5] This was the ideal of *mise-en-valeur*:

> a term which connotes not only economic development ... but also the moral and cultural improvement to be wrought in the colonies ... the moral and cultural dimension stemmed from the French belief in the universal value of its civilization. [6]

This vision of an altruistic French motherland endeavoring to "share the benefits of French civilization" hinged upon a devaluation of traditional Vietnamese society and culture.[7] In this respect, the traditional Confucian mores and structures of social organization were denigrated as the source of social decline and the "thousand-year-old torpor of the Asiatic world."[8] The words of Leon Perrier, Minister of Colonies, at the 1928 inauguration of the Indochina House in Paris are particularly representative of this official discourse and its concomitant educational

strategies:

> As soon as he enters the French school-room, the young school boy has the impression of entering another world ... One speaks to him of France as a divine guardian; one liberates his soul from ancestral terrors ... communicates to him a confidence in the future and a sense of progress to replace the tedious effort at memory which had paralyzed the intellectual activity of his race.[9]

Perhaps Perrier's rhetoric can best be explained by a brief foray into Hegelian thought, a pillar of the Western "Enlightened" tradition. Here, a metaphysical chain-of-being mimics the hierarchy of civilizations and the Scottish Enlightenment to underscore an "oriental despotism" that precludes human progress and parity with European man:

> No one can take an accurate survey of the different nations of Asia ...without remarking the near approaches they make to the same stage of civilization...Of some of the oldest nations...we acquire a practical ...knowledge, by our acquaintance with a living people, who have continued on the same soil...of those ancient nations, partake of the same manners, and are placed at...the same stage in the progress of society...The sagacity of Adam Smith induced him...to deny...any high attainments among those ancient nations...The opinion by which he supports his disbelief of the ancient civilization of Asia is at once philanthropic and profound;..."despotism" is more destructive...and adverse to the progress of the human mind, than anarchy itself.[10]

In *Vietnamese Tradition on Trial*, David G. Marr argues that Confucianism and Sino-Vietnamese village schools, as the source of such "ancestral terrors," stood in the way of the *mission civilatrice*. The schools themselves were subject to concerted efforts between 1919 and 1927 to eradicate traditional educational practices.[11] This particular breed of "philanthropic" cultural imperialism, endorsed by the assimilationist *mise-en-valeur* impulse, was, however, balanced and occasionally over-ridden by more pragmatic interests. Association, a reorientation of colonial policy which intended "native customs, institutions and organization to be respected as far as possible" was officially sanctioned in 1917.[12]

However, it is my contention that this policy cannot be adequately understood divorced from its more utilitarian incarnation: collaboration. French administrative control relied significantly on the collaboration of the Vietnamese mandarin elite.[13] In this respect, the Confucian system of social hierarchy and social control was an invaluable bureaucratic resource. The potential for Confucian ideas and organization to serve as a bulwark the French imperial status quo resulted in a French language curriculum which seemed to represent contradictory objectives to "impart French cultural and behavioral norms, to reinforce Vietnamese traditional morality, and to teach students how to read basic instructions and talk properly to their colonial masters."[14]

Collaboration, then, only went so far. Collaboration was not egalitarianism. It follows that strategies vis-a-vis Confucianism became a means through which to simultaneously include the

scholar-gentry in the institutions of imperial control while maintaining the spheres of difference justifying exclusionary practices. Morality, in other words, could operate both to include and exclude. French officials invoked the threat of moral crises in order to curtail the social and political activism of Indochinese students in Paris in the 1930s and to justify their expulsion from the metropole.[15] Norindr cites the official rhetoric of the colonial department under Francois Pietri, to which, paradoxically, can be attributed the first articulation of the edifying liberal imperial aspiration to "raise all peoples to an equality of mind":

> The Indochinese who come to Europe ... undergo a rapid transformation ... When they are not content to absorb the ... education which is given them and make themselves guilty of acts against public order, it is in their interest that they be returned to their natural milieu, where familial influence and influence of their ancestral tradition can aid them to emerge from ... crisis ...[16]

The "ancestral terrors" had been transformed and reiterated as a benevolent and utilitarian "ancestral tradition." French policies monitoring the flow of Vietnamese students to the metropole vacillated from the liberality of Governor-General Varenne to the draconian restrictions of his successor, Pierre Pasquier.[17]

The emphasis on morality instruction in the 1920s is emblematic of the contradictions of French colonial policy, which translated into an ambiguous and pragmatic attitude towards traditional Confucian ideas and institutions. The Confucian concern for social mores and the emphasis on morality as the basis of social order, was heightened in the 1920s by the turbulent changes associated with colonial rule and modernity. Marr writes: "The clash between old and new, East and West, collaborator and anticolonial, rich and poor, urban and rural, was tangible, and people had no certainty about what they should do in these circumstances."[18] French imperial conquest disrupted the traditional correlation between heaven and monarch, as embodied in the "Mandate of Heaven."[19] The Confucian literati sought moral justification and an ethical framework from which to understand contemporary events.[20] The French colonial government exploited this moral disquiet through polices that embodied both ideals of assimilation and association. Appealing to those members of the literati who were disillusioned with Confucian prescriptions, the French pushed their own moral ideas onto the colonial populous by importing and translating metropolitan textbooks on *morale* to be incorporated into the colonial curriculum.[21] These policies corresponded to the civilizing mission as well as the prerogatives of association and collaboration. Those Vietnamese who welcomed Western philosophy were more easily co-opted into the French paternalistic vision.[22]

Ironically, however, assimilationist policies were promoted and carried out in ways that clearly sought justification and legitimation in Confucian terms. The French understood that the Vietnamese elite required "moral as well as material reasons for active participation."[23] The moral defense of collaboration was constructed through mimicry of Confucian paternalism: France became father, teacher and protector to the Vietnamese son who responded with filial piety, gratitude and diligence.

The Vietnamese collaborationist elite also adapted and stretched Confucian dogma to create a quasi-Confucian collaborationist morality that balanced the French pretense of virtue with the more pragmatic promise of self-interest.[24] Marr's utilitarian interpretation of the classic Confucian dichotomy of "righteousness/profit" whereby "freedom was dependent on becoming strong, wealthy and learned" speaks to the "element of calculation ... [and] qualified ... loyalty" that coloured traditional models of Confucian filial piety.[25] Regardless, the French father was not troubled by the opportunism of his children-mandarin collaboration was too important for French rule to quibble over questions of sincerity. Thus, the French acquiesced to Pham Quynh's "prescriptions of moral-educational-cultural renaissance" promoting the return to orthodox Confucian moral principles or the "national essence" (*quoc tuy*) of Vietnam.[26] Furthermore, the French colonial government cast a blind eye to the 1932-33 campaign to model Emperor Bao Dai as a Confucian moral exemplar. French tolerance might have been assisted by the campaign's cautious qualification of ultimate French authority, but might also be understood in the context of the interests of collaboration.[27]

The best, most persuasive example of the intersection of Confucian mores with the interests of the French imperial project is the Vichy regime (1940-1944). Under Marshal Petain, and his colonial administrator, Admiral Decoux, the National Revolution was transformed and reinscribed into the colonial context as a facsimile of, and companion to, traditional morality. The official motto of the Vichy regime, "*Travail, Famille, Patrie*" was promoted as a blending of Western and Eastern canons which demonstrated the "enlightened" and "rational" character of the new French administration.[28] The historian Eric T. Jennings writes of a "Machiavellian conflating of Vietnamese traditionalism and Vichyite *volkism* [which] would become a cornerstone of National Revolutionary propaganda in Indochina."[29] Collaborationist propaganda and editorials spun out reams of rhetoric promoting the harmonious symbiosis between Confucian morality and Vichyite reaction:

> The new French maxim strongly resembles a Confucian one ... is akin to the four essential duties taught by Confucius ... individual improvement, the family nucleus, the government, and the pacification of the universe. From now on, the maxim of the new France is our own.[30]

Petain, himself, became "Confucius reincarnated": the man who would be "to the West what Confucius was to the East."[31]

Vietnamese schoolchildren were encouraged to rediscover their cultural heritage through a "re-education in 'authenticity'."[32] These educational policies were part of a "Vichy-style federalism" which encouraged the teaching of the "rich folklore" of the five countries of Indochina.[33] Jennings writes: "In the realm of youth indoctrination ... Vichy planners plotted the rebirth of Khmer, Viet, and Lao cultures, closely tied in their eyes with Indian and Chinese traditions respectively."[34] Admiral Decoux's Vichy youth camps included a "new mandarin training curriculum."[35]

For all this utopian harmony between the Occidental and Oriental worlds, the underlying

motivations of the Vichy regime were the same as those of Republican France: differences of ideology were subsumed under the unifying prerogatives of Empire. Petainist policies promoting a return to traditionalism, and the conflating of Petainism as a kind of neo-Confucianism, remained within the ambit of collaboration. Vichyite "federalism" was promoted as a "third path between assimilation and association" and epitomized the culmination of French imperialism.[36] It sought, as the Vichy newspaper *l'Echo annamite* proclaimed, to provide a "moral and intellectual element" which would cement "a true collaboration between colonizers and colonized."[37] Admiral's Decoux's "native policy" was designed, through egalitarian measures which would give indigenous elite greater access to, and equality within, the bureaucratic hierarchy, to revalorize the status of notables.[38] This edified mandarin class could then serve as a vehicle for a new Petainist social order. Jennings writes that under the Vichy regime "mandarins were transformed from the scapegoats of Third Republican colonialism into the ... embodiment and conveyors of Vichy traditionalism."[39]

The smokescreen of Confucian traditionalism obscured the autocratic nature of Decoux's administration which Marr likens to that of the "colonizing French admirals of the 1860s."[40] Underlying the Vichy concern for social order and stability was the disquieting realization that they themselves had become colonized in Europe.[41] The German occupation of France and the threat of the Japanese occupation of Indochina redoubled the colonial imperative of maintaining the social order.[42] The mandarin elite and the conservatism of Confucian morality became allies in the Vichy regime's struggle to maintain a tenuous sovereignty.

The French colonial regime's changing attitudes and policies towards Confucianism and the mandarin elite illustrate the fundamental tensions of imperialism, particularly of the altruistic, humanitarian and enlightened imperialism which France-in both its Republican and Vichyite incarnations-sought to embody. The vacillating educational policies vis-à-vis Confucian institutions and ideas speak to a self-defeating attempt to square the circle of assimilation and association, denigration and valorization, and a morality of inclusion and exclusion; thus underscoring the ultimate fallacy of *mise-en-valeur* in French colonial Indochina.

## Confucianism, Vietnamese Nationalism and Communism

If Confucianism revealed the uneasy ambiguities of French colonialism, it was no less subversive for indigenous Vietnamese society. An analysis of the utility and influence of Confucian thought and institutions for the Vietnamese revolutionary and Communist movements must begin with an understanding of Vietnamese history and traditional forms of resistance. Vietnamese culture and identity are defined by the creative tensions and hybridity resulting from a history of conquest and resistance.[43] Chinese imperialism and imperial aspirations, beginning from the third century B.C. and culminating in ten centuries of Chinese rule between the Han and T'ang dynasties, are central to an understanding of Vietnamese national identity.[44] As David G. Marr asserts:

> Paradoxically, group identity may be understood best in terms of group differentiation. In other words, groups seldom ponder their commonality actively

> until faced with internal cleavage or the menace ... of outside intervention ... the historian of Vietnam is repeatedly struck by the degree to which the Vietnamese have tended to define themselves in terms of their neighbors.[45]

The creation myth of the Vietnamese people describes national descent from the progeny of a union between a dragon and a fairy.[46] Nguyen Van Ky explains in his revisionist examination of Vietnamese folklore and oral history, that this mythical union is indicative of two antithetical traditions, which he frames as the binary opposition of a Chinese patrilineal and indigenous Vietnamese matrilineal social order.[47]

These hybridities and tensions vis-à-vis the Vietnamese relationship with China are reflected in the history of Vietnamese ideas, cultural and literary forms, and in strategies of resistance. Marr's interpretation of this creation myth speaks to a recurrent and persuasive theme running throughout Vietnamese history, which is reflected in literary traditions and archetypes: "This may have been the ideal Vietnamese image of their relationship to the Chinese: dependent on the same sources ... same roots, yet with an independent history that ... gave China no right of political hegemony."[48]

Throughout the ten centuries of Chinese imperial rule, and the succeeding nine centuries of autonomy within the Chinese cultural world, Vietnam retained a remarkable degree of distinctiveness.[49] John T. McAlister and Paul Mus write of the strength of the Vietnamese "unyielding sense of ... identity":

From the very beginning and from the very depths of themselves they must have escaped from the official formalism that had been characteristic of Chinese civilization.[50]

C.P. FitzGerald argues that the separate character and identity of the Vietnamese derived in part from Chinese strategies of imperial rule which depended, not on Chinese immigration from the North, but on rule by Chinese officials. Imposing rule upon a nation of rice-farming peasants, through establishing Chinese-style institutions in Vietnam, was relatively easy and did not require Chinese imperial settlement. Therefore, although Vietnamese culture assimilated many Chinese influences, "the ethnic character of the people continued to be ... 'Viet' and they inherited and cherished that consciousness of difference in race and desire for separate nationhood."[51] The Chinese rulers found that it was more economical to permit the indigenous leaders to become landlords in the Chinese landlord-tenant model of social organization.[52] These landlords were educated in and were encouraged to adopt Chinese customs and ideas, among which Confucianism factored largely, and this allowed them to gain positions in the imperial civil service.[53] Revolts against Chinese rule, in early Vietnamese history, were seldom led by the gentry but by the peasants.[54] Thus, it was this system of absentee and delegated imperial authority that lies at the root of one of the fundamental characteristics and paradoxes of Vietnamese society, namely the traditional power and equally traditional alienation of the Sinified landlord scholar-gentry vis-à-vis the peasantry.[55] Marr argues that the appropriation of Chinese learning, and particularly of Confucian models, could be used as a weapon against their own people. Through organizing orthodoxy campaigns to uphold the "five social

relationships," Vietnamese elites sought to represent rigid Confucian hierarchies as the "natural order of human existence."[56] Their denunciations were largely politically, rather than ethically, motivated.

Confucian models and ideas, however, were not exclusively draconian influences, nor were moral codes merely a fraudulent smokescreen for bureaucratic abuses. Marr argues that the traditional elite did conceive of itself primarily in intellectual and moral terms.[57] The basis of their legitimacy and power among the peasantry was an "implied moral covenant" whereby the mandarins upheld the "soul" (*linh hon*) and "spiritual locus of society" in times of crisis.[58] It is such moral rectitude that motivated the influential minority of scholar-gentry of the early 20th century, such as Phan Boi Chau, to resist collaboration with the French ruling classes.[59] Confucianism and the Sinified scholar-gentry have therefore been variously associated with reactionary conservatism and collaboration with foreign imperial powers as well as with a patriotic concern for social reform and national virtue. Marr writes of this class of educated elite:

> Over the next few centuries [following the first century rebellion led by the Trung sisters] a hybrid elite seems to have developed, drawing heavily on Chinese culture and political precedent, yet also prone to defending its own interests rather than those of the faraway Chinese court.[60]

The founding of the Le dynasty (1428-1788 AD) illustrates the paradoxical marriage between Confucian doctrines and Vietnamese nationalism. Le Loi's 1428 proclamation which reestablished in "vigorous, aggressive prose" Vietnam's separateness from China also incorporated "most Chinese classical and imperial symbols as implicit legitimization by Le Loi of his ... new dynasty."[61] Furthermore, Le Loi chose not to obliterate the collaborator mandarin families but rather allowed them to "buy their way back from annihilation."[62] Alexander Woodside's definition of the "two traditions"[63] of the Vietnamese Nguyen monarchy is illustrative of these social contradictions and ambiguities. He argues that the Nguyen court was influenced by two streams of thought: Chinese Confucian hierarchy, as represented by an early 19th century educational primer entitled "Twenty-four Stories of Filial Piety" (*Nhi Thap Tu Hieu*); and a "mythopoeic and religious" ideology, represented by the "Anthology of the Spirits of the Departed of the Vietnamese Domain" (*Viet Dien U Linh Tap*).[64] The latter encompassed a belief in a congruity between spiritual and material worlds manifested by the transgression of these boundaries by dead heroes, the virtues of whom were expressed by contemporary Vietnamese rulers.[65] This pantheon of heroic "un-dead" included the Trung sisters, an eighth-century rebel leader who fought against T'ang Chinese rule, agrarian deities and "an early, autonomous Chinese governor of Vietnam ... who had brought higher Chinese culture to the Vietnamese people."[66] The ideal Vietnamese ruler, as conceived by this dual monarchical tradition, had to encompass characteristics of rebel, guardian of agrarian and social stability, and Confucian scholasticism.[67]

Vietnamese literary traditions and archetypes speak to the integration of Chinese culture and the ways in which Chinese Confucian models and forms, including its human manifestation in the class of scholar-gentry, were appropriated, reinscribed and transformed within discourses of

Vietnamese nationalism. Marr argues that the scholar-elite "tended to detach Chinese thoughts and practices from their original contexts ... picking and choosing whatever met their fancy as Vietnamese," thereby creating specific interpretations of, and uses for, classical thought.[68] The satiric, political poetry of Cao Ba Quat ( ... - 1854) is particularly representative of what Woodside calls a "romantic tradition in Vietnamese political literature."[69] Quat was considered to be one of the literary stars of his time and his failure to pass the metropolitan examinations attributed to an "insolent wit and skeptical individualism."[70] His verses embodied the fruitful symbiosis of Chinese Confucian and literary forms with social criticism and Vietnamese cultural resistance:

> The ideological premises of the Sino-Vietnamese bureaucracy were more likely to be assailed in Vietnam than they were in China. Yet they were often assailed, ironically, by Chinese literary references, which writers like Quat employed as political variables independent of ... their usual narrowly orthodox contents.[71]

Quat was particularly prophetic in his portrait of a true Vietnamese iconoclast, which illustrated the deep-seated and Confucian belief in the moral and social leadership of the scholar-gentry: There is a man: his appearance is wretched but he belongs to a noble family ... His mouth still smells of milk [from his mother] ... The freshness of his student's countenance is apparent; he opens his eyes, recognizes the world, and [just dares to] kick the doors of his masters. Shamelessly summoning up the courage of the vagabond, he stretches out the hand created for him to change the direction of destiny.[72]

It is this simultaneous propensity both for cultural resistance and assimilation that has most defined Vietnamese society and culture, and it is as a product of this creative tension that an understanding of Vietnamese Confucianism, not to mention Vietnamese Communism and nationalism, must be derived.

From this understanding of balanced tensions and hybridities emerges the paradoxical relationship of the Vietnamese nationalist and Communist movements with Confucian ideas, institutions and models. In many respects, these movements were antagonistic to the Confucian status quo. By the turn of the century, French administrative and educational reforms had seriously corroded the Confucian ideology and the social institutions of Vietnamese social life.[73] This decline, coupled with growing dissatisfaction with repressive colonial rule and disgust at the behavior of the "collaborator mandarins"[74] was manifested in a new generation of scholar-patriots, who, although derived from the mandarin class, rejected the past in favour of reform along Western lines.[75] This generation, of which Phan Boi Chau was the most influential[76], was influenced by the legacy of the "obdurate, militant, idealistic scholar-gentry" who had led the *Can Vuong* Movement against the incursion of French imperial power in the 1880s.[77] Phan Boi Chau's decision to choose a career in revolution over a bureaucratic career was representative of his rejection of Confucian standards of success and led him to found a revolutionary movement to create a constitutional monarchy modeled after the Japanese Meiji Restoration.[78] Woodside notes that a Vietnamese proverb reads: "If one man becomes an official, his whole lineage can depend upon him."[79] In 1938, the Vietnamese novelist Khai

Hung's critique of the traditional Vietnamese family was published entitled "The Family" (*Gia Dinh*).[80] The family, as an integral part of the Confucian social order, represented the proper relationship between state and subject; to attack the family then, was to undermine the very basis of political power and legitimacy, i.e. the collaborationist Hue court.[81] Peter Zinoman, in his analysis of the significance of the prison experience for the emergence of Vietnamese nationalism and communism, writes of the phenomenon embodied by the verse "fortune lost, family dispersed" (*tang gia bai san*).[82] Prisoners, who had been forced to leave their families and wives, experienced a very literal family betrayal when their wives abandoned their marriages to live with other men.[83] This, together with other social forces at work in the prisons contributed, in the inter-war years, to a broad-based social movement rejecting the traditional family.[84] Collective imprisonment, Zinoman argues, was a great catalyst for the activism and iconoclasm of the years leading up to the revolution.[85]

It is important, however, not to take this anti-Confucianism at face value, or to deny the part that Confucian ideology and traditions played in early Vietnamese resistance. Part of the potency and strength of feeling characteristic of the "first" generation of scholar-patriots at the turn of the century was derived from their intimate knowledge and absorption of Confucianism. For although, as Marr articulates, Confucian dogmatism and traditionalism was not "the regime most conducive to a 'soft entry' into the twentieth century," the political character of the doctrine intensified dissatisfaction with colonial dominance:

> Confucianism being perhaps the most politically oriented of any historic world doctrine. Man's strengths and weaknesses as a political animal were abundantly evident to readers of the classics ... With servitude staring them in the face, they began searching actively outside their own traditions for alternative methods and ideas ... [86]

Furthermore, the prerogatives of moral leadership among the scholar-gentry motivated resistance and opposition. The decisions made by leaders of the *Can Vuong* Movement are representative in this regard, as these were not a repudiation of Confucian social values and conservatism but, rather, Confucian decisions:

> But mandarins choosing to fight ... retained the monarchist ideal and ... the confidence that they were neither betraying their forefathers nor leaving a besmirched reputation for their descendants ... they had to make agonizing Confucian choices between staying behind to protect family tombs and elderly parents and sallying forth to defend king and country, a choice that in itself would advance the development of modern patriotic norms.[87]

As the well-known story of Nguyen Trai-who begged to follow his mandarin father into servitude in China, but was instructed to stay at home to protect his country-attests, to save one's country is also virtuous.[88]

Thus, the emergence of organized Vietnamese resistance and political movements in the 1920s

must be understood within this wider tradition, in which Confucianism factored largely. The petty bourgeois intelligentsia, from which sprung the seeds of the revolution, was largely composed of people whose family histories reflected the tradition of mandarin resistors.[89] Anti-French nationalist organizations, such as the *Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang* (VNQDD) in Tonkin, and the *Tan Viet* (New Revolutionary Party) in Annam, drew its support from this traditional elite.[90] However, by the mid-1920s, these nationalist groups had largely become ineffectual due to internal fractures and division. Historian William J. Duiker argues that although part of the problem lay in the legacy of bureaucratic interest groups and secret societies, more serious was the disintegration of Vietnamese national identity which accompanied the collapse of Confucian institutions. The erosion of Confucianism cut the emotional bonds that had traditionally tied intellectuals with the rural masses, thereby undermining the ability of first generation urban nationalists to create broad-based anti-colonial alliances premised on a unifying common ideology.91

Perhaps no other learned the lessons from the failures of the Vietnamese nationalist movement so well as Ho Chi Minh.92 Known in his earlier years as Nguyen Sinh Cung, Ho Chi Minh recognized the importance of ideology, and specifically moral ideology, for successful revolution.93 He understood that when the opportunity arose again for another attempt at emancipation, it would be ideology, a moral imperative allied to revolutionary utility, that would be decisive.

Ho Chi Minh was, like many before him, a product of the scholar-gentry class.94 His father had been an official in the imperial bureaucracy during the early years of French rule. However, his dislike for the "slavish" relationship of the Hue court caused him to leave this position and become an itinerant scholar.95 Ho Chi Minh's father's novel and reformatory attitudes towards the Confucian canon underscored an unorthodox education for his son which favoured the "inner ethical content of Confucian philosophy" over formal study of the classics.96 This was supplemented by patriotic stories recounting the exploits of Vietnamese historic heroes.97 Duiker argues that these formative influences had a large impact upon Ho Chi Minh's world-view and would come to factor largely in his particular breed of Marxist-Leninism.

The Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League (*Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi*) had as its primary objective, not the realization of a Communist society, but the creation of a mass nationalist party which derived its support from all progressive classes in Vietnam.98 The League, in its publications and pamphlets, attempted to appeal to Vietnamese nationalism and to the scholar-gentry elite as its motivating force.99 Communism, was arguably, a means to an end. It was the potential of Marxist-Leninist ideology, which Ho Chi Minh found in reading Lenin's "Thesis on the National and Colonial Questions" to provide the unifying ideology necessary for a successful bid for nationhood, that motivated the rise of the Vietnamese Communist movement.[100]

Communism, however, did not and could not erase the legacy of Vietnamese social patterns and ideas that were, in many ways, a product of creative tensions and hybridities vis-à-vis China and its ideological export, Confucianism. Duiker draws parallels between the Chinese and

Vietnamese Revolutions:

The comparison with China is irresistible and persuasive: The early leaders of the CCP were most likely to be intellectuals descended from rural scholar-gentry families, while those of the rival Kuomintang tended to come from commercial families lacking a traditional Confucian background.[101]

Similarly, over ninety percent of members of the League were from the urban petty bourgeoisie and a high percentage of the leadership were, like Ho Chi Minh, from families with strong Confucian traditions.[102] This trend can be understood in geographical terms as the majority of early Vietnamese Communists were from provinces in the Center or the North where the Confucian cultural heritage remained stronger than in the Westernized and commercialized South.[103]

How, then, to reconcile this strong and pervasive Confucian influence with the rise of Vietnamese Communism ... Ostensibly, Marxism and Confucianism are antithetical traditions:

> Where Confucianism is built on a ... static conception of human society, Marxism is dynamic and ... progress-oriented; where Confucianism deprecate[s] material wealth as an obstacle to ... ethical standards, Marxism glorifies the productive process and views man as a natural creator; where Confucianism is fundamentally hierarchical ... Marxism is ... egalitarian ... [104]

One rationale is that it is precisely the anti-Confucian character of Marxism that was the source of its appeal among the young off-spring of the mandarin class who had witnessed the failure of Confucian systems to prevent French imperialism as well as the collusion of the mandarin bureaucracy with the colonial regime.[105] Marr writes that those intellectuals who responded to "proletarianization" were "not only following Comintern encouragement but also trying to prove that their bourgeois and feudal upbringing could be thrust aside."[106]

However these ostensible antagonisms belie a number of ways in which the ideologies are similar and mutually reinforcing. Confucianism shares with Communism a monotheistic vision of a single truth articulated through "quasi-sacred texts," the concept of "an anointed elite" charged with leading the masses through political and intellectual indoctrination, an emphasis on individual morality and service to society, the subordination of the individual to community, the belief that material gain should be subordinated to uplifting goals (rather than the motivating objective of human endeavour), and finally, a fundamental faith in the capacity of human nature for self-improvement.[107] Thus, a static interpretation of Confucianism is, perhaps, misleading. Destiny, or the "Way of Heaven" (*Dao Troi*), could be an active force as much as a stabilizing and conservative one.[108] The Confucian superior man, possessing the capacity to understand the Way, could and should influence the temporal and cosmological reality.[109] To quote Mencius, "there would always be times of revolt."[110] Duiker has also observed, "it is an easier step from Confucianism to Marxism than to capitalism, to a community-oriented socialist society than to one constructed on a libertarian, individualist basis."[111]

Perhaps, then the leap from Confucianism to Marxist-Communism was not so great as it might seem. It is possible to see other parallels between the two, in the processes of absorption, assimilation and transformation of Marxist ideology into the Vietnamese context. Just as Confucian forms and institutions were adapted to Vietnamese uses, as with the orthodoxy campaigns of the scholar-gentry landlords or the subversive poetry of Cao Ba Quat, Ho Chi Minh adapted and reinscribed Marxist thought within Vietnamese models, in which Confucianism remained an important part. Duiker even goes so far as to argue that Vietnamese Marxism was "a type of reformed Confucianism":

> a Confucianism adapted to modern conditions, a dynamic new ideology dedicated broadly to ideals that had animated the philosophy of the old Master, but more scientific and ... revised to meet the challenges and possibilities of the modern era. [112]

In order to assess the persuasiveness of this argument it is useful to compare and contrast the ways in which Ho Chi Minh's brand of Communism differed from Soviet Marxist-Leninism. To begin with, Ho Chi Minh's ideal revolutionary was not the nihilistic anarchist of Nechaev, whose "catechism of a revolutionary" was admired by Lenin and became the bible of the Bolshevik Party:

> For where Nechaev assumed that contemporary standards of morality had little relevance to the revolutionary code of conduct, Ho Chi Minh assumed that a revolutionary code need not do violence to traditional Confucian morality ... except for ... reference to the Party, Ho's commandments could easily be accepted in any devout Confucian home.[113]

Vietnamese Communism also differed from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy in its emphasis on the role of the peasantry in the revolutionary alliance.[114] While Ho Chi Minh did not formally depart from Leninist orthodoxy which advocated a "worker-peasant" alliance, Ho's version of the alliance did not discriminate between the "leading force" and "vanguard status" of the proletariat and the "basic force" and subordinate role of the peasant.[115] Given the overwhelmingly rural character of Vietnamese society, a revolution based primarily on the efforts of the proletariat was untenable.[116] The greater emphasis on the alliance between the leadership corps and the peasants correspond to Confucian models of social order and attitudes about the rural and peasant class:

> The Vietnamese village by its very rusticity had been an inviolable sanctuary of the nation. It was not that each village was capable of resisting individually. But these villages were found everywhere ... Vietnam is ... a way of being and living whose expression and means of expansion are the village.[117]

The exalted status which Ho Chi Minh attributed to the peasant population also implied a greater need for a unifying, populous ideology which would appeal to both urban and rural

constituents: "good leadership of the guerilla movement by the party of the proletariat is only possible if the latter possesses influence over the peasants, and if the peasants accept its slogans and struggle to realise them."[118] Ho Chi Minh's Communism was specifically adapted to appeal to the Confucian value-hierarchies and political models which remained influential among the Vietnamese peasantry.

Finally, it is interesting to realize the degree to which Ho Chi Minh himself conformed to both the romantic Vietnamese archetype of the young scholar-patriot (which was itself a product of Confucian influence) and the formal Confucian ideal of the "superior man" (*chun tzu*, in Chinese; *quan tu*, in Vietnamese):

> Ho Chi Minh projected all the desirable qualities in Confucian ethics: rectitude, probity, sincerity, modesty, courage, and self-sacrifice. To impressionable young Vietnamese intellectuals disgusted with the hypocrisy, corruption, cowardice, and greed ... in colonial society, Ho Chi Minh was the rare exception, the "superior man" in the broadest sense.[119]

Arguably, Ho Chi Minh exploited this image of the Confucian master in order to reinforce his appeal among the scholar-gentry and among the peasantry whose role in the revolution he gave much prominence. For instance, his textbook on Marxist revolutionary doctrine, "The Road to Revolution" included a section on the proper behavior of a revolutionary which corresponded to Confucian moral and social standards.[120] In this way, Confucian moral exhortation was utilized as a revolutionary tool. Like the first-generation of scholar-gentry anti-collaborators, Ho Chi Minh understood that "individual moral principle ... existed as a political force."[121] Duiker concludes that among the early leaders of Vietnamese Communism, the "moral imperative of serving the Vietnamese nation in its hour of crisis appears to have been the crucial factor."[122]

## Conclusion

Confucianism in Vietnam cannot be divorced from the political sphere. Wielded by both the colonizers and the colonized, Confucian ideas, institutions, and the class of elite which was most closely associated with it, became integral to strategies of political legitimacy, power and control. French imperialism and Vietnamese nationalism and communism co-opted and adapted Confucianism to political uses: morality became Machiavellian. The particular potency of a primarily moral ideology speaks to both the character and traditions of the Vietnamese people-for whom political legitimacy was located in the moral sphere of the Confucian social order-as well as to the persuasiveness of the moral imperative over purely imperialistic or nationalistic imperatives. The alliance of Confucianism with both of these became an irresistible political force.

## Notes

[1] William Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power In Vietnam*, Second Edition Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1996, p.25

[2] Ann Laura Stoler, "Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia" *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, p. 198

[3] Panivong Norindr, *Phantasmatic Indochina - French Colonial Ideology in Architecture, Film, and Literature*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996, p.44

[4] Nicola Cooper, *France in Indochina, Colonial Encounters*. Oxford, New York: Berg, 2001, p.11

[5] ibid, p.16

[6] ibid, p.29

[7] ibid, p.22

[8] Norindr, op. cit., p.31

[9] ibid, p.42

[10] James Mill, *History of British India*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975, pp.248-250

[11] David G. Marr, *Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981, p.34

[12] Cooper, op. cit., p.19

[13] Marr, op. cit., p.67

[14] ibid, p.36

[15] Norindr, op. cit., p.46

[16] ibid, p.46

[17] Marr, op. cit., p.40

[18] ibid, p.55

[19] ibid, p.60

[20] ibid. p.60

[21] ibid, p.55

[22] ibid, p.61

[23] ibid, p.63

[24] ibid, p.64

[25] ibid, p.64

[26] ibid, p.55

[27] ibid, p.69

[28] Eric T. Jennings, *Vichy in the Tropics: Petain's Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe and Indochina, 1940-1944*. Stanford University Press, 2001, p.151

[29] ibid, p.151

[30] ibid, p.151

[31] ibid, p.52

[32] ibid, p.193

[33] ibid, p.193

[34] ibid, p.196

[35] ibid, p.169

[36] ibid, p.180

[37] ibid, p.180

[38] ibid, p.167, p.171

[39] ibid, p.168

[40] David G. Marr, *Vietnam 1945 - The Quest For Power*. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1995, p.72

[41] Jennings, op. cit., p.181

[42] Marr, *Vietnam 1945 - The Quest For Power*, p.29

[43] John T. McAlister, Jr. and Paul Mus, *The Vietnamese and Their Revolution*. New York, Evanston and London: Harper Torchbooks, 1970, p..51

[44] Alexander Barton Woodside, *Vietnam and the Chinese Model - A Comparative Study of Nguyen and Ch'ing Civil Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971, I.

[45] David G. Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p.7

[46] Don Luce and John Sommer, *Viet Nam - The Unheard Voices*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969, p.25

[47] Nguyen Van Ky "Rethinking the Status of Vietnamese Women in Folklore and Oral History" *Viet-Nam Expose - French Scholarship on Twentieth-Century Vietnamese Society*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2002, pp.90-91

[48] Marr, *Vietnamese Tradition on Trial*, op. cit.

[49] Woodside, op. cit., p.7

[50] McAlister and Mus, op. cit., p.50

[51] FitzGerald, op. cit., p.22

[52] ibid, p.22

[53] ibid, p.22

[54] ibid, p.22

[55] ibid, p.22

[56] Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925*, p.20

[57] ibid, p.82

[58] ibid, p.83

[59] ibid, p.83

[60] ibid, p.10

[61] ibid, p.15

[62] ibid, p.15

[63] Woodside, op. cit., p.9

[64] ibid, p.12

[65] ibid, p.12

[66] ibid, p.12

[67] ibid, p.12

[68] Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925*, p.18

[69] Woodside, op. cit., p.229

[70] ibid, p.225

[71] ibid, p.228

[72] ibid, p.229

[73]Duiker, op. cit., p.7

[74] Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925*, p.96

[75] Duiker, op. cit., p.7

[76] ibid, p.7

[77] Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925*, p.48

[78] Duiker, op. cit., p.8

[79] Woodside, op. cit., p.38. Woodside gives the following gloss for this proverb in note 72, p. 391: "*Mot nguoi lam quan, ca ho duoc nho*."

[80] ibid p.42

[81] ibid, p.37

[82]Peter Zinoman, *The Colonial Bastille - A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862-1940*, p.124

[83] Peter Zinoman, *The Colonial Bastille - A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862-1940*, p.124

[84] ibid, p.124

[85] ibid, p.131

[86] ibid, p.132

[87] Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925*, p.97

[88] ibid, p.48

[89] Marr, *Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945*, p.333. According to this story, Nguyen Trai, having begged to follow his mandarin father into servitude in China, in the early 15th century, was instructed to stay and help save his country, and thus also revenge his father.

[90] Duiker, op. cit., p.9

[91] ibid, p.11

[92] ibid, p.13

[93] ibid, p.14

[94] ibid, p. 14

[95] ibid, p.14

[96] ibid, p.14

[97] ibid, p.14

[98] ibid, p.14

[99] ibid, p.18

[100] ibid, p.18

[101] ibid, p.16

[102] ibid, p.25

[103] ibid, p.25

[104] ibid, p.25

[105] ibid, p.25

[106] ibid, p.26

[107] Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925*, p. 334

[108]Duiker, op. cit., p.26

[109] Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925*, p.354

[110] ibid, p.354

[111] ibid, p.67

[112] Duiker, op. cit., p.27

[113] ibid, pp.26-27

[114] ibid, p.28

[115] ibid, p.20

[116] ibid, p.20

[117] ibid, p.23

[118] McAlister and Mus, op. cit., p.50

[119] ibid, p.22

[120] ibid, p.22

[121] ibid, p.27

[122] Marr, *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925,* p.83

[123] Duiker, op. cit., p.29

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