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Dear Readers,

Welcome to EXPLORATIONS: a graduate student journal of southeast asian studies. This year, the editorial team is pleased to announce our journal theme, Southeast Asia’s (Dis)integration: Re-examining approaches to the Study of Southeast Asia.

This issue of EXPLORATIONS re-examines established approaches to the study of Southeast Asia. The articles included in this issue attempt to destabilize or problematize existing notions of homogeneity/integration in light of contemporary research. In addition, a broad range of disciplines and areas of research are covered here including mystical practices in Central Java, gender representation in Myanmar, and impinging threats of the Islamic State (IS) in Southeast Asia. In raising these questions, we hope to bring alternative ways of thinking about Southeast Asia, both past and present.

The 2015 editorial team is glad to be a part of this student-initiated platform to encourage and promote graduate scholarship in Southeast Asian studies, and we look forward to seeing further advancement of research in this area.

Aloha,
2015 EXPLORATIONS Editorial team.

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The principle mission of EXPLORATIONS is to offer a forum for students to present disciplinary and interdisciplinary research on a broad range of issues relating principally to the region which today constitutes Southeast Asia. Embracing both the diversity of academic interests and scholastic expertise, it is hoped that this forum will introduce students to the work of their colleagues, encourage discussion both within and across disciplines, and foster a sense of community among those interested in Southeast Asia.

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Mystical Practice and Musicianship in Central Java

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ABSTRACT

Mysticism plays a significant role within the tradition of Javanese gamelan. This work focuses specifically on central Java, and the questions it posits and attempts to answer are: How does mysticism manifest itself in Javanese gamelan traditions? How has this changed? And, how does mysticism survive within the context of music and performance today? Ethnomusicological and ethnographic methodologies were utilized in the composition of this paper, relying on academic research done by past scholars as well as primary sources. Dialogues, interviews, and participation in various performing gamelan groups both in the United States and Indonesia have further informed the scope of this work. Most recently, those groups have been Kyai Gandrung based at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa and Sumunar based in St. Paul, Minnesota while at a performance exchange trip in Surakarta, Java.
Introduction

Mysticism is an inherent part of Javanese culture, including within the tradition of gamelan music. Gamelan can refer to the instruments that comprise an ensemble as well as the music and tradition itself. It encompasses metallophones and gongs, the ideal material being bronze, with the addition of wooden percussion, stringed instruments, and vocals. It can be played in a wide variety of contexts, ranging from rituals to public weddings and celebrations. A synthesis of textual research on the history and tradition of gamelan music by scholars such as Judith Becker, Marc Benamou, Sumarsam, and Neil Sorrell as well as works on Javanese mystic practice by Koentjaraningrat, Mark Woodward, Clifford Geertz, Niels Mulder, and Susan Pratt Walton will help to demonstrate how Javanese mystical practice is intimately tied to the sphere of gamelan performance and musicianship.[1] A gamelan performance is fundamentally lacking if it is bereft of rasa, a concept tied closely to mystical practice and defined pithily as sentiment or aesthetic affect. Javanese gamelan performance, called karawitan, provides a cultural context through which mysticism can be expressed and experienced.

Java’s Geographic and Historical Milieu

The historical diversity of Java provides fertile ground for the development of its rich musical and mystical traditions. Java, one of the five main islands of the Indonesian archipelago, is composed of many different regions, each with its unique history and provincial dialect. Indonesia is home to a multitude of religious, cultural, and ethnic traditions. Javanese comprise the largest ethnic group in the country. Moreover, Javanese culture permeates the broader cultural sphere of Indonesia as nation-state.

To be Javanese is to be Indonesian but the reverse is clearly not the case...Javanese culture occupies a position of “first among equals,” or hegemony depending on one’s perspective, in the larger Indonesian society because the Javanese are the largest ethnic community and have been politically dominant since the beginning. [2]

Currently, Bahasa Indonesia is recognized as the national language, although there are countless regional languages that preceded the establishment of a common language. This is due to the political unification of many disparate cultures under Dutch colonialism, beginning with the Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (the V.O.C.), or, the Dutch East India Company. The standardization and implementation of Malay, from which the Indonesian language developed, was “the means through which colonial hegemony was established and strengthened.”[3] Compared to the complex hierarchical linguistic systems specific to the Javanese language, Indonesian is considered to be relatively “egalitarian” because of its lack of speech registers traditionally employed to distinguish relative social status.

Along with the establishment of a unifying national language, there is a sense of religious pluralism within the context of a majority Islamic population. This includes the
survival of older indigenous practices found in each region before the early, external influences of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, and later by the Dutch and Japanese. The cultural and religious diversity of central Java, let alone Indonesia as a whole, is unsurprising upon examining a timeline excerpt of its history. The dynamic historical, religious, and cultural interchanges are demonstrated today by the remnants of an architecturally resplendent past. The Sailendra kingdom is credited for building the monumental Mahayana Buddhist candi (monument) Borobudur (a world heritage site) along with smaller candis Mendut and Pawon in the late 8th to early 9th centuries.[4] The subsequent Sailendra and Sanjaya royal families’ Hindu revival occurred at candi Prambanan, known colloquially as Loro Jonggrang in the 9th century.[5] One of the many ways this rich diversity and syncretic character expresses itself is through traditional cultural practices, such as the many varieties of theater and dance. The central Javanese court cities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta (alternatively known as Solo) are known as hubs of Javanese culture and art where various forms of theater still thrive today.

Circa the 7th-10th centuries CE, rivaling Saivaite (Hindu) and Buddhist dynasties and culture flourished in central Java. During this time, the major kingdoms of central and east Java became heavily influenced by Indian traditions: “the kingdom of the Shivaite [Saivaite] dynasty which supersedes the Sailendra in Java was known as Mataram...three kingdoms rise successively as centers of power in East Java: Kediri (1045-1222); Singasari (1222-1292); and Majapahit (1294-c. 1520)...Shivaism [sic] and Buddhism coexist and sometimes merge in syncretic cults strongly tinged by Tantric mysticism.”[6] The Indian influence on theatre, dance, art and culture in general can still be witnessed today, particularly in certain elements of Javanese dance. For instance, “the use of Hindu mythology, albeit thoroughly assimilated into Javanese culture through the wayang and other art forms, is one of the main examples of Indian influence...”[7] The most common South Asian story cycles that have been localized in Java are the epics Mahabharata and Ramayana.

On Localization and “Indianization”/“Sinicization”

When examining any tradition in Southeast Asia, it is necessary to discuss how the multitude of cultures in and around the region informed its development. These historical settings create the cultural contexts and matrices that allow for the cultivation of traditions like Javanese gamelan music and forms of mysticism. The term “localization” is readily used today in Southeast Asian regional studies to clarify the outdated overuse of concepts pertaining to “Indianization” and “Sinicization”. For the geographical and cultural scope and relevance of this study, we need mostly to concern ourselves with the issue of Indianization and localization. Indianization and localization are two different historical processes in Southeast Asia. The former term is related to the
influence of Indic culture on Southeast Asia, and the latter is how Southeast Asian cultures indigenized influences from other regions of the world. The emphasis of localization is on indigenous people borrowing something from outside and making it their own. They were, and continue to be, active agents in the making of their history and cultural development.

Influenced by Georges Coedès, O.W. Wolters is credited with coining the term localization in his extensive analyses of Southeast Asian history during the latter part of the 20th century.[8] Wolters challenges some of Coedès’ methodologies as well, by declaring that “the study of Southeast Asia must surely be for only one reason: to improve our knowledge of the region for its own sake.”[9] Although this realization may seem self-evident to some, the movement from European-centric or even Asian-centric viewpoints in order to create single universal histories has been an effective step toward understanding the Southeast Asian region in its own right.

Conversely, it is important to remember that the term “Southeast Asia” was not coined until World War II to delineate the region. The term is derived from its geographic position east of India and south of China. The single universal history approach is nonetheless valuable for analyzing cultural contexts from which artistic traditions stem.

The single universal history was implemented by John Smail, who similarly argues for a new historiographical approach and reinterpretation of Southeast Asian studies using a heightened emphasis on autonomous histories. As the terms suggest, localization arguments and autonomous histories challenged the long-standing systems that considered Southeast Asia as primarily Indianized or Sinicized—that is, the artistic, religious, political, and economic systems were borrowed from either India or China and supplanted onto the mainland and maritime regions of Southeast Asia. Localization and autonomous histories flip the script by arguing that rather than merely copying these exogenous conventions, indigenous Southeast Asian societies extracted from them what they wanted.

Perspective reconsiderations like these demonstrate the necessity of moving away from the preoccupation with the influence of colonial rule (including colonial, neo-colonial, and anti-colonial histories). They remind us of the importance in creating an independent perspective of Southeast Asia’s complex cultural setting.[10] In fact, Smail himself deconstructs the term “perspective” and subdivides it into two categories: an actual standpoint (e.g., to “stand over someone’s shoulder”) and a moral viewpoint more concerned with evaluating importance and placing agency. The two must be separated when striving to understand the development of Southeast Asian history and historiography. I argue that understandings of rasa in Java draw from a matrix of many different influences from near and far, linking performance with the mystical cultivation of spiritual experience.
Karawitan: Traditional Gamelan Music of Central Java

Gamelan music, known in Javanese as karawitan, is one of the essential components in performing the rituals and dances in Java. Gamelan as an ensemble of traditional Javanese music may accompany various wayang theater performances as well as religious rituals. The term karawitan means traditional gamelan music. It is important in part because it “allows the Javanese to distinguish their own musical culture from Western music, called musique...for a piece of music to qualify as karawitan, it must use one or both of the characteristic tuning systems sléndro and pélog...”[11] Karawitan is furthermore differentiated from fusion genres that incorporate gamelan instruments, such as campursari or dangdut.

A gamelan ensemble is comprised mostly of bronze percussion instruments, including gongs and other metal idiophones—musical instruments consisting of tuned metal bars. There are several wooden and stringed instruments, as well as a predominantly male vocal “chorus” (gérong) and a female vocal soloist (pesindhèn). Karawitan is structurally cyclic and employs several timekeeping instruments, the most important of which is the large gong. The two tuning systems are the heptatonic (seven pitch scale) pélog and the pentatonic (five pitch scale) sléndro. The sléndro system has more uniform intervals between its pitches, whereas the pitch intervals of pélog instruments are relatively unequal. Neither of these relate to the diatonic scale of Western music.

Current knowledge of the early history and development of karawitan is limited. There are very few writings on the origins of the musical tradition because the use of notation did not commence until the nineteenth century.[12] According to mythology, the gamelan was created by the god Sang Hyang Guru who ruled from the legendary Mahendra mountains, a mountain range from the Mahabharata story cycle that relates to Mount Lawu in Java. Sang Hyang Guru crafted the large gong, one of the most important timekeeping instruments in the ensemble, as a method to summon the other gods.[13] Ethnomusicologist Judith Becker explains the incomparable role of the large gong: “The sound of the gong is not an acoustic phenomenon of vibrating air, but a voice...In Java, gongs are the favored way. Because of this special function, gongs are highly respected and feared.”[14] From this stemmed the other main instruments of the gamelan, such as the smaller gongs called siyem, kempul, and kenong.

There have been several more recent developments that can be more easily determined, such as “certain instruments (siter, ciblon, gendèr panerus) [which] have not been in the gamelan for long, and pesindhèn too are a relatively recent addition...there used to be fewer but larger instruments, and pitch has risen over the years.”[15] Accounts by foreign visitors allude to the existence of ensembles resembling present-day gamelan around the sixteenth century, and the extensive Serat Wedha Pradangga states that the first gamelan of much simpler and smaller composition can be dated as far back as the 200s BCE. It should be noted,
however, that the Serat Wedha Pradangga is a Javanese chronicle with uncertain provenance and historicity. What is known is that particular gamelan instruments that are centuries old still exist, therefore elevating them to the prestige of pusaka, treasured heirlooms and markers of status.[16]

The two hubs of Javanese court culture mentioned above, Surakarta and Yogyakarta, retain differences in their respective styles of musical practice and performance, which is referred to as garap (musical treatment or interpretation) in Javanese. In the broadest sense, Yogya (Yogyakarta) is known for its loud playing style while Solo (Surakarta) is known for its soft style. Moreover, the main melodic (balungan) sléndro instruments of Solo typically contain an extra pitch—the low 6. While these stylistic distinctions exist, there is “no glass wall located somewhere between Solo and Yogya, defining where one style stops and the other begins.” [17] That is to say, particular characteristics from one city can be found in the other, and musicians from one tradition are also known to borrow from the other.

The significance of gamelan music is evident in the context of wayang kulit (shadow puppet) shows: “Gamelan music is essential to the performance...It establishes or alters mood. It provides respite between major actions.”[18] In addition to theater, performances in the royal courts (kraton) of Yogya and Solo, weddings, rituals, and tourist entertainment, it can also be played in very casual all-night settings like wayang kulit or shorter klenèngan, where audience members are often seen entering and leaving at their own leisure. It is common for wayang shows to take up an entire evening and may last approximately nine hours.

Theater in Java can be delivered in various forms, ranging from a style utilizing human dancers, known as wayang wong, a performance involving rounded, three-dimensional puppets called wayang golèk, and the better known leather shadow puppetry performance called wayang kulit. Most of these forms today develop their narratives from the major Indian epics, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana. The more vernacular kethoprak version of Javanese theater using live actors, gamelan, singing, and occasionally dance draws its repertoire from Javanese history.

There are other indigenous stories that are seldom performed today. An exception to this can be found with the comparatively rare wayang topeng (masked dance), which utilizes the legend of Panji that is native to Java, specifically in the town and historical kingdom of Kediri in east Java—previously called Daha—whence the hero Panji hails. Both masked and unmasked dance performance varieties are derived from wayang kulit. Both forms are thought to be reproductions of shadow puppetry using actors, dance, and sometimes dialogue. Although the date of origin is still indeterminate, evidence from Javanese literature points to circa 1000 CE as a time when wayang kulit was a recognized art form.[19] When observing both shadow puppet and masked dance performances, the formal parallels in facial, gestural, and choreographic elements become apparent.
**Kebatinan: Mystical Practice in Java**

The term “mysticism” can be defined in various ways within the Javanese context. It can refer to the process of accumulating spiritual knowledge that is otherwise unattainable via logical analysis or the intellect. It can suggest the belief that truth, god, and/or fundamental reality can be realized through intuitive and insightful practice, such as asceticism and meditation—*tapa* and *semedi*, respectively. *Iklas* (from Arabic’s *al-ikhlas* meaning “the purity”), detachment from the surrounding world, can also culminate in desired forms of self-control to achieve spiritual power.[20] *Tapa* is practiced most commonly by way of fasting or depriving oneself from sleep. There are some very extreme cases of asceticism which still occur today. For instance, *tapa pendhem* involves meditating and fasting while buried underground for long periods of time—usually between seven or forty days. Remarkably, there have been several known survivors of this practice in Java and, understandably, *tapa pendhem* has also been the cause of many deaths.[21] Less extreme versions include *puasa mutih* (“white fasting”), which restricts the ascetic to consuming only water and steamed white rice.

The Javanese term that most closely compares with the English word “mysticism” is *kebatinan*: “science of the inner self.” This term comes from the root *batin*, which means “the inner realm of human experience”, and *lahir* [also spelled *lahir*] ‘the outer realm of human behavior.’”[22] *Lahir* may simply refer to the outer or the external.[23] *Batin* is easily defined as “inward (feeling)”, and *kebatinan* as “pertaining to the inner self.”[24] As Geertz cautions, *lahir* and *batin* (both terms derived from Arabic’s *zahir* and *batin*) do not correspond to western notions of “body and soul.” They are understood to be separate and progressive realms of the self, the multifaceted vessel and terrain (irrespectively) through which the individual travels from the outward to the inward.

*Lahir* has to do with an individual’s sensory perception and the material world, whereas *batin* is the inner core and heart wherein lies pure feeling and intuition (*rasa sejati* or *rasa murni*).[25] Niels Mulder confirms: “people strive to subject their outer being to their inner potential; they hope to free their inner selves in a quest for reunification with their origin, and to experience the oneness of being.”[26] The idea of the origin is fundamental and is part of the concept of *sangkan-paran*, “origin-destination” and the unity of existence, *kasunyatan*. These ideologies propose that all beings and phenomena not only have intrinsic meaning, but are also interconnected. P. J. Zoetmulder labels it as pantheism, which in turn is “just a certain form of monism [the doctrine, as the etymology suggests, that there exists only one supreme being] in which, when establishing the oneness of all that exists, one proceeds from God and reduces everything to Him.”[27] Though easy to comprehend, this definition borders on essentialism and attempts to explain Javanese ideology in purely western terminologies. Perhaps Niels Mulder, three years after Zoetmulder’s work, tries to resolve this problem by description through example: events
“do not happen haphazardly, or because of chance, but because of necessity.”[28] This law of necessity within the ubiquitous kasunyatan is referred to as ukum pinesthi, and it governs the manner in which everything is related.

An individual’s spiritual quest involves accessing his or her inner being (batin) in order to reach a state of calmness and harmony (rukun) within, and consequently without the surrounding world. Mulder dubs it “the oneness of being,” which ends up revealing the belief that sangkan-paran, the origin-destination, and the inner and outer realms are not only pervasive but ultimately one. What is more, the reason mysticism carries a connotation of mystery and secrecy comes from its role as a deeply personal endeavor, notwithstanding the fact that accessing inner realms of being can occur during group meditation, and collective learning is encouraged and common in Java.[29]

Due to the diverse influences that Java has undergone and the resultant syncretic nature of its traditions, kebatinan has evolved into a variety of forms and sects. There are hundreds of established mystical groups in Java today.[30] These branches may, of course, also stem from differing personal interpretations and practices of spiritual leaders. Some of the better-known sects are Subud, Sumarah, Pangestu, and Sapta Darma.[31] More broadly, however, kebatinan put into practice can be subcategorized into groups that retain different cultural and religious influences, be they indigenous or exogenous.

There are three main subdivisions of kebatinan, or mystical practice, revealed by Javanese anthropological studies. The priyayi are the aristocratic descendants and king’s officials who became civil servants during the V.O.C.’s (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, or “Dutch East India Company”) colonial occupation. They “[stress] the Hinduist aspects and [relate] to the bureaucratic element” of Javanese society.[32] They can be identified with kejawèn, which was the lifestyle and is seen by some as retaining the cultural essence of being Javanese. Kejawèn involves the distinctive culture of the central Javanese principalities, namely the royal courts of Surakarta and Yogyakarta. Presently, it has adopted elements of Islam in combination with preceding traditions, namely tantric Saivism.[33] The santri emphasize the Islamic aspects incorporated into kebatinan. The term tasawuf can alternatively be used to denote Islamic mysticism or Sufism.[34] Finally, there are the abangan, who are either the non-practicing Muslims in Java or those who stress the animistic, generally expressed among academics today as “supernaturalistic,” elements of kebatinan. Geertz reminds us that these “are the three main subtraditions” that “are not constructed types, but terms and divisions that Javanese themselves apply.”[35] Even though Geertz was working ethnographically with an individual town called Modjokuto (or Pare) in the Kediri region, these distinctions are applicable to other areas where kebatinan practice continues.

Javanese anthropologist Koentjaraningrat provides a more thorough description of the nature and development of
religion, spirituality, and the social groups’ relation to mysticism in central Java. He asserts that it is more productive to compare and contrast differences between puritan and syncretic Javanese Islam rather than discuss the differences in the religious life of rural peasants and urban civil servants (priyayi). As a comparative statement Koentjaraningrat does, however, point out that “we may assume that magic is more frequently practiced by Javanese rural peasants than by civil servants, and that spiritual movements [such as the abovementioned sects] are much more part of the lifestyle of the civil servant rather than of the peasants.”[36] His analysis is comparable to Geertz’s in some respects. Both scholars distinguish Agami Jawi (“Javanese religion”) and Agami Islam Santri (“Islam of the religious people”). Followers of the latter adhere more closely to the formal tenets of Islam; whereas, the former incorporates elements of mysticism and ideas from the Hindu-Buddhist pantheon and tradition that are “syncretistically integrated in an Islamic frame of reference.[37] Furthermore, the Islam that arrived into central Java during the 16th century was one wealthy with mystical influences absorbed from Persia and India where Sufi traders traversed before reaching the bustling Malacca Straits.

Since he published Javanese Culture in 1985, Koentjaraningrat differentiates his own understanding from other Indonesianists, “especially the Americans” like Geertz, mostly by challenging the idea that Islamic influence spread in a haphazard manner throughout the island and even the rest of the archipelago.[38] Rather, he argues that Islam took heavier root in the coastal trade regions of north and northeast Java and did not profoundly penetrate the interior heartland even during the 1500s. Though much of Geertz’ work on Javanese religion is seen as pioneering and his concrete definitions of the sub-traditions is very helpful to our study, his attempt at poetry in describing “another meandering tropical growth on an already overcrowded religious landscape,” as Koentjaraningrat highlights, shrouds the actual manner of things. Islam did not spread via an arbitrary or “meandering” route.[39] Historical accounts and scholarly disputes aside, this can be perceived plainly from the monumental Hindu and Buddhist temples (such as Prambanan and Borobudur, respectively) that have remained in central Java and the syncretic elements that remain in gamelan music and the various forms of wayang theater.

Yang Penting Rasanya: “What Matters is Rasa”

A fundamental concept in the study of Javanese spirituality, music, philosophy, and practice is rasa (pronounced râsā in Javanese). Rasa, a term derived from classical Sanskrit, has a multiplicity of meanings in Java. The lexicological connections that modern Javanese has preserved from Sanskrit for this term are “disposition,” “mercury,” “flavor,” “the faculty of taste,” “sentiment,” and “aesthetic affect.”[40] Becker compares the aesthetic correlations and
diverse meanings of *rasa* from Indian conventions to those that have been localized in Java:

The different meanings of the term *rasa* in Javanese mystical writings are similar to the different meanings found in texts on Indian aesthetic theory. Sometimes the term *rasa* is partially disambiguated in Javanese as the distinction is made between ordinary feeling, sensation or perception (*rasa*) and the extraordinary, internal and refined cognition (*rasa sejati* or *rasa murni*). In Indian aesthetic writings, *rasa* was used in all these different ways.[41]

In relation to *karawitan*, *rasa* can range to mean feeling or mood (of a piece or performance), inner meaning, and deep understanding.[42] It can exist within and be relayed through the performer, as well as experienced by the receptive audience member. *Karawitan* performers “do not express personal feelings, but, rather, perform their personal interpretations of the tradition.”[43] Pieces and performances (called *gendhing*) without *rasa* are at the very least incomplete if not measured as empty altogether.[44] In his most recent work, appropriately titled *Rasa*, Benamou relates the quality of a piece or performance, bodily sensation, ability or knowledge of the performer, and faculty of the performer ultimately to pure feeling (*rasa murni*); all these factors can be defined as *rasa* and all can lead, in a deeply internal sense, to *rasa murni*.

The complexity of affect and intuition in *karawitan* are evident in multiple levels of translation—from formal Javanese (*krāmå*) to familiar Javanese (*ngoko*) to Bahasa Indonesia, for example—as well as binary oppositions, five continua, and several clusters of the terms and concepts Javanese employ to characterize a piece or performance. Some basic examples of how a *gendhing* would be described are *regu* ("imposing"), *sedhíh* ("sad"), *prenèś* ("coquettish"), *bérag* ("exuberant"), and *gecul* ("jocular").[45] These are placed within the more general dichotomies of *alus/kasar* (refined/coarse), *luruh/trègel* (humble/brash), and *berat/ringan* (heavy/light).

Admittedly, Javanese aesthetics is a very broad and complex subject and can be impossible to fully comprehend without being immersed in Javanese culture. However, a brief discussion of basic categories and distinctions is within reach and is fundamental to understanding the mystical aspects of gamelan. One of the major distinctions exists between the aforementioned descriptors *alus* and *kasar*. *Alus* can be translated from Javanese to mean humble, polite, refined, gracious, and even noble. In an earlier article, Benamou conveys the significance of this concept:

The best all-around translation of *alus* is “refined,” in all senses of the word. Smallness is a major component of the concept (gula *alus* is finely granulated sugar), as is smoothness…according to one line of argument, alusness, in the form of self-control or decorum, is tied to spiritual power gained largely through asceticism. [46]

*Kasar*, on the other hand, relates more to crass, unrefined, and coarse behavior: “the opposite of *alus* is *kasar*, perhaps best rendered by the English crude.”[47] These two terms create a dichotomy of traits and natures of being, which are then used to distinguish the various *rasa gendhing* (the mood or feeling of a piece or performance), not to mention the
traits of wayang characters. Though seemingly straightforward at first, these two concepts are much more intricate in the way that they shape Javanese culture, and therefore Javanese art, as can be seen in the way Benamou, from his time with numerous teachers in central Java, deconstructs them into the plethora of related but not necessarily synonymous descriptors listed above.

Another way rasa is expressed is through a performer’s realization of a piece (garap). This expression could be how a pesindhèn (female vocalist) chooses to reach the final note of a phrase by way of cèngkok (melodic contour). It could be how the drummer, one of the main determiners of tempo, decides to end a piece: rapidly and lightly in a gecul or bérag fashion on the one hand or, on the other, emphasizing the regu or sedhîh rasa slowly in order to instill a deeper, heavier experience. Benamou visually illustrates these domains of perception in the structure of concentric circles, wherein factors like bodily sensation, faculty of the performer, and ability or knowledge of the performer are situated on the outer circles.[48] Through the act of performance, asceticism, and/or meditation, rasa murni existing within the realm of batin can be experienced.

Rasa in musical contexts connects with sangkan-paran and kasunyatan, origin-destination and the unity of existence. The performer who communicates the rasa of a piece through his or her art is emblematic of the spiritual cycle that underlies kebatinan. The communication of the particular rasa of a musical piece and its interpretation is referred to as pancaran.[49] Effectively, the performer’s experience with rasa is like a mystical experience. The quest of a practicing mystic is to achieve spiritual or supernatural power (kesaktian) and self-control through his or her rejection of earthly and bodily desires. Through this s/he can access the enigmatic realm of absolute truth and rasa murni, which is tied to deep understanding, intuition, unity, and harmony—kasunyatan and rukun with the surrounding world. On the surface level, practitioners and musicians of gamelan are not ostensibly or necessarily rejecting anything in order to access their inner being and achieve a state of calmness and unity, at least not consciously. Rather, through their disciplined practice and development of musical intuition individually and with the rest of the ensemble, they can access deeper realms of batin by playing or performing, which ultimately can illuminate and express the path to pure and deep feeling.[50]

**Karawitan and Kebatinan: Musicianship and Mystical Practice**

Like the disciplined practitioner of kebatinan, such affairs are quite personal for musical performers as well and therefore, the experience and path to rasa through karawitan understandably cannot be generalized. However, some academics of Javanese ethnomusicology have attempted to delve deeper into the exploration of spirituality and performance of gamelan, the most notable of which are Susan
Pratt Walton, Marc Benamou, and Judith Becker. To date, there is not much scholarly literature on the subject linking musical and mystical traditions of Java. Walton’s main example for contemporary study is the prominent Sumarah sect that incorporates influences from Islam, tantric Saivism, Mahayana Buddhism, and local practices. [51] She includes the stories of several prominent pesindhen.

One of the most noteworthy points Walton draws attention to is the extremely personal nature of rasa and karawitan. She cites Warsadiningrat’s foundational Serat Wedha Pradangga—a book on the history, story, and sacred knowledge of gamelan—in stating that “coming to an understanding of the inner meaning of gamelan music is an individual matter, just as gaining access to one’s inner being is an individual matter.” [52]

In practicing, teaching, and performing karawitan, the significance of an individual’s deeply internal feeling is paired with the whole group’s refined sense of rasa and levels of responsibility. The importance and responsibilities between musicians and their corresponding instrumental or vocal parts do vary. This is evident by the function of the large gong in relation to the rest of the ensemble. Though the large gong is generally struck the least amount of times during a piece, the large gong player’s role is one of the most important. [53] In central Java, the oldest and most experienced member of the group usually fulfills this role. It is utterly noticeable for even a moderately experienced musician or informed listener if a gong stroke is accidentally missed at the end of a cycle, especially for longer pieces with as many as 128 or 256 beats per gong or gongan. [54] The rasa of a song is at risk of being lost and the other musicians prone to lose their place within the balungan (basic or skeletal melodic structure). This can be contrasted with the role of the higher register, fast-playing bonang panerus. Though this elaborating instrument requires a certain level of dexterity and focus, it does not carry as much structural importance and is sometimes considered to be the playful, less serious, less responsible half of its lower register bonang barung counterpart.

Despite the varying levels of responsibility, an effective performance depends upon an ensemble group’s cumulative capability to play and feel together. With these variations in responsibility it is always necessary for all the musicians in a group to listen to one another and play—and ideally feel, ngraosaken—together, just as it is rewarding for the ascetic to meditate or fast with his or her fellow disciples. [55] Walton affirms, “in the Sumarah view, each individual has access to ‘ultimate reality,’ though access to it is hidden by his own limitations.” [56] In the same vein, a performer or an ensemble’s experience is contingent upon the knowledge of its members and their ability to ngraosaken in harmony.

The emphasis on togetherness and unity of rasa and playing in order to realize a particular garap (musical treatment or interpretation) seems to have always existed in gamelan traditions. Again, yang penting rasanya. [57] There is such a large repertoire of traditional pieces: Ladrang Liwung of Yogya or Gendhing Bonang Babar Layar, to name
a few, that continues to be performed today. Since gamelan music has become more accessible with ensembles all over the world including many groups associated with academic institutions in the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom, change is most prominently witnessed in new compositions, a type of which is called *gendhing kreasi*, or collaborations with other non-Javanese genres.[58][59][60]

Upholding and passing down traditions beget the meaningful development of musicianship and mystical practice. The emphasis on maintaining customs that are linked with the musical tradition, such as staying low when standing around the instruments and never stepping over them, continues to evolve. Even in her work from several decades ago, Becker points out the changeability of music and the cultural and meta-cultural contexts (such as Java in the Netherlands or Java in the United States) in which they dwell. She informs us:

Musical change, like any other, is not of one kind. All music systems are in flux, and only the most detailed notation can momentarily hold time still. Often it is only ignorance of detailed histories that gives the outsider (in space or in time) the illusion of stability. However, the changes occurring in Javanese arts today are quantitatively more than, and of a different nature from, the usual accumulative changes of an oral tradition, and these changes are directly linked to changes occurring in the society and in the philosophic beliefs that support and sustain the society.[61]

Becker describes the changes that occurred between the medieval period in Java (7th century-16th century CE) that was defined by its hierarchical social structure and the subsequent Dutch occupation (1603-1942, 1945-1949 CE) in order to contextualize the changes that affected 20th century Java. Furthermore, Indonesia’s recognized independence in 1949 (or 1945, when the declaration of independence was drafted and as it is conveyed by Indonesians) was another catalyst for the Javanese to redefine their sense of identity and how it is expressed through the arts—from a “king-centered, stratified society” to the “modern state” it is considered today. [62] The national tension during this period, where relative social inequality shifted to a supposed democratic agenda, is evident in the young republic’s choice to decree a lingua franca based on Malay (today’s Bahasa Indonesia) the national language rather than Javanese with its intrinsic hierarchical structure.[63]

**Conclusion**

The connection between musicianship, musicality, and social values has nonetheless withstood cultural change. In spite of transformations in the musical sphere, such as the addition of new instruments and the introduction of notation as opposed to oral teaching, one thing did remain relatively unchanged: “what remained constant is the one essential element for musical survival: the “fit,” the congruence, the harmony, the consonance between the values of the society and the implicit values of the music system.”[64] When she published this work, Becker astutely remarked that Javanese art and music are transforming more into products and
“museum traditions” rather than spaces for ritual that are imbedded into quotidian life.[65] This is another trend that pervades Southeast Asian traditional performing and plastic arts.[66]

Now that several decades have passed, the argument that karawitan is becoming a museum tradition appears to be prescient. Naturally, with the waning of the emphasis on traditional customs in musical practice, even in the meta-cultural spaces outside of Java where they may not have ever existed prior, the mystical elements of karawitan also become diminished or, at least, deemphasized. Judith Becker and Nancy Florida’s translation of a passage from B.Y.H. Sastrapustaka’s (a renowned court musician from Yogyakarta) Wedha Pradangga Kawedhar reveals that

...if one studies and strives to cultivate the artistic skills of gamelan playing, the aim and intention is not the cultivation of physical skill alone. The aim of study is nothing other than the surrender to the primary aims of ethical behavior, rasa and beauty that are secreted within the spiritual and physical self, accompanied by sharpness of consciousness, refinement of rasa and strength of purpose.[67]

Sastrapustaka is not alone in defining karawitan and the practice and performance thereof as derivative of a deeper experience, i.e. the journey from lahir to batin. Most if not all of the teachers Benamou cites in his recent work, the older generation of Javanese musicians and philosophers, such as Rahayu Supanggah and Suharta, recognize and express this seemingly implicit idea. It is clear that without a cultivated sense of rasa neither a musical composition nor mystical practice in Java are complete. The particular contexts of disciplined asceticism and musical practice provide spaces for the transformative and uniting experience of rasa. Moreover, these spaces, even the meta-spaces and musical diasporas outside of Java, preserve Java’s cultural and artistic legacy against the currents of modernity and nationalism by harnessing and connecting musicianship with the experience of deep spirituality, understanding, and unity of existence through rasa murni.

Bibliography


ART JOG AND INDONESIA’S NEW ART PUBLIC

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ABSTRACT

In the last two decades Indonesia’s contemporary art world has experienced exponential growth—the result of a political shift in 1998 known as Reformasi and the impact of an art market boom in the mid-2000s. Indonesia now boasts a plethora of galleries, biennials, and large-scale art events. Of particular importance is an annual art fair known as Art Jog now in entering its ninth iteration. Held in the city of Yogyakarta, Art Jog is described as a “bottom-up art fair” organized by and for artists. It has become a highly anticipated event attended by international and domestic collectors, gallerists, art practitioners, and observers as well as the general public who are rarely present at other art events. By examining the history and position of Art Jog in comparison with Indonesia’s other biennials, this paper will analyze the significance of more “spectacular” events like Art Jog in the development of a “new art public” in Indonesia.
The Proliferation of Biennials, Art Fairs, and Mega-Exhibitions in Indonesia’s Art World

In the last two decades, the number of large-scale art exhibitions held throughout the world has expanded exponentially. Since the 1990s the number of biennials has reached—according to some estimates—as many as 200, while the number of art fairs (large and small) in cities ranging from Singapore to Miami is not far behind.[1] In Southeast Asia this trend has been particularly pronounced in Indonesia where there are currently five contemporary art biennials, approximately three-medium specific biennials, three annual art fairs, and a number of other large-scale events that happen on an annual or biannual basis such as Ruang Rupa’s OK Video Festival.[2] The number of sites in which contemporary artists both emerging and established can display their work has proliferated over the last twenty years, making the experience of young artists, as well as their audiences, much different than that of their predecessors who, until the late 1990s, experienced political repression and a rather hostile “art climate” under Suharto’s 31-year authoritarian New Order regime, which lasted from 1965 – 1998.

While the significance of such mega-exhibitions, in particular biennials, are recognized due to the nature of these sites as some of the most vital and visible locales for the production, distribution, and generation of public discourse around contemporary art. They are more commonly critiqued for their spectacular nature that is argued to undercut the critical autonomy of art practices or confuse the boundary of what is meant by local, national, regional, or transnational art. In the introduction to an anthology intended to examine the form of the biennial in contemporary global art discourse it is asked, “is the biennial an overblown symptom of spectacular event culture...a Western typology whose proliferation has infiltrated even the most far-reaching parts of the world, where such events are little more than entertaining or commercially driven showcases?” Or (on a more positive note) is the biennial form, “a platform—like perhaps no other art institution before it—for grappling with such issues as politics, race, identity, globalization, and post-colonialism in art-making and –showing today?”[3] It is in relation to questions raised by both biennials and other mega-exhibitions that share similarities that I argue it is relevant to examine such growth within a national art world – a task that is less often taken up as a topic of analysis in comparison to the examination of global events like the Venice Biennial, Documenta, or the various iterations of Art Basel. In a site like Indonesia where for decades, as Amanda Rath states, “government intervention and scrutiny of the arts...made it difficult for artists to gain the necessary permits to exhibit” and “…artists wanting to make a counterargument to official policy or to make social commentary had little choice but to work outside official and national institutions” the presence of myriad large-scale art events contributes to an exciting new arts context.[4] While there has been an increase in government support for the arts in the form of local funding for events, it appears that these events remain less attractive to a general audience in comparison to more spectacular,
privately funded affairs. This paradox raises a significant question. What is it that attracts a general audience, defined as individuals not already immersed in art world networks, to a large-scale exhibition, (potentially) contributing to greater appreciation for contemporary arts? It is with a desire to look at the impact of Indonesia’s mega-exhibitions on the development of a more general art public that this paper takes as its focus the examination of not one of Indonesia’s numerous biennials but rather an annual event held in the city of Yogyakarta, known as Art Jog.

Indonesia’s “Bottom-Up” Art Fair: Art Jog

Entering its 9th iteration in 2016, Art Jog is, at its core, a commercial art fair; however, it remains fundamentally different than more familiar art fairs like Art Basel. Described by its organizers as “bottom-up,” Art Jog highlights artists instead of galleries. It is curated, includes commissioned works, lasts approximately three weeks, and incorporates parallel events such as discussions, studio visits, a young artist’s award, and special “presentations” that have involved the display of internationally acclaimed artists including Marina Abramovic and Yoko Ono. These characteristics, along with the event’s professional execution, suggest significant parallels with Indonesia’s biennials, which seek to examine and produce discourse regarding the state of contemporary art both nationally and internationally.

When Art Jog was first conceived in 2008, just a year after Indonesia’s art market “boom,” its organizers sought to fill a perceived void—namely a site for and by artists where artwork could be made available to both national and international collectors and where artists would be given the opportunity to learn about the mechanisms of the market. Since 2008, Art Jog has come to rival Indonesia’s numerous biennials that have nearly tripled in number over the same time span. There are now three biennials on Indonesia’s central island of Java held in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and East Java, as well as two on Indonesia’s outer islands including Sumatra and Sulawesi. Amongst all of these events that claim some stake in the articulation of Indonesia’s recent contemporary art history, I argue, that of particular significance to Art Jog’s success has been its ability to draw the attention of what anthropologist Doreen Lee refers to as Indonesia’s “post-political generation,” the segment of Indonesia’s population comprised of individuals (aged 14 – 25) who have come of age since the end of Suharto’s 31-year authoritarian New Order Regime.[5] While Indonesia’s most recent biennial, held from mid-November to mid-January of this year (15 November – 17 January) drew a crowd of 30,000 over the course of 8 weeks, Art Jog 2014 attracted approximately 100,000 attendees in just 3 weeks.[6] Yet, despite Art Jog’s success, this event has received numerous critiques mostly relating to its commercial nature. This critique, in the context of Indonesian contemporary art’s recent economic and commercial development, warrants attention. In order to narrow the central inquiry of this
analysis I ask: what is it about the presentation of Art Jog that attracts more viewers than Indonesia’s other biennials, events perceived by many of Indonesia’s art world mediators to be more credible sites for the production of critical discourse than a commercial event like Art Jog?

In order to explore this question this paper invites you to experience Art Jog as I have the last two years. By touching most specifically on the growth and change of this exhibition’s annual commissioned work – an installation that takes over the façade of the exhibition hall – I intend to demonstrate the nature of Art Jog and the way in which its public has become an important facet of its execution. Through this discussion I suggest that Art Jog’s success has been influenced by the awareness of its organizers and their ability to cater the presentation of Art Jog to Indonesia’s post-political generation, ultimately resulting in the production of a new channel for the circulation of critical discourse surrounding contemporary art. As I will describe, this new channel is virtual, produced through the photo-sharing platform, Instagram.

Join me at Art Jog

A visit to Art Jog begins at the entrance to Taman Budaya, the site of this annual art fair [figure 1]. Taman Budaya, literally “cultural park” in Indonesian, is Yogyakarta’s government-owned cultural center. This site, located strategically in the heart of the city, is less than a mile from the sultan’s palace, just behind the city’s oldest market of Beringharjo, and along the central artery of Yogyakarta known as Jalan Malioboro. Its complex includes a large exhibition space, a performance hall, and offices that house various art related organizations. Built during the era of Dutch colonial control, these buildings are
relatively unassuming and in slight disrepair; it is during events like Art Jog that they are brought to life. This transformation is most pronounced by the annual commissioned installation which takes over the exhibition hall’s façade, effectively erasing any trace of the building’s colonial heritage [figure 2].

As one of Indonesia’s primary art centers, Yogyakarta is home to myriad galleries and cultural spaces. Due to the density of artists and the high-rate of art production in this city, it often seems that on any given night one can find an art opening. On Friday and Saturday nights especially, it is not uncommon for artists and their peers to jump from opening to opening. As a result, openings are never really that crowded. At times you will even hear the complaint that there are simply too many exhibitions to be interesting anymore. In this saturated context it is particularly astounding to consider the number of attendees that show up on Art Jog’s opening night. In 2015 it is estimated that approximately 20,000 people gathered in front of Taman Budaya, surpassing the previous year, which saw closer to 15,000.[7] Since its inception eight years ago a precedent has been set for Art Jog. Each year must be bigger, better, and more complex than the last. Having attended this event regularly since 2010, I have witnessed this development – reflected most directly through the development of its commissioned installations. I have seen these installations grow to become more interactive and better synchronized with the attention of Art Jog’s audience. This year’s installation, by the husband and wife duo Indieguerillas, was without a doubt the most engaging commission yet.

Playing off the literal translation of Taman Budaya as “Cultural Park,” Indieguerillas designed a dome covered in live plants with a small waterfall on its exterior in order to create a park-like green space [figure 3]. To enter Art Jog attendees had to pass through this dome in which they encountered eight interactive works, fashioned as bicycles or becak
(rickshaws) [figure 4]. These pieces were each designed around a particular theme that made reference to traditional culture and perceived problems of contemporary society. In the evenings they were brought to life by individuals and local communities who manned each piece, in order to invite attendees to participate in whatever activity that bicycle offered. For example, one bicycle was fashioned as a mobile kitchen while next to it was another bicycle that served as a place to eat, aptly titled *Face Off Dinner* [figure 5]. This piece features two seats separated by a partition that contains two video screens. On each screen a video was a projection of the individual seated on the opposite side, intended as a critique of our obsession with devices even during mealtimes. In order to both inform and instruct attendees, next to each bicycle was a placard that included not only a short description of the work but also various symbols representative of social media platforms and a QR code, linked to a website that provided a schedule of events associated with each bicycle.

On my first visit to Art Jog 2015 I was struck by the strategy and affect of not only Indieguerilla’s installation but also the overall exhibition. Indieguerilla’s green dome served as a tranquil gateway to what became an overwhelming experience. With a desire to create an exhibition that included only interactive or intermedia art, this year’s Art Jog entitled “Infinity in Flux” was comprised almost entirely of three-dimensional intermedia works with the exception of one painting.[8] As a result, lights, sounds, and the flicker of moving objects constantly confronted the viewer as she twisted through the exhibition that was laid out rather illogically as a series of long corridors with various rooms and small nooks throughout. As the curatorial remarks in the exhibition’s catalogue state, “The theme ‘Infinity in Flux’ was partly inspired by visitors of the previous Art Jog who incessantly took selfie snapshots with the artworks they found appealing. Although this behavior may seem ‘disruptive’ to some – it also shows their need to be ‘close’ to art.”[9] I argue that Art Jog’s organizing committee
not only successfully brought art closer to its attendees through the production of a sensorial experience but also strategically honed in on the engagement of its audience via social media. It is here that I would like to take you back to Art Jog 2014, the moment at which I also noticed a significant shift in the makeup of Art Jog’s audience and this audience’s engagement.

Identity Construction via Selfie

While I was not in attendance at the opening of Art Jog 2014, I was eager to see how the curatorial team had taken up the theme “Legacies of Power.” Held approximately one month before Indonesia’s second ever democratic election, the exhibition promised a significant opportunity to observe how Indonesia’s art world, 17 years after the end of Suharto’s New Order regime, was interpreting and responding to both Indonesia’s political past and future. While I was struck by the commission that greeted me when I arrived to Taman Budaya, I was more struck by a new phenomenon, namely the incessant need to take selfies or photographs in front of artworks and the use of the selfie stick, which in Indonesian is referred to as the tongkat narsis, best translated as “narcissist stick” [figure 6].

Of course the selfie is now quite familiar; however, in 2014 this was like nothing I had witnessed before. While I was intently reading the well-stated captions next to each artwork it seemed that everyone around me was more interested in finding the best angle from which to take a photograph, not of the artwork itself but rather of themselves in front of that artwork [figure 7]. I was made aware later that attendees were taking these selfies in order to upload to Instagram as part of an audience contest that had been advertised at the exhibition’s ticket booth.

Despite that for the first time Art Jog 2014 charged an entrance fee of Rp. 10,000 (at the time approximately USD $1.10), overall attendance was higher than ever before. Many young attendees, ranging from high school students to recent
university graduates stated that they had heard of Art Jog as a result of a photo uploaded by a friend to Instagram. After seeing these photos they too wanted to take part in this event.

This interest in the projection of self via social media is reflective of what Doreen Lee argues to be a “constant urge to document, circulate, and interpret representations of self on social media [an act that is now] a visible element in the formation of urban Indonesian subjectivities.”[10] Art Jog’s manipulation of this trend both in 2014 (and on a much more massive scale in 2015) demonstrates both a familiarity with their young (post-political) audience and a strategic move reflective of a desire to attract an even wider contingent of the young. While other social media sites in Indonesia are arguably more popular (for example, Indonesia is said to have one of the largest number of both Facebook and Twitter users in the world), the choice to utilize Instagram as a platform for audience engagement ensured more immediate participation. In comparison to other photo sharing platforms, Instagram is unique as it enables users to take and manipulate photos with the mobile application itself and then instantly post them. As described in a study on the use of Instagram in museums, “the fact that Instagrams [sic] are mostly shared live, during the event that the photos are taken, makes it possible for [a] community to provide synchronous commentary.”[11]

I suggest that such a “community” engaged with a particular set of Instagram posts might be compared to a “public” brought into being by its relationship to the circulation of a “text” such as that described by Michael Warner. While the type of text that Warner refers to in his work “Publics and Counterpublics” is arguably a more standard written text, I extend the use of this term, identifying posts on Instagram as a type of text. When tagged with a particular “hashtag” these texts become a cohesive body. These texts form a relation among strangers that is both impersonal and personal. Their relevance is constituted through the attention of those who respond or utilize the same hashtag. Presently,
there are close to 16,000 posts that use a hashtag associated with Art Jog 2014, creating a sort of virtual archive [figure 8]. [12]

An initial survey of these posts suggests that a seemingly large majority are selfies taken by attendees in front of artworks while another large subset display an artwork in isolation. Comments given with posts also vary. Some provide the title of a work while others include statements that have no obvious connection to the work itself but rather reflect an element of the viewer’s reaction to that work. Ultimately what these posts demonstrate is that the remediation of the work of art via Instagram leads to new meanings other than those originally intended by the work’s producer. On the idea of remediation, anthropologist Karen Strassler states, “A shift in the media ‘habitat’ of the image and the channels by which it travels...will change the image’s mode of address, its publics, and the protocols of use and interpretation by which its meanings are produced.”[13] This is in line with what theorist David Joselit’s describes as the “neoliberal” approach to the circulation of art, in which “images are dislocated from their original site and enter ‘networks where they are characterized by motion, either potential or actual, and are capable of changing format—of experiencing cascading chains of relocation and remediation.”[14]

The re-appropriation of artworks displayed at Art Jog via Instagram is of course not unique to this event or even Indonesia. What was unique, however, in the context of Indonesia was the response to this phenomenon by Art Jog’s organizers. By creating an exhibition in 2015 that was almost entirely interactive Art Jog created a space that encouraged this new form of participation for its public. It created a sort of “relational exhibition” encouraging the production and circulation of discourse via an unlikely platform, Instagram. [15]

The Price of Art Appreciation

It is thus that I return to a reflection on this event’s initial intent – to create a space by and for artists to display their work while somehow learning about the mechanisms of the market. In 2008, this goal held significance for young artists who had little exposure to the international art market. Fast-forward seven-years and the focus seems no longer on educating artists but rather engaging a growing public, comprised largely of young people, members of Doreen Lee’s post-political generation, This group is not necessarily apolitical but rather, as she states, “politically engaged in a new and disordered way...cognizant of and responding to the globalized terms of how citizenship is idealized in similar terms to how the emergent middle classes’ techniques of self in post-socialist regimes have incorporated neoliberal ideas while remaining embedded in broader moral and cultural frameworks.”[16]

Yet, despite the success of Art Jog in its ability to attract members of Indonesia’s largest demographic and successfully spark their interest in contemporary art, Art Jog remains at its
core an art fair. It is a commercial event that depends on the sale of art for its continued success. Although it suggests a primary parallel with Indonesia’s biennials, namely the exploration and further institutionalization of Indonesian contemporary art, it is not a biennial, which is presumably focused on the production of discourse rather than the commodification of art and the accumulation of profit. This interest in revenue, extracted from Art Jog’s audience was arguably the most contested aspect of Art Jog 2015. Instead of Rp. 10,000, this year’s entrance fee was raised to Rp. 50,000 for the general public and Rp. 25,000 for students. In Indonesian terms where lunch at a local food-stall might cost around Rp. 15,000, these sums were seen as potentially too expensive. Despite the high admission fee, Art Jog 2015 welcomed approximately 80,000 attendees. While this number was down from 2014, Heri Pemad, Art Jog’s founder told me that this decline was not cause for concern. In order to successfully execute this year’s exhibition, comprised almost entirely of three-dimensional inter-media works, Pemad stated that the higher entrance fee was necessary and that in order to foster appreciation for art, one must also realize its costs. For me it was somewhat of a surprise to find out from many attendees with whom I spoke that this fee did not decrease their interest in attending Art Jog. Many even went so far as to liken the entrance fee to a movie ticket or the cost of a meal at one of Yogyakarta’s malls – popular activities amongst Indonesia’s expanding middle-class. While this may be interpreted as a potentially pessimistic observation suggesting their appreciation of art for its “entertainment value” alone, many also described how Art Jog was exciting because it was different. Nowhere else in Indonesia are they able to see a display of contemporary art such as that which Art Jog puts on. Nowhere else do they feel as comfortable to engage directly with the works of art they are confronted with.

I am curious to find out during future trips to Indonesia how not only Art Jog but also Indonesia’s biennials continue to develop and adapt in line with the demands of its growing “new public.” Further, I wonder how established artists, critics, and curators (those who I mentioned at the beginning of this presentation as skeptical of Art Jog’s potential as a site for the production of discourse) will or will not acknowledge the credibility of new sites for the circulation of critical commentary concerning contemporary art.
ABSTRACT

This thesis explores how the media in Myanmar has covered gender issues from 2010 to 2014, exercised media freedom, and engaged with gender organizations. The research also examines the role of media in gender development in Myanmar. This research involves media content analysis to examine the representation of women in decision-making, economic participation, and social and security affairs. In addition, semi-structured interviews with gender representatives from development agencies are utilized to explore the engagement of gender development organizations with the media. The study found that media coverage regarding gender related issues increased from 47 reports in 2010 to 67 reports in 2014. Though media coverage about gender increased in number, their content can relay different meanings. Among these new reports, the most common were the stories of empowerment, focusing on women’s involvement in decision-making and the economy. In terms of social and security issues, the media has sought to promote public awareness about women’s security. Despite these improvements, gender stereotyping is still evident, in particular, with portrayals of women as vulnerable in conflict-related reports. This research has also found that gender organizations and the media need to collaborate in order to incorporate gender-related guidelines into current media laws – such as regulations to reduce gender stereotyping and the devaluing of women.
1. Introduction

1.1. Problem identification

The media is a key social agent that often reinforces social, political, and economic norms and traditions.[1] On the other hand, the media can be a powerful tool for advocacy and education, as well as a method for introducing and debating new policies and practices. Media engagement with women and development issues can help to support social justice reforms and lead to greater gender equality. In terms of empowerment, the media can help women engage in community issues beyond the household and gain awareness to help change established perspectives. The media has been recognized as an essential tool in achieving equality between men and women in contemporary societies since the 4th World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.[2]

In order to hear the real voices of women from the bottom, women’s rights to communication should be “understood, respected, and implemented” – with a view to bring about social change in the media.[3] In this light, Eva Solomon advocates for “development journalism,” which takes a people-oriented approach to stories, and encourages people to get involved in communication processes and news production.[4] Development journalism encourages community empowerment by engaging with communities and providing access to reliable and unbiased information, as well as diverse perspectives. A “gender focus” within development journalism involves participatory communication by engaging
with different voices and perspectives of ordinary men and women in order to foster well-being. This practice of communication for gender development emphasizes the reduction of human inequality in development; including political, economic, social, and poverty spheres. Given the capacity for media to create change, media approaches should be examined in order to understand how the media can represent the advancement of marginal groups from a development journalism perspective.

1.2. Research background

Myanmar, also known as Burma, borders China, Laos, Thailand, Bangladesh, and India. According to the 2014 census, 51.5 million people (51.8% female and 48.2% male) reside in the nation.[5] The literacy rate stands at 89.5% (86.9% for female, and 92.6% for male). The employment to population ratio age 15-64 is recorded at 81.9% for males and 48.4% for females. Myanmar was listed as a least developed country since 1987. In terms of gender relations, Myanmar was ranked 83 out of 149 for Gender Inequality Index in 2013, down from 80 in 2012, despite the end of the military dictatorship in 2010.[6]

Myanmar ratified the CEDAW convention in 1997, and as part of the convention’s obligations, Myanmar has committed to laws that uphold women’s rights and promote women’s security and equality in political and economic participation.[7] According to the 1947, 1974, and 2008 constitution, women have equal rights with men in the economic, social, and political spheres. However, social discrimination remains deeply rooted. Traditional proverbs provide a historical context. For instance, the sayings, “an intelligent woman cannot establish a village alone, no matter how intelligent she is,” and, “a good man or husband can have one thousand concubines,” support and reinforce patriarchal divides.[8] Moreover, marriage, divorce, and inheritance are still practiced according to local customs and traditions, and are evident among ethnic minority groups as well. According to cultural norms, Myanmar women are inferior to men, as men are believed to possess Bhone (the superior power). These social norms undermine and limit the role of women in community decision making and political roles. Currently, female representation in the House of National Level Parliament in Myanmar is the lowest among ASEAN countries, at 5.79 per cent.[9] The Myanmar Women’s Forum in 2013 recommended increasing women participation to at least 30% in the administrative, legislative, and judicial sectors of the parliament.[10]

Women also face challenges relating to a lack of maternal and child healthcare and security. Although the government has promoted reproductive health awareness through the National Health Plan, maternal death and childhood mortality remains high, due to inadequate health services and facilities in the remote areas. Furthermore, the Gender Equality Network reports that domestic violence and sexual harassment and assault are major issues which Myanmar women experience in their daily lives.[11] Reports from the
Myanmar police indicated that rape cases have almost doubled from 377 in 2010 to 605 in 2011, and 654 cases in 2012.[12] Burma Campaign UK also found evidence of sexual violence towards ethnic minority women, with rape being utilized a weapon by the military. [13]

Currently, development agencies in Myanmar have accelerated their efforts in advocating to the government and enhancing gender awareness. Gender development advocacy through the media also faces challenges, due to a legacy of restrictions on the freedom of expression for five decades. During four years of democratic transition, from 2010 to 2014, gender became a sensitive issue. Although media censorship has been eased and gender awareness has been promoted by the development agencies, nationalist forces and extreme Buddhists continue to believe that women’s roles need to be limited in order to retain national prestige and integrity, and to protect against interfaith marriage and polygamy. In this light, the media can be a powerful medium for raising different gender perspectives for both gender progressive and oppressive views.

2. Literature Review

2.1. The relation of gender, media and development in international context

Gender is a product of social and cultural settings that generate the norms and characteristics of masculinity and femininity, and has the power to create social hierarchies. Characteristics such as “competitive,” “strong,” “rational,” “dominant,” and “aggressive” are typically identified as masculine behavior, whereas feminine characteristics include “caring,” “emotional,” “weak,” “loving,” and “gentle.”[14] Rebecca Ann Lind and Colleen Salo indicate that gender roles are socially constructed, and based on stereotypical gender norms which include the belief that roles and responsibilities are designated to specific genders – for example, positions of power, such as “politician” and “manager” are for men, while “secretary” and “homemaker” are jobs for women.[15] However, Rosalind Gill explains that the content of gender roles can change over time in any society, falling in line with the changes in public perspectives or, with the shift of political or economic ideologies.[16] The mass media is a social cognitive tool for gender development, since media dispatches can shape public perceptions of gender roles.[17]

Since the 1970s, the United Nations (UN) and international community have emphasized the importance of equality between men and women. The 4th Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 recognized that gender sensitizing via the media should be a priority, in order to increase women’s rights and roles in political, social, economic, and cultural spheres.[18]

Gender developmental approaches have been progressed over decades. In the 1980s, the approach shifted to WID to GAD, because the WID approach was criticized for being too influenced by Western ideologies of female oppression. GAD approaches have been linked to Third World Feminism and acknowledge women as active agents of economic, political,
and cultural improvements, rather than passive recipients of development aid. In this light, women’s empowerment in economic, social, cultural, and political sectors was put at the heart of development agenda. Beyond GAD, gender development concepts shifted towards a women’s rights perspective, as reflected by CEDAW and MDGs. Promotion of gender equality and women empowerment, and improving maternal health have been at the core of the MDGs – with emphasis on the improvement of social and cultural rights, and the decision making power of women in developing countries.

As noted by Barbara Heron, the social justice needs of women in the developed world and developing world are different. Social discrimination based on class and race/ethnicity are the most challenging issues encountered by women from the Global South. Moreover, women in poorer countries are fighting for rights to access education, proper reproductive health, participation in community affairs, and the creation of a secure environment. In contrast, women in developed countries are demanding for equal rights in payment and positions in the employment sector and political participation. This trend shows that women’s movements in developed countries are more focused on social advancement, while those in the developing world are struggling for survival, justice, and basic needs. With regards to women empowerment in developing countries, Aruna Rao states that development initiatives often need to focus on women’s basic needs and rights and should respect the local cultures, rather than challenging culturally sensitive norms in a direct way. Rao argues that gender advocates should frame their objectives with consideration to the strengths and weaknesses of particular bureaucracies. For instance, encouraging governments in developing countries to provide education and healthcare services for women are more optimistic and diplomatic than blaming them for not working towards gender equality goals.

Although advocacy for gender mainstreaming aims for both institutional and social transformation, Rao claims that bureaucracies are often not effective agents for social transformation. In this regard, advocacy through the media needs to highlight not only gender development policy strengthening and institutional changes with gender mainstreaming, but also needs to encourage the empowerment of women at the grassroots level. Having said that, while grassroots participation is required for human development projects, Jill Johannessen suggests that it is necessary to involve women as subjects, rather than objects of development. This means that women should be given a greater control over resources and opportunities in order to take part in decision-making and the processes that influence their lives. With regards to empowerment, development journalism can stimulate the media to reveal women’s capabilities and achievement, rather than just focusing on suffering and struggle. According to Solomon, development journalism can engage with the voices of ordinary people by promoting their personal stories. In this respect,
development journalism is appreciated as an important and holistic approach to bring about gender equality, by addressing both bureaucratic issues and grassroots empowerment.

In addition, Trish Williams points out that advocacy work through the media should also combat gender discrimination in text and images, as well as content. Sherrie Inness argues that printed media often reinforces feminine stereotypes. This reinforcing of femininity may have two meanings. Media dispatches on women’s sufferings might strengthen the stereotype of women as victims. On the other hand, the focus on this suffering could be seen as an attempt to raise community awareness. Thus, three points need to be considered when conducting media analysis on gender representation: (1) what is the purpose of the media’s contribution?; (2) how does media coverage represent the development of marginalized women?; and (3) how can media coverage influence the gender development policy for improvement, institutional change, and social transformation?

In this light, the capacity of media persons and their knowledge about gender theories need to be enhanced to reduce any form of gender discrimination in their contributions. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action provided recommendations for prohibiting sexist media content and stereotypical representation; revealing inequity, suffering, and gender inequality issues; addressing particular subjects important to women; contributing a balanced and diverse representation of women in the media; promoting the role of female journalists in the newsroom; and advocating for gender sensitive journalism to media stakeholders. Following these objectives, contemporary gender and media projects are trying to monitor the media’s contributions, promote media literacy regarding gender, provide advocacy and lobby media persons to explore challenges, define approaches for media reform, and provide guidelines for gender sensitive journalism.

The different literature suggests the need for a two-pronged approach to improve gender representation in media contributions. First, the media should explore stories of women from the bottom with development journalism as a means of encouraging and empowering their voices. Second, the media should be aware of the guidelines for gender sensitive journalism to reduce gender stereotypes.

2.2. Gender and the roles of media in Myanmar’s context

Gender development via the media in Myanmar has been a challenge during the transition period, because of a greater focus on economic and political changes. Gender and women-focused issues have not received much attention, as these issues have been considered less important. Moreover, the development of media lagged behind due to media control by the government for a long period of time. Journalistic freedom in Myanmar was limited for almost five decades, starting in 1962. Although the democratic transition started in
According to the 2015 World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders, Myanmar improved from 174th out of 178th place in 2010, to 144th in 2015. Media freedom may result in greater publication of articles highlighting gender equality. However, Aniruddha Mitra et al. argue that despite the removal of state controls, the media itself may be institutionalized to perpetuate gender biases.

Women and media is one of the major components of the National Plan of Action for the Advancement of Women, which is aimed at enhancing gender awareness for the public through the media. Yet, Dilrukshi Handunnetti argues that current Myanmar portrayal of women in the media seems to reinforce stereotypes with dominant representations of females as family figures/homemakers or as victims. Gender organizations in Myanmar have approached media outlets in order to incorporate content and articles focused on gender development. However, the most challenging issue they are experiencing is the manifestation of nationalist ideology, which promotes women as responsible for national prestige and integrity. In 2012, the Nationalist Party proposed a law to ban interfaith marriage between Buddhist women and non-Buddhist men, forcing these women to convert to their husband’s religion. Chie Ikeya states that in the 1930s, the nationalist movement utilized newspapers, magazines, and cartoons to target women wearing foreign-imported costumes in order to mock them as national traitors.

History is repeated again; but more recently, gender activists have a comprehensive plan for women’s advancement, which can combat nationalist ideology. Different communication channels are being sought to raise voices, needs, and concerns of the women from the grassroots as well as to highlight the importance of their development. In this respect, research is required to explore the recent gender representation in media through texts and contents, and their contribution to development efforts.

3. Theoretical Approach

3.1. Gender and Critical Communication Theory

Engaging with media critical theory, Sue Curry Jansen highlights two important elements in order to examine how the media influences its audiences. First, the sociological analysis of formations and structures of knowledge and power through media is required. Second, cultural analysis is required to explore hegemonic and counter-hegemonic processes, whereby mediated messages attain meaning and exercise power. As noted by Jansen, languages, keywords, images, and content in media contributions are the most effective agent to reproduce knowledge and power, and to introduce ideas, ideologies, and theories.

Social constructivism is the key ontology within critical communication theory and is concerned with the social process of producing meaning.
“encoding/decoding” model, media agents ‘encode’ meaning into their text, depending on the social context, and readers interpret those texts by ‘decoding’ them into different meanings, based on their own social context.[37] In the study of gender and media, “encoding/decoding” approaches help to explore how the media creates certain formations of gender roles, masculinity, femininity, and gender development.[38]

In examining media engagement for the purpose of communication for social change, research needs to consider two key factors: participatory communication and gender power analyses. Development journalism acknowledges the voices of marginalized people and provides avenues for sharing stories of empowerment. Development journalism can create spaces for marginalized groups to raise their voices.[39] Thus, the media can convey the messages of marginalized groups and campaigners to decision and policy makers.

In order to examine how media outlets can empower marginalized women, a critical communication approach can be used to understand development journalism. Such an approach would include analyzing the use of keywords, content, presentation, and female participation in story contributions. Thus, a critical communication approach requires gender power analysis, and the way in which the media engages with women in diverse groups. In the analysis of gender power relations in the Global South, development journalism needs to observe how women are positioned differently within power relations. Barbara Heron reminds us that the experiences of diverse groups of women, across race/ethnicity and class, cannot be generalized.[40] In the Global South, women’s program interventions need to consider differences in class and race/ethnicity as important factors in understanding how power is distributed. In this study of gender representation in the media, the way of constructing knowledge was investigated by content analysis based on a social constructivist perspective and informed by critical communication theory. A development journalism perspective is applied to explore the different ways in which the media represents women of different race/ethnicity and class.

4. Methodology

4.1. Research Approach

In the study of gender development and the media, agencies such as Global Alliance for Media and Gender investigate three areas: media coverage about gender, gender representation in newsrooms, and impacts on the audiences. [41] This research examines only the role of print media in Myanmar in promoting gender development. The study engages a qualitative approach to examine media coverage regarding gender. By employing critical communication theory with a social constructivist methodology, the study aims to generate an in-depth understanding of the background and social context of Myanmar society. Accordingly, the study focused on two main research questions:
1) How did Myanmar’s print media portray gender roles from 2010 to 2014 in order to improve decision making power, economic participation, social affairs (health and education), and security?

2) How do gender development organizations engage with the media for gender development in Myanmar?

4.2. Data Sampling and Collection

The main research questions for this study are related to the ways in which Myanmar’s media portrayed gender roles from 2010 to 2014, and, the relation between gender, media, and development works in Myanmar. The investigation on media dispatches through content analysis is aimed at revealing gender representation in development issues by print media outlets. By means of semi-structured interviews, the research aims to obtain the required data to respond to the second research question.

a) Content Analysis

The national weekly paper, *The Myanmar Times*, was selected as a sample case study for content analysis. With the purpose of an in-depth case study, the research investigates this single unit case over time, reviewing publications of *The Myanmar Times* from 2010 (the initial year of democratic transition period), in 2012 (the year of censorship ended) and 2014 (the recent year). *The Myanmar Times* has been published since 2000 by the Myanmar Consolidated Media Company, established with the joint shares by Myanmar (51%) and Australia (49%). It is the only weekly paper published in both Myanmar and English languages, and the main subscribers are government organizations, embassies, international organizations, and community centers. The local Myanmar version has 68 pages published on Thursdays, while the 40-page English version is circulated on Mondays. The paper has a circulation of about 3,000 copies in English and over 25,000 copies in Myanmar per week. The topics covered include national and international news, in-depth stories and articles, opinions, politics, property and business, technology, travel, life and style, and sports. Moreover, Myanmar Consolidated Media publishes a special paper every month with the supplementary pages featuring specific issues such as “Education,” “Technology,” “Culture,” “Women,” and “Health.” Through content analysis, this study has explored the media portrayal of women in *The Myanmar Times* (Myanmar Version) by selecting their special issues for analysis. The special issues were chosen for analysis in this case study, because they are longer in length, and thus are more likely to include articles that touch on women’s issues. Accordingly, the case study analyzed the media dispatch of 36 special issues of *The Myanmar Times* for specific three years: 2010, 2012 and 2014 (12 special issues for each year).

b) Semi-structured Interview

Semi-structured interviews have been conducted with representatives from NGOs, selected using a purposive
sampling approach. As suggested by Jennifer Mason and Imelda Coyne, the target participants of purposeful sampling are selected according to strategic criteria.[42] Firstly, interviewees must be gender representatives from local gender organizations. The reason for choosing local gender representatives from local organization is that those people are believed to have better understanding about Myanmar's social, cultural, and political context. Moreover, these participants are friendly and familiar with local publications. Secondly, since gender is not about only women, the study has aimed to include both male and female voices. Among over thirty international and local gender organizations, the research chose four local gender representatives whose organizations met the following criteria: 1) most actively working in gender development programs; 2) has a strong relationship with media and is represented in the media; and 3) is closely engaged with community based gender organizations.

In line with the research purpose and questions, an interview guide was prepared. The interview questions relate to three main topics: 1) The changes in gender representation in the media from 2010 to 2014, including questions about the changes in content, text, and images; 2) The engagement of gender organizations with media, with questions about policy, advocacy works, strategic plans, and recommendations; and 3) The influence of media in gender development, with questions about achievements and drawbacks that impacted people, policy makers, and gender organizations.

4.3. Data Analysis

David Altheide suggests that media analysis should reflect the research objectives, main research questions, and theoretical approach.[43] Based on the critical communication theory, the research questions were prepared to explore the ways in which the media engages with gender development and the role of development agencies.

Content analysis is the key data analysis approach for examining media articles from a social constructivist perspective. The words, text, content, and images the media used in The Myanmar Times articles have been critically analyzed. By means of Hall’s “encoding/decoding” model, the key words and semiotics were decoded to interpret the meanings that reflect the newspaper’s perspective, and its possible influence on social roles and power creation of people.[44] The content analysis was aimed to respond to the first research question; “How did Myanmar’s print media portray gender roles from 2010 to 2014 (in order to improve decision making power, economic participation, social affairs (health and education), and security?” Thus the data was examined based on the following categories: “women and decision making power,” “women and economic participation,” “women and social affairs (health and education),” and “women and security”. To link with these categories, the data obtained from media coverage was categorized according to: date of media contribution; title of publication; categories; themes (neutral/ education/ advocacy/ empowerment/ stereotyping); brief description;
key words; and “remark.”[45] The results include qualitative data - capturing definitions, meanings, and types, as well as numerical data, for instance, how many articles are contributed to focused topics, in order to supplement understanding and interpretations.[46] In addition to data analysis, the study also took into the account of the ways gender representation differed according to class and race/ethnicity; and the representation of women as either object or subject.

For data analysis of semi-structured interviews, the study used categorization analysis. The researcher identified nine key categories after reviewing the responses of the gender development representatives thoroughly.[47] These categories become initial themes that align with the main interview questions. First, “purpose of the use of media;” “focused topics;” “perspective of media coverage about gender;” and “opinion on changing media trend” categories were put under the theme of “the perspectives of the respondents regarding the changes to gender representation in media from 2010 to 2014”. Second, “recent engagement of the gender organization with the media;” “future plans of the organization;” and “policy recommendation for the improvement of media engagement” categories were linked to the theme of “the engagement of gender organization with media”. Finally, under the theme of “the influence of media in gender development”, the categories such as “perspective on the role of media for gender development” and “experiences of gender organization in media engagement (both challenges and achievements)” were included.

5. Findings

5.1. Findings from content analysis

In the content analysis, the investigation focused on gender representations in Myanmar media in terms of “decision-making,” “economic participation,” “social” (health and education), and “security” issues from 2010 to 2014. In decoding media contribution, the use of words, semiotics, and content were analyzed to explore meaning. According to findings, most of the media’s contributions were presented as a form of brief news, articles, and features; but the paper included a small number of analysis articles with a gender perspective.[48] Analysis regarding laws and practices that limit women’s roles and rights, and thus threaten women’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR/CATEGORY</th>
<th>DECISION MAKING</th>
<th>ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION</th>
<th>SOCIAL (HEALTH &amp; EDUCATION)</th>
<th>SECURITY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Gender Representation in the Myanmar Times’ Contribution (2010-2014)
security, were few. Rather, the study found that the majority of articles were presented from a gender-neutral perspective – as in, it may have discussed women, but lacked a specific gender focus or analysis, focusing more on human interest. For instance, “Aung San Suu Kyi picked her son up at the airport on his arrival” (Vol 28, Issue 553, November, 2010); or

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENDER REPRESENTATION/CATEGORY</th>
<th>DECISION MAKING</th>
<th>ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION</th>
<th>SOCIAL (HEALTH &amp; EDUCATION)</th>
<th>SECURITY</th>
<th>TOTAL MEDIA COVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (or) Awareness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Stereotyping</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2:** Gender representation in four categories pertaining to development related issues in The Myanmar Times’ Contribution (2010-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR/CATEGORY</th>
<th>DECISION MAKING</th>
<th>ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION</th>
<th>SOCIAL (HEALTH &amp; EDUCATION)</th>
<th>SECURITY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>2014</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>184</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3:** Gender representation in The Myanmar Times’ Contribution (2010-2014)
“An orphan has been adopted by a woman doing commercial surrogacy” (Vol 35, Issue 684, July, 2014). Based on the findings, messages given in the articles were categorized into five key types: 1) Neutral message (there is no gender perspective in the news); 2) Education/Awareness; 3) Advocacy; 4) Empowerment; and 5) Stereotyping. In addition, the study analyzed how media contributions regarding gender represented marginalized groups according to class and race/ethnicity; for example, media representation related to women from ethnic minorities and from small religious groups in Myanmar.

The research also investigated the inclusion of women’s ‘voices,’ including the use of women’s portraits, and news and features that focused on women’s issues. According to Table 1, the rate of contribution of the news related to women’s issues by The Myanmar Times increased by 30% from 2010 to 2014. In 2010, women related stories were mainly related to women and social (health and education) issues. In 2012, the paper mainly focused on women and decision making, with a significant shift to women and security topics in 2014. Among the four key categories, gender representation in the news coverage regarding economic participation remained moderate. Articles were then categorized in terms of their representation of women, using the categories of: neutral, stereotyping, advocacy, empowerment, and education/awareness.

As shown in Tables 2 and 3, the number of articles exhibiting gender stereotypes decreased slightly in articles about decision-making, social, and security issues from 2010 to 2014. The number of stereotyping messages decreased significantly in articles pertaining to women and economic participation during the same period. In addition, the total rate of articles exhibiting gender empowerment messages exceeded the rate of articles exhibiting gender stereotyping messages between 2010 and 2014. According to Table 2, the media’s efforts in awareness raising with regards to security increased from one contribution in 2010 to ten in 2014. Apart from these, media’s gender empowerment and awareness raising in other areas fluctuated throughout the investigation period. In addition, the number of analysis articles or features contributing to advocacy remained low.

a) Women and decision-making

In 2012, The Myanmar Times included 17 articles about women and decision making from a ‘neutral’ perspective. Just three pieces about decision-making were written in 2014, as news regarding education, empowerment, and advocacy messages increased in number. Most of the news was defined as neutral, without a specific gender focus. Particularly in 2012, although the media covered the news about the female democracy icon, Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, some of the media contributions did not include any gender-related message – for example, “the opposition party – NLD’s fundraising event” (Vol 28, Issue 557, February, 2012), “Aung San Suu Kyi took three days leave from parliament” (Vol 29, Issue 576, July, 2012).
2012 saw a spike in articles taking an empowerment perspective, which could be linked to Aung San Suu Kyi’s activities, as she and her party were contested in a by-election held in April, 2012. Moreover, the news about female political candidates internationally, such as “Yingluck passes major hurdle in Thai parliament” (Vol 30, Issue 597, November, 2012); and “Park Geun-hye has won the election in South Korea” (Vol 30, Issue 600, December, 2012) created messages of empowerment by considering women’s involvement in decision-making. In contrast, the rate of media coverage regarding female candidates was very low in the 2010 general election in Myanmar. By 2014, the paper covered the voices of ordinary women, moving beyond the well-known female political figures. For example, an interview with Htar Htar, a Kha Yar women’s organization’s leader (Vol 35, Issue 692, October, 2014), and the feature about a museum manager (Vol 35, Issue 692, October, 2014) highlight the strengths of female subjects.

Further, The Myanmar Times raised awareness regarding women’s rights violations in an article in 2014 titled “Voting in election of Yangon Municipal committee members” (Vol 36, Issue 704, December, 2014). The article raised awareness to the public regarding the fact that women’s voices were lost in the electoral process, as only one family member was allowed to vote in the election of YCDC’s committee members, with families favoring men over women. Gender awareness in The Myanmar Times seemed to improve in 2014, with a “Women of ASEAN” special supplement (Vol 35, Issue 684, August, 2014). The article advocated for women’s participation in decision making through an analysis article.

Regarding the stereotyping messages, the study investigated one case in 2010. The feature titled “Autumn love blossoms” (Vol 27, Issue 532, July, 2010) included stereotypes of gender roles, discussing the marriage of a 40-year-old woman and a 70-year-old male author, the women was quoted saying, “I am less educated. It is good to be the wife of a respected and famous author such as Thakhin Tin Mya (her husband). I think of him as a parent, benefactor and uncle because he treats, guides, and understands me”. Those key words can be seen as disempowering women and reinforcing traditional gender roles.

In 2014, The Myanmar Times published an article explaining current marriage laws, while the nationalist forces were moving to ban interfaith marriages. The article did not make any comments or critiques about these laws, which have prohibited Myanmar Buddhist women from marrying people of different religions or nationalities. Although gender activists in Myanmar have issued several statements objecting to the interfaith marriage laws since 2013, the media did not published these statements or perspectives in the article.

b) Women and economic participation

In terms of women’s economic participation, it was found that articles in The Myanmar Times often portrayed women as ‘decorative items’ for business promotion, rather than investigating their skills, capabilities, and power at macro
or micro economic levels. The use of female portraits in the “Lifestyle” pages utilize gender stereotypes to promote tourism, beauty products, fashion, and food and beverage products. Such stereotyping messages were mostly found in articles from 2010.

Articles also drew on ethnic culture to promote tourism. Articles such as “Taung Yoe ethnic group’s customs, literature and costumes” (Vol 29, Issue 562, March, 2012); and “Traditional Music competition to reveal ethnic culture” (Vol 30, Issue 585, September, 2012), use portrayals of ethnic women, but do not involve any messages of empowerment.

In contrast, media coverage in 2014 explored women’s empowerment in economic spheres in a different light. Contributions including “The first female GM of Chatruim Hotel” (Vol 34, Issue 657, February, 2014), “Can female bus conductors give better services to commuters?” (Vol 35, Issue 682, June, 2014) and “Four women making changes over time” (featuring the success of women’s income generation activity of LIFT project) (Vol 35, Issue 684, August, 2014) highlighted economic achievements of women. After media censorship was removed, the paper also covered stories about labor strikes, which included female labor strikes and the voices of female participants. These articles highlighted barriers to women’s economic involvement and raised awareness about unequal job opportunities, labor exploitation, and unsafe working conditions. Prior to censorship removal, the media’s engagement with labor issues was rare.

With regards to development projects, articles followed a gender neutral approach – for example, “Agriculture loans boast production” (Vol 26, Issue 507, January, 2010); “Credit is needed in delta: Tripartite Core Group’s survey report” (Vol 26, Issue 509, February, 2010). The first article covered the agriculture loan program of a non-governmental agency, without mentioning how many female farmers received the loan. Similarly, the second article generalized the conditions of people affected by cyclone, who were in need of governmental assistance, in particular credit for recovery – the report did not make any reference to the required funding for women’s development activities, such as income generation schemes. It is worth considering that the gender-neutral approach may have been the result of development organizations or the reporters to include and share gender-disaggregated data. Similar gender neutral articles were found in social and security related stories in 2012 and 2014.

c) Women and social issues

Coverage on women’s roles, rights to education, and health care access did not change significantly from 2010 to 2014. Most articles regarding women’s health and education came from an awareness or empowerment perspective. News related to health issues were mostly about maternal and child health and HIV/AIDS prevention. However, media representations of child health as being the concern of women could be seen as a ‘gender stereotype’ approach. On the other hand, media promotion regarding the benefits of breastfeeding can have wider benefits for society. Articles
such as “HIV is not perilous to breast milk, says doctor” (Vol 27, Issue 528, June, 2010); “Football therapy helps women fight AIDS” (Vol 27, Issue 538, August, 2010); “HIV-free children bring hope to parents” (interview with a female with HIV about how she prevented mother-to-child HIV transmission) (Vol 27, Issue 538, August, 2010); and “Breastfeeding can reduce the risk of life of the infant” (Vol 30, Issue 586, September, 2012) provide knowledge and encouragement to women readers. In articles published in 2014, greater engagement with issues pertaining to reproductive health and sex education were found. Moreover, a feature story titled “Don’t discriminate against women with HIV” (Vol 35, Issue 684, August, 2014) advocated for the rights of women affected by HIV. In this light, the media’s stance on advocacy for women is obvious because the media did not publish a generalized story about both male and female HIV patients. Also in education, media highlighted the importance of education for women in an article “Education and labor” (Vol 35, Issue 684, August, 2014) that revealed the relation between education and low/high skilled labor. The article also discussed how many Myanmar women are working in informal sectors as unskilled laborers due to low education and capacity. However, the use of images of female teachers in the general news about primary and secondary education appears to strengthen the role of women as “teacher.”

d) Women and security

When examining articles about security issues in 2014, a gender-neutral approach was common. Gender neutral messaging includes articles that do not promote awareness, empowerment, or make use of stereotyping, but do include comments on particular women; for example, “Aung San Suu Kyi urges the government to enforce rule of law in Rakhine State” (Vol 30, Issue 594, November, 2012); and “The appeal of Phyu Hnin Phway, the activist of Lapataung mining was rejected” (Vol 35, Issue 692, October, 2014). While female voices were included in these articles, gender issues were not explored. However, the rate of news coverage about women and security in The Myanmar Times has grown steadily. For example, awareness about human trafficking was a significant topic within the theme of women’s security in 2010 and 2012. In addition, a number of articles analyzed called for the cooperation and collaboration among countries in the Mekong Region, and ASEAN countries, in the fight against human trafficking. It also called for compensation for women survivors of trafficking. The paper also discussed domestic violence and sexual harassment experienced by women both locally and internationally. Although ethnic conflict and anti-Muslim riots flared up in 2011 and 2012, the media’s attention to the suffering of women as a result of this conflict remained very low. Coverage highlighted the experiences of ethnic groups without a gender perspective; for example, “Kachin refugees are planning to go back to their home” (Vol 28, Issue 558, February, 2012); “Food security concerns for Kachin
refugees in coming year” (Vol 28, Issue 558, February, 2012); and “Local residents in Kachin struggle to continue their livelihoods due to displacement because of dam construction” (Vol 29, Issue 562, March, 2012).

Articles did not explore women’s voices deeply in relation to conflicts and violence, with the exception of general statements such as “most victims are women and children. They are suffering from trauma; even they cannot sleep at night due to fear” in “Rakhine refugees need food, clothes, medicines and security” article (Vol 29, Issue 574, June, 2012). Women’s voices were neglected in conflict reports; however, articles continued to refer to women and children as “victims” and “helpless and hopeless people” in conflicts. The use of pictures of women and children in a half-page article “UN will help the necessary support for emergency human security in Rakhine State” (Vol 29, Issue 574, June, 2012), and in the cover story, “After three year conflict in Kachin State” (Vol 34, Issue 676, June, 2014) are both key examples of gender stereotyping. The study has not found any examples of security related news utilizing women’s empowerment frames, with the exception of news about UNESCO giving a non-violence award to Aung San Suu Kyi (Vol 28, Issue 557, January, 2012).

5.1.1. Interpretation of words and semiotics used by media

Media representations of gender, in terms of contents and words, have improved since 2012. The publication of a special issue titled “Women of ASEAN” (Vol 35, Issue 684, August, 2014) and the use of empowerment words (for example: “smart,” “making changes,” and “successful leadership”) are evidence that the media has attempted to change its approach towards gender development. In the special issue of “Women of ASEAN,” key concepts and laws, including “what gender is,” “what gender equality means,” and “what CEDAW is,” were explained, alongside features about women and employment, education, sexual harassment, and health. In addition to gender development, it was witnessed that the media emphasized on the use of the word “female.” The media coverage about women’s achievement looked very general in 2010 and 2012, the reports published in 2014 highlighted the word “female” in headlines to show women’s capabilities and success. For instance, “Female artists’ art exhibition showing their confidence and strength” (Vol 34, Issue 664, March, 2014); “The first female bank president in Japan” (Vol 34, Issue 664, March, 2014); and “Female drivers are given more parking space in China” (Vol 35, Issue 682, June, 2014).

However, the study has also found the use of words that could be considered explicitly sexist. For example, in the feature about Myanmar New Year Festival, the media used the phrase “lost virginity” to capture the Western cultural domination over the local festival (Vol 34, Issue 664, April, 2014). Similarly in the political features, the articles discussing the immature stage of Myanmar’s democracy used phrases likening this period to a woman after giving birth.
(Thway Nu Thar Nu Democracy). In addition, the media portrayed women’s dignity as “being modest” and “following the traditional rules.” Such description can been seen in the article “Korea soap operas and Myanmar’s society” (Vol 29, Issue 574, June, 2012) and in the interview, “How will you cultivate your daughters?” (Vol 35, Issue 684, August, 2014). Likewise, articles reinforced masculinity and femininity through interviews with male and female managers (Vol 27, Issue 532, July, 2010) that captured the male executive as being “logical,” “rational,” and “active”; while the female executive was characterized as being “emotional,” and “sensitive.” The paper was also less likely to approach women as sources of news. In particular, women’s voices were rare in news contributions about decision-making, economics, and security affairs. Women were also portrayed as being helpless and weak in news coverage regarding conflicts and riots, including photos of women in vulnerable conditions. Similarly, news regarding education featured photos of women teachers, while product promotion news and beauty contest news featured sexualized images of women, reinforcing these as arenas for women.

5.1.2. Media’s representation for women from different class and race/ethnicity

The Myanmar Times paper covered the news of Aung San Suu Kyi’s activities following her release from house arrest in November 2010. Thus, she became the news maker – her words and comments regarding current political, economic, and social affairs were used in headline news and cover stories. From 2012, there was an increasing trend towards publishing feature articles about other prominent female figures from local and international (but particularly, most are from international) arenas, including politics, economics, science, and arts. In 2014, the paper expanded representation, by discussing female politicians and female business executives. The paper also included discussions about ordinary women, such as the stories and voices of female authors, filmmakers, artists, sculptors, teachers, horse-cart female drivers, low-skilled laborers, farmers, peacemakers, activists from CSOs, bus conductors, and housewives. For example, the paper included a feature on a housewife in its special issue for “Women of ASEAN” (Vol 35, Issue 685, August, 2014). The article discussed a woman who raised 12 children, focusing on the children’s passion, affection, and kindness and her support for them to be successful in their fields. As her husband is a low-paid government employee, she made extra income by working as a broker in car and house selling and renting. Thus, these represent an encouragement of women’s involvement in leadership positions, and also domestic roles. The article thus highlights how women can make changes within and beyond traditional roles and spaces. In these features, the articles highlighted both challenges and achievements – such stories encourage the audiences to recognize women’s hardships, as well as their capabilities.
However, less space and attention was given to the voices and representations of ethnic women. In Myanmar, less developed regions tend to be home to ethnic populations, and are sites of conflict and communal violence. While articles have considered poor development conditions and issues regarding conflict, the needs of women have not been covered. For example, the paper has not deeply explored issues around human rights violation against ethnic women. Rather, the paper makes general statements and uses their portraits to highlight sufferings in these less developed regions. Images of ethnic women are used to promote their traditional costumes, customs, and culture; for example, in features about traditional facial tattoo of Chin women; and about the traditions of the Taung Yoe people. These features highlight the fading traditions of the ethnic groups and the importance of retaining and reviving cultural heritage.

5.2. Findings from semi-structured interviews

a) The perspectives of respondents regarding the changes of gender representation in media from 2010 to 2014

Under this theme, the researcher and gender development agencies discussed “the organization’s purpose of the use of media;” “focused topics;” “their perspective on media coverage about gender;” and “opinion on changing media trend.” Regarding the use of media in gender development, all respondents from gender organizations agreed that the media is a strong advocacy tool. The gender organizations interviewed subscribed to weekly papers such as The Myanmar Times, The People’s Age, Kumudra, and Mizzima to read analysis articles, and reviewed daily papers such as Messenger, Crime, Daily Eleven, and 7 Days for daily updated news. These gender organizations used media for sharing information with the public, as well as collecting information, offering transparency, and monitoring the media’s activities. The use of media for sharing information includes two strategies: information about specific project activities (to promote the organization’s profiles) and awareness raising around gender issues. Offering transparency involves building trust among stakeholders, by being open about projects and activities through media and sharing with relevant authorities and partner organizations. With regards to media monitoring, one gender organization highlighted that they studied media interpretations and understandings about gender through media coverage, while another organization examined the media’s presentations and current trends in order to enhance IEC materials production—for example, ‘Thingaha’ Gender Organization examined reported cases of gender-based violence, and put some illustrations in their IEC materials to raise awareness. Thus, gender organizations were learning about current issues from the media, and used the media as a tool for social norm change and to ensure organizational accountability.

All respondents confirmed that gender representation in the media had improved since 2012. However, they indicated that there was still significant scope for further improvement.
Respondents 2 and 4 believed that the number of articles about the project activities of international organizations and government related to gender issues, had increased, but analysis pieces on current injustices, laws, policies and social practices were still few. As Respondent 4 stated:

“Currently most of the gender related activities are presented as news – just to inform public what is happening. The media talk less about why it is happening.”

Respondent 2 believed that coverage on gender related news depended on the organizations’ activities. Respondent 2 said:

“Around 2011 and 2012, there were one or two conferences or seminars relating to women’s issues in a year. More gender workshops, press conferences, or seminars have been organized from 2013; sometimes two events in a day. As long as more events are being organized, more news about the events can be seen.”

Respondent 1 and 3 felt that media personnel do not have sufficient knowledge about gender and do not have the capacity to contribute to analysis articles and features. Gender is a new subject to the media, and the media is still recovering from years of censorship. Respondent 4 pointed out that according to the nature of media, they are looking for ‘a scoop,’ thus gender issues will not always attract the interest of the media.

As a drawback of media freedom, all respondents highlighted that the removal of restriction also has served to reinforce feminine representations of women. After censorship removal in 2012, the number of women’s magazines focusing on beauty, fashion, and women’s domestic roles increased. Sexualized images and poses of women have been frequently used in women’s magazines. Yet, while censorship existed, such representations of women were banned. Respondent 3 was concerned about the open use of sexualized images in the media;

“A lot of sexual images can be seen in media. So, media freedom supports the strengthening of femininity in some ways. Some people may misunderstand freedom of expression and women’s rights movements. They may think democracy is nonsense, that it is just eroding our cultural values”.

Contrary to women’s magazines, the state run media promoted femininity in a different way, highlighting women’s roles in traditional customs, culture, and nationality, showing women wearing traditional costumes, and arguing for women to not marry with non-Myanmar. The gender organizations involved in the study criticized such representations. Also, respondents pointed out that the traditional costumes parades organized by the authorities on Myanmar Women’s Day (July 7) failed to promote gender awareness, women’s rights, or empower women.

On the other hand, the respondents felt that the reporters were becoming more aware of gender as a key issue
that should included in their articles, which was reflected in articles about gender organizations’ activities as news and features about the women from senior management levels. Respondent 1 and 3 recognized some positive changes in media coverage. For example, Respondent 3 stated that

“In crime news, when the incidents became human interest news, the reporters covered such news and images without any consideration about ethical issues pertaining to respecting other people’s dignities and rights. Now, ethical consideration of media persons has been improving”.

Particularly, the media attempted to avoid using the images of female victims or blurred faces in articles about murder or sexual abuse cases. However, Respondent 4 claimed that media still viewed women predominantly as victims, exploiting women’s sufferings, in the belief that such coverage would be of interest to readers and such attention may bring about change and action. Thus, media photos of women in news are mainly of sex workers and refugees.

According to Respondent 2 and 4, current gender news coverage in media touches only on women, but does not engage with other gender minority issues, such as discussions on LGBTIQ rights. Moreover, those two respondents pointed out that most of the media coverage about women’s empowerment is focused on women from upper class, with few stories about women at the grassroots. Coverage regarding ethnic women’s issues also focused only on their culture and costumes, and not on their concerns and hopes.

b) The engagement of gender organization with media

In this investigation, the study focused on the recent engagement of the organizations with the media, their future plan, and policy recommendation for the improvement of media. The study found that of the four organizations interviewed, three gender organizations have strong relationship with media persons through the Myanmar Journalism Network (MJN), while the remaining organization has not prepared a clear strategy to build close tie relationship with media, but did approach the media when required. In respect of media engagement, organizations were utilizing two key strategies: providing gender training to media persons, and publishing their own gender newsletters and magazines to be circulated among gender activist networks. Gender organizations have provided some gender awareness training workshops to media persons since 2011. In addition, gender activists give guest lectures, weekly training, and workshops at MJN. One of the organizations has prepared guidelines for media engagement for their own organization – including defining key spokespeople and outlining key terminology. These guidelines are intended to help avoid the use of discriminatory terms and misinformation. Respondent 4 posited that each organization should have their own media engagement plan and build their understanding of the nature of the media. In that respondent’s view, most media interviews fail to explore the strength of female leaders and women’s rights activists. As such, this suggests that the
representative women and gender organizations should have a media strategy that can guide key messages.

Regarding the current national policy about gender equality, respondents gave insightful recommendations. Respondent 1 maintained that the government is mainly responsible for making a policy that can enhance journalistic freedom when covering culturally sensitive gender issues. Respondent 2 and 4 suggested that the government should limit the use of sexualized portraits in media, seeing this as a means of reinforcing stereotypes. Further, the government should provide laws and guidelines to prevent women from being exploited in media. Respondent 4 argued that this should include strategies to protect the rights to privacy of women and strategies to ensure women’s dignity is maintained. Respondent 3 believed that this advocacy is not the role of gender organizations alone, and that media persons’ should also encourage the government to strengthen laws and national policy, while women’s rights in the media are still weak.

The organizations interviewed intended to continue building their relationships with media outlets. They aim to build a strong relationship with the media by involving the media in public or organizational events. As Respondent 2 stated,

“We are engaging with at least one media event a week, getting involved in their interviews or press release. We also facilitate the media to get on the right track when they cover gender issues.”

c) The influence of media in gender development

In this part, the study explored the development agencies’ perspective on the role of media for gender development and their experience in media engagement. Gender activists have struggled to lobby policy and perspective change regarding gender sensitive issues to decision makers, although the media has provided a space for these organizations to raise awareness regarding inequality and to make policy recommendations. Respondent 1 said that:

“We cannot advocate to change traditional perspectives through the media that has limited women’s role, because cultural and religious values are highly regarded here than in other issues....we can engage with the promotion of women’s rights in education and health care services. This is the delicate way that we can use media as an advocacy tool.”

The remaining organizations also affirmed that advocacy for policy change was an ongoing challenge – all gender organizations felt the ongoing need to fight against unjust laws, which limit women’s rights and a collective voice of women. On the other hand, the respondents confirmed that gender development agencies in Myanmar have the media’s support in raising gender awareness to the public, particularly with regards to “Education about CEDAW” (Respondent 1), “Women and peace” (Respondent 2), “Prevention on sexual
harassment” (Respondent 3), and “Women’s participation in 2015 election” (Respondent 4).

The most challenging issue that the gender organizations reported with regards to dealing with the media is the limited knowledge about gender among reporters and other media staff. Respondent 3 asserted that even media persons cannot overcome deep-rooted, traditional gender norms situated within traditional stereotypes, despite receiving gender awareness training. This lack of knowledge is a barrier to contributing to in-depth analysis. Respondent 1 and 4 experienced that occasionally newsroom editors and reporters edit or cut out the key messages due to space limitation, and sometimes the reporters took a more human-interest angle when discussing women. Respondent 2 pointed out that the media has sometimes included misinformation, as they have misinterpreted information, or failed to seek confirmation from key organizations. Yet, the respondents acknowledged the current increase in media coverage about gender related activities and events, and welcomed the gender sections that have been included in publications Mizzima, Irrawaddy, and special issues of The Myanmar Times. Further, they argued that although gender stereotyping is common, practices have improved since 2012. Overall, respondents had a positive view about the future of the media’s involvement in issues pertaining to gender development.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

Based on the findings presented above, the study clearly documents positive improvements in gender-related reporting. However, the study also revealed some gaps in the engagement between the gender organizations and the media agencies, and some failures to achieve gender development goals. The following section discusses these key findings and their implications.

a) Changes of the media’s trend

The content analysis showed that the media contribution of The Myanmar Times in terms of gender development (particularly in gender awareness making and empowerment) has been improving since 2012. While there were still issues with gender-related coverage, the study found an increase in published news, articles, and features, which promoted gender awareness to the public. The paper covered the various voices: from ordinary housewives to the lives of female entrepreneurs. According to the findings in Table 2 and 3, the rate of media coverage about gender with an educational purpose was at its height in 2014 across each of the key themes: women and decision-making, economic participation, social, and security issues. Regarding gender empowerment and stereotyping, media trends changed slightly after 2012. For example, the paper included an interview with executives in 2010 (Vol 27, Issue 532, July, 2010) that compared and contrasted male and female managers’ capabilities – but that interview presented female leadership in a negative light,
highlighting women as “emotional” and “sensitive.” In contrast, the interview with the same female executive in 2014 (Vol 35, Issue 684, July, 2014) made a positive contribution to gender empowerment. The article revealed the struggle this woman had experienced and highlighted her achievements. Similarly, the paper published a brief article about “female farm workers’ fashion contest” in 2012 (Vol 29, Issue 578, July, 2012). In 2014, news about the contest (Vol 34, Issue 663, March, 2014) also discussed the life, struggles and dreams of these female farm workers. In addition to gender empowerment, it was found that the media emphasized the word “female” in key article titles.

b) Media, culture, and knowledge production

The study examined how the media produced a new form of knowledge for gender equality, based on existing culture and knowledge. The media has emphasized gender empowerment since 2012; but as mentioned in Section 5.1.1 (Interpretation of words and semiotics used by media), above, the study found evidence of stereotyping practices through words and pictures. According to the study findings, the media acknowledged the traditional role of women (as being housewives), but also promoted women’s decision-making power and economic participation. For example, the paper published a story on a housewife in 2014, which discussed how she managed a big family successfully (Vol 35, Issue 685, August, 2014). In this light, it can be said that the media is promoting the role of women within traditional boundaries. That sort of perspective might be viewed differently from a Western perspective, because Western feminism encourages women to move beyond traditional roles. However, in taking a holistic view, this framing of women as housewives can be seen as being respectful of existing local cultures, while considering approaches to gender empowerment and production of new knowledge regarding gender equality by the Myanmar media.

In contrast, some of the media’s contributions seemed to be following the market demand for particular articles and representations. Such market demand produces two kinds of representations; empowering and stereotyping. For instance, the news about the opposition party leader, Aung San Suu Kyi was intended to attract the readers’ attention. News including “Aung San Suu Kyi that was offered Global Thinker award by US Foreign Policy Magazine in 2012” (Vol 30, Issue 597, November, 2012) can inspire and empower female audiences. On the other hand, the news, articles, and images in “Life Style” pages and “Wedding” special issues strengthened cultural norms of femininity, since female models are mainly used to promote new fashion and beauty products. Also, the papers included articles and photos of women in poor conditions to attract readers’ attention. Such media dispatches strengthen the view of women as vulnerable.

There is a tension between representing reality and promoting stereotypes. According to Danica Minić, media representations are not a reflection of reality, but a social practice of looking for and assigning sense and meaning to reality.[49] That practice is determined by the existing
relations of power within society. The media may argue that the reason they include photos of women and children in conflicts, riots, and disasters is to make people aware of current issues. However, when the research investigated the news and article contributions about the conflict situation, it was found that only the photos of women and children were included — their voices, words, and perspectives were excluded. The study found that the media tended to generalize the concerns and sufferings of affected people in news regarding conflict. Articles rarely used gender disaggregated data in news related to disasters or international aid. Thus, conflict-related coverage promoted stereotypes of women as victims. In this way, the media tends to reinforce societal perspectives of women as “weak” and “helpless.” Moreover, in an article discussing marriage laws (published in 2014), the media did not cover the perspectives of gender activists regarding the interfaith marriage laws, or any critiques of the laws. Thus, findings suggest that the media’s approach to gender development did not overcome market demands or traditional norms in many cases.

c) The gaps between gender development organizations and media

Based on the findings from the content analysis and semi-structured interviews, the study found some gaps in the way gender organizations engaged with the media. Improvements are needed in the knowledge and awareness of journalists and the key messages shared by gender organizations. Confirming findings from the content analysis, gender activists pointed out that many articles still fail to overcome traditional norms. Despite some basic gender training, journalists may be unaware of stereotyping practices in their contributions. The media is still weak in covering issues regarding women at grassroots, ethnic minority women (except promotion of their culture and costumes), and other gender minorities. Due to difficulties in overcoming market demand, findings suggest that gender agencies should prepare communication strategies to share or key messages that can attract the audiences within the limitations of print media. Another thing that the study witnessed is that the media rarely used gender disaggregated data in most of their reports. For example, gender related issues or data were not found in the news of development organizations: “Agriculture loans boast production” (Vol 26, Issue 507, January, 2010); “Credit is needed in delta: Tripartite Core Group’s survey report” (Vol 26, Issue 509, February, 2010); and “UN will help the necessary support for emergency human security in Rakhine state” (Vol 29, Issue 574, June, 2012); “Su foundation was established for education and health care development” (Vol 34, Issue 664, March, 2014). Generalizations by the media showed that key messages of the organizations, as well as the gender awareness of media persons, still needs improvement.

d) Conclusion

The media contributions in these focal areas have increased by 30 percent from 2010 to 2014. In the analysis of the ways in which gender issues were represented, the media paid more attention to education and gender empowerment in
2014. Stereotyping practices have decreased in contributions regarding decision-making, economic participation, and social issues, but were still found in conflict reports, and in the use of images of women in vulnerable conditions. Further, media remains weak in contributing stories for advocacy purposes and in covering ethnic women’s issues.

With regards to gender development agencies, their efforts to provide gender awareness training to journalists have resulted in the rise in the number of gender related news items. However, gender activists have been competing with market demand and the promotion of stereotypical representations of women in beauty and fashion magazines. Since the media’s intention is often to boost their market, gender topics are not always a priority – sometimes, gender related news is given a small space in the paper. This points to the need for gender development organizations to strengthen their relationship with the media by providing more gender training and by conducting media monitoring. The findings also indicate the value of development organizations in preparing key messages to attract media interest in the most effective way within a limited space. Moreover, some gender development organizations maintained that they are advocating to strengthen laws to prohibit sexual discrimination and the exploitation of women through images in publications. For this to happen, the gender development organizations will need the coordination and cooperation of media agencies to encourage policy makers to establish gender-related standards in media regulations.

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Decolonizing Cham Sculptures as Art: From Cultural Appropriation to Cultural Revitalization

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Abstract

The Cham people, who are indigenous to present-day Vietnam, are often viewed as extinct. This is especially apparent when we consider the presentation of Cham sculptures as artwork in numerous museums worldwide. Cham sculptures, which are primarily based on Hindu and Buddhist depictions, are not presented as religious or spiritual cultural objects but as art. By displaying these cultural objects as art, it takes away the intended spiritual and cultural values and places the priority on the tourist gaze. Additionally, French and Vietnamese museums have come to culturally appropriate Cham cultural objects as part of their own respective colonial or cultural histories. This paper profiles several museums worldwide that have retained Cham cultural objects, discusses ways to decolonize these museums and exhibits, and offers some insight into revitalizing contemporary Cham culture.
Introduction

Many Asian nations do not recognize indigenous peoples as distinct, and often homogenizes indigenous peoples as ethnic minorities. Vietnam is no exception. There, Cham people are classified as one of Vietnam’s fifty-four federally recognized ethnic minorities. Since the Cham are not federally recognized as indigenous in Vietnam, they are also not recognized as indigenous at the international level by the United Nations. The United Nations Declaration of Indigenous Peoples does not have a formal definition of ‘indigenous.’ However, it grants the respective nation-states the authority to recognize (or not) their own indigenous peoples. As such, Cham indigeneity is a contested issue.

The kingdom of Champa reigned over central and south present-day Vietnam from 192 CE to 1471 CE when the kingdom fell. The last Champa lands were annexed to Vietnam in 1832.[1] Despite the fall of the Champa kingdom, the ethnic Cham people continue to reside in parts of Vietnam. Although approximately 132,000 Cham people continue to reside in Vietnam, they are not regarded as significant.[2] This is evident as the Vietnamese government continues to homogenize ethnic minority groups to assimilate to Vietnamese society and culture.[3] I reiterate these points to support the Cham as an indigenous peoples: 1) the Cham are descendants of the Champa kingdom dating back to the second century CE, 2) they are now ethnic and religious minorities in the respective nation-states in which they reside in, and 3) because they are minorities, they are often discriminated against and forced to assimilate to the dominant ethnic majority.

Many Native scholars attest to the common struggle that all indigenous peoples face – survival. Patrick Wolfe describes settler colonialism as an ongoing phenomenon, rather than a static event, “…[colonial] invasion [should be] recognized as a structure rather than an event, its history does not stop…”[4] Wolfe argues that, “…settler colonialism destroys to replace.”[5] Additionally, Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel argue that “contemporary settlers” push towards the extermination of culture through the erasure of land and history, thereby forcing indigenous peoples to assimilate into mainstream society.[6] Although there are a number of differences among indigenous peoples, Alfred and Corntassel maintain that all indigenous peoples face a common struggle to survive against colonization “…culturally, politically and physically.”[7] The Cham continue to fight for their survival in history and in the present-day as they are viewed as no longer living, extinct, or archaic. Ancient Cham culture is regarded as noteworthy and continues to be considered significant by Asian Studies and French scholars. However, Nguyen Thi Thu Huong states that, “While Cham objects are regarded as fine artworks and sculptures by scholars, and the Cham are considered the only builders of stone structures and sculptures of large classical objects like Hindu deities, they still remain unfamiliar to most of the general public.”[8] Therefore, the Cham are an invisible indigenous and ethnic minority group.
The Cham were highly influenced by Hinduism and as such, many of their sculptures represent the Hindu religion.[9] In the ninth century, Buddhism became popular among the Cham and in the seventeenth century, Islam became the major religion that the Cham followed.[10] The Vietnamese and French have come to appropriate Cham culture through Cham sculptures by claiming that these artifacts are part of their respective colonial and cultural histories. This paper will profile several museums and exhibits that have kept Cham sculptures in their vicinity. These cultural and religious objects are regarded as art and as such, are displayed as art in numerous museums and exhibits. This paper will also discuss the potential reasons behind this labeling, the issues of displaying Cham sculptures, and offer methods at decolonizing museums and exhibits.

Informal Indigenous Recognition and Colonial Attempts at Modernization

Approximately 86 million people live in Vietnam. Indigenous peoples in Vietnam are grouped with ethnic minorities and are often referred to as hill tribes people. There is no federal or formal distinction of indigenous peoples in Vietnam. In 1979, a “scientific method” was established to categorize and classify fifty-four ethnic groups in their nation. The majority ethnic group, who are ethnic Vietnamese people, are called the Kinh. The remaining fifty-three ethnic groups are considered ethnic minorities and reside in mountainous or remote areas.[11]

In official wording indigenous peoples in Vietnam are referred to as ethnic minorities... The Government has defined ethnic minorities as ‘those people who have Vietnamese nationality, who live in Viet Nam but who do not share Kinh characteristics such as language, culture, and identity.’[12]

The fifty-four ethnic groups are separated into three linguistic families: Austro-Asiatic, Austronesian, and Sino-Tibetan. Two other forms of classification were used prior to 1979. In 1959, sixty-three groups were classified as ethnic groups.[13] In 1973, however, the number decreased to fifty-nine.[14] The decrease is reasoned to have come from the consolidation of two groups into one group, name changes of groups, and redefined group names.[15] Vietnam bifurcates major groups as those living in the plains and deltas and those living in the mountain regions.[16] Although there is no formal recognition of indigenous peoples, they are informally recognized and characterized as those who live in the upland, highland, or mountainous regions.

Among the 54 defined ethnic groups living in Vietnam, the majority – the Kinh, Khmer, Cham (except the Cham Hroi), Hoa and Ngai – usually prefer to inhabit lowland or coastal areas. The remaining 49 ethnic groups, plus a separate group of the Cham, the Cham Hroi, are designated as real hill tribes or hill people, living in the mountainous regions of the north and in the Central Highlands. The French called them ‘Montagnards’ (highlanders), the Vietnamese often refer to the hill peoples as ‘Moi,’ a derogatory word meaning ‘savages.’[17]
The fifty hill tribe groups were further divided into “... differences in dialects, tribal relationship, geographical location, altitude of settlement, social and political structure.”[18] Although hill tribes are often very different from each other, they do share a history of war between neighbors, the lifestyle of subsistence living, living in remote areas, and are tied to their cultural traditions, and as such, are reluctant to change.[19] While these differing groups have some similarities and differences, they are homogenized and categorized by the Vietnamese nation-state as ethnic minorities.

The Cham people living in the lowlands are in the state of limbo as they are (what I deem) semi-recognized by the Kinh. Since Champa was a large kingdom, many clans and tribes were established to distinguish between different Cham peoples. The Cham Hroi is one of these groups.

When the Champa kingdom came under full control of the Viet by the end of the seventeenth century, a small group split off the Cham society and withdrew into mountainous areas on the edge of the Central Highlands to become the Cham Hroi group. The Cham Hroi group was separately classified in the second classification of ethnic groups in 1973. But in the latest classification of 1979, the Cham Hroi are classified among the ethnic Cham people.[20]

Although the Cham Hroi is grouped with the larger Cham group by Vietnam, other groups such as the Ede, Raglai, and Cho Ru have been argued to be part of the original Cham peoples. The Cham Hroi is one of these groups.

More recent archaeological artifacts have argued against these three hill tribes being part of the larger Cham group.[22] However, both sides of the argument are debatable. Nevertheless, the examination of the Cham Hroi group is important as they may be classified as Cham in the larger group and be considered ethnic minorities, rather than informally recognized as indigenous peoples. The Cham Hroi and the larger Cham group have complicated the issue of indigeneity as they challenge the preconceived notions that indigenous peoples only live in the highlands and are primordial.

The label of primordial is problematic as it imposes certain characteristics among indigenous and nonindigenous peoples. Oscar Salemink explains that post-1975 ethnic classification in Vietnam follows a Marxist evolutionist theory in the former Soviet Union.[23] In Vietnam, this theory has created a hierarchy, which designates fixed inferior characteristics to ethnic minorities: “Ethnic minorities are increasingly seen as less advanced, less developed, and less civilized.”[24] Due to the ethnic minorities’ perceived inferior statuses, neo-Confucian principles establishes the Kinh to assume the paternalistic role of older sibling. The older sibling is supposed to help guide the uncivilized children (ethnic minorities) to become modern, evolved adults. Salemink argues that rituals performed by the Kinh reflect a Daoist aspect, rather than Confucian paternalism.[25] The Daoist
aspect incorporates the recognition of ethnic minorities as predecessors to the land before the Kinh’s takeover, therefore making these ethnic minorities indigenous. The Kinh’s recognition and respect for indigenous peoples may theoretically reclassify them as “contemporary ancestors.” This reclassification establishes that there are indigenous peoples in Vietnam, as the Kinh are performing rituals to please these ancestors.

**Cham Sculptures in Present-day Vietnam**

While different scholars had their own methods of classifying sculptural styles, Jean-François Hubert has simplified them into seven styles: 1) the 6th to 7th centuries as Primary style, 2) the 7th to 8th centuries as My Son E1 style, 3) the 9th to 10th centuries as Dong Duong style, 4) the 10th century as Tra Kieu style, 5) the 10th to 11th centuries as Chien Dan style, 6) the 11th to 13th centuries as Thâp Mam style, and 7) the 14th and 15th centuries as Yang Mum style.

The Thâp Mam style refers to the region of Binh Dinh, which prospered from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, and “...is characterized by its monumentality and the use of big, broad surfaces as background for ecstatic patterning. While anthropomorphic images were found at the site [Binh Dinh], it is best known for its fantastic beasts.” An example of a “fantastic beast” is “Gajasimha,” an elephant-lion. Many of the sculptures in the following museums have Thâp Mam style and My Son sculpture styles.

The Da Nang Museum of Cham Sculpture in Vietnam is home to the largest collection of Cham sculptures. There are approximately 2,000 Cham sculptures that the museum possesses, of which 500 are on display in the museum and in an adjacent garden. More than 1,200 of the remaining sculptures are held in a storehouse with other objects including clothing, photographs, films, and digital discs. The sculptures date back from the seventh to fifteenth century and are made from several different materials including sandstone, terracotta, and bronze.

The museum itself was proposed in 1902 and erected in 1915 as the Musée Henri Parmentier. Considering its French influence, the museum’s building design borrows from French colonial architecture.

The French became interested in Champa in 1885 when soldiers came into contact with the My Son sanctuary. Vietnam was conquered by France and declared to be part of the Federation of Indochina in 1887. The French established the Permanent Archaeological Mission to research their new territories in 1898; the organization was renamed École Française d’Extrême-Orient (French School of Oriental Far East – EFEO) in 1900. The French admired Cham objects so much so that they came to be viewed as artwork in some museums, like the EFEO. The irony is that the EFEO Museum, later renamed the Louis Finot Museum, faced protests from the Vietnamese for being too “colonial.” As a result, the Museum tried to engage the Vietnamese community by changing the labels of text on objects from
French to Vietnamese. Once Vietnam gained independence, the Vietnamese government sought to reclaim Vietnamese history. Consequently, the Vietnamese government developed the National Museum of Vietnamese History, the National Museum of the Vietnamese Revolution, the Army Museum, and the Museum of the Viet Bac Autonomous Regions.[36]

The Museum of Vietnamese History was erected in 1958 after Vietnamese independence from France.[37] The goal of the Museum was to offer a locale for visitors to learn more about Vietnamese early history up until 1945 and to build a national identity.[38] Nguyen Thi Thu Huong explains that the, “The museum displays objects in such a way that it lets the objects “speak for themselves,” with minimum information about object names, dates, and materials, written in third person.”[39] In 2008, the museum finished its renovation and has displayed 89 Cham objects, which were excavated by French scholars between 1927 and 1934 in a special rotunda.[40] As such, the Cham collection is separated from other objects. However, Huong notes that Cham objects are still considered to be works of art by the Vietnamese.[41] In 2010, the Prime Minister of Vietnam, Nguyen Tan Dung, agreed on a new display for a new concept of the National Museum of History, which separates Cham history in two sections (from the second to the tenth century and from the tenth to the fifteenth century).[42] The goal of this project is to present Cham history as part of Vietnamese history, and therefore to view Cham objects not solely as artwork.

Cham Sculptures in Europe

Cham sculptures are also held at other sites outside present-day Vietnam, primarily in Europe. The Rietberg Museum in Switzerland is one such museum. Most of the Rietberg Museum’s collection was donated by the banker and collector, Freiherr (Baron) Eduard von der Heydt.[43] Heydt’s donated pieces were first excavated from one Cham sanctuary, Dong-du’o’ng in Vietnam, by French archaeologist Henri Parmentier in 1902. The sculptures made its way to Paris to an art dealer named Paul Mallon. Many of the same sculptures were later collected by Heydt and eventually donated to the Rietberg Museum. Other sculptures at the Rietberg Museum have been excavated from My Son, another Cham sanctuary in Vietnam. Sculptures from Dong Dong-du’o’ng and My Son have come to gain greater significance to the museum world because of the near destruction of these sites during the Vietnam War. It is also noted that many inscriptions of Cham sculptures have been lost due to numerous wars and “...the habit of the conquering Vietnamese to destroy all Cham inscriptions they could lay their hands on.”[44] Therefore, the sculptures standalone without any known content to describe its original meaning. This could be one reason why these sculptures are viewed as art pieces and treated as such, rather than sacred objects to be revered.

Another museum that has a large collection of Cham sculptures is the Guimet Museum of Asian Art (or Musée National des arts asiatiques Guimet) in Paris, France. The
Guimet Museum was established with the help of industrialist Emile Guimet, who the museum is named after. As a result of Guimet’s travel across the world, he collected numerous objects from Egypt, Greece, Japan, China, and India. The objects were originally displayed at a different location in France in 1879 and later these objects were transferred to the Guimet Museum in 1889. In 1945, the Guimet Museum traded numerous Egyptian pieces to the Louvre and in exchange, received numerous Asian art pieces. As a result, by 1953 the Guimet Museum became the most prominent museum to hold Asian art. In 1996, it was renovated and according to the ASEMUS Asia-Europe Museum Network and the goal of the renovation,

... was to ensure that the institution founded by Emile Guimet can increasingly assert itself, in line with the efforts of all its previous Directors and curatorial staff, as a major centre, in the heart of Europe, for the appreciation and knowledge of Asian civilizations, while also taking into consideration the latest developments in museum science and new requirements for the display and conversation of artworks.

[45]

Jan Fontein also states that the Guimet Museum’s collections “...are part of France’s colonial heritage.”[46] Both statements impress on the importance of Asian art to France’s own cultural history. Between October 12, 2005 and February 6, 2006, the Guimet Museum held an exhibition titled “Art Treasures of Vietnam, Champa Sculpture,” which was organized by the National Museums and the National Museum of Asian Art Guimet with help from Credit Agricole SA, Vietnam Airlines, and the House of Indochina. The exhibit was initiated as a result of a sculpture restoration workshop at the Museum of Da Nang in Vietnam. It included ninety-six pieces from a number of sites including the Da Nang Museum, Ho Chi Minh City, My Son, Guimet Museum, and both Guimet Museum locations in Zurich and Lyon.[47] The Guimet Museum’s permanent collection includes two sculptures, Vishnu Garudasana, which dates from the eighth to ninth century from My Son, and Shiva, which dates from the eleventh to twelfth century.[48][49] While both descriptions of the sculptures from the Guimet Museum website describe some information about their religious background, they are both also described as artwork, and therefore displayed as such.

Cham Sculptures in the United States

In an obscure locale for a Cham sculpture, in the Midwest at the Cleveland Museum of Art, are at least two sculptures from the Champa kingdom. The Aspara Bracket dated from the 900s was donated to the Cleveland Museum in 1990 by prominent dealer Robert H. Ellsworth.[50] Ellsworth was an avid collector of modern Chinese pieces including Chinese paintings, Ming dynasty furniture, and jade artwork. [51] He is said to have purchased whole collections of objects and sold them to other collectors and museums. It is also claimed that he sold fifteen pieces to the Cleveland Museum of Art. The Museum website states that items were donated, rather than sold, so this transaction still seems to be unclear.
Ellsworth did not graduate from high school, but was known to have been in “high-society circles” of which resulted in his prominent status as a collector. The New York Times even dubbed the name “king of Ming” for his extensive Chinese collection. Another Cham sculpture held at the Cleveland Museum is the Heraldic Lion, also dated from the tenth century. The piece was donated by collector and millionaire, Leonard C. Hanna, Jr., who served in the museum’s advisory committee in 1914, and in the accessions committee in 1920. Both sculptures at the Cleveland Museum of Art are not on view and held in storage.

One of the few traveling exhibits that entered the United States was the “Arts of Ancient Viet Nam: From River Plain to Open Sea.” The exhibit was held at two locations: the Museum of Fine Arts in Houston from September 13, 2009 to January 3, 2010 and at the Asia Society and Museum in New York City from February 2 to May 2, 2010. In the exhibit catalogue, a statement from the General Director of the Department of Cultural Heritage, part of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in Vietnam, Dr. Dang Van Bai, includes the following message:

> It is our belief that this project will deepen the American people’s understanding of the culture of Viet Nam and its important role in the history of Asia. Arts and culture have always provided a bridge to mutual understanding among the peoples of the world, and this project is a first important step toward that end.[53]

Similar to the importance of Cham cultural objects to French colonial history, this statement emphasizes the importance of Cham cultural objects to Vietnamese cultural history. The exhibit covered a lengthy history of Vietnam including “Early Cultures” from the first millennium BCE to second century CE, the Fu Nan period, the kingdom of Champa period, and the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. It borrowed from a number of museums including the Da Nang Museum, Dong Nai Museum, Fine Arts Museum in Ho Chi Minh City, Hue Royal Antiquities Museum, Long An Museum, Museum of Vietnamese History in Ho Chi Minh City, National Museum of Vietnamese History in Ha Noi, Thua Thien Hue Historical and Revolutionary Museum, and the Viet Nam National Fine Arts Museum.

**The Tourist Gaze**

In a study conducted at the Da Nang Museum, researchers Thu Thi Trinh and Chris Ryan surveyed 411 visitors to examine their satisfaction with their visit to the Museum.[54] Satisfaction was measured in terms of “...repeat visitation and loyalty.”[55] The study took place during a three-month period between October 2012 and February 2013. Through the study, it was found that the majority of the visitors were international visitors on vacation (or holiday): 18% of visitors were from Australia, 17% from the United Kingdom, 14% from France, and 10% from Germany. Only 20% of visitors were Vietnamese residents.[56] Additionally, for 85% of the international visitors it was their first trip to Vietnam and for 26% of Vietnamese visitors it was their first
visit to Da Nang. 38% of respondents were in tour groups and visited the museum as part of a tour package. The results of the study suggested that the visitors had high levels of satisfaction while visiting the Da Nang Museum. However, going beyond the scope of the study, the results revealed that only few visitors were from Vietnam. Additionally, the authors did not describe ethnicities of the visitors and only discussed visitor nationalities. Therefore, there was no clear evidence of ethnic Cham visitors being recorded in this study. The study proves to be focused on tourists instead of indigenous peoples whose objects are being presented in the Da Nang Museum.

Several years after the previous study, the same researchers, Thu Thi Trinh and Chris Ryan, conducted another study on the Da Nang Museum and My Son sanctuary in 2015. This study was qualitative and fifty-one in-depth interviews were performed with twenty international visitors and twenty-six domestic tourists. 80% of the visitors were driven to visit the My Son sanctuary and Da Nang Museum as a result of history lessons of the Vietnam War, rather than actually having an interest in Cham culture or artifacts. [57]

This study suggests that tourists derive satisfaction from an aesthetic experience of heritage places and this experience becomes interpreted as an authentic feeling further enhanced by a story of past bombing in the twentieth century, thereby reducing a psychological temporal distance for contemporary tourists. Furthermore, it appears that tourists seem to be sensitive, both subjectively and objectively, to aesthetic issues over restoration work and the nature of what constitutes authenticity. A positive relationship is thought to exist between a perception of authenticity and the level of satisfaction being derived from the visit. Tourists serve as consumers in a marketplace of aesthetically pleasing experiences.[58]

While the article focused on perceptions of tourists, it does shed some light into issues of identity. For the Vietnamese (national) tourists who visit, there may be a sense of belonging as they learn more about their nation’s past. For international tourists, there seems to be a sense of connectedness through spirituality because the site is viewed as religious. These feelings were even stronger when tourists had a tour guide escorting and teaching them about the various structures of the site. However, one issue that is disregarded in these articles and many others, is Cham identity. These Cham sculptures and the ways in which they are displayed depict an ancient history, which assumes that Cham people and culture are ancient, and therefore no longer living.

**Tradition, Authenticity, and Cultural Revitalization**

Similar to Cham people, other Native peoples are scrutinized by non-Native scholars who measure cultural identity and authenticity through ancient traditions. These non-Native scholars regard living Native peoples as inauthentic because they do not practice ancient traditions. For example, Jocelyn Linnekin boldly states that Native Hawaiian tradition is invented. Native Hawaiian traditions are described as “reflexive” as they are unknowingly constructed by its people.[59] Linnekin describes two types of
Native Hawaiian identity: rural and nationalist. Rural Native Hawaiians are described as constructing tradition, because they try to maintain their ancestral traditions, whereas the nationalist Native Hawaiians use tradition for their political gains. Although Linnekin explains, “Tradition is fluid; its content is redefined by each generation and its timelessness may be situationally constructed,” Linnekin argues that many Native Hawaiians are inauthentic because they are not performing traditional modes of living.[60] Similarly, anthropologist Roger Keesing contends that Native culture borrows so much from Western culture that it is difficult to determine what is the “real past.”[61] These non-Native scholars project an extreme, purist, reductionist view of Native tradition, culture, and identity in which there is no middle ground. The portrait that is painted depicts stereotypes of what a Native should be and disregards the humanness of Native peoples. To affix an image that must be met in order to claim Native identity is offensive and counterproductive to understanding Native cultures, especially when this message is presented from a non-Native person.

While some non-Native scholars point to the inauthenticity of Native peoples who do not practice age-old traditions or who have become “modern,” Native scholars challenge the concept of tradition as solely primordial. Many Native scholars note the dynamic nature of traditions and rebuke the idea that traditions are fixed. Joanne Barker suggests that Natives and traditions are “conditional, that they are made meaningful and relevant again and again...”[62] In Barker’s *Native Acts: Law Recognition, and Cultural Authenticity*, she explains how many Native American tribal laws were changed to reflect the Christianized patriarchal narrative in United States law. “Traditional” laws were used to determine membership and disenrollment of many Native peoples, and used to bolster the power of some tribal leaders. Barker questions what is “traditional” because traditions and customs continue to change through time. James Clifford explains that Stuart Hall’s concept of articulation may be applied to understanding traditions, "...an articulated tradition is a kind of collective 'voice,' but always in this constructed, contingent sense."[63] Since cultural forms continue to change, authenticity is not a primary concern. Barker also states,

In thinking about the relationship between Native traditions and Christianity, social formation suggests that Native cultures and identities are always in negotiation, transformation, change, and exchange and so never possess a moment of ‘authenticity.’[64]

An example of the transformative nature of culture can be viewed by Native musicians who have utilized music as a tool to revitalize culture and combat historical trauma. Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart, et. al explain that Native Americans suffer from historical trauma, which is defined as

...cumulative emotional and psychological wounding across generations, including the lifespan, which emanates from massive group trauma...[resulting in] emotional challenges such as depression, substance abuse, collective trauma exposure,
Victoria Lindsay Levine explains that music revitalization is not just about restoring musical traditions, but also implementing and building new styles. Levine refutes what some scholars deem as the “final step” to assimilation and explains that, “Native American musical revitalization [is] an extension or reconstruction of traditional culture – a strategy for preserving cultural continuity instead of a harbinger of assimilation and cultural abandonment.”

Musical revitalization allows Native Americans to be actors and create their own sense of agency by shaping their own histories, rather than passively reacting to white culture. Levine explores three types of music revitalization from three Choctaw tribes in different locations. Revivalistic musical revitalization was present in the Choctaw people of Ardmore, Oklahoma; and two different forms of perpetuative musical revitalization were present in the Mississippi and Louisiana Choctaw peoples.

Levine explains that revivalistic musical revitalization is when “a repertory that had ceased to be performed is restored, with modifications that reflects the interests, needs, and tastes of the individuals involved.” After forty years of silence and inactivity, the Choctaw people of Ardmore, Oklahoma engaged in revivalistic musical revitalization in the 1970s by enlivening their music and dance. Buster Ned and Adam Sampson “reshaped, reinterpreted, and redefined Choctaw musical culture” by restoring traditional music, but also altering the position that the dances were displayed, thereby creating new meaning to the dances. They were able to change the duration, date and time of performances, wear uncustumary attire, and replace musical instruments they deemed more appropriate for their setting. Revivalistic musical revitalization offers the Choctaw people of Ardmore with the opportunity to modify traditional customs as they saw fit. Levine explains,

In perpetuative musical revitalization, a conscious, aggressive effort is made to perpetuate a current style or repertory, again with modifications that reflect the interests, needs, and tastes of the individuals involved...[it is] motivated by the need to assert a discrete ethnic identity in a multiethnic context.

In order to showcase ethnic pride and bring awareness to the outside public, the Mississippi Choctaw wore customary clothing while performing customary ceremonial music and dances. Conversely, the Louisiana Choctaw did not perform customary music, but performed uncustumary pan-tribal music and dances until the 1940s. They displayed and strengthened their ethnic pride by merging with other southern tribes to form a pan-tribal identity.

Considering the updated cultural practices that other Native peoples have performed to revitalize their culture, I ask: How can living Cham people display their ethnic and indigenous pride through cultural revitalization while being bound to colonial views of their culture within the institutions of museums?
Decolonization and Implications

Cham sculptures seem to have similar experiences to Maori taongas (treasure) in that these objects are often viewed by museums as artwork, rather than sacred objects. The Maori people of New Zealand have struggled to gain cultural respect from various museums worldwide, but some Maori groups have been able to implement cultural protocols to their respective taongas. These attempts at following cultural Maori protocols are viewed as methods to decolonize museums with colonial histories. For the Cham, it is clear that these sculptures once had a religious or spiritual overtone as they depict many Hindu and Buddhist gods and deities. While the majority of Cham people today are Muslims and may not find these sculptures to be sacred, perhaps even blasphemous in the sense that there is an emphasis on polytheism, there are small Cham communities who still view these objects and sites, such as the My Son sanctuary, to be sacred.

The museums and exhibits presented in this paper can be viewed as monocultural in the sense that they homogenize Cham history with Vietnamese history. How, then, can these museums and exhibits that display Cham sculptures be decolonized? A solution that may be argued is to display objects in a multicultural framework by incorporating multiple cultures in museums. However, the problem with multiculturalism is that it again homogenizes ethnic groups and creates a divide between the dominant and minority groups. It can be argued that Vietnam’s attempt to categorize their fifty-four ethnic groups comes from a multicultural framework. It is because of this that I believe a bicultural approach could be applied to these exhibits and museums inside and outside present-day Vietnam. An attempt to clarify the distinctions between Cham and Vietnamese histories could then be made. Instead of Vietnam claiming Champa as part of their history, they could acknowledge that it is a significant history to the development of the Vietnamese nation, but distinct from it. This approach can also be applied to museums and exhibits outside of Vietnam as most displays are either referred to as related to the Champa kingdom or Vietnamese history. An acknowledgement of both histories is important in displaying an accurate and nuanced history of Vietnam and its predecessors.

An issue that may arise with the bicultural approach is that other ethnic minority groups (in Vietnam fifty-three, to be exact) may not be included. However, exhibits and museums that refer to other ethnic minority groups may also benefit from a bicultural approach in terms of representing that particular ethnic minority group in relation to the Vietnamese state. My point is that in order to specifically decolonize museums and exhibits in which Cham sculptures are displayed, museums must consider making a distinction between Cham and Vietnamese. While both groups may have borrowed some aspects of each other’s culture, these two cultures are in fact different as the peoples have different languages and ways of living. To homogenize both cultures would discredit both cultures. When appropriate, these cultures may be displayed as sharing aspects of each other’s
culture, but that does not mean that all of Cham culture should be displayed as Vietnamese culture or vice versa. Through a bicultural approach, museums may consult with Cham communities who still identify these sculptures as sacred. By doing so, the community members can offer more accurate meanings behind these sculptures and therefore, remove the label of artwork to these religious and spiritual objects. For the Cham who no longer practice Hinduism or Buddhism, there is equal importance to represent their stories as traditions change through time.

It is vital to remember that there is flexibility in interpreting Cham objects, and thereby Cham culture. For example, dates of objects may be unclear and information may not come from primary sources (the Cham) as information often relies on non-Cham sources. In the “Arts of Ancient Viet Nam: From River Plain to Open Sea” catalogue, it is noted that the primary sources of information came from inscriptions and accounts from Chinese and Vietnamese writings.[69] Two sculptures from the “Arts of Ancient Viet Nam: From River Plain to Open Sea” exhibition are listed with uncertain origin dates. The first is listed as “Female”, which is a fragmented sculpture of a female figure, and is described as being dated between the fifth and tenth centuries.[70] Another statue, listed as “Shiva”, is also unknown because the temple, My Son, where it was meant to be installed, was being renovated in the tenth century. Nonetheless, it was found in the rubble of the site. Interestingly, some scholars have placed “Shiva” in the eighth century due to the statue’s facial features.[71] Both statues are owned by the Da Nang Museum. Additionally, as previously mentioned, many inscriptions of sculptures at the Rietberg Museum were lost. Thus, it can be argued that data analyzed and provided by numerous Asian Studies and French scholars are hypothetical.

Conclusion

It is clear that Cham culture is appropriated by the French and Vietnamese through the display of Cham sculptures in their museums. Since Cham sculptures are viewed as beautiful, they are therefore perceived as artwork. By labeling Cham sculptures as art, it takes away their connection with the people who once viewed them or continue to view them as sacred or spiritual pieces. It is important to recognize that although the majority of living Cham people may not find these objects as sacred, there are still some Cham communities who view these objects as religious. Therefore, it is important to follow cultural protocols held by these smaller communities. When institutions such as museums do not recognize these contemporary living peoples as important contributors to the display of these cultural objects, they discount Cham people and culture. This indicates that institutions do not offer the full story to museum visitors.

While cultural objects in museums are ancient, it is important to emphasize that Cham people have survived and continue to live on today. As such, there should be attempts...
by institutions to showcase contemporary Cham culture. This can be viewed through the attempts at cultural revitalization by contemporary Cham peoples through music in addition to other creative and visual elements. It is important to revive cultural history, but it is just as important to create new stories that reflect contemporary Cham peoples. Perhaps, another approach at decolonizing museums with Cham sculptures would be to bring in contemporary Cham artists to showcase their own works. This way, Cham peoples and cultures can be viewed as contemporary, rather than as ancient objects only viewable through glass cases in colonial museums.

Bibliography


ABSTRACT

Questions about the implications of China’s rise have loomed in the international system for quite some time. These questions have become more pertinent as China’s global and regional initiatives have begun to grow teeth. With these developments the effects of the geopolitical competition between China and the United States are becoming more tangible, especially in Southeast Asia. Whether or not ASEAN’s organizational culture, loosely termed the “ASEAN Way”, remains viable will depend on its ability to handle increasing competition between large powers in the region. By necessity, ASEAN must become a regional powerbroker or risk becoming a broken regional power. This paper analyzes the strategies select ASEAN member states employ in their dealings with regional and world powers. This analysis provides a basis for exploring ASEAN’s ability to manage geostrategic competition in Southeast Asia. The study finds that, despite the differing perceptions ASEAN member states have of the United States and China, they are unified in their search for a middle road that does not leave them too reliant on either actor. This consensus bodes well for ASEAN’s ability to handle increasing competition through hedging. However, if ASEAN wants to maintain hedging as a viable strategy, the association must work to decrease the development gap, curb military adventurism, and strengthen coordination mechanisms.
Introduction

Questions about the implications of China’s rise have loomed in the international system for quite some time. These questions have become more pertinent, as China’s global and regional initiatives have begun to grow teeth. China has broken ground on a few of its One Road, One Belt infrastructure projects and created the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to fund future projects. With these developments, the effects of the geopolitical competition between China and the United States are becoming more tangible, especially in Southeast Asia. For the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), finding its answer to the challenge of increasing US-Sino competition will test a great many aspects of the organization’s character, including ASEAN’s centrality and unity.

Recently, in Southeast Asia there has been a flurry of almost parallel initiatives by China and the United States, at times in cooperation with its regional allies, to curry diplomatic capital in the region. Whether or not ASEAN’s organizational culture, loosely termed the “ASEAN Way,” remains viable will depend on its ability to handle increasing competition between large powers in the region. By necessity, ASEAN must become a regional powerbroker or risk becoming a broken regional power. ASEAN’s reliance on consensus based decision making further complicates brokering power in the region as the process can be derailed by one dissenting member.

ASEAN member states (AMS) must work jointly to manage regional and world power competition. If not, individual member states will be more susceptible to external interference and less able to protect their national interests. Moreover, a divided ASEAN will be ineffectual and subsequently forfeit its centrality in the regional architecture of Asia to other institutions or actors.

Since ASEAN is an intergovernmental organization, a thorough understanding of how individual AMS are managing increasing geostrategic competition is needed to fully assess the challenges that a US-Sino rivalry present to the region. In ASEAN, three geostrategic contexts exist in relation to China which can be grouped based on their overall perception of Chinese engagement. Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand are eager to engage with China and have few reservations about growing Chinese influence in the region. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are largely supportive of Chinese economic engagement, but have some strategic interests that are threatened by China’s growing assertiveness. Myanmar, the Philippines, and Vietnam not only have several strategic interests threatened by growing Chinese power, but also active disputes with the regional heavy weight.

This paper analyzes how Malaysia, Laos and Myanmar manage their relations with the US and China. It is important to note that each of ASEAN’s ten member states employ their own unique strategies in dealing with great powers. However, this study sought to provide an overview of the strategies ASEAN states use to manage US-Sino competition by

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analyzing one state from each of the region’s three geostrategic contexts: Malaysia, Laos, and Myanmar. This analysis is then used as a basis for exploring ASEAN’s ability to manage geostrategic competition in Southeast Asia.

Malaysia

Despite having overlapping territorial claims with China in the South China Sea, Malaysia is expanding high level economic and security ties with China. Conversely, Malaysia’s relationship with China has not proven to be an obstacle for developing its relationship with the US.

Malaysia is expanding trade partnerships with both the US and China. In 2013, China and Malaysia signed a five-year plan to increase bilateral trade to $160 billion by 2017.[1] In the same year, China led the US in bilateral trade with Malaysia, roughly $107 billion to $40 billion.[2] In 2015, Malaysia and the US along with ten other states across the Asia-Pacific (except China) concluded negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement.

Under the new agreements and initiatives, investments in Malaysia will surely expand for both the US and China. As of 2012, the US leads China in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Malaysia, $15.5 billion to $783 million.[3] However, China is expanding its investments in Malaysia. During a recent visit to Malaysia in late November of 2015 by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, China and Malaysia signed several memorandums of understanding (MoU). These agreements enhanced cooperation in many sectors which are important to China’s One Road, One Belt initiative including transportation and international trade.[4] As a part of the agreements, Port Klang, Malaysia’s busiest port and a key site for the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) portion of the One Road, One belt initiative, entered into business alliances with ten ports across China. Chinese investors are involved in the development of a deep sea terminal in Kuantan and several others in Melaka.[5] Shortly after Premier Li’s visit, it was announced that $2.3 billion of energy assets from 1Malaysia Development Berhad, a debt-addled state sovereign wealth fund, were to be purchased by the state-owned China General Nuclear Power Corporation. The acquisition was welcomed by the Malaysian government as it is in the process of dismantling the failed enterprise, which has amassed over $11 billion of debt and was cited as a factor that contributed to the depreciation of the Malaysian Ringgit.[6] Chinese companies have been bidding on rail and road projects across ASEAN. In December 2015, a Chinese firm was awarded the $1.5 billion Gemas-Johor Bahru electrified double-tracking rail project.[7]

Malaysia maintains military ties with both the US and China. In September 2015, Malaysia and China had their first ever a joint military exercise in the Strait of Malacca. Codenamed “Peace and Friendship 2015,” the exercise was the largest to date between China and an ASEAN member state. [8] US-Malaysian military cooperation focuses on counter-terrorism. Malaysia allows the U.S Navy to fly its spy planes
from Malaysian airstrips and dock its vessels at Malaysian ports.[9] Moreover, Malaysia has done a fair amount to signal its South China Sea grievances. Unlike the states of Mainland Southeast Asia and American ally, South Korea, Malaysia did not send a top-level delegation to China’s high-profile military parade to commemorate the end of World War II.[10] Additionally, China received heavy criticism at the 2015 East Asian Summit, which was chaired by Malaysia. Malaysia’s prominent treatment of the South China Sea issues in its chairmen statement ran roughshod over China’s adjurations to keep the issues out of multilateral discussions.[11]

In its relations with the US and China, Malaysia follows an even-handed foreign policy that seeks to maximize benefits by keeping both powers actively engaged. Malaysia avoids needless antagonizing either big power and does not allow disagreements in one area to affect productive cooperation in another. It maintains amicable partnerships with both the US and China, but will judiciously protect its national interest from encroachment by either partner.

Laos

Laos and Cambodia have the most pro-China tilt. Chinese economic influence is pervasive throughout the two states. Currently, western investment in these states is dwarfed by its Chinese counterpart. Between 2009 and 2011, the US Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) provided $425 million to development projects in Cambodia, Laos and the three other states of mainland Southeast Asia.[12] Since its creation in 1966 through 2014, the US and Japanese-led Asian Development Bank (ADB) have provided $2.11 and $1.78 billion in loans to Cambodia and Laos respectively.[13] However, in 2013 alone, China invested more than $2.5 billion in each of the two States.[14] Laos will be of particular interest to China and the US as the 2016 chairmen of ASEAN.

When compared to China, the US has fewer substantial economic or diplomatic ties with Laos. China is Laos' largest export market, accounting for 46.1% of all Laos’ exports in 2014. It is also the largest foreign investor, with $6.6 billion worth of investments by Chinese firms.[15] Surprisingly enough, even though the US has more robust ties with Cambodia, recent US diplomatic efforts have found a warmer reception in Laos. This is due to several factors: the government’s desire to correct their over reliance on China, the position of Laos as the 2016 chairman of ASEAN, and recent political shifts that have reemphasized the country’s traditional political orientation towards Vietnam.

Recently, political shifts in Laos were on display at the country’s 10th Party Congress, the meeting at which the one-party states selects its new top leaders. The Congress decided to replace the party chief and the deputy prime minister who were closely aligned with Beijing. They were staunch advocates of the Boten Vientiane Railway. The railway connects China and Thailand through Laos and is a crucial leg of the Chinese backed Pan-Asia Rail Network that will link Southwest China to Singapore. Some government officials felt
the project was too much of an economic concession to China. The dismissal of the party chief and the deputy prime minister has largely been viewed as a move to lessen Chinese influence in Laos and a nod to the interests of Vietnam, a historical ally of Laos.[16] As competing Vietnamese and Chinese territorial claims on the Paracel Islands aggravate tensions between the two states, stronger political ties between Laos and Vietnam will serve to distance Laos from China.

Considering the changing political climate in Laos, it might be premature to dismiss Laos’ commitments to ASEAN unity, maritime rights, and avoidance of militarization of the South China Sea. Former Prime Minister, Thongsing Thammavong, conveyed the aforementioned commitments to US Secretary of State John Kerry during Kerry’s recent 2016 visit to Laos.[17] Laos is feeling fairly secure in its political relationship with China. While the Boten Vientiane Railway may turn out to be a financial liability for Laos, it has made Laos an indispensable part of China’s One Road, One Belt initiative.[18] The initiative is not just about winning friends; it is critical in Beijing’s plans to spur on growth in its underdeveloped hinterlands, prime new markets for Chinese goods, and manage the economic changes stemming from China’s shift to a consumption based economy.[19] Right now, Laos is just as important to China as China is to Laos. This political equilibrium gives Laos the flexibility to shore up relations with Vietnam or explore increased cooperation with the US.

**Myanmar**

Too often Myanmar is grouped with Laos and Cambodia as a Chinese satellite state. This perspective fails to take into account the complexities of the bilateral relations between the two countries, which have ranged from ambivalent, highly contentious to amicable. Since Myanmar's independence, the most constant feature of its foreign policy has been strict neutrality. For much of their history, Myanmar and China have peacefully coexisted. It has not precluded a number of irritants from developing over the course of their relations. The major irritant being Chinese support for the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) and later Chinese ties to the armed ethnic minority separatist groups that descended from the BCP after it was disbanded. Thus, even when Myanmar had warmer bilateral relations with China, engagement on Yangon’s part always included a healthy amount of caution and a fair amount of suspicion.[20] Myanmar has a longstanding interest in diversifying its international ties away from China. Until recently many avenues to developing international ties with Western states were closed to Myanmar because of international opposition to Myanmar’s military junta. However, political reforms by Myanmar’s new civilian government are opening up new diplomatic opportunities that were previously closed to Myanmar.

Myanmar was forced to compromise its principle of strategic neutrality in 1988 after the government’s violent suppression of a series of pro-democracy protest called the 8888 Uprising. The suppression of the protest left Myanmar a
pariah state in the West, forcing it into an alliance of convenience with China. Strategic political alignment with China always ran counter to the better judgment of Yangon. By the early 2000’s, Myanmar was already trying to reduce its dependence on China by exploring military ties with Russia. [21] In 2011, after Thein Sein became Myanmar’s first civilian President in nearly 50 years, diplomatic decision making became a subject to more domestic pressure. It was domestic anti-Chinese sentiments that ultimately led Thein Sein to suspend the Chinese backed Myitsone dam mega project.[22] This decision marked Myanmar’s return to a neutrality centered foreign policy and the end of its strategic alignment with China.

Since Myanmar’s 2011 transition to a civilian government, it has had substantial engagements with both the US and China. China continues to have a large economic footprint in Myanmar. It supplied 42% of $33.67 billion of foreign investment between 1988 and 2013.[23] However, many of the Chinese mega projects associated with these investments have met with substantial resistance. Some projects, like the Myanmar-China pipelines and the Letpadaung mine, continued, albeit under increased government scrutiny and public protest.[24][25] On the other hand, the Myitsone Dam and Kunming-Kyaukphyu Railway were out right cancelled, much to the dismay of Beijing. However, the revival of the Chinese backed deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu shows that Myanmar and Chinese cooperation in the area of infrastructure is set to endure despite changes in the political climate.[26]

China’s relations with several of Myanmar’s armed ethnic rebel groups are also a constant irritant in bilateral relations. Chinese ties with the rebel groups revolve around the lucrative smuggling of jade, timber, and gems. Illegal timber exports are estimated at nearly $2 billion per year.[27] Officials in the Myanmar government have accused China of providing assistance to the Kokang rebel group, who has been engaged in intense fighting with Myanmar’s military for the past year.[28] China is also suspected of using its influence over other rebel groups, the Wa State Army and Kachin Independence Army, to obstruct Myanmar’s efforts to negotiate a nationwide cease fire deal. It has taken issue with the cease fire deal as it may include a provision that would invite Japanese and Western observers into the peace process. [29] Chinese and rebel representatives have denied the charges. The truth of the reports aside, they highlight very real tensions in Myanmar-Sino relations.

As Myanmar’s ties to China begin to fray about the edges, their ties with the US are being judiciously woven tighter. The US restored full diplomatic relations with Myanmar in 2012 after ties were severed in 1989. However, relations began recovering in 2000 when the US started providing humanitarian assistance to Burma. US Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar was increased in 2008, following Cyclone Nargis. Between 2008 and 2012, the US provided $196 million in assistance to Myanmar and over
$500 million since 2012.[30] Over the past three years, Western-led financial institutions, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, have provided more than $3.8 billion for the development of infrastructure and human services. Trade with Myanmar remains modest, but doubled from 2014 to 2015 to $371.2 million. While the US has concerns about the pace of reforms, sectarian violence against the Rohingya, and the progress of reconciliation with ethnic groups, the US is employing a calibrated engagement strategy that recognizes the positive steps Myanmar has already undertaken to incentivize further reforms.[31] According to the policy, if Myanmar diligently continues to strengthen its democratic institutions and address the country’s unsettled ethnic problems in a proactive and peaceful manner, the U.S. will deepen its ties with Myanmar and thereby, bolstering its capacity to act as a much welcomed counterbalance to China.

Myanmar stands to gain a lot from engagement with both China and the West. How it manages the balance of its relationship with external powers will depend heavily on the decisions of the newly elected government, led by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy. Suu Kyi’s meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping in China in summer 2015 highlighted China’s desire to build rapport with the new government. Myanmar’s strategic location, as the land bridge between South and Southeast Asia, makes it an important stop on China’s MSR. Similarly, Myanmar’s pipelines make it vital to China’s energy security. Thus, China has ample incentive to remain a friend to Myanmar. Myanmar, on the other hand, is reevaluating the terms of its friendship with Beijing. The potential gains from increasing business ties with the West, the need to correct an over-dependence on Beijing and Washington’s steadfast support of Myanmar’s democratically elected government puts a slight Western tilt on the balance of Myanmar’s hedging strategy.

**Conclusion**

This analysis demonstrates that the member states of ASEAN are navigating a middle road between the regional interests of the US and China regardless of their perceptions of Chinese power. This approach is referred to as “hedging”. This bodes well for the ability of ASEAN to manage great power competition in the region because the use of hedging strategies is not only beneficial for individual ASEAN states, but also the Association as a whole. The fact that all the ASEAN member states are using the same strategy, albeit with substantial individual modifications, lessens the difficulty of reaching a consensus should great power competition begin to pose an imminent threat to the interests of the region. However, this only mitigates and does not eliminate the complications ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making poses to managing great power competition in the region. A glaring example of this is the failure of ASEAN to produce a joint statement during its 2012 summit because of differing opinions on the South China Sea dispute.
Acknowledging its limitations, hedging is a prudent strategy for ASEAN because it is less about countering the US or China and is more focused on managing the inherent risks of relations with any hegemonic or emerging power. Hedging allows ASEAN, as an association and separate member states, to remain nimble in their foreign policy. Therefore, ASEAN can effectively respond to the possibilities of a bellicose China or a countermand of the importance the Obama administration assigned to the region while maximizing the benefits of their engagement with more powerful international actors.

ASEAN member states cannot only be concerned about maximizing the gains they receive from their hedging strategies. They must also be concerned about maintaining an international environment, in which hedging remains a viable foreign policy. Hedging only remains viable if the international arrangement in Southeast Asia is acceptable to both the US and China. Currently, the US cannot accept Chinese hegemony in Asia; therefore, it seeks to preserve its military primacy in the Asia-Pacific. Conversely, China cannot accept continued US primacy in the region and accordingly contests US primacy which, if successful, would leave China well positioned to become a regional hegemon. In order to maintain a regional environment conducive to hedging, ASEAN must support a US presence in the region that is capable of preventing Chinese hegemony, but not strong enough to maintain US primacy. This is not an easy equilibrium to find. Both China and the US are willing to divide ASEAN rather than lose the whole region to their rival. In the wake of increasing great power competition, ASEAN must promote policies that support its internal unity.

ASEAN’s first step in finding a balance between US primacy and Chinese hegemony is internal. ASEAN must continuously work to increase interregional trade and investment, especially between the more developed ASEAN states and the region’s lesser developed states, namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. Increasing inter-ASEAN economic ties goes hand in hand with narrowing the development gap. These economic links encourage the lesser developed countries of ASEAN to link national prosperity to regional interests rather than the good graces of extra regional powers.

The second step is external. ASEAN should not be a party to or condone military adventurism in the region by any external actors. This includes the recent freedom of navigation exercises conducted by the US in the South China Sea. These actions have been tacitly endorsed by Vietnam, while The Philippines seeks to join the US patrols. ASEAN can challenge Chinese claims in the South China Sea without antagonizing the behemoth nation and legitimizing its aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, which brings us to the final step.

Finally, ASEAN needs mechanisms to coordinate foreign policy when facing great power competition. Increasing competition will require increased coordination. As it
happens, competition is most definitely increasing at the moment. Some might argue that joint proclamations carry little weight to dissuade the machinations of the world's largest powers. However, the strategic value of ASEAN is increasing by the day, especially for China. With every Maritime Silk Road project completed ASEAN becomes a more important partner in China's economic development and energy security. ASEAN proclamations backed up by unity and resolve carry more weight than the world has yet to realize. This proposal is controversial as it might infringe upon the national sovereignty and independence so jealously guarded by ASEAN Member States. However, a coordinated response will be necessary to disallow the divide and conquer strategies employed in the great games of powerful nations. If a great game is played in Southeast Asia, its nations will be subjected to the interference, subversion and coercion ASEAN was created to guard against
ABSTRACT

Terrorism and extremism is not a new phenomenon to Southeast Asian countries. Dangerous radical groups such as Abu Sayyaf and Jammah Islamyah have carried out dozens of deadly attacks in the region. Some of these local terrorist groups are suspected to have links with Al Qaeda. The rise of ISIS on the other hand has raised new security concerns in Southeast Asia, particularly for those countries with majority-Muslim populations. According to official reports more than 200 people from Southeast Asian have already joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

Based on the concept of a world-wide Caliphate, which is central to its doctrine, ISIS has started to extend its influence to other parts of the world, including Southeast Asia. Considering ISIS is much more organized and sophisticated than Al Qaeda, there is little doubt of ISIS’ possible appeal in Southeast Asia. The current article strives to examine the presence and estimate the threat of ISIS in the region with a focus on Malaysia and Indonesia.
Introduction

Radicalism and terrorism are not new phenomenon in Southeast Asia as jihadist groups have long had a foothold in this region. In fact, Southeast Asia has much experience with dangerous terrorist groups such as Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and Jammah Islamyah in Indonesia. In 1995, Abu Sayyaf killed more than 50 people in the southern Philippines. In 2002 and 2005, The Bali terrorist attacks by Jammah Islamyah caused more than 200 casualties. These atrocities and dozens of other Al Qaeda-alleged terrorist attacks clearly demonstrate that the region is prone to the influence of international terrorism. The Bush administration even labeled the region as the “Second Front” in the war on terror. Although ASEAN had already designated international terrorism a serious security threat in Southeast Asia, the Bali bombings highlighted terrorism as the top concern in the region.[1] As a result, the 2007 ASEAN summit, showed its members responding to terrorism seriously for the first time. [2]

This article strives to examine the influence of ISIS in Southeast Asia to estimate the threat of this new generation of terrorism poses to the region. The focus of this research is on Malaysia and Indonesia, two majority-Muslim countries. The research method utilized is based on content analysis of online ISIS materials including websites and social media.

The Rise of ISIS

ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in its current form originated in 1999 as Jamaat Tawih Wal Jihad (JTWJ) under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the group was involved in the Iraqi insurgency and conducted suicide attacks against civilians and Iraqi government officials. In 2004, JTWJ pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and soon assumed the unofficial name of Al-Qaeda-Iraq (AQI). AQI merged with other Iraqi insurgent groups to form the Mujahedeen Shura Council (MSC). Roughly seven months later MSC declared the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS) under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, claiming Baqubah as its capital city. In 2010, the then leader of ISIS, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, was killed in an American-led attack and was replaced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Baghdadi began a marked shift in the group’s strategy and started to use the internet and social media in order to appeal to potential supporters of ISIS across the world. The “Breaking the Walls” propaganda campaign released by ISIS is one of their first documented attempts at implementing its new web-savvy strategy.[3]

In June 2014, ISIS proclaimed the establishment of its worldwide caliphate (IS) under the leadership of Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi.[4] The establishment of this worldwide caliphate marked a noticeable shift in the group’s strategy from the regional to the international stage. As caliph, Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi demanded the allegiance of all Muslims around the world. The announcement of this caliphate directly
questioned the legality and sovereignty of many world governments.

**ISIS in Southeast Asia**

Currently several extremist groups in Southeast Asia have pledged allegiance to ISIS. Furthermore, up to 200 Indonesian, 50 Malaysian, 100 Filipinos and even a handful of Singaporeans have joined the ISIS mujahedeen in Iraq and Syria.[5]

In fact, the rise of ISIS represents a new chapter of radicalism and extremism in Southeast Asia, and the region’s governments are acutely aware that ISIS has the potential to spawn a new generation of terrorism in the region. The similarities between the former challenge of Al Qaeda and the current threat of ISIS have increased awareness among Southeast Asian authorities over terrorism’s devastating legacy in the region.

In comparison with Al Qaeda, ISIS shows a higher level of organization and sophistication which may make its ideology more appealing in Southeast Asia.

Three factors undergird the charm of ISIS in Southeast Asia: social media, returning jihadists, and the world wide caliphate.

1- **Social Media**

New information and communication technologies (ICT) not only have revolutionized the world the average person. They also play an important role in enabling connections among terrorists. ISIS represents a new generation of terrorism in its exploitation of these new technologies to spread its violent ideology across the globe, including to Southeast Asia. Their efforts have already conquered a great swathe of social media space through deploying sophisticated

The number of internet users in Southeast Asia, 2016 (Source: [http://www.ecommercemilo.com](http://www.ecommercemilo.com))
web-based strategies to promote their extremist agenda. ISIS' social media presence has easily made the group more appealing than Al-Qaeda. The vastly popular social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube have proven to be the perfect tools for ISIS to establish its virtual Caliphate (e-Caliphate) and to attract e-citizens (e-Ommah). Thanks to new ICT, terrorist groups such as ISIS have waged informational warfare and have exploited the internet to inspire potential supporters across the globe. In this context, ISIS tries to demonize its enemies and to legitimize their use of violence to convince its audience that they have no choice other than to resort to violence. To shift the responsibility for their violent acts onto their enemy ISIS jihadists usually characterize their enemies as anti-religious demons who are suppressing Muslims and damaging their dignity.

To analyze the influence of ISIS in Southeast Asia one must consider that the digital landscape in of the region is expanding rapidly. Younger generations spend most of their time on social media and blogs and are inevitably exposed to online extremist propaganda. The faster the number of internet users in the region grows, the more people will be exposed to extremist propaganda online.

The effects of ICT on ISIS’ presence in Southeast Asia can be examined on two levels: first, new communication technologies have provided platforms for ISIS to spread its ideology within the region. The global network of Islamic jihadists can easily influence young Muslims via the internet. Thank to electronic media small, local extremist groups which were previously geographically isolated can now easily communicate with each other and receive inspiration from ISIS.

Online forums, blogs and websites are one of ISIS’ main platforms for propaganda in the region. These online materials, though in Arabic or Malay, offer their support to Islamic State and justify its violent acts by selectively quoting religious texts. Under this framework, ISIS’ enemies are all referred as infidels (كافر) and their own terrorist recruits as
holy warriors. The contents of the jihadist websites usually focus on Muslim communities under attack, urging their religious brothers to help them and to protect Islam at all costs. The jihadist websites also contain instructions for building weapons, such as bombs and improvised explosive devices.

Islam al-Busyro is an example of one of these propaganda outlets. This Indonesian online forum distributes ISIS videos and provides tutorials and online discussion forums for its followers across the region. This blog is also connected to a Twitter account which—though suspended for a while—has been reactivated and has announced a new associated Twitter account.

These social media accounts may be run directly by ISIS jihadists in Iraq and Syria or their sympathizers in Southeast Asia. Each of these accounts has thousands of followers which prove the appeal of ISIS in the region. Mohd Faris Anuar and Muhamad Wanndy Muhammad Jedi, two Malaysians identified in an ISIS beheading video, are other examples of Southeast Asian involvement in ISIS' online presence. Via these kinds of videos, ISIS attempts to attract more Southeast Asians to their cause and to encourage their migration to their caliphate. Jasminder Singh, a researcher at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, stated: “[Recently] there has been a surge in Indonesian and Malaysian language material posted by ISIS online”. According to official reports, ISIS has already succeeded in extending its influence to Southeast Asia through local radical groups. The idea of an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia spanning Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore, the southern Philippines, and southern Thailand is being widely propagated by these local e-jihadists.

ISIS has effectively grasped social media’s potential to help establish a virtual presence in Southeast Asia. The videos and propaganda of ISIS on YouTube or other social media can go viral with the help of their regional followers. These videos are often edited with Hollywood style special effects to be more impressive. A few months ago a set of videos were uploaded by local IS sympathizers which showed off the Abdullah Azzam Academy, a jihadist training camp for Southeast Asian children in Syria. The academy was established for the children of ISIS’ Southeast Asian fighters so that they can train the next generation of ISIS combatants. Secondly, the internet has proved a potent recruiting tool for ISIS. While the internet has not completely replaced traditional methods of recruitment many experts believe that internet-based recruitment systems are growing rapidly. The decentralized nature of the Internet and the associated difficulty in curbing online propaganda and recruitment make it more appealing to terrorist activity. Many ISIS affiliated websites in Southeast Asia not only give advice to their followers on how to undertake terrorist activity in their own
countries but also go so far as to support them financially. Indonesian officials believe the 2002 terrorist bombings in Bali were financed through such an online source.

Recently Malaysian authorities arrested a group of extremists who used Facebook to recruit locals for ISIS.

Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, the Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs, claimed that more than 70 percent of ISIS jihadists from Southeast Asia are recruited online. Indeed social media in Malaysia has not only become a primary tool for exposing Malaysians to ISIS ideology but it is also being used to pass along information to interested individuals on how to travel to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS.

Lotfi Ariffin, a former member of PAS (Malaysia Pan Islamic Party), was killed while fighting for ISIS in Syria—just one prominent example of a Malaysian involved in ISIS terrorist activities. He and his brother used to propagate jihadist activities on social media. On his Facebook page (which has more than 20,000 followers), Ariffin openly promoted IS ideology and sought to influence youth in the region. While his account has since been suspended many Facebook pages and blogs continue to follow the jihadist example he set. The Tribute Asyyahid Ustaz Lotfi Ariffin Facebook page and the Blog Rasmi Briged Kibaran Bendera are examples of such activities, the latter of which has more than 2 million followers and is linked to a similarly-inspired YouTube account.

Influenced by ISIS’ online presence, some Southeast Asian extremist groups have already pledged allegiance to the group. Furthermore, ISIS online activity has even inspired the establishment of new jihadist groups. Majmu’ah al-Arkhabiliy is one such new Indonesian-Malaysian terrorist group in Raqqah, Syria under the command of ISIS. It claims
over a hundred Malaysians and Indonesians as members of the unit.

Besides just recruiting fighters from Southeast Asia, dozens of local women have been encouraged to join the IS Caliphate in Iraq and Syria and to participate in Jihad Al Nikah, contributing to extremist activities through marrying combatants. These women are exposed to ISIS ideology via social networks until they decide to migrate to Syria. Before the rise of the Internet and social media, Southeast Asian authorities only had to control mosques and other religious gatherings, such as Friday prayers, to hinder Islamic extremism. New ICT and social media have heightened the challenge of dealing with radicalism and have amplified the threat.

2- Returning Jihadists

In the 1980s, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, over 700 Southeast Asian jihadists joined in the war. Upon their return some of these local jihadists formed their own terrorist groups including Jammah Islamyah and the Abu Sayyaf group. During the Afghan war, many Southeast Asian Muslims joined the mujahadeen and were influenced by Al Qaeda ideology; however, currently more than 1000 jihadists are fighting in Iraq and. Thus, ISIS is proving itself more organized and more sophisticated than Al-Qaeda and could pose a more serious threat than its predecessor.

Local jihadists who spent time with IS militants eventually return with their radical ideology and a new set of military capabilities. Upon their return, similar to those returning militants in the 1980s, they may pass their tactical skills and violent ideology on to local extremist groups and revive them.

Ansyaaad Mbai, the head of Indonesia’s National Counter-terrorism Agency, recently stated the main concern of Southeast Asian governments is returning fighters and what they will do upon their arrival back in the region.[6] These returning militants may help a new generation of jihadism to take root in their home countries and inspire a new generation of Muslim extremists. As an Indonesian expert stated: “They will return to their homes across the world, repeating what happened when fighters in Afghanistan returned. A new wave of international terrorism will likely recur.”[7]

Hishammudin Hussein, the defense minister of Malaysia, recently announced his concern over the establishment ISIS branches in Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia.[8] Some of these returning jihadists had been directly involved in ISIS terrorist activities in Syria and Iraq. Ahmad Tarmimi Maliki, a 26 year-old Malaysian who carried explosives to the ISIS headquarters in Iraq, is just one such example. He was Malaysia’s first suicide bomber with known links to ISIS. He participated in a terrorist attack on Iraqi soldiers at their SWAT headquarters in Baghdad which caused more than 20 deaths. Details of the attack were published on
the ISIS website and Maliki was widely praised as Martyr (شهيد).[9] Zulkifli Binhir, also known as Marwan, Southeast Asia’s top terror suspect, is another Malaysian who was killed in January 2015 by the Filipino security forces. He was the FBI’s most wanted terrorist and a notorious bomb-maker for terrorist groups throughout the region.[10]

Some of the Malaysians and Indonesians known to have joined IS have been spotted in propaganda beheading videos. Malaysia officials believe these people are the members of Majmuah Arkhability, a new joint Malaysian-Indonesian militant group within Islamic Caliphate territory.[11] In Indonesia, previously the base of dangerous terrorist groups such as Jammah Islamyah (JI), many old and new jihadist groups have begun supporting ISIS and its ideology. In addition to JI, Jammah Anshurat Tauhid and Aktivis Syairiad Islam have already pledged their allegiance to ISIS. Recently Abu Bakar Bashir, a famous Indonesian Islamic extremist and the spiritual leader of Southeast Asia’s extremist network, has beseached his followers to support ISIS.[12]

According to official estimates, the number of Indonesians joining ISIS has soared from 56 in mid-2014 to over 110 by the end of the same year.

It seems ISIS ideology in Indonesia is even proving popular among scholars and journalists. Abu Shoilah Attamarowi and M.Fachry are scholars who organized a gathering in Jakarta to pledge their support for ISIS.[13] A similar ceremony was organized by ISIS supports in Solo Baru in July 2014. The previous president of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, labeled ISIS as humiliating to Muslims and banned any support for this group. The current government of Indonesia maintained the ban on jihadist activities; however, ISIS ideology is still being widely propagated in Indonesia. General Tito Karnavian, Indonesia’s National Police Inspector worried that ISIS is providing “oxygen” to local extremist groups. He added that those Indonesians who have joined ISIS will likely return home with sophisticated combat training and will spread their extremist ideologies to others.[14]

In its most recent report, IPAC (the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict) warned the Indonesian government and other regional leaders about ISIS hubs in the country and urged better monitoring of the movements of ISIS sympathizers.[15] To impede ISIS recruitment, Indonesia security services are keeping a close watch on extremist group and have even gone so far as to invalidate passports of local jihadists who have become ISIS members.

In the Philippines, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the Abu Sayyaf group have already declared their allegiance to ISIS.[16] A BIFF spokesman confirmed their alliance with Islamic State in a video uploaded to YouTube. Filipino forces are embroiled in a battle against Islamic extremism in the south of the country and even withstood a terrorist attack in January 2015 in which more than 44 counter-terrorist police commandos were killed in a bombing by Abdul Basil Usman.[17] According to
official reports, ISIS has also gained ground among radicalized Muslims in Mindanao; however, there remains no official consensus among Filipino rebel and terrorist groups. While some of them such as Abu Sayyaf and BIFF have already pledged allegiance to ISIS, MILF and MNLF which feature a more nationalistic identity have condemned ISIS and vowed to halt the dangerous virus of extremism in the region.

3- The world wide Caliphate

In July of 2014, Abu Bakar Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, declared the establishment of a worldwide caliphate. In his statement Baghdadi summoned Muslims across the globe to join IS. He stated, “[y]our brothers all over the world are waiting for your rescue, and are anticipating your brigades.”[18] The heart of Islamic State’s doctrine is a belief in the apocalypse and the fulfillment of the prophecy according to the Qur’an. According to the religious narratives of the hadith, particularly those contributed to the Prophet Mohammad, the final apocalyptic battle will take place between Muslims and infidels. On the day of judgment, which is said will take place in Syria, Muslims’ savior, the Mahdi, and Jesus Christ will appear together and summon their Muslim army against the infidels (kafir). According to the prophecy, on that day all people have to convert to Islam otherwise they will be considered enemies. The Qur’an states that the victory of Muslims is inevitable. While there are a wide variety of prophecies in Islamic texts, ISIS has mainly focused on the Dabiq hadith which is attributed to Mohammad. The prophecy says, “The last hour would not come until the Romans would land at Al-Amaq (Dabiq).” Dabiq, a small city in Syria, is the location of the apocalyptic final battle where the Romans will land and, after a bloody battle, suffer defeat at the hands of the Muslim army. In order to draw a parallel between the Dabiq prophecy and their own campaigns, IS jihadists captured Dabiq in a showy effort to prepare the scene for judgment day. Dabiq is only a small town of little strategic importance; however, the location holds great value as a propaganda tool as after its capture, IS supporters all around the word tweeted photos of the city with quotes from the hadith.

Whether ISIS terrorists really believe this prophecy or whether it is just a part of their strategy, apocalypticism is feeding their ideology and justifying their violent acts.

ISIS even releases a magazine named Dabiq. Besides being a news platform, the magazine expounds the agenda of the Islamic Caliphate and seeks to justify ISIS’s violent strategies. The third issue of the magazine “The Call to Hijrah” encourages all Muslims across the globe to migrate (هِجْرَة) to the Islamic Caliphate and to participate in the holy war as a precursor to the final apocalyptic battle. One of the articles in this issue, “Hijrah from Hypocrisy to Sincerity,” elaborates on the concept of a worldwide caliphate in the context of religious migration (هِجْرَة). Referring to the Qur’an
and the hadith (حاديث), Muslims today are being portrayed as hopeless people who would dream of hijrat (migration) from the lands of infidels to the lands of jihad. The writer continues on that the caliphate is an Islamic utopia which accepts all Muslims regardless of their nationality and does all it can to protect them. According to the article, religious migration is an obligation for today’s Muslims, especially after the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate.

Back-page photo of the fourth issue of this magazine shows Southeast Asians who have already joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq to fulfill their religious obligation.

Therefore the fast growing appeal of ISIS in Southeast Asia can be explained within the framework of the prophecy. Considering Southeast Asian Muslims’ strong commitment to Islamic beliefs and practices and the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate as a symbol of a supposedly unfolding prophecy, ISIS has the potential to wage a substantive campaign to charm Muslims in the region. ISIS has been actively attempting to luring Southeast Asia’s current generation of young Muslims to join their terrorist group. From the viewpoint of the small segment of suppressed and marginalized Muslims in Southeast Asia, Islamic State (IS) is the prophesized caliphate of the Mahdi and a utopia in which to experience true Islamic government. One significant example pertaining to ISIS’ appeal in Southeast Asia is the formation of the Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyyah (The Malay Archipelago Unit of the Islamic State). This unit was established by Malaysian and Indonesian jihadists who
have joined IS. The formation of this group inside the territory of Islamic State has raised serious security concerns that these fighters may pass along ISIS ideology to sleeping terrorist cells in the region and help to revive them upon their return to their home countries. According to the official reports, currently four new extremist groups have been formed in Malaysia. It is believed that these new jihadist groups are an outgrowth of the older radical groups in the region and they seek to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Southeast Asia.

Conclusion

The governments of the region are completely aware that the threat of ISIS is not confined to the Middle East and merits their attention and correspondingly serious measures to quell it. Learning from their past experience fighting against Al-Qaeda, Southeast Asian leaders consider terrorism as a long term security concern as well as a regional threat. They are highly concerned about the number of local jihadists in Iraq and Syria and what they will do upon their return home. To combat against this new wave of terrorism Southeast Asian governments have done a lot to curb the influence of ISIS in the region. They have taken serious measures to impede ISIS recruitment and have coordinated their counter terrorism activities.

Counter ISIS measures in Southeast Asia could be implemented at different levels.

At the national level, Indonesia’s government has encouraged moderate Muslim leaders to speak out and condemn ISIS. The government has also banned all types of propaganda supporting or sympathizing with ISIS, including YouTube videos. Malaysia, another Muslim-majority country in the region, has publicly condemned the violent acts of this terrorist group. The Malaysian police are monitoring social media to identify and arrest people suspected of terrorist activities. The Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yasin, recently stated that strong measures like the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Pota) are needed to curb the threat of terrorism and radicalism in the country.[19]

While Singapore is not a Muslim-majority country, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have been contributing military assets to combat terrorism in the region. However, Singapore’s defense minister has announced that none of its combat troops will be sent to Iraq and Syria. To develop of national counter-terrorism strategy, countries must consider that the seeds of radicalism can only grow in fertile soil. Many Southeast Asian Muslims are motivated to engage in jihad due to the internal problems of their home countries just as much—if not more than—external pull factors. The perpetual cycle of poverty, corruption, injustice, lack of democracy, and religious and ethnic discrimination can provide exactly the fertile soil needed for ISIS to takes root in the region. The strengthening of democracy and civil society along with political reform and greater governmental transparency could
prove the region’s most powerful weapons against ISIS’
dangerous, extremist message.

Supporting civil and moderate interpretations of Islam
should be another priority of Southeast Asian governments in
order to counter the influence of the radical ideology of ISIS.

At the regional level, ASEAN has begun taking effective
steps towards implementing counter-terrorism strategies to
combat ISIS. At ASEAN’s 25th annual summit in Burma,
member states expressed their concerns and commitment to
fight ISIS as a new regional threat. ASEAN has also expanded
its cooperation with other countries to strengthen local
counter-terrorism capabilities. ASEAN plus Japan issued a
declaration to improve their regional cooperation against
terrorism. Attacking the ideologies at the root of terrorism,
strengthening border and immigration controls, and
conducting joint training programs are critical achievements
of this major step forward.

At the regional level, counter-terrorism cooperation
should be boosted through stronger information sharing on
returning jihadists. Monitoring suspected social media
activities and enhancing cyber security measures could also
help to blunt ISIS’ online presence. Finally, it must be stated
that reducing the threat IS poses to Southeast Asia without
addressing the internal factors which could foster its rise will
be impossible. IS’ appeal in Southeast Asia derives from the
region’s many internal problems including frustration,
repression, corruption, religious and cultural extinction,
marginalization, fragile democratic systems, and a lack of a
strong civil society. The convergence of these catalysts with IS
appealingly apocalyptic ideology are the two strongest factors
driving the desire of Southeast Asian Muslims to join the
Islamic caliphate.
Notes From the Field
“Notes from the Field” piece is a short exploration of some research ethics challenges I have experienced while doing ethnographic field work in a rural community in Cambodia. Issues explored include obligations to research participants, the desire to “give back” to a community, and protection of human subjects in repressive contexts.
Sothy[*] asked me to bring her weight-loss pills from Phnom Penh. This was not covered in any of my research methodology or ethics classes. While I thought I was fairly well prepared for field work, with previous experience in Cambodia and some ability to speak Khmer, at the mid-point of my field research I realize I am facing ethical challenges that I did not fully anticipate, which have quite literally kept me awake at night. What follows is a brief discussion of some of those challenges, which may be familiar to researchers doing similar work.

My field research concerns social mobilization related to land conflict in Cambodia and is supported by a Fulbright US Student award. One of my two research sites, Areng Valley, in the Cardamom Mountain range in the southwest of Cambodia, is one of the most under-developed corners of the country. A planned hydroelectric dam would flood between six and eight villages of Jong indigenous minorities who are currently living a primarily subsistence lifestyle of fishing and farming with no electricity, running water, or phone service. When I first traveled there almost two years ago there were only two toilets for eight villages of 1,500 people. Now, there are about sixteen toilets, which is a dramatic improvement, but is still just over one toilet per hundred people. In most villages, three to five families share each open well. However, it seems to be over-simplifying for me to label the situation in Areng as “poverty”. Rather, the residents of Areng are dealing with the effects of Cambodia’s rapid, uneven development and the shift from a subsistence economy to a cash-based one. In

Areng, houses are airy and spacious compared to the urban poor areas in Phnom Penh. Food is adequate – getting hit on the head by a falling coconut is an actual concern – though protein can be scarce. Most families can afford some small luxuries such as sweets for the children and a few cosmetics for the women. The community shares burdens and takes in some cash from ecotourism and long-term guests like me and my NGO partners. But, they are cash-poor and a new metal roof or a trip to the hospital in the provincial capital is out of range for most families without assistance. Residents’ needs are still great and they often appeal to outsiders for help, which, for me, leads to ethical questions.

No one outright asks for money – Cambodian politeness forbids this – though people do bring up illnesses and other problems and the specific amount of money it would take to meet these needs. While I have not given money directly to community members (with the exception of Sothy and her husband, who I live with when I am in Areng and who I pay for my room and board), I have given money to NGO partners with a suggestion that it go discretely to a specific family facing a crisis. I do not want research participants to expect money from me, but I also know I can afford to help them out, and, as I will discuss below, I feel I owe them something. When Sothy’s older daughter developed a persistent ear infection, I paid her mother a bit extra for housing me and suggested that she use some for her daughter rather than pay it all into the community fund. Other requests, however, leave me at a loss. There is no health center or doctor, so people ask
if I can give them medicines. I once brought antibiotics (available over the counter in Cambodia) but the possibility of mis-use worried me so much I did not repeat this. I bring more basic supplies now: acetaminophen, antiseptic wipes, bandages, etc. Because of lack of sanitation and the hot, humid nature of the region much of the year, minor issues such as insect bites and small injuries, which are common among farmers and those who work in the forest, can become major problems. Thus, a clean piece of gauze and an antibiotic ointment can have a real impact. But, weight loss pills? Sothy has become a friend and key informant, so I did not want to refuse a rare direct request. I opted to bring her herbal tea and told her that it is healthy and that I drink a lot of tea (I have lost weight in the time I have known her, which is why she asked me for weight-loss pills, but my weight loss has been a result of exercise and a parasite infection, another challenging aspect of fieldwork). Research participants have also semi-jokingly asked me to take their children and asked more seriously for help sending their children to school. The valley has no secondary school, so most students leave school by or before eighth grade and parents will often lament how difficult it is for their children to study. For the few students who do continue to secondary school, their parents typically send them to live with a relative or rent a room for them in a larger town, which is expensive. Parents will tell me how much it would cost to send a child to school for a year and ask if I know any way for them to get support. Publicly, I tell them the best thing they can do is continue to advocate for better schools and a secondary school so that all the young people can get an education, but privately I am wondering how I can help to send Sothy’s daughters to secondary school and even university, if they want. This, in turn, generates concerns about favoritism: I spend the most time with Sothy’s family, so I feel more of a bond with them and an obligation to them. However, I wonder what does helping one family do to my relationships with other families? More importantly, does helping them benefit the community as a whole?

Many of my concerns over ethics stem from the balance of taking and giving back – as a researcher, I take a lot. People open their homes and workplaces to me, feed and house me, and give me hours of their time. Practically and ethically, what can I give back? At the end of my research I will leave to write a few hundred pages of academic English that, if I am lucky, will be read by other academics, but this is of little to no use to the bulk of my research participants. I may draft a “lessons learned” piece that can be translated into Khmer, for the use of my NGO partners, though it will be a long time before I am able to do this and I question how valuable it will be for my partner. I pay for my room and board and give small gifts when it is culturally appropriate, which seems small in proportion to the access my participants give me to their lives. I cannot meet their actual needs - a school, a health center, or clean water. While in the long-term my research may help my NGO partners working with the community to advocate for these needs, in the short-term I am basically useless to my research participants – an odd foreigner who shows up every few weeks, asks the same questions over and over again, and
has to be taught even the most basic tasks, like how to bathe in a sarong or eat mud crabs.

The close personal relationships that are created by ethnographic research also mean that I am intervening in my participants’ lives in ways I never imagined before I began field work. Dara[*] is a colleague who I met through my research and subsequently developed a close personal relationship with. Privately, over dinner at my apartment, we were discussing the possibility of him being arrested for his work. Dara is not afraid to be arrested, but is worried about the potential impact on his family and career. The Cambodian authorities have been taking increasingly harsh measures against what they perceive to be dissent, and in the year that I have been in Cambodia, at least fourteen activists and NGO staff have been arrested, nearly all of them friends and colleagues of ours. I mentioned Bayard Rustin's quote that Martin Luther King, Jr.’s arrests “made going to jail like receiving a Ph. D.” A few weeks later I heard Dara repeat what I said to a group of youth activists joining a demonstration protesting the jailing of several activists. I immediately felt conflicted: as a former community organizer and activist, I was proud of these young people for standing up for justice. As an educator and many years their senior, I was worried about what an arrest would do to their chances of going to university and the emotional impact on their parents most of whom still carry trauma from the Pol Pot era murder and disappearance of family members and loved ones. As a researcher, I panicked about my unintended intervention into my research population.

My NGO partners have become my friends, in addition to key informants, interpreters, and guides. In many cases, I have more experience with social mobilization and community organizing, the subject of my research, than they do. Occasionally they ask for advice or assistance. Traditional research ethics say I should intervene as little as possible (though more and more researchers reject this approach). It seems unfair and contrary to the ethnographic project, though, to refuse to share knowledge. I do not want to impose my ideas and views, but neither do I want to keep silent when a colleague is asking for ideas and input. I will sometimes close my notebook, announce that I am speaking as a friend and not a researcher and they know their context better than I do. Then, I give my commentary on the issue being discussed. But, I worry on multiple levels: am I intervening too much when I should be observing? Are my suggestions, based mainly on the American context, suited to the Cambodian context? Are my interventions or even just my presence putting my participants in danger (this is in relation to the previous question in that a social mobilization tactic that is accepted in the West may result in harsh consequences in Cambodia, as was recently the case when eight civil society members were arrested for joining or attempting to join a demonstration in which all the participants wore black shirts)? I rationalize that I am not putting them in any more
danger than they have already put themselves, but still, I lose sleep.

Short-term, it may be impossible to tell what, if any, effect I am having on my participants. Likely, in my fears I am over-emphasizing my own importance – my ten months here will likely matter very little to the lives of my participants. However, regardless of the setting, human science research ethics are rarely simple. Ethnographic research, with the long-term, deep engagement it creates with participants, can be particularly challenging. Thus, at the end of many days in Cambodia, I find myself lying awake, staring at the ceiling, wondering if this was the day that I accidentally put a participant in danger or intervened with my participants in a way that will have lasting effects for them or my research.
SERANG - JAKARTA ROUND TRIP

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This fieldwork is part of my ongoing dissertation research on the politics of elite-peasant relations in post-authoritarian Indonesia.
It was Tuesday, January 12, 2016. After a quick breakfast with a fist of kampung-style fried rice and a cup of tea, I was ready to go. I soon found myself standing on the side of the highway, waiting for the Jakarta-bound bus to come. “Jakarta-Kebon Jeruk-Kampung Rambutan!” yelled the bus conductor, calling the passengers to board the bus.

It was just like my regular Serang-Jakarta trips, except the purpose of my visit to Jakarta this time was a bit special: to attend and observe the fourth national congress of the Confederation of Indonesian People’s Movements or KPRI for short – a national confederation of various social movements and unions across different sectors, representing workers, peasants, fishermen, women, and indigenous peoples. A friend of mine kindly invited me to the congress. “You should come,” she said.

So there I was, sitting in the congress hall, paying attention to what KPRI’s leaders, organizers, and invited speakers said about the confederation: its origins, goals, and policy proposals. Apparently, this was one of the latest attempts by Indonesian leftists and activists to make a breakthrough into oligarchy-dominated mainstream politics, in which big capital and remnants of the authoritarian elites continue to be important actors in politics. As a former student activist, I found this development interesting. Yet, as a scholar in training, I have many questions as to how this confederation will develop down the road. For instance, how will KPRI broaden its support base given the fragmented nature of lower-class unions and movements in Indonesia?

Furthermore, what are its strategies in facing upcoming elections? Of course, in trying to be a bit moderate, I also maintain a cautious optimism.

Fortunately I was not the only one who was pondering those questions. Other activist friends whom I met in the congress shared similar sentiments. This inevitably led to a series of lively discussions among us, but when the congress meetings started, we stopped. Some of us – including myself – even volunteered as note-takers for some of the sessions.

At the local level, the task of community organizing, let alone movement building, can be even more challenging since the local political condition and civil society landscape might not be as conducive as the national one for social movement activities. This is what I have observed in Serang in the last five months or so. Serang is one of the districts in the Banten Province – a province notorious for its corrupt oligarchic dynasty, the Rau Dynasty. The dynasty’s matriarch, Ratu Atut, who is also a former governor of Banten, is now in jail for corruption. However, the dynasty still prevails in Bantenese politics – it will not collapse in anytime soon. The result of the latest Serang District Head election is proof of the continuing dynastic rule: Ratu Tatu, Ratu Atut’s younger sister, won the election and soon will be appointed as the District Head of Serang.

Furthermore, the current state of civil society forces in Serang is quite weak. In several communities that I have observed since September 2015, non-state civil society
activities, such as NGO activities and programs, are something rather unheard of based on the accounts of both ordinary community members and village officials. Buzzwords such as “development” and “community participation” are almost inevitably linked to phrases like “the role of local government.” Moreover, patronage politics and clientelistic practices remain rampant. In the village I lived in, I witnessed a local MP (member of parliament) for the Serang District Parliament from the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat) giving away 20,000-50,000 rupiahs (around USD 1.5-4) to community members who attended his talk in his visit during parliamentary recess. In another village, I heard stories of how the local MP, a Gerindra Party cadre who represented the village, always made sure to distribute enough coffee and cigarettes in every gathering for Koran recitation or pengajian that he organized regularly. Hearing and observing all of this makes me wonder: is this the legacy of the New Order Era?

This does not mean that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are entirely absent in Serang. In fact, some of them are active. One NGO is Rekonvasi Bhumi, an environmental preservation NGO whose main beneficiaries are peasant communities in the western part of Serang. One of Rekonvasi Bhumi’s main programs is the promotion of Payment for Environmental Service (PES) and community-based watershed management. They do this through the Cidanau Watershed Communication Forum or FKDC, a tripartite entity brokered by Rekonvasi Bhumi which connects communities, the Banten Provincial Government, and several corporations whose water supplies come from Cidanau Watershed. The idea behind PES is to ask the private sector compensation for ecological commodities – in this case the watershed – which communities provide.

This means that the peasant communities received additional incomes from their farming and environmental conservation activities. The end goal of this scheme, according to the Executive Director of Rekonvasi Bhumi, is to create “a prosperous and productive community of small and household farmers.” This may sound like a good idea, but not everyone agrees with this proposal. “That NGO has so many ties with big corporations!” said a colleague of mine, a militant local activist, with disdain. For him, NGOs and social movements should limit their ties with corporations in order to maintain their independence and truly represent community voices. He might be right.

Researching and observing all of this has kept my mind busy for the last couple of months. Sometimes I think a lot about this while I am on the road, on my trip to Serang City, the villages, or Jakarta. I often ask myself: is it possible to organize collective action from below effectively? How? To date I still have not found the best possible answer to this question. This inquiry can be a little bit frustrating. Fortunately I have found consolation through sleepless nights of endless chitchats with my neighbors and friends in the villages, accompanied by coffee, snacks, and cigarettes. Hearing their stories of daily struggle with the hardships of life, often filled with jokes, and their relaxed attitude to the
challenges they face daily inspires me to do the same: to be resilient in my struggle in the quest of knowledge.
Images and End Notes
Oriana Filiaci - End notes

1. The terms and sources translated throughout this text are predominantly from modern Javanese, but some come directly from Bahasa Indonesia/Indonesian, the national language.


3. Ibid., 15.


9. Ibid., 45.


12. Ibid., 4.


20. Becker, Traditional Music in Modern Java, 100.


24. Ibid., 60.


28. Ibid., 29.


33. Mulder, Mysticism in Java, 16.


37. Ibid., 317.

38. Ibid., 319.


42. Benamou, Rasa, 244.


44. An interesting tidbit: the practice room of the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa’s Javanese and Balinese ensembles has a sticker subtly on display that says yang penting rasanya, “what’s important is the rasa.”

45. Benamou, Rasa, 66.


49. Ibid., 223.

50. Benamou, Rasa, 118: In reference to the compositional process, singing, and rebab playing, Benamou cites a proverb from his older teachers: “Lair utusané batin,” translated from ngoko (familiar Javanese) as “outer behavior is the emissary of the inner self.” Here we see a direct correlation to a musician or artist’s inner urge to pour something out through creative expression. This demonstrates the inseparability of rasa and musicality in karawitan.


52. Ibid., 38.

53. You may refer back to Becker’s affirmation of this on page 5.

54. On page 105 in Traditional Music in Modern Java, Becker defines gongan as “theoretically at least, infinitely repeatable. The basic repeated unit, the gongan, is structured by the principle of subdivision.”

55. Krâmâ (respectful/high Javanese) transitive verb form of rasa, known as ngrasakké in Ngoko (low Javanese) and merasakan in Indonesian: “to feel.”


57. See footnote 34.

59. When I was a student of Marc Benamou at Earlham College, he spoke before of how karawitan, traditional Javanese gamelan, has become more popular outside of Indonesia even when taking into account the active institutes for the arts in Yogyakarta and Solo, Institut Seni Indonesia (ISI).

60. For instance, directed by Joko and Tri Sutrisno originally from Solo, the Sumunar gamelan ensemble of Minneapolis, Minnesota recently performed and recorded a topeng (masked dance) show called “A Meeting of Two Spirits.” This performance, originally just with cello accompaniment, featured collaboration with the East Metro Symphony Orchestra with instruments tuned to the pélog scale so as to harmonize with the rest of the gamelan. Interestingly, this recording sparked a heated discussion on the worldwide gamelan listserv based in Dartmouth University on the possibility or impossibility of combining Western instruments with Javanese ones.


62. Ibid., 101.


64. Becker, *Traditional Music in Modern Java*, 100.

65. Ibid., 104.

66. See Michel Picard’s “Cultural Tourism in Bali: Cultural Performances as Tourist Attraction,” *Indonesia* (1990): 37-74, for an innovative and applicable discussion on the impact of tourism on the performing arts of Bali.

Figure 1: Taman Budaya Yogyakarta, photo by author

Figure 2: Façade of Taman Budaya covered by Art Jog 2013 installation, photo courtesy of Art Jog
Figure 3: Installation by Indieguerillas for Art Jog 2015, photo by author

Figure 4: Interior of installation by Indieguerillas depicting the bicycles part of this commission, photo by author
Figure 5: “Face off Dinner” by Indieguerillas at Art Jog 2015, photo by author

Figure 6: Selfies at Art Jog 2014 in front of commissioned installation, photo by author
Figure 7: Selfies at Art Jog 2014 in interior of exhibition, photo by author

Figure 8: An example of a “cohesive text” or Art Jog’s archive, Screenshot taken from Instagram
1. In reference to the number of biennials that exist throughout the world a relatively comprehensive list is provided on the website of the “Biennial Foundation” (http://www.bienniafoundation.org/biennial-map/).

2. Presently there are five contemporary art biennials held in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, East Java, West Sumatra, and Makassar. The Jakarta Biennial, Indonesia’s most long-standing biennial began in 1974 as the “Indonesian Painting Exhibition” (Pameran Seni Lukis Indonesia) with Yogyakarta’s first biennial opening in 1988 as the “1st Yogyakarta Painting Biennial” (Biennale Seni Lukis Yogyakarta I). More recent biennials in East Java, West Sumatra, and Makassar reflect a contemporary interest in the promotion of regional arts outside of Java and Java’s art centers. This interest can be attributed to decentralization and the expansion of Indonesia’s art world in the last decade. East Java’s biennial began in 2007, West Sumatra’s in 2012, and Makassar’s in 2015. The rise of medium specific biennials began in 2008 with the Jakarta Contemporary Ceramics biennial, followed by the Jakarta Craft and Design Biennial (held once in 2013), the Yogyakarta Mini-Print Biennial (2014), and the Yogyakarta Terracota Biennial (2015). Regarding art fairs such events can be found in Yogyakarta (Art Jog), Jakarta (Bazaar Art), and Bali (Bali Art Fair).


6. These statistics are quoted from two newspaper articles each published the Jakarta Globe. Regarding the Jakarta Biennial information can be found in the article “Jakarta Biennale Ends on High Note with 30,000 in Attendance” (http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/features/jakarta-biennale-ends-high-note-30000-attendance/). Regarding Art Jog information can be found in the article “Business and Passion Mix for Art Success in Art Jog” (http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/features/business-and-passion-mix-for-art-success-in-artjog/).

7. Statistics provided by Art Jog organizing team.

8. The only two-dimensional work included as part of Art Jog 2015 was a painting by Nyoman Masriadi, Indonesia’s highest grossing living artist. This fact was critiqued by a number of art world mediators. Heri Pemad, founder of Art Jog stated that some provisions had to be taken as sales were expected to be lower in comparison to recent years as three-dimensional works are not as attractive to collectors. Masriadi’s piece sold for Rp 4.5 miliar or 4.5 million USD.


12. The majority of Instagram posts associated with Art Jog 2014 utilize the hashtag “#artjog14,” however, as a virtual archive one must also take into account the numerous other hashtags associated this event over the course of its history and that of Instagram (Instagram launched in 2010). Presently there are approximately 29 hashtags that include approximately 59,211 posts associated with Art Jog. These numbers fluctuate and are current as of 11 February 2016.


15. My reference here to a “relational” exhibition refers to a tendency in contemporary art that began in the early 1990s. This tendency was marked by an interested in creating art that had the ability to engage an audience more directly. Of particular significance in this movement is the artist Rikrit Tiravanija who is best known for his 1992 piece “Untitled (Free).” This piece involved Tiravanija cooking Thai curry in a gallery space. Attendees were invited to share in the meal at hand, eating the curry, an act that constituted an important part of the artwork itself. This type of art practice was deemed a “relational aesthetic” by French art critic Nicolas Bourriaud. While I do not believe that Art Jog’s organizing committee was explicitly hoping to reference this type of art practice in their exhibition, I do suggest that Indieguerilla’s installation and the present interest in Yogyakarta’s art world to create more participatory, often non-object based art reflects an interest in the stream of art loosely referred to as relational or socially engaged.

Aye Lei Tun - End Notes


13. UK, Burma Campaign, "One Year on from Burma Signing Sexual Violence Declaration – No Steps Taken on Implementation" (Burma Campaign UK, 2015).


23. Ibid., 8-11.

24. Ibid., 8-11.


40. Heron, "Gender and Exceptionality in North-South Interventions: Reflecting on Relations", 117-27.


45. Neutral Message – There is no gender development perspective in the news. ii) Education/Awareness – The news/article that can increase the readers’ knowledge, consciousness, recognition, perception, understanding and appreciation on gender related topics. iii) Advocacy – The news/article that gives some recommendations for policy changes, or supports strong reason and analysis data for a new policy initiative. iv) Empowerment – The news/article that encourages or stimulates female audience to gain more confidence in their life. v) Stereotyping – The news/article that make use of traditional gender norms.

46. Altheide, Qualitative Media Analysis, 44.
47. The researcher avoided mentioning the name of specific organizations in the analysis not to appear as more of an evaluation for them.

48. Analysis article: The article which investigates the issues using gender lens, and puts key messages and recommendations to advocate the decision makers for policy change.

49. Minić, "Feminist Media Theory and Activism: Different Worlds or Possible Cooperation," 296.


3. Huong, “Art in the Rotunda,” 89.


5. Ibid., 388.


7. Ibid., 597.


9. Ibid., 84.

10. Ibid., 84.


12. Ibid., 451.


15. Ibid., 21.

16. Ibid., 1.

17. Ibid., 23.

18. Ibid., 23.


21. Ibid., 25.

22. Ibid., 26.


24. Ibid., 266.
25. Ibid., 266-267.


28. Ibid., 230-231.


31. Ibid., 256.

32. Huong, “Art in the Rotunda,” 84.

33. Ibid., 84.

34. Ibid., 86.

35. Ibid., 87.

36. Ibid., 88.

37. Ibid., 81.

38. Ibid., 81.

39. Ibid., 82.

40. Ibid., 90.

41. Ibid., 91.

42. Ibid., 92.


44. Ibid., 38.

45. “Guimet Museum of Asian Art, France,” accessed December 16, 2015, 


48. “Vishnu Garudasana,” accessed December 16, 2015, 

http://www.clevelandart.org/art/1990.34?collection_search_views_fulltext=&collection_search_views_artist_full_name=&field_images_field_large_image_url=All&field_highlight_museum=All&page=2&f[0]=field_collection%3A834


62. Tingley, Arts of Ancient Viet Nam, x.


64. Ibid., 239.

65. Ibid., 252.


67. Ibid., 17.


69. Ibid., 242.


73. Barker, Native Acts, 197.


76. Levine, “Musical revitalization among the Choctaw,” 405.

77. Ibid., 407.

78. Tingley, Arts of Ancient Viet Nam, 179, 181.

79. Ibid., 200-201.

80. Ibid., 210-211.

2. Data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD)


20. Ibid.,


The number of internet users in Southeast Asia, 2016
(Source: http://www.ecommercemilo.com)

Brian McCarty's image repurposed by IS jihadists as Islamic Caliphate propaganda.

Blog Rasmi Briged Kibaran Bendera
Neda Jebellie - End Notes


3. The joining of Islam and politics (political Islam) can be traced to the establishment of the first Islamic state in Medina by the Prophet Mohammad. In fact, Mohammad was both prophet and statesman. After the holy Prophet Shiaas believe that he indeed designated Ali, his cousin and Ali's descendants as the Prophet's heirs. Sunnis on the other hand, argue that Mohammad did not give clear instruction about his temporal and spiritual successor. After the Holy Prophet, Caliphate became the manifestation of political Islam in Muslims society and Caliphs claimed religious authority. After the passing years, however the Caliphate was transformed into a dynastic institution.


12. Bashir born in 1938, in East Java is or was the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiah (JI), a shadowy group with links to Al-Qaeda. He has spent decades teaching religion, and became influential among radical Muslims in South East Asia during the 1970s. Following the Bali bombings in 2002, Bashir was arrested and accused in connection with a number of bomb attacks, including the attack on the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2003, which killed 14 people. In March 2005, he was jailed for conspiracy over the 2002 Bali bombings, in which 202 people died - but his conviction was eventually quashed on appeal. In May 2010, he returned to the spotlight when officers raided the headquarters of the Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) - a group he had established in 2008. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-10912588.


