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Introduction

For Chinese intellectuals, the years immediately before and after 1919 represented an exciting period of change. The most influential individuals of this era called for a new literature, a new system of thought, and a new orientation toward modern life. Commonly known as the New Culture Movement, this intellectual momentum spilled beyond China into the overseas Chinese communities. The Chinese residents of Singapore, in particular, became increasingly caught up in intellectual currents coming from the mainland.

At this time, Singapore's most active forum for the discussion of new ideas was the newspaper. This is not surprising in that the newspaper industry in Singapore had already enjoyed a long and rich history. In fact, some of the earliest Chinese language newspapers were printed there. During the 1920s, Singapore's newspapers actively promoted a "new culture" for the Chinese people. For this reason, some scholars view the New Culture Movement in Singapore as a reflection, or even an imitation, of the New Culture Movement in mainland China. While there are many similarities between the movements in China and in Singapore, there are also some
very distinct differences. These similarities and differences can in part be explained using the
concept of a diaspora community. An analysis of the history, organization, and contents of
Singapore's newspapers not only provides a better understanding of the intellectual contours of
the New Culture Movement as a whole, but also demonstrates the applicability of the
movement's ideas in an overseas environment.

The May Fourth Incident and the New Culture Movement

China historians have provided many definitions of the New Culture Movement. Most scholars
believe the movement is inextricably tied to the May Fourth Incident of 1919.[1] On that day
approximately 5,000 students descended on Peking to demonstrate against the Versailles Peace
Conference. The day's events included marching, the shouting of slogans, and eventually the
ransacking and burning of the house of foreign minister Ts'ao Ju-lin. Demonstrators
participated in similar protests throughout the nation, and the "May Fourth Incident" quickly
assumed increased significance. Since these protests were prompted by many of the ideas that
would later be manifest in the New Culture Movement, namely anti-imperialism, cultural
rejuvenation, and independence, the May Fourth Incident and the New Culture Movement are
difficult to separate.

Multiple factors led to the May Fourth Incident. During World War I, Japan took advantage of
Germany's predicament in Europe and occupied German-held territories in China and the
Pacific. China, in the throes of warlord politics and civil war, was in no position to counter
Japan's territorial claims. In fact, the government in Peking, which at the time was controlled by
Japan-educated officials, "gladly agreed" to Japan's claims in exchange for a loan of 20 million
yen from Tokyo.

While attending the peace treaty at the end of the war, China's delegates assumed that Wilsonian
ideals would help them to re-acquire control over those territories occupied by the Japanese.
Japan's delegates, on the other hand, believed that the various secret treaties they had signed
with the European powers would ensure their continued dominance in China. In the end,
Japan's realpolitik triumphed over China's faith in the principles of democracy and self-
determination. Japan, the European powers decided, would retain control over those parts of
China it had occupied during the war.

The popular response in China was swift and impressive. On 4 May 1919, thousands of students
protested the decision. The target of their anger was China's foreign minister Ts'ao Ju-lin.
Carrying placards that read "international justice" and "down with the traitors," the crowd
marched first to T'ien-an-men, and then to the home of Ts'ao. After finding that Ts'ao had
escaped, the group assaulted one of his house guests. Unbeknownst to the attackers, their victim
was Chang Tsung-hsiang, the Chinese official responsible for "gladly agreeing" to Japan's
demands. In the end, the government arrested thirty-two students, but following tremendous
public outcry, they were released.

The Singapore reaction to these events was profound. Chinese living in the city commiserated
with the protesters in Peking and responded to the call of their compatriots on the mainland. Singapore’s newspapers took action by printing news of boycott activities in China, inciting the local population to take similar action. Plans for Singapore’s boycott were made in secret, with wealthier Chinese immigrants taking the lead and encouraging their fellow residents to avoid anything Japanese. Not only did the boycott leaders urge local consumers to reject Japanese products, but they also encouraged all Chinese workers in Japanese factories or businesses to quit their jobs. When necessary, boycott organizers used intimidation and threats to convince others to honor the boycott. A popular method of "persuasion" was the anonymous letter. One such letter was reprinted in the Singapore Free Press. It read:

Dear Sir:

We know that at the Paris Peace Conference our foreign delegates announced their failures. We overseas Chinese deeply fear that from this point, it will not be long until our nation is destroyed. The students' indignation and the businessmen's boycott are [each] fine examples of a patriotic activity on the part of our countrymen. You are part of the Chinese people. We believe that you must endorse our tactics. A few days ago we already informed you that you should resign [yourself] to the boycott. But till now you still have not listened. We are giving you a last warning, limiting you to less than one week to comply. If not, in the future we will use ruthless measures to oppose you. [We] hope you accept our warning. Otherwise, in the future we will use blood to report to you.[2]

Such methods naturally incited the local population, and Singapore became a simmering pot of antagonism and suspicion which finally boiled over on 19 June 1919.[3] That night at about 8:30, a group of students broke into the business of a Chinese merchant and demolished all Japanese merchandise in the store. Their brashness only provoked others to join in, and soon students and workers were destroying much of the surrounding neighborhood. Eventually merchandise and property of all kinds, Japanese or otherwise, was ruined by the ever-increasing crowd. Even a neighboring brothel was set ablaze, adding to the already emotionally-heated atmosphere. "The mob," the Straits Times reported, "made bonfires in the middle of the roads, and with the air filled with piercing screams and shouts, scenes of wild confusion reigned. Gangs of Chinese rowdies entered the brothels in Tan Quee Lan Street...and persuaded the women to assist them in throwing Japanese articles into the street where they were smashed up by the crowd."[4] Residents of the neighborhood, hoping to avoid further destruction to their property, took it upon themselves to throw their own wares into the street.

As the crowd traveled from house to house in search of their targeted products, the police attempted to control the situation. In the ensuing scuffle, the demonstrators pushed four policemen into the surrounding flames, killing two of them. Another officer fired into the crowd, causing a momentary dispersal, but by no means dissuading the protesters. By 3:00 in the morning the throng still consisted of approximately two-hundred people.

Although at one point some local Japanese youths emerged to confront the rioters, most
Japanese residents remained locked up in their homes, fearing to open their doors. One group of older Japanese women took shelter in a local museum. Amazingly, by night's end not one Japanese resident had been killed.

Eventually, the Governor called on the sailors of the warship "Manchester" for support. They began to patrol the city, and by the early morning hours the riot petered out. In its wake lay several thousands of dollars of damage. Four individuals had been killed, two Chinese and two Indians. There were at least eight serious casualties, and over 130 arrests.

Like the May Fourth Incident in Peking, the demonstrators in Singapore were motivated by many of the same concerns that influenced the next decade. For the following several years, both of these protests provided inspiration for a wide variety of social and political movements. In fact, some historians refer to the years immediately surrounding 1919 not as the era of the New Culture Movement, but as the May Fourth period.[5] Regardless of their terminology, most scholars find it difficult to separate the larger intellectual movement of the 1920s from the specific incidents of 1919.

Actually, the Singapore New Culture Movement extended beyond the 1920s, including the years between 1919 and 1933. Not only was 1919 the year of these important protests, but it was also the year the editors of the newspaper Hsin Kuo Min Jih Pao (New People's Daily) first printed their influential literary supplement, the Hsin Kuo Min Tsa Chih (New People's Magazine). For the next 14 years, this supplement, and others like it, called for a new culture for the Singapore Chinese. The ideas of this and other similar publications retained public attention until the late 1920s and early 1930s. By this time British authorities in Singapore became more domineering in their control of the press, and the newspaper industry became increasingly censored. Consequently, by 1933 the New Culture Movement in Singapore had come to an end.

The Singapore Chinese as a "diaspora"

Analyzing Singapore's newspapers does not simply provide a textual supplement to the study of China's New Culture Movement. Singapore's New Culture Movement existed within a very different context than in China. Despite the fact that many of the residents of "Nan-yang" (or the "South Seas") spoke, ate, and dressed similarly to their relatives on the mainland, it would be inaccurate to refer to them as "Chinese." I believe the Singapore community can be more usefully analyzed as members of a "diaspora" community.

Recently, scholars have helped define and clarify the concept of a diaspora. For example, James Clifford suggests that members of a diaspora maintain such characteristics as:

1. dispersal from one center to at least two peripheries,

2. a "memory" of the homeland,
3. a belief that they will never be fully accepted in the host country,

4. a belief in returning to their ancestral home,

5. a commitment to the maintenance of their homeland, and

6. group consciousness and solidarity.[6]

Clifford goes on to explain that not all diaspora groups maintain each of these characteristics but usually maintain at least a few.

Helpful to understanding diaspora communities are the recent works of individuals such as Paul Gilroy and Homi Bhabha. These scholars suggest that neither "culture" nor "tradition" constitute the essence of an unchanging national identity. As Gilroy explains, "Tradition [is] a way of conceptualizing the fragile communicative relationships across time and space that are the basis not of diaspora identities but of diaspora identifications. Reformulated thus, [tradition] points not to a common content for diaspora cultures but to evasive qualities that make inter-cultural, trans-national diaspora conversations between them possible."[7] These "identifications," Gilroy suggests, are the result of contested and negotiated socio-cultural processes.[8] Furthermore, these are ongoing processes, which are informed by societal and discursive relations of power. For these reasons, some of Gilroy's associates have labeled him an "anti-antiessentialist."[9] The diaspora, for Gilroy, is in a constant state of flux, yet persistently there. It is, in Gilroy's words, the "changing same."

Bhabha's ideas in many ways complement those of Gilroy. In *The Location of Culture*, Bhabha develops the notion of "hybridity," which is "neither the One nor the Other but something else besides, which contests the terms and territories of both."[10] The hybrid, for Bhabha, is not simply a combination of its constituent parts, but is something new that articulates the contradictions between them. He goes on to explain that the nation is "a liminal signifying space that is internally marked by the discourses of minorities, the heterogeneous histories of contending peoples, antagonistic authorities and tense locations of cultural difference."[11]

For the Chinese in Singapore, this "discourse of minorities" was especially acute, leading to the formation of a hybrid that was "neither the One nor the Other but something else besides." Instead, the Singapore Chinese can be most accurately defined as members of a diaspora community. Interestingly, during this period the Singapore Chinese referred to themselves as hua-ch'iao, or overseas sojourners. Wang Gungwu has explained that the term hua-ch'iao eventually applied to all overseas groups, regardless of their dialect, class, family, or village background.[12] The experience of displacement and marginalization, he suggests, was sufficient to forge a community consciousness strong enough to overcome, at times, other more divisive factors.

In short, studying the New Culture Movement in Singapore does not simply provide a textual
supplement to the mainland movement, for the "new culture" of the Singapore Chinese was both similar to and different from the "new culture" of the mainland Chinese. Thus, an understanding of these similarities and differences will illuminate the intellectual concerns of both the New Culture Movement as a whole, as well as those of the diaspora community of the 1920s and 30s.

**Singapore's newspapers during the New Culture Movement**

Newspapers have long been an important aspect of the Singapore community. With the arrival of the British in 1819, publishers began disseminating Western style newspapers throughout the city. From meager beginnings, the industry grew to involve not only the English-speaking population, but eventually Chinese, Malay, and Tamil segments of the population as well. Not surprisingly, newspapers played an active role in Singapore's New Culture Movement.

By the time of the New Culture Movement, Chinese language newspapers had a significant audience. Higher literacy rates, a growing Chinese population, and improved typesetting techniques made the newspapers of this period accessible to more people than ever before. As writers began using more punctuation, men and women with lower levels of education could read the newspaper with less difficulty. At the same time, journalists attempted to reach a greater number of people, which should be expected, since many of the newspapers of this era intentionally sought to educate the common man. As a result, stories dealing with education, prostitution, commerce, and other day-to-day themes became common. Corresponding with this growing audience came a growth in the number of newspapers. In 1918 there were four major Chinese language newspapers in the city. By 1933, five additional newspapers had appeared with a combined circulation of over 30,000. Such growth represented a nearly 400% increase in readers over this 14 year period.

In addition to new papers and readers, Singapore's news editors experimented with increased coverage. Whole sections were added to each paper, focusing on topics from entertainment, to sports and finance. By far the most important addition was the fu-chang, or "supplement." Actually, Singapore's first "supplement" appeared in 1907, and throughout the 1920s, each major paper introduced similar inserts. Sometimes, a particular literary club would rent the use of a newspaper's printing equipment to produce its own fu-chang, and consequently, the tie between it and the sponsoring newspaper was tenuous. Other times, the fu-chang was directly under the control of the newspaper's editorial board. Between 1919 and 1938 dozens of such inserts appeared in Singapore's newspapers, containing, among other things, short stories, poetry, and translations of various foreign works. Naturally, these supplements were able to influence the course of literary reform throughout the New Culture Movement. At the same time, since many of the contributed essays, poems, and stories discussed current social and political problems, these periodicals affected more than just literature.

In order to understand the significant role newspapers and their supplements played throughout the New Culture Movement, it is necessary to have some understanding of the various publications of the period. While they shared many characteristics, each newspaper had a unique function in the propagation of the "new culture" of its time.
The *Le Pao* (Singapore News)

The first commercial Chinese language newspaper in Singapore, the *Le Pao* (Singapore News), was founded in 1881 by Su Yu-li, a pioneer in the Singapore community.[15] Despite lagging circulation numbers, Su remained committed to providing news for the Chinese-speaking community. His early editions were a collection of imperial rescripts, reprints from other Chinese and English language papers, local government announcements, advertisements, and short stories of "hearsay" or gossip.[16] The *Le Pao* generally presented a pro-Chinese, conservative point of view, and throughout its history, the paper was never targeted for censorship by either the reigning government in China or the colonial authorities in Singapore.

The *Le Pao*’s circulation was never extensive, leading some to believe that Su maintained the paper more for its social and political value rather than its financial potential.[17] Su was a local-born resident well-connected within both the Chinese and English communities. By managing and financing a newspaper, he was able to pose as both an educator as well as a power-broker within Singapore.

Despite its conservative stance, the *Le Pao* introduced innovations that would later become extremely important in the course of the New Culture Movement. In 1907, the *Le Pao* became the first Chinese newspaper to offer a fu-chang (known simply as the *Le Pao* Fu Chang, or "Singapore News Supplement"). This fu-chang carried folk stories, poems, "farcical writings" and other humorous works, as well as advertisements, imperial rescripts, and other information that previously was placed in the main portion of the newspaper. Perhaps because the attachment was not considered part of the serious news section, many of the writings were in the Kuang-tung and Fu-chien dialects, as opposed to the official Mandarin of most Chinese newspapers. The *Le Pao* Fu Chang was published for sixteen years, making it one of the longest running inserts in Singapore's newspaper history.

This first supplement served as a model for other similar ventures of the 1920s, and while later *Le Pao* inserts were not always as progressive as those of other papers, they still deserve much of the credit for inspiring Singapore's New Culture Movement. In 1923 the original *Le Pao* Fu Chang was replaced by a newer version entitled the *Le Pao* Chü Le Pu (Singapore News Club, or Chü Le Pu). The Chü Le Pu contained both old and new style literature, as well as translations of foreign works. Through these translations, the Chü Le Pu helped introduce new political and literary ideas into the Singapore community.

Building on the success of the Chü Le Pu, the *Le Pao* launched other literary supplements. One of these, the Hsing Kuang (Starlight), became an active voice in the crusade against "feudalism."[18] Founded in 1925 by T'an Yun-shan, the Hsing Kuang served as a forum for the ideas of his literary club. In reality, the Hsing Kuang had little to do with the *Le Pao* other than using the newspaper's printing equipment for the production of an independent and free-spirited public forum.
By 1928 the Le Pao management was ready to unveil another supplement. However, instead of simply allowing an outside literary group to use its presses, the editors of the Le Pao decided to create an insert themselves. The resulting literary page, entitled Yeh Lin (Coconut Grove), was one of the first fu-chang published directly under the auspices of a newspaper editorial board. [19] The Yeh Lin occupied a full sheet of newspaper and was printed daily. Although this fu-chang was published for only two years, this accounted for 406 issues.[20] As such, the Yeh Lin provided more space for various writers to display their work than had ever before been possible. Furthermore, the editors of the Yeh Lin rejected clippings or abridgments from other mainland papers, choosing instead to reserve space for the original work of Singapore writers. These policies made the Yeh Lin an influential forum in the community.

### Table 1 Literary Fu-chang (supplements) of the Le Pao[21]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fu-chang</th>
<th>Years</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Le Pao Fu Chang (Le Pao Supplement)</td>
<td>1907-1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Pao Chü Le Pu (Le Pao Club)</td>
<td>1923-1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsing Kuang (Starlight)</td>
<td>1925-1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeh Lin (Coconut Grove)</td>
<td>1928-1930</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Kuo Min Jih Pao/Hsin Kuo Min Jih Pao (New People's Daily)**

Although the Le Pao was the first successful Chinese newspaper in Singapore, it was certainly not the only one. In 1914, Ch'en Hsin-cheng, a newsman from Penang, decided to establish a new daily in Singapore. His paper, the Kuo Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), became very popular as the news-hungry community sought information from the war front. By 1918 it had a circulation of approximately 2,000. Immediately following the May Fourth Incident of 1919, the paper strongly advocated the boycotting of Japanese products. Fearing that the newspaper added to public unrest, the local British authorities shut down the Kuo Min Jih Pao. One month later it resumed publication, but changed its name to the Hsin Kuo Min Jih Pao (New People's Daily). This "new" paper not only survived this trying period, but by 1930 had built a circulation of over 5,400, and eventually peaked at over 8,000 copies.[22] Like nearly all newspapers during World War II, Japanese occupation authorities forced the Hsin Kuo Min Jih Pao to suspend publication. Following the war, its editors never resumed operations.

In the first edition of the Hsin Kuo Min Jih Pao the editor announced the creation of a literary insert, the Hsin Kuo Min Tsa Chih (New People's Magazine). This fu-chang was only the first of several such attachments that would accompany the newspaper over the next decade. Although the Hsin Kuo Min Tsa Chih was not the first supplement in Singapore, it was innovative and progressive. As early as 1919 its editors began publishing experimental literature known as pai-hua. Pai-hua writers avoided the use of classical forms and vocabulary, opting instead for more vernacular language. Their goal was to make the written language accessible to the masses, or in other words, to "democratize" literature. The pai-hua movement originated on the Chinese mainland, but it was the Hsin Kuo Min Tsa Chih that imported this movement to Singapore.
Between 1920 and 1922, approximately half of all the supplement's articles used the new vernacular forms.[23] By the end of the decade, nearly all of its contents were written in pai-hua.

In 1925 the *Hsin Kuo Min Jih Pao* again broke new ground with another literary attachment, the *Nan Feng* (South Wind/Customs). The *Nan Feng* was one of the first journals dedicated to solely printing pai-hua literary works, especially those written by local writers. In the inaugural edition, one of the editors included his own poem to serve as a model for later submissions. In the poem, the writer Shih Ko exclaimed:

Two by two beautiful people walk back and forth,  
Elegant and graceful they pace up and down;  
Listen carefully to the river's gurgling,  
Hear closely the love tide's surging,  
Listen carefully to the river's gurgling,  
Hear closely the love tide's surging;  
Forget reality,  
Plundering, warring, trading.

Forget reality,  
Plundering, warring, trading;  
South wind, south wind, south wind,  
Blow quickly! Blow throughout the world!  
South wind, south wind, south wind,  
Blow quickly! Blow throughout the world!  
All people are like us,  
We joyfully love such as this![24]

While this poem is of debatable literary quality, *Nan Feng*’s commitment to pai-hua literature had a profound effect on the local population. Furthermore, by encouraging local writers to submit articles, the insert facilitated the growth of local literature.

In 1927 the *Hsin Kuo Min Jih Pao* editors took another step toward the promotion of local literary talent by creating the Huang Tao. They dedicated this new fu-chang to literature with a "Nan-yang se-ts'ai," or "South Seas color." For this reason, the Huang Tao can be considered one of the most important journals in the development of a truly new local literature in Singapore. Early in its history, the writers of the Huang Tao argued that "the Nan-yang environment is rich and beautiful," and therefore a perfect setting for literary inspiration.[25] Tin mines, coconut trees, and rickshaw pullers were excellent material sources for a local literature, they explained, and did not depend on mainland China for substance. Through the publication of poems, essays, and short stories, the Huang Tao helped involve greater numbers of local writers and readers in the basic elements of the New Culture Movement.
Before the end of the decade, the *Hsin Kuo Min Jih Pao* produced three additional supplements. Each of these, the *Lü i* (Green Ripples), *P'u pu* (Waterfall), and *Ch'ang hsüi* (Lasting Sunlight), furthered the ideas of a "new culture." The *Lü i* editors modeled their journal after the Huang Tao, but hoped to provide more substantive pieces.[26] The *Lü i* lasted less than a year, after which its contributors launched a new insert, the *P'u pu*. The *P'u pu* appeared only sporadically, with approximately 35 issues spanning a period of five years. The last insert, the *Ch'ang Hsüi*, ran from May 1929 to September 1930. None of these three supplements had the same impact as did their predecessor, the Huang Tao. Despite their short publication lives, these inserts demonstrate the interest and activity that permeated the news industry.

*Table 2 Literary Fu-chang (supplements) of the Hsin kuo min jih pao*[27]*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Hsin Kuo Min Tsa Chih</em></td>
<td>1919-1936</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Nan Feng</em> (South Wind/Customs)</td>
<td>1925-1926</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Huang Tao</em> (Desert Island)</td>
<td>1927-1928</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Lü I</em> (Green Ripples)</td>
<td>1927-1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>P'u Pu</em> (Waterfall)</td>
<td>1928-1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ch'ang Hsüi</em> (Lasting Sunlight)</td>
<td>1929-1930</td>
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*Nan Yang Shang Pao* (South Seas Commercial News)

The *Hsin Kuo Min Jih Pao*, like the *Le Pao*, appealed to a variety of people. In 1923, however, Ch'en Chia-k'ang launched a more audience-specific newspaper, the *Nan Yang Shang Pao* (South Seas Commercial News, or *Shang Pao*).[28] Ch'en earned his fortune in the rubber business, and relied heavily on advertising to sell his products. At the time there were only three viable advertising papers in Singapore. Perhaps Ch'en believed that starting his own paper would provide him with unlimited advertising space and would be a better investment than advertising in the existing papers. Not surprisingly, the first page of the *Shang Pao*’s inaugural edition was filled with advertisements.

Besides advertising Ch'en's products, the *Nan Yang Shang Pao* promoted economic activity among the Chinese community, and educated its members about current economic practices. As such, the *Nan Yang Shang Pao* was the first of its kind, and represents the changing nature of the Chinese population in Singapore. Businessmen and entrepreneurs increasingly constituted a larger percentage of Singapore's residents at the expense of the laboring community. At the same time, Ch'en apparently hoped to use the paper to support the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanking. The paper's overt political involvement aroused the colonial government's suspicion, and the publication was forced to suspend operations for one month. Early in 1924, the colonial government allowed the *Nan Yang Shang Pao* to resume publication, and it served the Singapore community for the next eighteen years, until World War II, when Japanese occupation officials discontinued it. At war's end, the editors of the Shang Pao revived the daily, and it continued uninterrupted until 1982, when it merged with its rival, the *Hsing*
Chou Jih Pao (Singapore Daily).[29]

Although the Nan Yang Shang Pao appeared later than either the Le Pao or the Hsin Kuo Min Jih Pao, it did not take long before it too launched its first literary insert. Known as the Hsin Sheng Huo (New Life), this fu-chang quickly joined the pai-hua movement. In fact, the Hsin Sheng Huo soon exceeded even the Hsin Kuo Min Tsa Chih in the amount of space it dedicated to pai-hua literature. Whereas the amount of space given to the older classical writing style and the newer pai-hua remained nearly evenly split in the Hsin Kuo Min Tsa Chih, the Hsin Sheng Huo was wholly dedicated to the newer colloquial language.[30] In 1924, a year after its debut, the Hsin Sheng Huo changed its name to the Shang Yü Tsa Chih (Profit Magazine), but the fu-chang remained otherwise unchanged. The Shang Yü Tsa Chih continued to play an important role in Singapore's literary community for most of the next decade, printing its last edition in 1933.

The Nan Yang Shang Pao's next major attempt at a fu-chang involved the Wen I Chou K'an (Literature Weekly). Under the leadership of Tseng Sheng-t'i, the Wen I Chou K'an competed vigorously with the Huang Tao, with each trying to provide the most innovative forum for "South seas colored" literature.[31] In most aspects, however, the two inserts were very similar. Like the Huang Tao and Yeh Lin, the Wen I Chou K'an was greatly responsible for fostering local literary talent. In 1929 the Wen I Chou K'an stopped publication, but the following year the Nan Yang Shang Pao started a new fu-chang entitled Ya Chüeh Chou K'an (Claustrophobia Weekly). Though this new supplement was under different leadership, it was basically a continuation of the Wen I Chou K'an. After only 24 editions, the Ya Chüeh Chou K'an also ceased publication.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3 Literary Fu-chang (supplements) of the Nan Yang Shang Pao[32]</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hsin Sheng Huo (New Life)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shang Yü Tsa Chih (Profit Magazine)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hung Huang (Vast Wilderness)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wen I Chou K'an (Literature Weekly)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ya Chüeh Chou K'an (Claustrophobia Weekly)</td>
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Hsing Chou Jih Pao (Singapore Daily)

With the coexistence of the Le Pao, the Hsin Kuo Min Jih Pao, and the Nan Yang Shang Pao, Singapore's news market was well-covered. Despite this, a fourth paper appeared near the end of the New Culture Movement, the Hsing Chou Jih Pao.[33] The writers of this paper claimed that their mission was to "enlighten the vision of the general public and to supplement the inadequacy of formal education."[34] Since the paper was the creation of Hu Wen-hu, it also served to promote the Hu family Tiger Balm oil industry.[35]

Regardless of his motives, Hu's paper quickly became a success. By the end of 1929, the year the
paper was founded, the *Hsing Chou Jih Pao* had a circulation of around 7,000 copies, and it soon became one of Singapore’s most popular dailies.[36] The *Hsing Chou Jih Pao*’s success is partly attributable to the Hu family’s financial investment. Overseas reporters, advanced printing techniques, better cable communications, and a Sunday edition set the *Hsing Chou Jih Pao* apart from its competitors, forcing them to either adapt and compete, or go out of business. Consequently, the introduction of the *Hsing Chou Jih Pao* caused a great change in the Singapore newspaper industry.

While the Hu family maintained control of the paper, they hired outside members to write and manage the day-to-day affairs. Hu chose Lin Ai-min to work as the paper's manager and Ch’uan Wu-men as editor.[37] Under the direction of these two men, the *Hsing Chou Jih Pao* continued to expand its audience, diversify its coverage, and provide new features for its readers. The paper included sections on "local news," "Malaya news," "Nan-yang news," "Kuang-tung and Fu-chien news," "foreign news," and "news commentary." Beyond these, the Sunday edition had additional sections dedicated to commentary, economics, women's affairs, international problems, exercise, literature, and travel. These additions reflected the growing interests of the local community, and increased the popularity of the *Hsing Chou Jih Pao*, helping it to maintain its competitive position from the time of its inception up to the 1970s.[38] In 1982 a government sponsored merger brought about an end to the *Hsing Chou Jih Pao* as it joined with the *Nan Yang Shang Pao*.[39]

Despite its late appearance in Singapore's news market, the *Hsing Chou Jih Pao* still played an important role in the New Culture Movement. Two of its inserts, *Yeh P’a* (Country Blossoms) and *Liu Hsing* (Falling Star), had a large influence on Singapore literature. Under the leadership of Mao Ch'eng-po, the *Yeh P’a* evolved from a small weekly publication to a well-respected journal.[40] Because it generally only included two articles per issue, the *Yeh P’a* provided longer essays and stories. This made it possible for the supplement’s editors to present an entire essay, story, or even a play in fewer serialized issues. Since lengthier pieces were becoming increasingly popular, the *Yeh P’a* was able to publish some of the most well-known stories of its time.

While the *Liu Hsing* was ultimately not as successful as the *Yeh P’a*, it nonetheless attracted the attention of respectable writers. *Liu Hsing* was originally the product of a group of students from the Singapore Overseas Chinese Middle School, and its contributors were generally young and ambitious.[41] They initially called their journal *Liu Chan* (Miscarriage), and distributed it with the *Le Pao*, yet it lasted only one month before it was dropped in early 1930. The serial resurfaced four months later as a fu-chang to the *Hsing Chou Jih Pao*, re-titled *Liu Hsing*.

**The Straits Times**

It would be inaccurate to suggest that only Chinese language newspapers influenced the course of the New Culture Movement in Singapore. After all, in addition to reading the above mentioned papers, many Singapore Chinese also perused the English-language press. One paper in particular, the *Straits Times* (or simply, the Times), was read by Chinese, Malays, and
Indians, as well as the English. Furthermore, since Singapore was part of the British colonial system, any study of the Chinese community there must also be informed by this British colonial context. Consequently, an introduction to the predominant English language paper of the 1920s is necessary for an understanding of the New Culture Movement in Singapore.

Throughout the nineteenth-century the *Straits Times* maintained a dominant position in the English-speaking community. By the time of the New Culture Movement, the *Straits Times* was the most respected and widely read English paper in Singapore. As such, it is an important source of information regarding this era. While it did not always record the activities of the Chinese community, it nevertheless provides a glimpse into the reactions and attitudes of the ruling colonial government and other Western residents.

Immediately prior to the May Fourth era, the *Straits Times* claimed to be the "Thunderer of the East," or the Asian version of the London Times. Alexander William Still, editor of the paper, believed that the *Straits Times* had the duty to investigate and expose corruption in both the business world and in government. He explained:

> For our own part, we cherish the liberty of the press simply for its value to the community as a whole.... In the modern constitution of society, the press has great functions to perform. It is the chief safeguard against corruption.... Our business is to do what we deem right and necessary in the public interest, and no law court can be the keeper of our conscience.[42]

From 1908 to 1926, the Times was known for its attacks against unethical business leaders and their companies.[43] At the same time, the *Straits Times* was hesitant to criticize the colonial government. For example, in comparing politicians to businessmen, Still suggested, "the simple truth is that statesmanship is not very often found under the silk hat of a company director.... The instinct of the company man is to think from one declaration of dividends to another, but the statesman has to think in decades or generations."[44] Not surprisingly, the *Straits Times* took the official government position during such major political crises as World War I and the Indian Mutiny of 1915.

Perhaps the best way to gauge the relationship between Still's *Straits Times* and the Chinese residents of Singapore is to examine the paper during the period between 17 June and 23 June 1919, the week of the anti-Japanese riots. Even before the events of 19 June, Still was highly critical of the Chinese boycott efforts. In writing about anti-Japanese agitation in Shanghai, he explained:

> We should doubt whether half of those Chinese who express resentment quite know what all the trouble is about. China is a land where the charlatan flourishes and the noisy talker commands the public ear. The public in China...is very easily led by agitators, and we should suppose that there are some very clever agitators behind the trouble in Shanghai and elsewhere in China. Only the other day we read of Chinese labourers who had returned from Siberia and Europe "infected with
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Bolshevist ideas" daily making roadside speeches in order to stir up strong anti-Japanese sentiments....[45]

Predictably, the *Straits Times* was critical of the Singapore riots on the night of 19 June. The Chinese and Japanese residents of the city, the paper chided, "shall not fight out their battles here. They must be taught that they shall not with impunity disturb the peace of the Colony nor interfere with the liberty of any person. This is not a time for mincing words. Lives have been lost, property has been wantonly destroyed and a salutary lesson is needed to put a check once and for all upon manifestations of this kind."[46]

Interestingly, despite the tragic loss of life and property, the *Straits Times* focused on the "inconveniences" endured by the European community due to the riot. For example, the paper of 20 June states:

Many hundreds of people were inconvenienced this morning by the absence from the streets of the greater number of rickshas. Why these vehicles should have been called off the streets is obscure, unless it was intended as a protest against the use of vehicles made in Japan. The result of this action was to throw an extra load on the trams, which are most inconveniently crowded as it is, and hundreds of workers were therefore forced to walk to work.[47]

The next day's paper focused on another similarly "troublesome" incident:

Chinese hooligans gave a considerable amount of trouble all day long yesterday and perpetrated impudent acts. For instance the lunch of a gentleman, employed in the Eastern Telegraph Company, while being carried by his Chinese boy, was nearly thrown out on the road by some Chinese because forsooth it was being carried in a Japanese made carrier. On the protestations of the servant the hooligans said they would allow him to take the lunch to his master, but the next time they found him with a Japanese carrier, they would throw carrier and contents into the dust bin.[48]

As can be seen from such accounts, the *Straits Times* under Still's leadership remained far removed from the concerns of the local Chinese population.

Still retired as editor in 1926, and for the following two years, the editorship of the *Straits Times* passed through the hands of four different men. In 1928, George Seabridge took the editorial reigns of the paper and guided it for the next eighteen years. During his tenure, Seabridge helped change the Times from an influential editorial paper with an elite readership of 5,000, to the "common man's" paper with a circulation of over 25,000.[49] Many of the changes instituted by Seabridge were necessitated by increased competition in the newspaper business. In 1915 the *Malaya Tribune* came into existence, and since the Tribune's subscription rate was approximately half that of the Times, the Tribune's circulation numbers steadily increased.[50]

At the same time, the Tribune actively sought to attract the growing number of English-speaking
Asians. In July of 1930, the Tribune printed a list of "100 Reasons Why You Should Subscribe to the Malaya Tribune." Within this list, the Tribune writers explained that their paper provided "frank discussion of Malayan affairs" and "weekly articles by special and well-informed writers, for Chinese, Indians and Muslims."[51] Perhaps most importantly, the Malaya Tribune hired promising young local journalists, Malayan and Chinese, to write for the paper. Not surprisingly, by 1932 the Tribune's circulation exceeded that of the Straits Times.[52]

Seabridge realized that the Straits Times had to make radical changes to compete against the Tribune and attract the "common man." His answer was to make the Times' layout more attractive with the use of pictures, comics, and other eye-catching elements. He also provided more coverage of events in Singapore and Malaya. His most important innovation, no doubt, was the creation of a Sunday paper, which immediately became popular. By the end of the 1930s, the Straits Times management cut the price of the paper to match the Malaya Tribune, which led to a drastic and immediate increase in subscribers. For these reasons, Seabridge is credited with changing the Times from an influential and well-respected paper, even if it was not widely read, into a popular medium for not only the European community, but for the Asian community as well. Consequently, the Chinese newspapers of the New Culture Movement had to compete with the Times for their voice to be heard.

Similarities with the mainland New Culture Movement

Each of these publications--the Le Pao, the Hsin Kuo Min Jih Pao, the Nan Yang Shang Pao, the Hsing Chou Jih Pao, and the Straits Times--helped spread the new ideas of their era. Each of them, and their accompanying supplements, helped portray and define the Singapore version of the New Culture Movement. From literary reform to iconoclasm and anti-feudalism to anti-imperialism, Singapore's newspapers transplanted and re-debated verbatim many of the core ideas of China's New Culture Movement.

Perhaps the most common denominator in both China and Singapore's New Culture Movement was the ubiquitous emphasis on "newness." Many leading intellectuals felt they were witnessing the dawn of a "new era," with myriad unforeseen possibilities ahead. They used terms such as "enlightening" and "emerging" to describe the world in which they lived. Singapore's newspapers and inserts helped spread this belief in a new era. In one story, for example, two students aboard a ship spend the night discussing marriage, family, and the characteristics of the "modern woman." By night's end, one of the students is extremely discouraged. His friend encourages him saying:

Dear friend, do not be sad! This deep night and vast sea will pass. Do you not see the reddish light already [emerging] in the northeast? At the extreme end of that sky and water, the coast is already appearing. Everyone should pass through and understand [such a] deep night and vast sea. So long as you do not lose heart and diligently break through night's curtain, the ship will pass over this expansive sea. Upon reaching the other shore, [you] will then see the bright and beautiful morning light. This is the path of light and happiness. Friend, do not be sad! Diligently push
As previously mentioned, literary reform played a large role in the New Culture Movement both in mainland China as well as in Singapore. The first newspaper fu-chang to actively incorporate vernacular literature was the *Hsin Kuo Min Tsa Chih*. As early as 1920, approximately half of the *Hsin Kuo Min Tsa Chih*'s contents were in the pai-hua style, and over time the number continued to grow. By 1925 over 70 percent of all contributed material in the various newspaper supplements utilized the colloquial pai-hua language. An early example of a poem in this style is "Happiness and Diligence" from the *Hsin Kuo Min Tsa Chih*. It reads:

There are innumerable things on this earth that bring happiness to man,
There are innumerable things on this earth that bring happiness to man,
Must you use an "equivalent price" to buy it?
No, you must use your own diligence as the price.
There are innumerable roads on this earth that bring happiness to man,
There are innumerable roads on this earth that bring happiness to man,
However, your own road of happiness
Is measured by way of your own hard work.

Poems such as this one flew in the face of conventional literature. Not only did the writers of these poems use colloquial terms, but they ignored the previously accepted standards of balance, sentence structure, and rhyming patterns, yet in each case, mainland poets had already displayed these characteristics in their own poetry.

The call for literary reform was not limited to the promotion of pai-hua. Singapore's newspapers also reflected other evolving literary trends in China. For example, as early as 1925, Kuo Mo-jo and other members of China's "Creation Society" (Ch'uang-tsao she) called for a new literature that would lead to socialist revolution, calling such work "proletarian literature." This literature, they explained, would be realistic, critical, and didactic. In essence, proletarian literature was based on the idea that all literature is propaganda. Within a few months, proletarian echoes were heard among the Singapore writers. For example, Ch'eng Li suggested that "Literary works must draw close to life in [our] society. Writers must use ardent enthusiasm and a calm and cool intelligence to depict life. The writer should use an enthusiastic cry to call the pained, the grieved, and the weak to rise in a righteous fight." Yu Yu, in his essay entitled "Concerning the direction of literature," explained his views toward the concept of "positivist" literature. "[I am not opposed to] 'positivism,'" he stated, "but...if it is a bourgeois 'positive' literature, then that is a great mistake. At the same time we must also have 'negativism.' [We must] 'negate' feudalistic, bourgeois, and petty bourgeois literature." The Creation Society and other proletariat literature advocates on the Chinese mainland had previously made similar suggestions.

Like their contemporaries in China, Singapore writers called for an end to feudalism. Feudalistic social elements included, but were not limited to, sexism, Confucianism, paternalism, familism, hierarchy, and exploitation. Usually, feudalism referred to the exploitation and distress of the
working class. In the story "Suffering," Ch'en Chia-fang writes of a man who is forced to work in the factory day and night. When he complains of his exhaustion to his factory manager, the manager simply grabs him by the nose, and threatens his job dismissal. Later the man collapses with fatigue and injures himself, and the factory manager, as a member of the "petty bourgeoisie," refuses to lend him money to pay for his medical care. As a result, the man, his wife, and his two children are left to "suffer."[59]

In a similarly depressing story entitled "Life and Crime," the writer Tseng Sheng-t'i tells of another impoverished father. Overwhelmed at the responsibility of caring for his five children, the father compares them to five bullets pointed at his heart. His situation becomes especially acute when an automobile crushes his rickshaw, his only source of financial support. Desperate, he hides along a dark pathway waiting to rob unsuspecting passers-by. In his first attempt, his victim turns out to be penniless. His second attempt becomes even more disastrous when he realizes his chosen victim is a policeman. Before the father understands what has happened, the policeman's handcuffs are placed on his wrists.[60] Singapore's writers used stories such as these to critique the "feudalistic" world in which they lived.

These are only a few of the characteristics common to New Culture literature in both China and Singapore. Looking at these similarities, many scholars suggest that Singapore's literary supplements were nothing more than poor imitations of China's New Culture magazines.[61] No doubt, in many instances the literary quality of Singapore's newspaper inserts was inferior to that of similar publications in China. Still, this does not mean that Singapore's writers were simply copying the work of their mainland contemporaries. Since Singapore's New Culture Movement occurred within a different context--a diaspora context--it produced some unique results. A look at some of these differences further illuminates the New Culture Movement in Singapore.

Unique aspects of Singapore's New Culture Movement

Beginning in 1927, as a new wave of Chinese immigrants arrived in Southeast Asia, the Singapore version of the New Culture Movement took a novel turn. For the next several years, Singapore's writers made a self conscious effort to break the intellectual moorings that held them to their mainland Chinese counterparts. Between 1927 and 1933 there was an almost incessant demand on the part of Singapore's intellectuals to develop a more purely indigenous literature that they termed "Ma-Hua wen hsüeh," or Malay-Chinese literature. The opening salvo in this new battle was fired by the Huang Tao. In April of 1927, a writer by the pen name of "Yan" wrote an essay entitled "The South Seas and Literature." In this essay Yan pointed out that the Chinese had been in Southeast Asia since the Yüan dynasty, yet over the course of several centuries, had failed to produce any writers comparable to those on the mainland. He claimed:

To the present time it is most unfortunate that of all the works of [our] artists, it is impossible to find one that portrays the spirit with which the people of Nan-yang [or the South Seas] currently struggle to obtain a living. [There are those] who say "this land is not our home land, so why should we trifle with the wriggling worms
"Nan-yang is not an indescribable mass of mud and flesh. Nan-yang is like the paradise admired by the Palestine people after the flood. In the schools in Peking... scholars have said, "the scenery of Nan-yang is tremendously rich and beautiful," and in years past the artists that have come to Nan-yang have emphasized to the colonists saying "the great achievements of our ancestors are not unlike those of the Spaniards in the New World." Alas! How rare it is to find a realistic portrayal of [our] background and people. Will we find it? Diligently describe! Bravely portray! Nan-yang literature must display its unique colors in the world of literature.[62]

Several writers heeded Yan's call, and soon a whole genre of "Ma-Hua wen hsüeh" emerged. Titles such as "Singapore Artists, Awake," "Literary Culture and the Overseas Chinese," and "Literature and Local Color" splashed across the front pages of Yeh Lin, Wen I Chou K'an, and Huang Tao.[63] In each of these cases, the writers urged that environment and local culture be more prominent in the works of Singapore artists. Only then, they argued, could their art forms achieve true excellence. For example, in a thinly veiled allegory entitled "A Discussion of the Fervor of South Seas Literature," Ssu Shih told the story of an old painter. According to the story, there was a certain old painter whose work was widely sought after. Interestingly, he used only one color in his paintings, an unusually brilliant red. Other artists, jealous of his acclaim, hoped to copy the old painter's methods. They traveled far to the east in search of precious dyes, but to no avail. As for the old painter, the story continues:

He... continued to paint. With time his paintings became even more brilliant, and with time, [he] became more old and gray. One day they found that he had died in front of his painting. They raised him up and were going to bury him. Some people secretly looked in all of the color jars in his studio, but they could not find the thing that they were lacking.

When they took off his long coat, they found a scar on the left side of the old man's chest. It was an old scar, and must have been there his whole life because its edges were old and hard. But, death is an envelope that seals up all affairs...

When they buried the old man, people naturally all asked, "Where did the dye for his color come from?"[64]

Having recounted this story, Ssu Shih explains that true art work requires a tremendous effort on the part of the artist, and that he or she must use a part of themselves. This is only possible, he suggests, when they use their own environment, language, and culture for their inspiration and for their "color."

Some historians and literary theorists suggest that this emphasis on "local color" represents an important step in the cultural transformation of overseas Chinese.[65] In many ways, it appears that these writers, and the audience they wrote for, were assimilating their new environment. Throughout this same period, however, other works suggest just the opposite. Various short
stories describe the injustices the Chinese immigrants experienced as a marginalized segment of society. Others refer to the "temporary nature" of their Nan-yang, or South Seas, experience. And nearly all writers allude to China as their "ancestral home." For example, in the pages of Yeh Lin the writer Ch'en Lian-ch'ing laments:

> Life is really so senseless. Look farther afield and we see our motherland lying under a dark cloud.... Nan-yang is not our final resting place. Life is just senseless. The situation in our motherland resulted from such senselessness and such senselessness has made us come across the vast seas. Now, [for the same reason,] we take shelter in this coconut grove. ...However, since we are human and have to live such a life, ...we should seek some temporary happiness in the senselessness.[66]

In another story, Wang T'an describes the ongoing discrimination and segregation that continued to plague the Chinese in Singapore. Wang tells the story of two boys, Yü-nan and Tan-mi. Yü-nan is a European boy that befriends Tan-mi. Because of their youth and innocence, neither understands the discrimination and prejudice of the world around them. Yü-nan's father forbids them to play together, but his warnings fall on deaf ears. Angrily, Yü-nan's father yells at him:

> You stupid boy! I do not know how many times I have warned you! Yet everyday you still associate and play with Tan-mi. If you associate with those kinds of humiliated people it will destroy your honorable status. Nobody will look up to you. His father is a slave, and when he is grown he will never be more than a slave. His body stinks like excrement and is as dark as the dirt. Furthermore, he has never been to school. He is like a swine. There is absolutely no benefit to being with him. I really cannot even guess the intentions of a stupid boy like you, wanting to be friends with a humiliated friend like that... You loafer! You scamp! Do you not know, Tan-mi is from a shameful, humiliated, and weak people![67]

Despite the desire for "local color," it seems that the Singapore Chinese were still very much aware of their "outsider" status in Singapore. This apparent contradiction should not be unexpected within a diaspora context. The members of the diaspora community in Singapore were, after all, neither "Chinese" nor "Malay," and therefore their literature can not be analyzed as either a symbol of Chineseness nor an indication of assimilation. As Stuart Hall explains:

> Cultural identity... is a matter of "becoming" as well as of "being." Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But, like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject to the continuous "play" of history, culture and power. Far from being grounded in mere "recovery" of the past, which is waiting to be found, and which when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past.[68]
In the case of Singapore, the Chinese immigrants positioned themselves within at least three different "narratives," the narratives of China, Malaysia, and Great Britain. Each of the three is associated with the narrative of nationalism and the nation-state, and as such is intrinsically problematic. Each of the three helped in forming a Chinese diaspora, or as Homi Bhabha would suggest, a hybrid identity in Singapore. This diaspora phenomenon explains, to a large degree, both the similarities and differences between the "new cultures" of China and Singapore in the 1920s.

A diaspora community can be defined both positively as well as negatively. Discrimination and exclusion made it such that the Chinese of Singapore saw themselves as "neither" British nor Malaysian. Official discrimination as well as less formal social segregation made the Chinese realize that complete assimilation was, at least at that time, impossible or undesirable. At the same time, discrimination does not necessarily imply economic disparity. After all, Chinese businessmen in Singapore were often very wealthy and influential. Yet, the knowledge that such wealth depended on the sometimes capricious consent of other sources of power made even the wealthiest Chinese aware of their precarious position.

A diaspora can also be defined positively. Genealogy, territory, and language were just some of the positive characteristics held in common by the Singapore diaspora community. Each member shared a past that eventually linked them to a "homeland." A diaspora "homeland" is not necessarily a sovereign nation-state, but is at least an "imagined community." Furthermore, each member of Singapore's diaspora shared the experience of displacement from China and relocation to Singapore, with all of the difficulties of adaptation and survival that this required. Even among second and third generation Singapore immigrants, this "tradition" was part of their common "heritage." This does not mean that all the immigrants wanted to return to their "homeland." In fact, actual trips to China were frequently disheartening and disappointing. Still, as Hall explains, "symbolic journeys are necessary for [all diaspora]. This is the homeland we must return to--but 'by another route': what [the homeland] has become..., what we have made of [the homeland]: [the homeland]--as we re-tell it through politics, memory and desire."[70]

It is not surprising, then, that the literature of Singapore's New Culture Movement did not exactly mirror the work of mainland writers. Though Singapore's intellectuals were participating in the movement of their "homeland," this homeland had been recreated and refashioned within the interplay of competing nation-state narratives in Singapore. For this reason, Singapore's writers could emphasize their "local colors," and at the same time resist becoming indigenous. Their narrative(s), which in many ways opposed the narrative of the nation-state, can best be described as belonging to a diaspora community.

Conclusion

From 1919 to 1933, the Chinese community in Singapore participated in the New Culture Movement. As in China, the movement included debates on such topics as "newness," literary reform, and an end to feudalism. In short, Singapore's movement reflected current events and
As in China, literature played a large role in Singapore's New Culture Movement. In China, student magazines were often the vanguard for new ideas, while in Singapore, newspapers and their accompanying literary supplements provided the most active forum for discussion. Throughout the 1920s the Le Pao, the Hsin Kuo Min Jih Pao, the Nan Yang Shang Pao, and the Hsing Chou Jih Pao were the most dynamic participants in the spread of this new culture.

Around 1927 the Singapore movement began emphasizing "local colors" in literature, instead of merely imitating Chinese models. Nonetheless, this emphasis does not mean that the immigrants were assimilating the local culture. Their literature can be best described as the product of a diaspora community.

Instead of understanding "China" as an easily defined geo-political package, diasporas complicate and call into question our accepted objects of study. "Chinese studies," "Japanese studies," or even "Asian studies" rely, to some degree, on the essentialization of a cultural identity, and for these disciplines diaspora studies can be problematic. For the historian, however, the study of the particular and local characteristics of a diaspora can be an enlightening, exciting, and worthwhile pursuit.

Notes


2 Singapore Free Press, 6 June 1919, as quoted in Ts'ui Kui-ch'iang, "Hai hsia chih min ti hua jen tui wu ssu yün tung ti fan hsiang," Nan yang hsüeh pao 20 (1965-66): 17-18. All translations in this paper are my own, unless otherwise noted.

3 This account of the events of 19 June 1919 is taken from the Straits Times, 20-23 June 1919 and Ts'ui Kui-ch'iang, "Hai hsia chih min ti hua jen tui wu ssu yün tung ti fan hsiang," 13-18.

4 Straits Times, 20 June 1919.

5 There are several interpretations and approaches to the May Fourth Period and its connection to the New Culture Movement. The best known interpretation, with its encyclopedic coverage, is undoubtedly Chow Tse-tsung's, The May Fourth Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). Other notable accounts include: Arif Dirlik, "Ideology and Organization in the May


8 Clifford suggests that "we should attempt to think of cultures not as organically unified or traditionally continuous but... as negotiated, present processes." James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988) 273.

9 Clifford, "Diasporas," 320.


11 Bhabha, 148.


16 He Shu-min, *Hsin chia po tsui tsao ti hua wen jih pao--le pao*, 1881-1932 (Hsin chia po: Nan
yang pien i suo ch'u pan, 1978) 15-16.

17 For more information on the Le Pao's circulation see Chen Mong Hock, 39.

18 Cheng Wen-hui, 49-50.

19 Cheng Wen-hui, 52.


21 He Shu-min, 79-83.

22 Ts'ui Kui-ch'iang, Pao k'an yü pao jen, 15 and Cheng, 39.


26 Fang Hsiu, *Ma hua hsin wen hsüeh shih kao*, 1: 87-93.


28 Ts'ui Kui-ch'iang, Pao k'an yü pao jen, 29.


31 Tseng Sheng-t'i often wrote under the pen names Ta Chi and Ting Lang. His work from the *Wen I Chou K'an* is included in Fang's MHTH.


33 Ts'ui Kui-chiang, Pao k'an yü pao jen, 31.
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34 Tan and Soh, 14.
36 Tan and Soh, 14.
37 Cheng Wen-hui, 45.
38 Ts'ui Kui-chiang, Pao k'an yü pao jen, 32.
40 For examples of Mao Ch'eng-po's work see Fang's MHTH.
41 Fang Hsiu, Ma hua hsin wen hsüeh shih kao, 1:173-177.
42 Straits Times, 27 November 1913.
43 See, for example, the Straits Times editorial of 21 May 1912.
44 Straits Times, 15 May 1912.
45 Straits Times, 17 June 1919.
46 Straits Times, 21 June 1919.
47 Straits Times, 20 June 1919.
48 Straits Times, 21 June 1919.
50 Turnbull, 87. The daily rate for the Times was ten cents, while the Tribune was only five cents.
51 Turnbull, 87.
52 Turnbull, 92.
53 Chou P'i-ch'eng, "Ch'uan chung chih i yeh," Shang yü tsa chih, 25 April 1925. Reprinted in
MHTH 3:64-69.

54 Fang Hsiu, Ma hua hsin wen hsüeh shih kao, 14-15.


57 Ch'eng Li, "Kuan yü hsin hsing wen i," Yeh lin, 1 March 1929. Reprinted in MHTH 1:60.

58 Yu Yu, "Kuan yü wen i ti fang hsiang," Yeh p'a, 6 April 1930. Reprinted in MHTH 1:73.


62 Yan, "Nan yang yü wen i," Huang tao, 1 April 1927. Reprinted in MHTH 1:119-121.

63 See MHTH 1:119-149.

64 Ssu Shih, "Shuo shuo nan yang ti wen i shu," Huang tao, 18 October 1927. Reprinted in MHTH 1:122-123.


66 Pan Lan (Ch'en Lian-ch'ing), Yeh lin, 1928. Reprinted and translated in Mo Yimei 47.

68 Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, eds., 

69 James Clifford has used this approach in his article entitled "Diasporas," Cultural 
Anthropology 9(3):302-338.

70 Hall, 399.
The Present Echoes of the Ancient Bronze Drum: Nationalism and Archeology in Modern Vietnam and China

by Han Xiaorong

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Introduction

Bronze drums are one of the most important archaeological artifacts to be found in southern China and Southeast Asia. Their use by many ethnic groups in that area has lasted from prehistoric times to the present. Northern Vietnam and southwestern China (especially Yunnan Province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) are the two areas where the majority of bronze drums have been discovered. According to a 1988 report, China has stored about 1460 bronze drums.[11 The Provincial Museum of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region actually boasts the largest collection of Bronze drums in the world. The total number of bronze drums discovered in Vietnam reached about 360 in the 1980s, among which about 140 were Dong Son drums.[2]

The earliest historical records relating to bronze drums appeared in the Shi Ben, a Chinese book dating from at least the 3rd century BCE. This book is no longer extant; however a small portion
of it appears in another classic, the Tongdian by Du You.[3] The *Hou Han Shu*, a Chinese chronicle of the late Han period compiled in the 5th century CE, describes how the Han dynasty general, Ma Yuan, collected bronze drums from Jiaozhi (northern Vietnam) to melt down and then recast into bronze horses. From that point on, many official and unofficial Chinese historical records contain references to bronze drums. In Vietnam, two 14th century literary works written in Chinese by Vietnamese scholars, the *Viet Dien U Linh* and the *Linh Nam Chich Quai* record many legends about bronze drums. Later works such as the *Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu*, a historical work written in the 15th century, and the *Dai Nam Nhat Thong Chi*, a book about the historical geography of Vietnam compiled in the late 19th century, also mention bronze drums.[4] Additionally, a wooden tablet found in Vietnam dating from the early 19th century describes the discovery of some bronze drums.[5]

Modern archaeological research on bronze drums did not begin until the late 19th century, after the arrival of Westerners in the region. Before the 1950s, almost all of the important works on bronze drums were written by Western scholars: most particularly, F. Heger.[6] Due to the social-political circumstances, few Vietnamese scholars were able to engage in research on bronze drums during those years. Although a few Chinese scholars, such as Zheng Shixu, Xu Songshi, and Luo Xianglin, conducted research on bronze drums, interest in the topic was not as widespread as it was in the West.

After the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and the division of Vietnam in 1954, Vietnamese and Chinese scholars began to dominate research on bronze drums. In the 1950s and 1960s, many excavation reports and some general studies on bronze drums were published. However, on the whole, bronze drums did not attract serious attention in either country. Moreover, although China and Vietnam maintained good bilateral relations during that period, very little academic exchange took place between bronze drum experts from the two countries. It was not until the mid-1970s, shortly before the break-up of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance, that several important articles began to be published in both countries.

The late 1970s and early 1980s then saw the publication of many more books and articles on the topic in both China and Vietnam, and heated debates between Vietnamese and Chinese scholars ensued. In March 1980, the first Chinese symposium on ancient bronze drums was held in Nanning, the capital city of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in southern China. The Chinese Association for Ancient Bronze Drum Studies was formed immediately following the conference. Another symposium was held in Kunming, the provincial capital of Yunnan Province, in late 1984.[7] In 1987, Vietnamese scholars summed up their views in a book titled *Trong Dong Son* (The Dong Son Drum).[8] The following year, the Chinese Association for Ancient Bronze Drum Studies (ZGTY) also completed a conclusive monograph entitled *Zhongguo Gudai Tonggu* (The Ancient Bronze Drums of China). In October 1988, Vietnamese and Chinese archaeologists finally met at the International Symposium on The Bronze Drum and Bronze Culture of South China and Southeast Asia to discuss their differences. The publication of the above-mentioned two books and this symposium actually put an end to the protracted controversy that had ensued between scholars from the two countries. Since then, no important works on bronze drums have been published in either Vietnam or China.
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The timing of this Vietnamese and Chinese research on bronze drums is laden with political implications. The boom in bronze drum research started when Sino-Vietnamese friendship was about to turn sour and ended when the two countries were ready to seek a solution to their problematic relations. The political influence on research is also reflected in the issues that the Vietnamese and Chinese archaeologists chose to address in the 1970s and 1980s. While in the previous period, scholars had tended to give more or less equal attention to the classification, dating, origin, functions, and other issues relating to bronze drums, in the 1970s and 1980s, scholars paid much more attention to the geographic and ethnic origins of bronze drums than to other issues. Where the first bronze drum was made and who made it were the core issues in the controversy between Chinese and Vietnamese scholars during that period. The answers to these questions seem to have been largely determined by the nationality of the scholars concerned. Hence, the Vietnamese scholars unanimously claimed that the first bronze drum was invented in the Red and Black River valleys in northern Vietnam by the Lac Viet, the remote ancestors of the Vietnamese people, and then spread to other parts of Southeast Asia and southern China. Meanwhile, Chinese archaeologists declared that the real inventor of the bronze drum was the Pu, an ancient ethnic group who inhabited southern China. Chinese scholars argued that the Pu made the first bronze drum in central Yunnan in southwestern China, and that the technique was then adopted by other ethnic groups living in the surrounding areas, including the Lac Viet in the Red River delta.

In this article, I intend to make a brief review of the major works on bronze drums published in Vietnam and China in the 1970s and 1980s in order to demonstrate how nationalism predetermined the positions of the scholars researching the issue of the origin of the bronze drum. I will also discuss how their theories about the origin of the bronze drum in turn influenced their understanding of other aspects of the bronze drum, such as its typology, dating, and decoration. My chief concern here is not to prove which side is right or wrong, but to try to explain why the issue of the origins of the bronze drum became so important to the Vietnamese and Chinese scholars during this period and why none of the scholars, either Vietnamese or Chinese, expressed views different from those of their compatriots.

Classification and Dating

The most well-known classification of the bronze drums was made by the Austrian archaeologist F. Heger in 1902 in his *Alte metalltrommeln aus Südost Asien*. He collected 22 bronze drums and the records or photographs of another 143, which he divided into four types (I, II, III, IV) and three transitory types (I-II, II-IV, I-IV) based on their form, distribution, decoration, and chemical composition. He believed that Type I, found mainly in northern Vietnam and referred to as the Dong Son drum by Vietnamese scholars, was the earliest (see Figure 1).[9] Before the 1950s, some other classifications were proposed, but none of them were as widely adopted as Heger's.

Did Heger's classification stand the test of time and the excavation of many more bronze drums? Vietnamese scholars thought that the general framework of Heger's classification was still valid.
and could be modified or expanded but should not be replaced. Since they continued to use Heger's general framework, Vietnamese scholars did not expend any time on working out new schemes. Instead, they chose to concentrate on the details of the classification system with the aim of further proving Heger's classification with evidence discovered after 1902. With many more bronze drums in hand, they began to divide each of Heger's types into several sub-types.

Vietnamese scholars focused their efforts on Heger's Type I, the Dong Son drum, referred to above. For example, in 1963, Le Van Lan, Pham Van Kinh, and Nguyen Linh proposed to subdivide Heger's Type I according to the proportion between the diameter of the face and the height of the drum. In 1975, Nguyen Van Huyen and Hoang Vinh subdivided Heger's Type I into three subtypes. That same year, in an article published in *Nhung Phat Hien Moi Ve Kao Co Hoc* (New Archaeological Discoveries), Pham Van Kinh and Quang Van Cay suggested that Heger's Type I be subdivided into seven subtypes belonging to four consecutive stages.[11] Meanwhile, Tran Manh Phu,[12] as well as Luu Tran Tieu and Nguyen Minh Chuong subdivided it into four subtypes.[13] Chu Van Tan proposed two subtypes with five transitory types.[14] Diep Dinh Hoa and Pham Minh Huyen suggested seven sub-types.[15] However, the most complicated scheme was proposed by Pham Minh Huyen, Nhuyen Van Huyen and Trinh Sinh, who divided Heger's Type I into six sub-types with 24 styles. [16]

Vietnamese scholars paid much more attention to the Dong Son drum than to the other types of bronze drum that Heger had identified. They saw these other types as later in date and thus less related to the Vietnamese people.[17] Therefore, they were much less important than the Type I drums for proving the Vietnamese origin of bronze drums.

The attitude of Chinese archaeologists toward Heger's classification is sharply contrasted with that of Vietnamese scholars. They believed that Heger's classification was so outdated that it necessitate a complete overhaul. After the break-up of bilateral relations, Chinese scholars began to openly criticize Vietnamese scholars for what they saw as blind adherence to Heger's classification for un-academic reasons. One Chinese book explained that Heger could be forgiven for asserting that the Dong Son drum was the earliest because he did not have enough evidence at that time. Vietnamese scholars, however, could not be forgiven because they had so much more information than Heger and still refused to pay due attention to this new evidence. [18]

From the 1950s to the 1980s, Chinese scholars strove continuously to make new schemes of classification (see Table 1). They made at least seven schemes during those four decades. From the 1950s to the mid 1970s, the Chinese scholars endeavored to reverse the order of Heger's first three types by categorizing the Type II as the earliest, and arguing that Heger's Type I developed from the Type II. Three out of four classifications made by Chinese scholars during that period did precisely that.[19] Only the Yunnan Provincial Museum continued to support Heger's order.
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The above modifications of Heger's classification naturally led to much suspicion from the Vietnamese side. Vietnamese scholars were aware that China had very few of Heger's Type I bronze drums at that time, and that the great majority of Heger's Type II drums had been discovered in Guangxi, in southern China.

By the mid to late 1970s, China had discovered many bronze drums believed to belong to Heger's Type I. Moreover, after the excavation of Wanjiaba in Yunnan Province in 1975-1976, Chinese archaeologists believed that they had found the most archaic form of Heger's Type I bronze drum. As a result, they began to discard the schemes made by Chinese archaeologists in the previous period and to go back to Heger's classification. Here, however, they made one important modification: they added the newly-found Wanjiaba drums to Heger's plan as the earliest type. Wang Ningsheng, Li Weiqing, and Shi Zhongjian represented this new, revisionist school. This revisionist school maintained the earlier Chinese view that southern China was the place of origin of the first bronze drum. Yet their works differed greatly from the previous classifications in that they took Yunnan, instead of Guangxi, as the specific place of origin of the bronze drum within southern China.

### Table 1: Summary of Chinese Modifications on Heger's Classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heger</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wen You</td>
<td>II (western)</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan Museum</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Sheng</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Ningsheng</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Weiqing</td>
<td>I:a</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi Zhongjian*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZGTY</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*One way to bolster claims regarding the origins of the bronze drum was to name each type of drum after the place where it was found: a practice carried on by both Vietnamese and Chinese scholars. For example, Shi Zhongjian and the Chinese Association for Ancient Bronze Drum Studies chose the following Chinese place names to designate their eight types of bronze drum: 1. Wanjiaba (Yunnan); 2. Shizhaishan (Yunnan); 3. Lengshuichong (Guangxi); 4. Zunyi (Guizhou); 5. Majiang (Guizhou); 6. Beiliu (Guangxi); 7. Lingshan (Guangxi); 8. Ximeng (Yunnan). The conclusive volume edited by the Chinese Association for Ancient Bronze Drum Studies (ZGTY) followed Shi Zhongjian's classification. Shi was the director of the Board of Directors of the Association at the time of writing and wrote the preface to the volume.

This indicated some differences between the Chinese scholars in Guangxi and their colleagues in Yunnan. These differences were not new, considering that among the four classifications made...
by Chinese scholars between the early 1950s and the mid-1970s, only the one made by the Yunnan Provincial Museum refused to recognize Heger's Type II, found mostly in Guangxi, as the earliest bronze drum. It was probably not a coincidence that two of the three scholars who claimed the Guangxi origin of the bronze drum, Huang Zengqing and Hong Sheng, were from Guangxi (the other, Wen You,[24] hailed from Sichuan). Incidentally, two of the scholars who claimed the Yunnan origin of the bronze drum, Wang Ningsheng and Li Weiqing, were from Yunnan (the other, Shi Zhongjian, from Beijing). It was reported in 1982, however, that a majority of Chinese archaeologists had agreed that the bronze drum originated in Yunnan.[25] This implied that there was still a minority that did not agree. The debate with Vietnamese scholars had probably prevented this minority from expressing their views. By 1995, it was finally announced that Chinese archaeologists had all agreed that the Wanjiaba type bronze drum was the earliest in the world and that Chuxiong prefecture in Yunnan, where Wanjiaba is located, was thus the birthplace of the bronze drum.[26]

Figure 2: Wanjiaba Drum (China)[27]

Vietnamese scholars claimed that the attempts by Chinese archaeologists to reclassify the bronze drums were all groundless. They argued that besides the fact that China had very few of Heger's Type I drums, the Chinese had reversed the order of Heger's first three types before the mid-1970s because they believed that the bronze culture in the south could not have developed without the influence of Chinese culture from the north. Heger's Type II, the Vietnamese noted, had something which the Chinese were looking for: decorations similar to those found in the Central Plain area of China. These classifications, just like the traditional Chinese belief that the bronze drum had been invented by Ma Yuan---the Han general who crushed the Trung sisters' rebellion in Vietnam in 40 CE---and Zhuge Liang---the famous prime minister of the state of Shu during the Three Kingdoms period (220-265 CE)[28]---reflected the mentality of Han chauvinism. To Vietnamese scholars, Chinese classification schemes were not reflective of historical realities, but precisely the opposite, constructions of the present.[29]

The more recent Chinese classifications, which returned to, but adapted, Heger's plan to include the Wanjiaba drums as the earliest type, were based in part on the idea that the form and decoration of the Wanjiaba drums were very simple: the premise being that the simpler the form and decoration, the more ancient the drum. Vietnamese scholars believed that this was another misinterpretation. The three principles used by Chinese scholars in their classification---namely that "the face of the drum grew bigger and bigger, the body of the drum decreased from three to two parts, and the decorations became more and more complex"---were considered to be oversimplifications by Vietnamese scholars. They argued that the simple form and decorations could also be indications of decline, thereby implying that the Wanjiaba drum was not the earliest of the various types of bronze drum, but the latest.[30] Phan Huy Thong was a Vietnamese scholar who argued this point. According to him, drums of the same type were found in Vietnam during the 1930s and had long since been judged to be coarse, but late.[31] Thus, in the most complicated Vietnamese classification proposed in the publication Trong Dong Son (The Dong Son Drum), the Wanjiaba Drum was listed as the fourth sub-type of the Dong Son Drum (Heger's Type I). The Thuong Nong drum, a Wanjiaba style bronze drum found
in Vietnam in the 1980s, was put in the same sub-type (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Thuong Nong Drum (Vietnam)[32]

The aim of all of these classifications was to determine the relative dating of the bronze drums. To date, scholars in the two countries have not found common ground on this issue. The biggest problem concerns the first two types of Heger's classification, which are directly linked to the issue of the origins of the bronze drum. Since relative dating proved unconvincing to both sides, Chinese and Vietnamese scholars then made attempts at absolute dating. However, this proved to be as controversial as relative dating.

The Vietnamese scholar Vu Tang proclaimed in 1974 that he dated one bronze drum to the 13th-10th centuries BCE and another one to the beginning of the late second millennium BCE. This is the earliest absolute dating so far proclaimed for any bronze drum by any scholar. However, this dating later led to much criticism from Chinese scholars, according to whom the method used to date those two drums had been unscientific.[33] The dating of the first drum was based on the motifs of rings and parallel lines, which are believed to be similar to those found on ceramics of that period of time. Apparently, Vietnamese scholars later discarded this dating scheme, as it was not included in Trong Dong Son (The Dong Son Drum), the conclusive volume published in 1987.

Other Vietnamese scholars believed that the earliest Dong Son drum can be dated alternately to the 7th century BCE;[34] or the 8th century BCE;[35] or sometime before the 7th century BCE. [36] Vietnamese scholars later admitted that it was difficult to reach an exact date for the Dong Son drum because many drums were discovered accidentally, and thus, the sites were not well protected. Further, it is very difficult to find any biological materials directly related to the drum which may be useful in arriving at an absolute date.[37]

The earliest C14 date established for a bronze drum excavated in China by Chinese scholars is 2640+- 90 before 1950, or 690 +- 90 BCE.[38] The dating was based on the materials that coexisted with the drum in the tombs. Chinese scholars claimed that this is the earliest credible C14 dating for any bronze drum. They argued that the Wanjiaba type bronze drums were mostly made between the 7th and 5th centuries BCE, and that the Shizhaishan (or Dong Son) type was popular between the 6th century BCE and the 1st century CE: the latter representing a more developed form of the former.[39]

However, according to Vietnamese scholars, this dating is erroneous. Vietnamese archaeologists conducted an experiment on a piece of wood obtained from an excavated coffin and found that the margin of error for such dating could be as much as 235 years. They believed that the Chinese archaeologists deliberately chose that date in order to support their claim of the southern China origin of the bronze drum. According to Vietnamese scholars, the dating of bronze drums should not be based solely on C14 statistics. Instead, other factors should also be taken into consideration. They even went so far as to set an example for the Chinese. A bronze drum was found in an ancient tomb at Viet Khe. C14 dating indicated that the tomb was from
2480+-100 years before 1950 CE, or around 530 BCE.[40] However, based on its style, it was decided that the drum could only be dated to the 3rd or 4th centuries BCE. To date, scholars from the two countries have failed to reach common ground regarding absolute dating, just as they have not achieved a consensus on relative dating.

**Interpretation of the Decoration**

The decoration of the bronze drum is another major field of controversy between Vietnamese and Chinese scholars. Decoration is important because it is believed to reflect the social and spiritual life of the people who invented and used the drum and, thus, can help determine its ethnic and geographical affiliations. The most popular motifs on the early drums (Heger's first two types plus the Wanjiaba) include various species of birds and other animals, as well as boats, shining entities, and geometrical lines.

A flying bird with a long beak and long feet appeared very frequently on the early drums, and a good deal of scholarly attention was devoted toward trying to determine what kind of bird it was (see Figure 4).[41] Dao Duy Anh, the Vietnamese historian, believed that it was the legendary "lac bird," the symbol of the ancient Viet people. Dao Tu Khai, however, argued that the bird was not a lac bird because the lac bird was a magpie or some other species whose appearance was rather different from that of the bird on the bronze drum. According to Dao Thu Khai, the bird was, instead, a heron.[42] Still other scholars argued that the lac bird and the heron were the same.[43] What is more, it was argued that herons lived in every part of Vietnam, and the ancient Viet people regarded them as the symbol of the laborious peasants because it was believed to be diligent. As one Vietnamese scholar put it, "We believe that since the bronze drum is a product of Vietnam made by the Viet people, it should reflect something real in the Vietnamese landscape. The flying bird on bronze drums should be something that the Viet people were very familiar with, and it should have a Vietnamese name. We believe that our interpretation of the bird with its long beak and long feet on bronze drums as a heron is in conformity with the reality of Vietnamese history and culture."[44]

Figure 4: Flying Birds on Bronze Drums[45]

Most Chinese scholars also believe that the bird is a heron. However, they do not agree that the heron is a symbol of the ancient Vietnamese peasants. Instead, they interpret it more as a result of Chinese influence. They argued that the heron is considered to be the spirit of the drum in the Central Plain of China. This belief first spread to the Chu area in southern China and then reached other ethnic groups living to the south of Chu. According to the Chinese Association of Bronze Drum Studies,

The flying heron is the major motif on Shizhaishan drums (Dong Son drums). There is a long tradition of decorating drums with the motif of herons in the Central Plain. The feather drums excavated from the Chu tombs in Xinyang, Henan and Jiangling, Hubei and the Zenghouyi tomb in Suixian, Hubei are all decorated with the motif of the heron...there is clear evidence to support the idea that the motif of
In addition to the bird motifs, there are also small three-dimensional animals on the face of some Dong Son (Shizhaishan) drums and other types of drums which archaeologists have argued are either frogs or toads (see Figure 5). Chinese scholars argued that they were frogs and explained them as decorations without special meaning, or something related to the ceremony of rain-seeking, or the frog-worshipping custom of the ancient Yue people of southern China, a group believed to be related to the ancient Viet people. Edward Schafer agreed that the animals were frogs, "for the drum embodied a frog spirit---that is a spirit of water and rain---and its voice was the booming rumble of the bullfrog." He retold a story of the Tang period recorded in a Chinese source to show that the drum could even take the form of a living frog. According to the story, a frog pursued by a person leaped into a hole, which turned out to be the grave of a Man (barbarian) chieftain containing a bronze drum with a rich green patina, covered with batrachian figures. The bronze drum was believed to be the reincarnation of the frog. Vietnamese scholars initially agreed that the animals were frogs in the 1970s, but later interpreted them as toads because "a widely known popular saying in Vietnam calls the toad 'the uncle of the heavenly god' and maintains that rain will inevitably fall when the toad raises his head and croaks." 

The motif of a long boat is another very popular decoration on the surface of the Dong Son (or Shizhaishan) drums (see Figure 6). Usually the two ends of the boat are decorated with the head and tail of a bird. In the boat are numerous ornamented human figures. There are fish under the boat and birds around the boat. Following Goloubew, Dao Duy Anh believed this was the "golden boat" described in the belief system of the Dayak people of Kalimantan in Indonesia that carries the spirits of dead people, symbolized by the birds, to heaven. He further concluded that there was a possible blood relationship between the Dayaks and the Lac Viet, and that the ancient Lac Viet could be the ancestors of the Dayaks.

Feng Hanji, a Chinese archaeologist, did not agree. He believed the motif of the long boat was a reflection of the popular custom of boat racing in southern China. According to Feng, the boat does not have an outrigger, thus, it could only have been used in rivers or small inner waters like the Dian Lake. Further, to decorate boats with birds was also an old tradition in China. He also believed that the motif might indicate some connections with the Chu. Ling Shunsheng, a Chinese ethnologist, wrote in 1950 that the motif of the long boat was a direct reflection of the custom of boat racing in ancient Chu. Although legend has it that the custom was to pay tribute to the memory of Qu Yuan, a Chu poet from the 3rd century BCE, Ling argued that the custom had an even earlier origin. Chinese scholars later pointed out that the boats on bronze drums were involved in four different kinds of activities which were all popular in ancient southern China, namely, fishing, navigating, boat racing, and offering sacrifices to the spirits of the river.
Vietnamese scholars later accepted the idea that the motif was about boat racing. However, they interpreted it as a part of the ancient Viet ceremony for seeking rain and water.[58]

As for the shining entity located in the center of the surface of bronze drums, some scholars have interpreted this as a star, while others have viewed it as the sun (see Figure 7). Vietnamese scholars have taken the position that this reflects the ancient Viet custom of worshipping the sun.[59] Meanwhile, Chinese scholars have argued that many ancient ethnic groups in China, such as the Shang (or Yin), the Chu, and other southern peoples, all worshipped the sun. Moreover, rulers tended to use the sun as a symbol of themselves.[60]

Figure 7: Shining Entities on Bronze Drums[61]

The two most common geometric motifs on bronze drums are believed to represent clouds and thunder. According to Chinese scholars, the same motifs can be found on the ancient carved-motif pottery of southern China, as well as the bronze wares of the Central Plain. The motifs, it was argued in the Zhongguo Gudai Tonggu, "prove the uniformity and continuity of the cultural development of ancient southern China and the frequent cultural exchange between southern China and the Central Plain."[62] They also reflect the custom of worshipping clouds and thunder in ancient China. These motifs appear only occasionally on Dong Son drums but can be frequently seen on Heger's Type II drums, most of which have been found in southern China especially the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Vietnamese scholars did not openly object to the Chinese claim that such motifs reflect Chinese influence; however, they strongly rejected the idea that such an influence proves that the bronze culture of the south developed under Chinese influence and that drums bearing such motifs are the most ancient.[63]

In sum, Vietnamese scholars tend to view the decorations of early bronze drums, especially the Dong Son drums, as a reflection of the special cultural characteristics of the ancient Viet people. They believe that the various motifs on the bronze drum describe the various aspects of the life of the ancient agrarian Viet culture of the Dong Son age.[64] They, therefore, argue that the decorations prove that the Dong Son drum belonged to the ancient Viet people. However, Chinese scholars interpret the decorations as a reflection of the cultural exchange between interior China and China's frontier, arguing that they represent the cultural features of the various peoples living in that area, and not just the Lac Viet. They do not deny the affiliation between the Dong Son drum and the Lac Viet, but they believe the same type of drum was also used by other ancient ethnic groups---such as the Dian, the Laojin, the Mimo, the Yelang and the Juding---believed to be the relatives of the Lac Viet. They thus contend that the earliest type drum was invented in a region belonging to modern China. According to them, "the Dong Son drum is a developed form of the imported Chinese Shizhaishan drum, which spread from Yunnan to Vietnam along the Red River."[65] Citing both historical records and archaeological findings, Chinese scholars have tried to prove that the earliest drum was invented by the Pu-Liao groups which included the Dian from the Dian Lake area of Yunnan, the Yeyu and Mifei of the Chuxiong and Erhai areas of Yunnan, the Yelang and Juding of western Guizhou, and the Qiongdu of southwestern Sichuan. According to Chinese scholars, the bronze drum was first
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invented by the Pu-Liao people on the eastern Yunnan plateau and then spread to the surrounding areas.[66] Chinese scholars have proposed that the Lac Viet also belonged to this Pu-Liao group and have cited the similarities between the Dian culture in Yunnan and the Dong Son culture of Vietnam as evidence.[67]

Nationalism and the Bronze Drum

The functions and the molding methods of the bronze drum also caused much controversy. However, these issues are less related to the origins of the bronze drum and, hence, differences on such issues have been more individual than national. Only in regards to issues that are more relevant to the ethnic and geographical origins of the bronze drum, such as its classification, dating and the interpretation of the decorations, can a clear national difference be discerned. In fact, the issue of the origin of the bronze drum came to resemble a sacred topic in both countries. The scholars in each country debated freely among themselves about many details. For example, there are Vietnamese scholars who support the Chinese claim that the flying bird is a heron, and Chinese scholars who believe that the bird is the totem of the Lac people.[68] However, once the debate touched on the key issue of origin, all scholars took a national stand. Therefore, the Vietnamese scholars who support the heron interpretation do not believe that there is a connection between the heron and the Chinese spirit of the drum, while the Chinese scholars following the Lac bird explanation do not think it has anything to do with the Vietnamese origin of the bronze drum. Hence, they have quarreled freely about the smaller details, but no one has dared to challenge the larger conclusions.

The origin of the bronze drum was deemed important by scholars in China and Vietnam during this period of time not only because of its academic significance, but also because of its political value, the latter probably outweighing the former. To the Chinese and Vietnamese scholars, the bronze drum was not just an archaeological artifact, but, more importantly, a crucial part of their national culture and national identity. The sound of the ancient bronze drum stimulated the modern nationalistic nerves of the archaeologists.

Communist victory in China and Vietnam brought about a process of reconstructing history which was in both countries guided by the two important principles of Marxism and nationalism. The research of sensitive topics concerning the past relationship between the two countries, such as the issue of the bronze drum, was always permeated by a strong nationalistic spirit. When the two countries enjoyed "comradeship plus brotherhood" (in Chinese, "Tongzhi jia xiongdi") from the 1950s to the mid 1970s, that spirit was covered with a Marxist Internationalist coating. Hence, the Vietnamese and Chinese scholars made their own nationalistic claims but never openly accused each other. For example, both Wen You and Dao Duy Anh published their works in the 1950s, Wen was the first Chinese scholar to attempt to modify Heger's classification to propose a China origin of the bronze drum, while Dao made the claim that the bronze drum was invented by the Lac Viet and then spread to some minority areas of Vietnam, southern China, and insular Southeast Asia. Their works went unnoticed for about two decades. It was not until the late 1970s that they were accused of mixing academic work with chauvinist or nationalistic agendas. The break-down of Sino-Vietnamese bilateral relations in
the late 1970s brought nationalism to the fore in both countries, thereby overriding the internationalism of the previous years.

For Vietnamese scholars, an essential part of reconstructing Vietnamese history was to prove the existence of the legendary Van Lang state established by the Hung Kings. This itself was in turn part of a larger program to prove that the Red River delta was an early center of civilization independent of the north. Their starting point was to establish a direct relationship between the Hung Kings and Dong Son culture, and then to prove that the Dong Son culture was native to northern Vietnam. To do so, they had to prove the native origin of the bronze drum because it is one of the most important artifacts of the Dong Son culture. Pham Huy Thong, who wrote the prefaces to the two special issues on bronze drums in the journal *Khao Co Hoc* (Archaeology) writes:

> In our process of studying the dawn of human history, namely, the age of the Hung Kings, the artifact that has gradually emerged as the most deserving symbol of the Hung Kings civilization is the bronze drum. More accurately speaking, it is the Type I drum among the four types classified by Heger in the beginning of this century.[69]

In his work on bronze drums published posthumously in 1990, he declared that "the Dong son drums were cast on Vietnamese soil by the bearers of the Dong Son culture at the time of state formation. They were the handiwork of the forebears of the present-day Vietnamese, the ancient Viet state builders who were conscious of their ethnic and cultural identity."[70] According to Pham, the idea that the bronze drum was an original and typical artifact of the Dong Son culture was first brought up in the four-volume collective historical work *Hung Vuong Duong Nuoc* (The Founding of the State by the Hung Kings). Published between 1969 and 1971, it was to become the foundation on which all further studies of the Dong Son culture were based.[71] A later book about how the Hung Kings built the Vietnamese nation has a picture of a bronze drum on its cover and lists the bronze drum as the most typical artifact of the Dong Son culture.[72]

For Chinese archaeologists, bronze drums served different purposes at different times. For the older generation of Chinese scholars like Luo Xianglin and Xu Songshi, not only the Han Chinese, but also the various ethnic groups in southern China, were all considered to be branches of the larger Han Chinese race. They supported Sun Yat-sen's claim that China had only five ethnic groups, namely, Han, Hui (Muslims), Manchus, Mongols, and Tibetans. That classification included most ethnic minorities in southern China in the Han group.[73] Both Luo and Xu were southerners themselves. To them, the bronze drum served as an indicator of the cultural achievement of the southern Chinese as well as a symbol of southern identity. After 1949, the Chinese government officially identified many southern groups as ethnic minorities independent of the Han. It encouraged scholars to prove that the minority peoples had their own cultural achievements, but also that historically there had been much mutual influence between the Han Chinese and the Southern minorities. As a result, the bronze drum, which was scorned by earlier Chinese scholars because of its "barbarian" origins,[74] was now regarded as one of the most magnificent material relics of the southern minority peoples and the symbol of interior/frontier cultural exchange. The Chinese archaeologist Wen You wrote, "If somebody asks, what
is the most important ancient cultural relic of our minority siblings in southern China, we can answer him unhesitatingly that it is the bronze drum." The bronze drum, he further claimed, was the "common treasure of all the people of China."[75] The two authors of an article about the ethnic affiliations of the various types of bronze drum concluded that their study "reflects in a specific aspect the process of ethnic mixture and cultural exchange among the brotherly ethnic groups of China," and "sufficiently proves that the various ethnic groups in southern China, together with other ethnic groups of China, created the great, brilliant ancient culture of the Chinese nation."[76] Such expressions are very common among Chinese archaeologists. Moreover, such research might also be related to the construction of local identities and the expressions of local pride, as evidenced by the subtle differences between the Guangxi and Yunnan scholars on the issue of the origins of the bronze drum.

The core issue is that both Vietnamese and Chinese scholars try to make exclusive claims to a tradition that was possibly shared by the ancestors of both the Vietnamese and the minority peoples of southern China. There was no boundary between southern China and northern Vietnam at the time the bronze drum was invented. Many of the groups living in that vast area were interrelated either biologically, culturally, or both. The people who invented the bronze drum would have had no consciousness of polities such as "Vietnam" or "China," as we do today. It is unfair to impose such modern concepts on ancient peoples and to determine exactly when, where, and who invented the bronze drum. Charles Higham, an outsider to these disputes, commented that the nationalistic bias of the Vietnamese and Chinese archaeologists had obscured the situation revealed by archaeology. He hypothesized that the bronze drum was created by the specialized artisans of a cluster of increasingly complex polities that spread across the present day Sino-Vietnamese border to arm the warriors of their polities and signal the high status of their leaders. He concludes,

Seeking the origins of this trend and the associated changes in material culture in one or other particular region misses the point. Changes were taking place across much of what is now southern China and the lower Red River Valley by groups which were exchanging goods and ideas, and responding to the expansion from the north of an aggressive, powerful state.[77]

Hence, the theme of the bronze drum could equally make for an excellent story about the cultural coprosperity and unity of the various peoples living in that area.

It is interesting to note that in order to prove the indigenous origins of the bronze drum (in either southern China or northern Vietnam), both Vietnamese and Chinese scholars have vehemently denied any possibility of a place of origin outside of the present-day southern China and northern Vietnam landmass. J.D.E. Schmeltz's (1896) theory about the Indian origin of the bronze drum, A.B. Meyer and W. Foy's (1897) theory about the Cambodian origin and R.Heine-Geldern's (1937) theory about the European origins of the Dong Son culture have all been criticised by both Vietnamese and Chinese scholars.[78] In fact, this is probably the only significant common ground for scholars from the two countries about the origin of the bronze drum.
The obscurity of the information about the bronze drum is an important element in the whole debate. There are no inscriptions on the bronze drums. The records in Chinese classics about the origins of the bronze drum are not supported by solid evidence and are often contradictory. Modern techniques have also failed to provide hard evidence about its origin. As a result, neither side has been able to persuade the other. All conclusions made about the origin of the bronze drum are more or less speculations, which are the result of limited archaeological information and nationalistic sentiment. In other words, the bronze drum is an artifact ambiguous enough for both sides to render some meaningful interpretation for themselves. The same ambiguity makes it difficult for an outsider to determine who is right and who is wrong.

Largely as a result of improved Sino-Vietnamese bilateral relations, the crossfire between Chinese and Vietnamese scholars over issues surrounding bronze drums has come to an end. However, neither side has changed its stand. They have just set the topic aside or have made their own claims from time to time without openly accusing the opposite side, a situation similar to that which prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s. The issue has become less important but remains unresolved, and it will probably reemerge under new circumstances. There may be more academic exchanges between Chinese and Vietnamese scholars in the future and more research on other aspects of the bronze drum may take place as well. However, the views on the origins of the bronze drum held by each respective side are not likely to change in the near future. This intransigence is the result of a tradition that has existed in the two countries for a long time: a tradition of making official history and using the past to serve the present.

Notes

1 Zhongguo Gudai Tonggu Yanjiuhui, *Zhongguo gudai tonggu* (The Ancient Bronze Drums of China) (Beijing: Wenwu Press, 1988), 8. Hereafter, ZGTY. According to this book, the numbers of bronze drums stored in various provinces and cities are as follows: Guangxi: 560; Guangdong: 230; Shanghai: 230; Yunnan: 160; Guizhou: 88; Beijing: 84; Sichuan: 51; Hunan: 27; Shandong: 8; Hubei: 6; Zhejiang: 6; Liaoning: 4. The total number of bronze drums stored in China remained unchanged in 1995. See *Shijie ribao* (World Journal), "Nanfang tonggu wenhua yanjiu you chengguo" (Results have been achieved in the Study of the bronze drums of southern China), 13 January 1995, 11.

2 Nguyen Duy Hinh, "Bronze Drums in Vietnam," *The Vietnam Forum* 9 (1987): 4-5; Pham Huy Thong, *Dong Son Drums in Vietnam*, (Hanoi: The Vietnam Social Science Publishing House, 1990), 265. Some more Dong Son drums have been found in Vietnam since then. For example, in 1994, a Dong Son drum later named a Ban Khooc drum was found in Son La Province in northwestern Vietnam. Pham Quoc Quan and Nguyen Van Doan, "Trong Dong Son La" (The Son La Bronze Drum), *Khao Co Hoc* 1 (1996): 10.

3 Xu Songshi, *Baiyue xiongfeng lingnan tonggu* (The Masculine Spirit of the Hundred-Yue and
the Bronze Drums of Southern China), Asian Folklore & Social Life Monographs 95 (Taibei: The Orient Cultural Service, 1977), 7-8.


5 Jiang Tingyu, Tonggu shihua (History of the Bronze Drum) (Beijing, Wen Wu Press, 1982), 18.

6 For a comprehensive introduction to and list of Western archaeological works on the bronze drum see Pham Minh Huyen, Nguyen Van Huyen and Trinh Sinh, Trong Dong Son (The Dong Son Drums) (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1987), 12-14, 306-309; ZGTY, 10-12.


8 Pham, Nguyen and Trinh.

9 Pham, Nguyen and Trinh, 19-21; ZGTY, 10-11.

10 Pham Huy Thong, Dong Son Drums in Vietnam, 4.

11 Pham, Nguyen and Trinh, 21-22.


15 Diep Dinh Hoa and Pham Minh Huyen, "Ve viec chia loai trong loai I Hego va moi quan he giua loai trong nay voi cac loai trong khac" (The Classification of Heger's Type I Bronze Drums and Its Relationship with Other Types of Bronze Drum), Khao Co Hoc 13 (1974): 126-134.

16 Pham, Nguyen and Trinh, 23-34, 120-123.

17 For example, Heger's Type II were mostly found in southern China and among the Muong minority of Vietnam; Type III existed in Burma and southern China but not in Vietnam; Type IV were believed to exist in southern China only. Pham Huy Thong, "Trong Dong" (The Bronze Drum)
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It was reported in the 1980s that 14 Type III drums and 6 Type IV drums had been found in Vietnam. Nguyen Duy Hinh, 4.

18 ZGTY, 12.


22 Li Weiqing, 66-78.


24 Wen You worked in Sichuan as a University professor for more than ten years before he moved to Beijing in the mid-1950s. He wrote in 1956 that he first became interested in the bronze drum when he saw a beautiful bronze drum in Hanoi more than a decade earlier. Wen You, preface.


26 *Shijie ribao*, 13 January 1995, 11.

27 ZGTY, Plate IX.

28 Fan Chengda, a scholar-official of the Song Dynasty (960-1279 AD) first suggested that the bronze drum was invented by Ma Yuan. A scholar in the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) first recorded that the big bronze drum was invented by Ma Yuan, and the small one by Zhuge Liang. F. Hirth tried to prove these stories in two articles published in 1898 and 1904. Zheng Shixu (Cheng Shih-hsu), *Tonggu kaolue* (A Study of the Bronze Drum) (Shanghai: Shanghai Museum, 1936), 3-5, 14, 33-37.

29 Nguyen Duy Hinh, "Ve guan diem cua mot so hoc gia Trung Quoc nghien cuu trong dong nguoi Viet" (A Review of the Views of Some Chinese Scholars on the Bronze Drums of the
The Present Echoes of the Ancient Bronze Drum: Nationalism and Archeology in Modern Vietnam and China


31 Pham Huy Thong, Dong Son Drums in Vietnam, 269.


34 Nguyen Van Huyen, "Tu chia loai nhom den tim hieu nien dai va que huong cua trong dong co" (From the Classification and Sub-classification of the Ancient Bronze Drums to the Understanding of their Dating and Origins), Khao Co Hoc 13 (1974), 101; Chu Van Tan, "Nien dai trong Dong Son," 114.

35 Diep Dinh Hoa and Pham Minh Huyen, 131.

36 Luu Tran Tieu and Nguyen Minh Chuong, 119.

37 Pham, Nguyen and Trinh, 216-217.

38 ZGTY, 110.

39 Wang Dadao, "Yunnan qingtong wenhua jichi yu Yuenan Dongshan wenhua, Taiguo Banching wenhua de guanxi" (The Bronze Culture of Yunnan and its relations with the Dong Son Culture of Vietnam and the Ban Chiang Culture of Thailand), Kaogu 6 (1990): 536, 540.

40 Chu Van Tan, "Phai chang ho da tim thay trong X?," 30, 32.

41 Dao Tu Khai, "Chim Lac hay con co? Ngoi sao hay mat troi?" (Lac Bird or Heron? Star or Sun?), Khao Co Hoc 14 (1974): 27.

42 Dao Tu Khai, 27.


44 Dao Tu Khai, 28-29.
45 ZGTY, 157.

46 ZGTY, 233.


48 ZGTY, 160-161.


50 Vu The Long, 17.

51 Pham Huy Thong, *Dong Son Drums in Vietnam*, 268.

52 Pham Huy Thong, *Dong Son Drums in Vietnam*, 154.


54 Tong Enzheng, 178.


56 Ling Chunsheng, "Ji benxia o er tonggu jianluan tonggu de qiyuan he fenbu" (On the Two Bronze Drums Stored at National Taiwan University and the Origin and Distribution of the Bronze Drums), in Ling Chunsheng, ed., *Zhongguo bianjiang yu huan taipingyang wenhua* (The Culture of Chinese Border Areas and the Pacific), Vol. I, (Taipei: Lianjing chuban sheye gongsi, 1979), 542.

57 ZGTY, 175-181.

58 Pham, Nguyen and Trinh, 239.

59 Dao Tu Khai, 30.

60 ZGTY, 151.

61 ZGTY, 152.

62 ZGTY, 154.
63 Nguyen Duy Hinh, "Ve guan diem," 23.

64 Tran Quoc Vuong, "Trong dong va tam thuc Viet co" (The Bronze Drum and the Mentality of the Ancient Viet People), *Khao Co Hoc* 3 (1982): 25; Dao Tui Khai, 28-29.

65 ZGTY, 127-129.

66 Wang Ningsheng, 305; Tong Enzheng, 181.

67 Tong Enzheng, 173-174.


70 Phan Huy Thong, Dong Son Drums in Vietnam, 262.

71 Phan Huy Thong, Dong Son Drums in Vietnam, 264.


74 For example, Wen You lamented that traditional Chinese scholars before the Qing dynasty seldom paid serious attention to the bronze drum because it did not have inscriptions and was believed to have been made by "barbarians." During the Qing dynasty, however, more attention was paid to the bronze drum and several books were produced. Wen attributed this to the general increase in popularity of the Ma Yuan and Zhuge Liang myth after the Song dynasty. Wen You, preface.

75 Wen You, preface.


78 ZGTY, 10-11; Phan Huy Thong, Dong Son Drums in Vietnam,, 263-264.
Last September, Indonesian President Suharto addressed his country’s state-controlled media to publicly apologize for the massive forest fires that were wreaking havoc with the atmosphere of other countries in the region. At the time, "haze" from dozens of fires blazing out of control on several of Indonesia's islands was drifting into neighboring Malaysia and Singapore, causing dangerously high levels of air pollution and contributing to a variety of fatal accidents throughout Southeast Asia.

Suharto blamed drought conditions brought about by that year's El Niño current for causing the fires, and vowed that his government was stepping up efforts to put an end to the blazes. He could have left it at that. In the next breath, however, the man who has ruled Indonesia with an iron fist for over thirty years added democracy and human rights into the equation.

"We truly understand that...protecting the environment, developing democracy and upholding human rights...are indeed important conditions for the growth and development of the nation," Suharto declared. "Failure to handle the issues can become a source of disaster for our offspring in the future."[1]

Why, many outside observers ask, would an authoritarian like Suharto even mention democracy or human rights -- issues that have been anathema to his rule from its very beginning -- when discussing environmental problems? Coming from the chief of a government that stakes its legitimacy on its ability to deliver economic prosperity, admitting that environmental concerns,
democratization, and human rights are part of the same equation makes for a surprising
pronouncement indeed.

Yet for Indonesia's burgeoning community of non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
Suharto's admission represented a vindication of their efforts to influence public policy in their
country. Currently totaling over 8,000, many of Indonesia's NGOs have long been saying -- often
at their own peril -- that needs Indonesia greater political participation in order to safeguard
future development.

Leaders of environmental NGOs have been at the forefront of these calls for political
liberalization in Indonesia. "The only way to be anti-Suharto is through the environmental
movement," one NGO activist went so far as to say. "There is no other way to talk about Suharto
or human rights."[2]

In the past, there has been little love lost between Indonesia's NGOs and Suharto's so-called
"New Order" government, which traditionally disdains non-governmental involvement in
political matters.

"They [NGOs] may claim to be supporters of campaigns to defend worker's rights or even protect
the environment but later involve themselves in political activities," said one high-ranking
government official earlier last year. "That," he intoned, "is not acceptable."[3]

Yet Indonesia's recent environmental and financial crises have made NGO criticism of
governmental policies all the more powerful, if still not officially "acceptable." Moreover,
growing domestic and international recognition of their political leverage indicates that future
political change in Indonesia will undoubtedly directly involve the country's NGO community.

This essay explores the role Indonesia's NGOs, and its environmental NGOs in particular,
currently play in Indonesian society as advocates for political reform. I will begin this essay with
a survey of the history of political pluralism in Indonesia, and will discuss contemporary non-
governmental organizations as being the last remnant of that tradition permitted under
Suharto's all-encompassing rule. As background to the rise of Indonesia's environmental
movement, I will then discuss the most pressing and the most publicized of Indonesia's
environmental concerns. Focusing on several case studies involving Indonesian NGOs -- and in
particular, the controversial Indonesian Forum for the Environment -- I will analyze the real
impact NGO activities have had on political liberalization to date in New Order Indonesia.

**Colonialism to "Guided Democracy": The Rise and Fall of Political Pluralism**

Mass organization has played a central role in Indonesian society since well before the country's
independence. What began as small self-help cooperatives in the nineteenth century among
peasants, urban workers, indigenous petty traders, and intellectuals evolved into embryonic
political movements that became vehicles for popular anti-Dutch sentiment.[4] Often directed
by a cadre of educated, charismatic indigenous leaders, the mushrooming of these anti-colonial mass organizations in the early twentieth century gave birth to the zaman bergerak, 'the era of movement,' in Indonesian history.

The zaman bergerak began largely with Islamic, nationalist groups like Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) and the Mummadiyah (Followers of Muhammad).[5] Following on their heels was another wave of mostly nationalist mass-based associations and youth organizations. In 1927, a group of Dutch-educated nationalists led by a 26-year-old Sukarno established the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). While often suppressed by the Dutch, these early mass organizations were given new life when the onset of WWII saw the passing of colonial control over Indonesia from the Netherlands' strict imperial rule to an unquestionably brutal, though in many ways more politically liberal Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1945.

During the Japanese occupation, many mass organizations coalesced into political parties, including various Islamic parties and the Indonesian Communist Party.[6] Along with Sukarno's PNI, these political organizations were instrumental in securing further liberalization from the Japanese colonial masters. Other mass organizations born at this time developed into labor unions, farmers and fishermen associations, youth and women alliances, or other types of NGOs.[7]

As Indonesia passed from partial to full independence under Sukarno, political pluralism reached dizzying heights. In 1945 Sukarno articulated the state ideology, Pancasila,[8] in an effort "to bind together the diverse groups of an extremely pluralistic society."[9] Nonetheless, extreme political pluralism in the new country resulted in what Benedict Anderson (1994) described as "a kind of permanent round-the-clock politics in which mass organizations competed with each other at every conceivable level without there being any real resolution."[10]

By 1950 some thirteen major parties were politically active, each representing a particular class, ethnicity, ideology, or Islamic group. Continuous disagreement and infighting among the various political factions virtually paralyzed Sukarno's government. Between 1950 and 1956, Sukarno was forced to dissolve and reform his cabinet six times. In Indonesia's 1955 elections -- considered the fairest ever in the history of the country -- Sukarno's PNI barely managed to hold on to power, garnering just 22.3 percent of the popular vote. With such a narrow mandate, Sukarno could not form a cohesive ruling coalition, and the government once again dissolved into chaos.[11]

Declaring the present arrangement unworkable, Sukarno effectively ended Indonesia's brief experiment with parliamentary democracy in 1956. Backed by both the PNI and the Communist Party, Sukarno dismissed the national assembly and voided the country's nine-year old constitution, proclaiming an era of "Guided Democracy." From 1956 until his overthrow by the military in the mid-1960s, Sukarno became increasingly left-leaning and authoritarian.

Student Activism and the Ascendancy of the New Order
Beginning in the early 1960s, student and intellectual activism became an increasingly important political force. Sukarno oversaw the establishment of the Communist Party-affiliated People's Cultural Institute, called Lekra, which sought to repress and harass intellectuals deemed to be less-than revolutionary. The predominantly upper- and middle-class students and intellectuals strongly resented Lekra, and what began as dissatisfied grumblings with that organization snowballed into widespread student protest against Sukarno's undemocratic and corrupt rule as a whole. The student protests, in turn, became flashpoints for popular anti-Sukarno sentiment from many sectors of the population.

As the governing communist and leftist alliance crumbled in the mid-1960s, students "heightened the sense of crisis -- of an uncontrolled situation" with near-daily public protests against Sukarno's rule. When the military came to power promising to reestablish order and eliminate corruption, students and intellectuals joined them in calling for the "simplification" and reduction of political parties for the sake of social stability. Seeking to establish a dual-party democratic system, these activists garnered substantial public support for the new military government and their proclaimed New Order under the slogan "politics no, development yes" in a campaign to replace "ideological factionalism with the development programme." 

Yet while sharing the frustrations of students and intellectuals with the political instability and economic stagnation that characterized Sukarno's rule, "Suharto came to power determined to restrict the political process to a small elite in the belief that less politics was a necessary precondition for a prolonged period of economic development." 

Soon after taking power, Suharto's party, Golkar, introduced the "floating mass" concept of political participation whereby the populace would be "allowed to vote once every five years but otherwise refrain from political activity." The nine remaining political parties, excluding Golkar, were "encouraged" to dissolve and reform as two new parties: the United Development Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party. Even when elections were held, the results were obviously manipulated by the central party. If the military had not interfered with the election, said one General Soemitro, "the Muslim parties would have won. I can assure you that!"

This kind of "democracy" was well suited to Suharto's vision of political organization. After all, he reasoned, "with one and only one road already mapped out, why should we then have nine different cars? The General Elections must serve the very purpose for which they are held, that is, to create political stability. Only these kinds of elections are of value to us."

While accommodating student activists in the early years of his rule -- even going so far as to allocate several parliamentary seats to student leaders until the early 1970s -- Suharto gradually began depoliticizing Indonesia's campuses as part of an overall effort to curtail political pluralism.

Student and intellectual support for Suharto came to an abrupt end in January 1974, when demonstrations against the high levels of Japanese economic influence in Indonesia resulted in the arrest of student leaders and the banning of several liberal newspapers. The ability of
students to organize en masse was gradually eroded until Suharto imposed the Campus Normalization Act of 1978 which effectively ended the possibility of student activism. Further protests were met with violence, and the government abolished the dewan mahasiswa -- university-wide student councils -- that had previously provided the framework for student political activities.

Owing to their former partnership, however, student groups were among the last of the mass organizations to suffer from Suharto's deep antipathy towards political pluralism. Indeed, the ascendency of the New Order government witnessed "the steady weakening of political parties and other society-based forces, such as pressure groups, social classes, [and] voluntary organizations such as NGOs."

Suharto's government established the principle of perwadahkan tunggal, meaning "the only, rightful place," by which most non-governmental associations, unions or other popular movements were forced to place themselves under government-sponsored umbrella organizations. Political pluralism and rights of free association were made subject to increasingly harsh restrictions as the New Order government solidified its power base, while those who continued to openly challenge Suharto's rule were co-opted by the regime or eliminated.

The Transformation of the NGO in the New Order

Although forcefully insistent on the right of his government to silence political protest or pluralism, Suharto has never sought the destruction of Indonesian civil society altogether. Rather, recognizing the need for controllable structures that can accommodate Indonesia's tradition of civic involvement, the New Order government has allowed new kinds of depoliticized NGOs to become "a legitimate channel for social and political participation which has otherwise been blocked by the government."

At the same time, however, Jakarta has closely monitored and moved quickly to restrict any activities by NGOs that may constitute a political challenge to the authority of Suharto's regime. New Order authorities guard their government's legitimacy so jealously that the "non-governmental" phrase in the term "NGO" has been deemed to come uncomfortably close to connoting "anti-government." In order to avoid harassment and intimidation, Indonesian NGOs are obliged to use the term lembaga pengembangan swadaya masyarakat (LPSM), meaning "self-reliant community development institution." Smaller NGOs often call themselves simply "self-reliant community institution" and use the Indonesian acronym LSM. Although the term NGO is still used owing to its wide international currency, all non-governmental organizations in the New Order are careful to stress their "community" and "development"-oriented outlooks.

The central government has typically sought to channel NGOs towards its stated goals of economic development, relying on them to render services and expertise to Indonesians that the central government is unwilling or unable to provide. Voluntary organizations aimed at
promoting community self-reliance through work in such fields as local development, education, cooperative housing, and local agricultural projects -- in short, anything deemed sufficiently "apolitical" by Suharto -- have actually been encouraged by the New Order government.[29]

Keeping carefully within the guidelines of perwadahkan tunggal, these types of NGOs are unsurprisingly marked by a high level of cooperation with the state.[30] Their work is generally on the local level and is grassroots-oriented. Frequently working in conjunction with government officials or programs, these LPSMs have been so effective that a number of them have achieved region- or nation-wide recognition.

One such group is the Nuclear Smallholders' Scheme (NSS) based in West Sumatra. Begun in the early years of the New Order government, this LPSM helps small farmers pool management expertise and, in cooperation with the West Sumatra Development Bank, assists them in securing and managing loans. A related LSM started by NSS is the Yayasan Suluh Desa, which now operates schools, community workshops, and small shops as well as health, livestock, and fishpond programs.[31]

Another LPSM with close governmental ties (its director was made head of the government-affiliated farmer's organization) is Bina Swadaya, an organization that also works in agricultural development and with community savings groups. Begun in 1957, Bina Swadaya has grown to a national organization in the New Order, holding training workshops for government officials and village heads alike on the implementation and management of community development programs.[32]

In the early 1970s, NGOs with markedly different attitudes towards cooperation with and co-optation by the state began to emerge. While also coordinating a number of activities ostensibly aimed at "community development" or simply "development," these groups have sought to influence government policy at the highest levels through grassroots organizing and, more recently, through limited media campaigns in both the local and international press. It is the efforts of these organizations to achieve a measure of participation in the political decision-making process that "constitute the first signs of societal pluralism in Indonesia's authoritarian political order" since Suharto's rise to power.[33]

It is no coincidence that increasing numbers of activist NGOs came into existence as Suharto tightened his grip on campus protests. Prohibited from other forms of political involvement, many of these newer NGOs were established by intellectuals and former student activists themselves.[34]

The Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education and Information (LP3ES) is one such group. Espousing moderate Islamic values, LP3ES maintains small industrial projects, household economy programs and various other educational programs in pesantren[35] throughout the country in an attempt to foster autonomous, regional development in a manner that is "more culturally indigenous and less socially alienating" than the government's
NGOs, the Environment and Political Pluralism in New Order Indonesia

LP3ES also publishes Prisma, one of Indonesia's leading journals of social affairs.

One of the most radical NGOs to emerge under the New Order is the Indonesia Legal Aid Foundation -- Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (LBHI). Through its work, LBHI seeks to make public its efforts to improve the rule of law in Indonesia. Arguing that "equality before the law will remain an impractical ideal unless gross imbalances in wealth and power are corrected," LBHI and its local affiliates provide legal representation and assistance to small labor associations (groups that, while under the aegis of the national labor union, are unable to obtain satisfactory representation), small businessmen, squatters, small landholders, and the like. Historically affiliated with dissident politicians and frequently taking on cases that are embarrassing to the regime, LBHI officials are frequently the targets of censure or harassment by Suharto's government, and have been forbidden to leave the country on several occasions.

The Environment and Development in Indonesia

By the time Suharto formally took over the reigns of government in 1968, Sukarno's disastrous economic legacy seemed an almost insurmountable problem. According to the World Bank, over sixty percent of Indonesians lived in poverty at the time. Inflation was over one thousand percent per year, while the government was saddled with a massive budget deficit and a foreign deficit of US$2 billion -- the yearly interest on which exceeded the country's total export revenue. Factories were operating at a fraction of capacity and with outdated equipment, and the country's infrastructure was in a shambles. Once a major grain supplier to the region, Indonesia had become the largest purchaser of rice in the world by the end of Sukarno's regime. Sukarno's fiery rhetoric and closed door policies had also alienated foreign donor institutions and slowed foreign investment to a trickle.

Suharto came to power promising to change Indonesia's economic situation, and economic development became the raison d'être for his government. Engaging a group of Berkeley-trained economists -- the technocrats, otherwise known as the "Berkeley mafia" -- to get the economy moving at all costs, Suharto flung open the nation's doors to foreign investment and funneled oil revenue into the construction of factories for the making of steel, paper, textiles and the like.

Suharto's development efforts also focused on the rapid exploitation of Indonesia's natural wealth in order to boost foreign revenue. While developing the national oil industry, the New Order government also moved to tap the forest resources of the countryside. Claiming sole jurisdiction over a staggering 74 percent of all land in Indonesia, Jakarta began granting logging concessions to state-run and private companies over vast tracts of prime timber areas for next to nothing. The 1967 Foreign Capital Investment Law encouraged multinational corporations to extract timber from the country's outer islands, granting them as well as domestic logging companies five year tax income holidays, which some companies have been able to extend to up to fifteen years.
Massive timber extraction over the years made Indonesia one of the largest exporters of wood products in the world, and by the late 1980s, Indonesia accounted for more than 70 percent of the world trade in plywood.[44] Like any lucrative industry in the New Order economy, government interests have historically been closely involved in natural resource exploitation. In 1980, 24 of the 34 local companies engaged in the timber business involved high-ranking military personnel.[45]

The efficient exploitation of Indonesia's natural resources has contributed substantially to the steady growth rates that have characterized Suharto's rule. However, the Washington-based World Resources Institute estimates that, once the deleterious effects to the environment are accounted for (a factor ignored by traditional accounting methods), Indonesia's real growth from 1971 to 1984 has only been 4 percent annually, rather than the 7.1 percent suggested by traditional economic measures.[46] Although such statistics must be treated with some caution, it is clear that much of Indonesia's growth in the New Order has come at a steep price to the natural environment.

With 10 percent of the world's rain forests (second only to Brazil), Indonesia is losing as much as one million hectares of forest every year. The timber trade, commercial plantations of palm and rubber, and massive state-sponsored resettlement programs have also led to the large-scale clearing of land. Owing to the destruction of the country's rainforests, Indonesia currently has a longer list of endangered species than Brazil.[47]

The effects of deforestation are felt throughout the country. Following the clear-cutting of rainforest, the thin layer of tropical topsoil that anchors the forest's tremendous biodiversity quickly washes away, rendering the land unable to regenerate forest growth and making it useless for cultivation. As a result, the government has classified 8.6 million hectares of Indonesia as "critical land," defined as "land which is generally unable to fulfill any of the normal soil functions, including water absorption or the production of even a meager subsistence crop."[48] An additional 20 million hectares of land have been classified "non-arable" following deforestation, and another 12 million hectares are judged to have "serious erosion problems." These "erosion problems" are conservatively estimated by the government to lead to crop yields falling by 5 percent per year.[49] Environmentalists outside the country put the direct costs to the Indonesian economy at close to US$1 billion per year.[50]

Indonesia's rapidly expanding industrial sector has begun to cause a number of environmental problems as well. Factories are usually built next to rivers so that industrial waste may be disposed of easily, often without prior treatment. Some twenty major rivers in Indonesia are classified by the government as having "acute" pollution problems. These include the Musi River in South Sumatra, where 14 ice factories pour untreated ammonia directly into the water; the Barito in South Kalimantan, where pulp and plywood factories have largely destroyed the local fishing industry; and the Cipinang near Jakarta, where the tens tons of chemical waste per day that are poured into the river have reportedly even reduced the local mosquito population, not to mention that of other animals in the area.[51] Coupled with the high number of rivers that suffer from siltation owing to upland deforestation, river pollution has adversely affected much of
Indonesia's rural population that relies solely on rivers for their water supply.

Industrial pollution has become relatively serious in some urban areas as well. Motor vehicle and factory emissions have resulted in dangerously high air pollution in a number of Java's major cities. In one factory area, a recent survey showed that 24 percent of the local population suffered from acute respiratory disease.[52] Unchecked industrialization has also been at the root of several catastrophic environmental accidents, such as the abrupt release of waste from a fertilizer plant in Aceh that polluted fish stock in ponds within a 500 hectare radius.[53]

The Rise of Environmental NGOs

Bowing to international pressure and acknowledging the real need for pollution control in its rush towards development, Indonesia's central government established the Ministry for Development Supervision and the Environment in 1978.[54] As originally conceived, the Ministry's sole purpose was to promote an efficient, economically and "environmentally sound development," defined as the "conscious and planned endeavor to utilize and manage resources wisely in sustainable development to improve the quality of life."[55]

Yet the former technocrat appointed to head the new ministry, Emil Salim, shocked both his employers and the international community with the vigor with which he pursued environmental causes under the aegis of "sustainable development." Serving as State Minister for the Environment from 1978 to 1993, Salim proved to be "a tireless advocate for the environment who [was] not afraid to criticize the environmental records of industry, forestry concessionaires, and mining companies, many of whom have close ties to the Suharto government."[56]

While Salim's championing of environmental causes led Western conservationists and development agencies to cite him as "the single ray of hope in an otherwise environmentally unenlightened government,"[57] the close ties between the Suharto regime and the businesses criticized by Salim's ministry forced the minister to constantly walk what one analyst calls "a tightrope between taking action on the environment and holding onto his position within the government."[58]

Despite the high regard in which he was held by foreign environmentalists, Salim's controversial tenureship did not help the position of his ministry vis-a-vis the rest of the New Order government. Quickly realizing that Suharto intended the Ministry for the Environment to remain underfunded and, as one foreign official put it, "weak politically...lack[ing] the ability to enforce any of its legislation," Salim took the initiative to cultivate the support of NGOs to build a domestic constituency for sustainable development with considerable donor support.[59]

Indonesia's landmark Environmental Management Act of 1982, written mainly within the Ministry for the Environment, therefore deliberately called on NGOs to play a "participatory role"[60] in the development process and "recognized the right of NGOs to act as community institutions for environmental management and development."[61]
Encouraged by the Ministry for the Environment, the number of environmental NGOs mushroomed over the course of Salim's career. Where there were once virtually no environmentally-focused organizations, observers wrote that there were suddenly "hundreds springing up around the nation."[62]

In many respects, the rest of the Suharto government welcomed the skyrocketing number of international and domestic environmental NGOs in Indonesia. In fact, the government came to rely on the funds and expertise of many of them. The World-Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), for example, now helps manage 17 out of Indonesia's 32 national parks. With an annual budget of US$5 million and a large staff that includes 15 foreigners, the Switzerland-based organization maintains a close working relationship with the New Order government.[63]

Like many of their peer organizations in other fields, the bulk of the domestic environmental NGOs that sprouted up in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s work with local governments and within small communities to provide necessary services while remaining well within the boundaries of perwadahkan tunggal. The Yogyakarta-based CD Bethesda, for example, received a national award in 1979 from President Suharto for tapping underground aquifers to provide drinking water to several of the surrounding communities.[64]

At the urging of the Ministry for the Environment, various local and regional NGOs played a key role in the government's Clean River Program (Prokasih Kali Bersih). Providing pollution monitors and community organizers that the government could scarce afford, environmental NGOs worked closely with government officials to significantly reduce the pollution loads of 24 of the country's most polluted rivers within two years.[65]

Unwilling or unable to help all of the myriad communities scattered throughout the Indonesian archipelago cope with the sometimes severe environmental impacts of rapid development, New Order officials offer cautious praise for the activities of many of these NGOs. "If we look at the total number of LSMs in Indonesia, they are quite promising in terms of becoming a national asset, in their efforts to improve the quality of life and the welfare of the people," said Djon Sani, head of the Sub-Directorate on Development and Guidance within the Office of Social and Political Affairs. "Nevertheless," Sani continued, "there are a few LSMs, just the minority...which have become involved in opposition activity."[66]

A disproportionate number of the NGOs Sani and his employers are worried about hail from the environmental sector. For "sustainable development," as conceived of by Suharto's government and as referred to in the Ministry for the Environment's original charter, has become quite a different thing in the hands of many of the NGOs under Salim's protective wing. Rather than simply connoting a means to soften the rougher edges of rapid development, most of the larger, Jakarta-based NGOs or networks of NGOs have adopted a broader definition of "sustainable development" whose main features include a concern for:
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inter-generational equity; improving human welfare (i.e., poverty alleviation); distributional equity (i.e., economic growth with equity); balanced or sound resource use (i.e., sound resource management); maintaining the carrying capacity of the biological system by promoting environmental protection; and the "participation of all sectors of society in decision-making" [my emphasis].[67]

As one of the only (somewhat) acceptable forums where such ideas can be forwarded in New Order Indonesia, many environmental NGOs have begun to serve as focal points for political activism, particularly for students. As many environmental NGOs provide useful and inexpensive services to Indonesian communities, however, the New Order government has largely tolerated even some of the more radical aspects the environmental "movement" as being "a politically attractive way to channel student frustration." Student activism in support of environmental causes is therefore often "quite acceptable in Indonesia, whereas more direct protest against the government and its other policies is not."[68]

Encouraging NGOs to act as a sort of a proxy for his essentially toothless ministry, Emil Salim has thus managed to call greater attention to -- and attract outside funds for -- Indonesia's myriad environmental problems.

Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI): A Legal Challenge to the New Order

One of the most outspoken environmental NGOs to emerge since the establishment of the Ministry for the Environment is the Indonesian Forum for the Environment, known by its Indonesian acronym WALHI (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia). Founded in 1980, WALHI is a Jakarta-based network of local and regional NGOs located throughout the Indonesian archipelago.

As the environmental movement in Indonesia has grown, so has WALHI's numbers and its political voice. Since its inception, WALHI has grown from a loose grouping of a couple dozen environmental NGOs to a network of over three hundred members.[69] In addition to providing a forum for its constituent organizations, the central office in Jakarta become a vocal critic of national environmental policies in its own right.

In the name of "sustainable development," WALHI has frequently pressed the New Order government for greater political pluralism. Openly disagreeing with Jakarta on issues ranging from endangered species management to indigenous peoples' rights to the granting of logging concessions over "public" land, WALHI publicly calls for a "development process in which the people of Indonesia have a decisive voice in the formulation of policy about resource use in their areas."[70]

Unlike the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (LBHI), WALHI can count on its environmental focus to lend its political efforts greater legitimacy. As WALHI's first executive director, Erna Witoelar, said in 1983: "There is no lack of sincere and broad-minded government officials, and it is only beneficial to the environmental movement that we join forces with them to fight the
same war, even in different battles and using different tactics."[71]

WALHI's most dramatic challenge to Suharto's development policies came in December 1988, when the organization led a suit against PT Inti Indorayon Utama Ltd., a pulp and rayon factory based in northern Sumatra and backed by Suharto's eldest son, along with several government ministries for compensation for damages caused by the factory's unchecked pollution and deforestation of the surrounding area.

In complete disregard for the detailed environmental stipulations inserted by the Ministry for the Environment into its government-issued operating contract, Indorayon had been dumping chemical wastes directly into the nearby Asahan River and rapidly depleting local forest stocks for its pulp mill. At one point a poorly-maintained chlorine tank located next to the river exploded. Wearing gas masks, Indorayon officials went from village to village in the area assuring people that all was safe.[72] Although concerns for Indorayon's cavalier behavior towards the environment were raised by the Ministry for the Environment, the company's powerful supporters -- which went all the way up to the President's office -- swept them aside.

With fish dying in the Asahan River and local people complaining of skin irritation, WAHLI, together with legal assistance from LBHI, filed suit against both Indorayon and the government, claiming that negligence by the latter, in failing to enforce its own environmental regulations, was responsible for much of the damage.

The suit, which has come to be regarded as a "milestone in the history of environmental advocacy in Indonesia,"[73] drew extensive media attention both domestically and internationally and by many accounts became a tremendous embarrassment to Suharto personally.[74] The case was a radical step indeed; never before had any non-government organization challenged the authority and the effectiveness of the New Order so directly.

Not surprisingly, WAHLI lost the suit in short order. But the moral victory belonged to the environmentalists. Even in allowing the suit to proceed, the Indonesian courts had acknowledged for the first time that an agency could represent the environment, or a community, that was not the central government itself. In the words of a WAHLI official, the case "laid the groundwork for future victories for the environment and the Indonesian people."[75]

**NGOs and Social Control in the New Order**

Buoyed by such victories, environmental NGOs became increasingly critical of government policies throughout the 1980s and '90s. Under the rubric of "sustainable development," many environmental NGOs have also expanded the scope of their advocacy work to include calling for government aid in alleviating poverty alleviation and working for labor rights.

Yet NGOs also have been repeatedly cautioned to lower their profile. As even Emil Salim said:
As long as the differences [between NGOs and the state] concerns problems of implementation, then the NGOs' right to exist is guaranteed. But if the differences concern more 'philosophical' differences in ideology or differences in national aims, then clearly any NGO with those sorts of differences with the government will not have the right to exist.[76]

The contradictory situation this requirement placed on many of the more progressive NGOs in Indonesia was summed up by Abdul Hakim, chairman of LBHI:

We are not in any sense a political party. We are not seeking to change the government. But it is also wrong to say NGOs cannot play politics. Their main activity is to influence policy -- which means playing politics.[77]

In reality, 'playing politics' in order to influence policy has led many Indonesian NGO activists, particularly those in the environmental field, to begin lobbying outright for a change of government. Their growing demands have taken subtle and not-so-subtle forms.

At a national-level seminar on "Motivating Private Sector and NGOs' Participation in Environmentally Sound and Sustainable Development," sponsored by Emil Salim's Ministry of Population and Environment in September 1990, NGO activists allegedly "hijacked the agenda," contending that democracy was essential to achieving sustainable development in Indonesia. In a move widely reported in the Indonesian press, Adi Sasono, a leading NGO activist, argued that as Indonesia's ruling elite did not have the "vision and effective political commitment" to environmentally sound and sustainable development, "the key issue to sustainable development is how to create a political system in which the public would assume the role of social control." Sasono concluded that "democracy is needed within the framework of promoting people's participation, as development is not only a state project."[78]

Such radical statements from the NGO community have motivated the authorities in Jakarta to constantly adopt new practices in place of the old policy of perwadahkan tunggal to further restrict the ability of NGOs to critique the government.

In 1985, for example, the New Order government introduced the Mass Organizations (ORMAS) Legislation with the purpose of limiting the scope for independent action of NGOs. ORMAS Legislation made it impossible for new NGOs to be established without special government permission, and it reestablished the right of the central government to revoke the licenses of existing NGOs at will. The legislation also made it more difficult for Indonesian NGOs to receive foreign assistance.[79]

On the introduction of the ORMAS legislation, Mohammed Natsir, a former Prime Minister of Indonesia (1950-1951), declared that "the rearrangement which occurred in the New Order in the field of political power . . . has resulted in paralysis and increasing narrowness of room for maneuver by non-governmental social and political organizations. This is being done step by step, systematically and unyieldingly."[80]
Again in 1994, in the wake of a series of crackdowns on the domestic press and national labor leaders, Suharto issued a presidential decree that further jeopardized NGOs' standing in New Order society. In the interests of national development, stated the decree, any organization would be shut down if it was found to be "undermining the authority [of the state] and/or discrediting the government...hindering the implementation of national development" or engaged in "other activity that upsets political stability and security." In addition, personal biographies of all NGO leaders were required to be submitted to the central government.[81]

Indonesian NGOs have thus had to increasingly operate in what they call "a 'climate of terror' -- a pervasive feeling that someone is always watching and ready to punish them if they behave 'irresponsibly.'"[82] This danger has also prompted many NGOs to seek other, more effective ways to influence their government.

**Access to Political Power for NGOs: The Media and INGI**

With their activities increasingly restricted by the government, NGO activists sometimes complain that the only reason their existence is tolerated at all is because it serves to further legitimize the New Order regime.

"We give some appearance of democracy in Indonesia, some appearance of freedom of speech, but our base is very narrow, and our power to disrupt the economy is very small," said George Aditjondro, a lecturer at Satya Wacana Christian University and a member of the Joint Committee for the Defense of the East Timorese. In Indonesia, he continued, "if you do not have economic power, then your political powers are more symbolic than real." For Indonesian NGOs, Aditjondro concluded, "political clout does not depend on their membership but more on their voice in the media."[83]

Indeed, it is Indonesian NGOs' ability to manipulate the media -- and particularly the international media -- that has led to some of their most notable domestic successes.

In early 1989, mere months after WAHLI had filed suit against the government and Indorayon, Jakarta announced the biggest foreign investment project in the nation's history. In a US$654 million deal, the US firm Scott Paper proposed to build and operate a 550,000 hectare eucalyptus plantation and pulp mill in the rainforests of Irian Jaya in a joint venture with the Indonesian company P.T. Astra International. Although the Scott-Astra project threatened to displace some 15,000 indigenous people, the estimated 6,000 jobs and US$200 million in annual revenue that the venture promised to generate prompted a rapid endorsement by the central government.[84]

A coalition of Indonesian NGOs quickly formed to oppose the project on environmental and ethical grounds. With the NGO Network for Forest Conservation in Indonesia (SKEPHI) acting as the overall coordinating agency and WAHLI representing various environmental NGOs operating on the local and provincial levels, the coalition managed to enlist the aid of two
international environmental NGOs: the Rainforest Action Network and Survival International. [85]

The coalition embarked on an extensive media campaign designed to embarrass Scott Paper. The Rainforest Action Network sponsored an advertisement in the New York Times calling attention to rainforest destruction in Indonesia and the proposed Scott-Astra project, while the coalition began mobilizing an international consumer boycott of Scott Paper. [86] The campaign worked, and quickly; owing in large part to NGO pressure, Scott Paper pulled out of the project in October 1989. [87]

The impact of Indonesian environmental NGOs' use of the international media proved to be effective enough for the government to respond in kind. In 1990, the government-sponsored Indonesian Wood Panel Association (APKINDO) took out several million dollars' worth of advertisements in newspapers around the country in an effort to rebut international complaints that the country's tropical forests were being destroyed by uncontrolled logging. WALHI issued a stinging criticism of the ad campaign, which was reported even more widely by the international media, countering that the advertising budget would have been better spent disciplining loggers. [88]

The New Order regime has also gone so far as to form environmental groups of its own -- so-called GONGOs (government-organized NGOs) -- whose primary purpose is to launch counter-public relations campaigns. [89] The Environmental Management and Information Center (PIPLI), for example, was established by the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce to supposedly monitor industrial waste water treatment. While it appears to do little in the way of monitoring, it annually presents awards to forty-five firms it considers most "environmental friendly," an event that is given wide press exposure in Indonesia. [90]

As demonstrated by the Scott-Astra case, domestic environmental NGOs' cooperation with international NGOs can have a direct economic impact. Indonesian environmental NGOs have also been somewhat successful in influencing the US$4.7 billion in foreign development aid that Indonesia receives annually from the member states and multilateral organizations that comprise the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). [91]

In 1985, a group of western, Asian and Indonesian environmental NGOs formed the International NGO Forum on Indonesia (INGI). Designed to "strengthen people's participation in development" and to "direct its advocacy to the IGGI conference," [92] the INGI meets annually prior to the IGGI meeting to formulate recommendations and criticisms for current development aid.

Much to the chagrin of the Suharto government, the INGI appears to have directly affected the decisions of the IGGI on more than one occasion. In 1988 the INGI, at the prompting of several Indonesian NGOs, sent a letter of concern to the World Bank regarding the Bank's funding for the US$283 million Kedung Ombo dam project. [93] In the letter, the INGI expressed concern over the Indonesian government's treatment of the nearly 7,000 people who had refused to
resettle without adequate compensation. Some of these families, according to the INGI, had been "physically beaten up and their identity cards marked ex-Tapol, branding them as ex-communist political prisoners" by government soldiers.[94] To Jakarta's horror, the World Bank responded to the INGI's concerns by sending a special mission to Indonesia to re-evaluate the entire project.[95]

Environmental NGOs' meddling with the IGGI donor forum was strongly disapproved of by the central government. Following the Kedung Ombo incident, then-Home Affairs Minister Rudini summoned the heads of the country's environmental NGOs and berated them for being "unpatriotic" by "speaking ill of their country overseas."[96] State Secretary (General) Moerdiono, Suharto's principle spokesman, pointedly stated that "environmental problems must not be abused for political ends."[97]

The following year, the government threatened to withhold exit permits for the NGO officials who were planning to attend the Seventh Annual INGI Meeting in Washington, DC. Wielding the blacklist that threatened to effectively silence environmental NGO participation in one of its most important forums, Rudini was able to extract an agreement from the NGO leaders that this time they would behave properly while abroad. Jakarta was satisfied that it had made its point; the permits were granted.[98]

The Impact of Environmental NGOs on Policy Making

Through their often controversial techniques, environmental NGOs in Indonesia have scored some important victories that have clearly led the central government to change some of its ways with regards to the environment. Seeking to reduce environmental NGOs' role in exposing pollution cases, Jakarta announced in June 1990 its decision to establish an Environmental Control Agency (Bapedal) that would aggressively enforce its industrial pollution regulations. By mid-November 1990, 738 companies in East Java alone were cited for various pollution violations.

When asked what had prompted such decisive action from a government so long accustomed to giving industry free reign concerning environmental issues, Assistant Minister for the Environment Nabil Makarim admitted that: "Increasing NGO pressure and a new regulation empowering the public to sue the government for mismanagement and breaking its laws make it imperative that the Environmental Control Agency Bapedal move rapidly and carefully."[99]

The following year, the government made clear its intention to take a more pro-active role in the environmental arena as President Suharto declared 1993 "the Year of the Environment." Even more recently, the government has adopted a Business Performance Rating system that gives companies a gold, green, blue, red, or black label depending on their efforts to protect the environment. Though the system has little ability to punish companies rated less than "green," the results are publicized in the media. The rationale, according to Business Asia, "is that the humiliation of a bad environmental rating will have more effect than a lawsuit."[100]
Yet such efforts to co-opt the themes and strategies of the environmental movement, while somewhat beneficial to environmental causes, have not silenced NGO efforts to press for greater political liberalization from the Suharto regime. In this regard, it cannot be said that the NGO sector has been particularly successful. If anything, Suharto has tightened his grip on political control in response to their demands.

Yet greater attention must be paid to the NGO sector if Indonesia is truly to find its way towards something resembling "sustainable development." Indeed, the most powerful players in the New Order government continue to be closely tied to the activities that harm the environment the most.

Months before last summer's devastating forest fires, Indonesia's current environment minister, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, tried to warn his colleagues in the government of the impending danger. In addition to contravening land-clearing legislation that had been enacted in 1995, he said, state-sponsored timber, palm oil and lumber plantations were courting disaster by continuing to set fire to their land in order to prepare it for planting. Yet his pleas fell on deaf ears. "When we announced three plantation companies that had set fires, the agriculture ministry challenged us," Sarwono said. "They have a conflict of interest."[101]

Although a watchdog outside the government was clearly needed, the environmental NGO community was forced to keep silent at the time by a renewed examination of their status by the authorities. While the Ministry for the Environment found no allies in the government, Justice Minister Oetojo Oesman declared that a number of environmental NGOs who tried to voice their concerns were guilty of violating the state Pancasila ideology. The appropriate response, he said, was to disband them. "We need to anticipate NGO activities as they can damage the nation's image abroad," he told reporters.[102]

Yet while the core New Order actors continue to deeply distrust environmental NGOs, there is also increasing evidence that in the wake of last summer's fires, many in Jakarta have come to acknowledge that the role played by NGOs in national politics could ultimately be a healthy one.

"The government should treat NGOs as partners in national development, particularly in raising people's participation in the process of democratization," said New Order official Rudini as the arrival of the season's long-delayed rains finally began to quench the worst of the fires. "Developing nations need a system of checks and balances."[103] In Indonesia, where political pluralism has traditionally provided the check against misrule, the inclusion of NGOs in policy development is clearly still much needed.

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1 "President at Regional Meeting Comments on Fires, Democracy," *Kompas* (September 17, 1997), http://www.kompas.com/.


3 "Jakarta to Launch Probe into Non-Govt Bodies." Singapore *Straits Times* (September 10, 1997), A25.


6 Schwarz, 11.


8 Meaning 'the five principles': 1) Belief in one supreme God; 2) justice and civility among peoples; 3) the unity of Indonesia; 4) democracy through deliberation and consensus among representatives; and 5) social justice for all.


10 Benedict Anderson, "Elections and Democratisation in Southeast Asia: Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia," Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio 24 Hours (1992), 58. See also Scharwz, 11.

12 Schwarz, 18.

13 Mahasin, 30.

14 Mahasin, 30.

15 Schwarz, 72.

16 Schwarz, 33.

17 Schwarz, 33.

18 Schwarz, 33.

19 Mahasin, 31.


21 Corrothers and Surtyatna, 124.

22 Mahasin, 30.


26 Eldridge, 36.


28 Eldridge, 37.
29 Corrothers and Surtyatna, 122.

30 Eldridge, 41.

31 Eldridge, 44.


35 Islamic boarding schools that educate a wide range of ages and are usually located in rural areas.

36 Eldridge, 48.

37 In a 1980 interview regarding the government's unlawful harassment of dissidents, Admiral Sudomo, head of Indonesia's internal security agency from 1978 to 1983, clearly illustrated how far groups like LBHI have to go towards improving the rule of law in Indonesia:

Where is the law that regulates prohibitions like that?

Sudomo: We can just do it...It's true, there's no written prohibition. But that's not a problem.

Why not just write it, it's a government decision, isn't it?

Sudomo: The government can adopt a policy like that if it wants. The policy can be written or not. That's the right of the government.

That way, they [the dissidents] can't take legal action against the policy, can they?

Sudomo: This is a political matter, isn't it?

So, the only way to settle this problem, they have to ask for forgiveness, like that?

Sudomo: Yes, ask for forgiveness.

Quoted in Schwarz, 245.
38 Eldridge, 50.

39 Most notably the "group of fifty," prominent dissidents (discussed by Admiral Sudomo above) who openly questioned Soeharto's use of the military as the political muscle behind his rule.

40 Schwarz, 52.

41 Potter, 15.

42 "Southeast Asian Smog is Tied to Politics," Wall Street Journal (September 30, 1997), A17.

43 Dauvergne, 513.

44 Dauvergne, 513.


46 Schwarz, 59.

47 Dauvergne, 497; Riker, 161.

48 Dauvergne, 508.

49 Dauvergne, 508.

50 Riker, 161.

51 Robert Cribb, "The Politics of Pollution Control in Indonesia," Asian Survey (December 1990), 1124.

52 Crib, 1125.

53 Crib, 1124.

54 The Ministry's name was later changed to the Ministry of Population and Environment, and in 1993 it was re-christened the Ministry for the Environment. I will refer to the Ministry by its current name for the rest of this essay.

55 Donor official quoted in Riker, 162.

57 "Minister Calls for Decentralisation, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development," Down to Earth (November 1990), quoted in Riker, 162.

58 Riker, 162-3.

59 Quoted in Riker, 163.

60 Eldridge, 49.

61 Riker, 163.

62 Potter, 13.


64 Riker, 164.


68 MacAndrews, 376.

69 Potter, 13.


71 Erna Witoelar, "NGO networking in Indonesia," in Environment, Development and Natural Resource Crisis in Asia and the Pacific, Penang, Malaysia: Sahabat Alam Malaysia (Friends of the Earth Malaysia), 1984, 417.

72 Potter, 21.

74 Eldridge, 49.

75 Quoted in Riker, 168.


78 Jakarta Post (September 27, 1990).

79 MacIntyre, 39.

80 Quoted in Riker, 173.


82 Potter, 31.


85 Riker, 168.

86 Riker, 168.


88 "Indonesia Group Criticises Apkindo's Ad Campaign," Far Eastern Economic Review (February 1, 1990), 52.

89 Riker, 174.

91 Riker, 176. Since 1992, the group has been known as the Consultative Group on Indonesia

92 From INGI Charter, quoted in Riker, 169-70.


95 Eldridge, 49.


97 Quoted in Riker, 174.

98 Riker, 175.

99 Riker, 175.

100 "Indonesia's Greyish Green Politics," *Business Asia* (February 27, 1995), 2.


102 Singapore *Straits Times* (September 10, 1997), A25.

103 Singapore *Straits Times* (September 10, 1997), A25.