EXPLORATIONS

A GRADUATE STUDENT JOURNAL OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

volume 2, issue 1
Spring 1998

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Explorations
in
Southeast Asian Studies
A Journal of the Southeast Asian Studies Student Association
Vol 2, No. 1 **Spring 1998**

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Colonial Knowledge and Indigenous Power in the Dutch East Indies

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Notes

> Do you know the villages and quarters of the Javanese? Most likely you've only passed by them. Do you know what the Javanese farmer, of your own people, eats?... Believe me, Tuan, I know these people better than you do. You'll understand later, there is too much that you do not know about your own people.[1]

In this passage from Pramoedya Ananta Toer's Child of All Nations, Minke, a budding Indonesian nationalist, is reprimanded by a Dutch journalist for his lack of understanding of his own people, the Javanese. Minke, from an elite aristocratic family, is one of the first Javanese to complete a Dutch high-school education and is enamored with everything European. The accusation of not knowing his own people is stinging, particularly coming from a Dutch gentleman who claims to have a superior knowledge of them. The fact that he cannot refute the accusation makes it all the more troubling for him.

The colonizer's knowledge of the colonized has always been privileged in colonial discourse. Indeed, Minke himself cannot imagine an East-Indies totally independent of the Dutch. His concern in this matter is similar to that of the Dutch: the Javanese rulers and Javanese society in

general remain backward and feudal. What he does not yet grasp is that under the Dutch, the traditions of the Javanese, particularly of the elite, were first defined, then frozen. The very act of defining Javanese tradition, furthermore, was just as much an act of self-definition on the part of the Dutch as it was an attempt to accurately understand Javanese society. Through the Dutch discourse of self-definition, the Javanese came to be defined as everything the Dutch were not: a phenomenon common to colonial discourse worldwide. They were forced into molds that the Dutch created, then told that they were not capable of ruling themselves because of the backwardness of their society.

In this paper, I will first examine the prevalent image of the Javanese elite in the final decades of Dutch rule. Then I will demonstrate the role played by the Dutch in creating this image. Up to this point, the discussion clearly hinges on Foucauldian notions of power and knowledge. Yet for all the insight Foucault may offer to such a study, he presents a static image of power that is somewhat divorced from the processes through which hegemony is created and subsequently renegotiated in an ongoing discourse. I hope to show that the Javanese themselves played a significant role in the emergence and continual renegotiation of the hegemonic discourse of the Dutch.

To understand Minke's skepticism toward the possibility of Dutch rule, it is useful to understand his view of the Javanese elites. In the following passage, Minke has been summoned by a regent and describes the thickly feudal elements that continue to define the nobility:

> The agent was already inviting me--the impudence!--to take off my shoes and socks. The beginning of a great tyranny. Some supernatural power forced me to follow his orders. The floor felt cold under my bare soles. He signaled me and I went, step by step, to the top. He pointed out to me the place where I must sit, eyes to the floor, before a rocking chair.... Oh rocking chair, you will be a witness to how I humiliate myself in order to glorify some bupati I don't even know. Damn! What would my friends say if they saw me traveling on my knees like this....

When the regent finally comes in:

> I raised my hands, clasped in obeisance.... And I did not now withdraw my pose until the bupati had sat himself comfortably in his place.... This person, the bupati of B--, cleared his throat. Then slowly he sat down on the rocking chair, kicking off his slippers behind the foot bench, and placed his honorable feet on the velvet cushion The chair began to rock a little. Damn! How slowly time passed. Some object, by my reckoning fairly long, gently tapped upon my uncovered head. How insolent was this being that I must honor. And every tap I must greet with a sigh of grateful obeisance....
> "You!" he addressed me weakly, hoarsely. "Yes, I, my master, Honored Lord Bupati," said my mouth, and like a machine my hands were raised in obeisance for the umpteenth time and my heart cursed for I don't know how many times now.[2]

The elaborate rules for this deference and sycophancy, known as hormat, were an inevitable component of court life in the final decades of Dutch rule, however much those carrying it out may have resented it. It is fitting that the resentment in this case comes from a member of an aristocratic, or priyayi, family (indeed, the regent whom he cannot see in his obsequious position is his own father) who has had the benefit of a Dutch education. In this way, Minke is representative of the first nationalist elites who were later to take up the question of hormat as a major concern.

Power and Status in Precolonial Java

It would, of course, be useless to try to argue that precolonial Java was democratic and egalitarian. Already in the Central Javanese period-roughly the early eighth century through 938 C.E.-systems of hierarchy were developing on both the village and state levels of society and government.[3] By the Eastern Javanese period, lasting through the fifteenth century, an increasingly complex bureaucracy developed alongside further social stratification. Intermediaries between the king and his subjects grew in number concomitant with increasing levels within the bureaucratic hierarchy. At the same time, the king and much of the upper nobility were requiring a greater degree of deference to be paid to them. For example, the king was no longer addressed directly by his subjects. One had rather, to address his shoes. By the twelfth century, it was to the dust under his shoes that one spoke.[4]

It hardly needs to be said, however, that noting the "feudal" nature of precolonial Javanese kingship misses the point.[5] Javanese notions of kingship were never static as Western discourse so frequently asserted. Even on the eve of Dutch colonialism, the relatively new kingdom of Mataram was undergoing significant changes in its ruling philosophy. Although much continuity from earlier kingdoms was extant in Mataram, concepts of hierarchy and duty were becoming further developed as well as the notion of an aristocratic class known as the priyayi.

The contract between the king and his subjects is outlined in a fairly abstract way by the kawula-gusti (servant-lord) relationship. Theologically, the goal is for the servant to achieve union with God-an adaptation of the Indian concept of moksha. On a more practical level it is a concept that outlines the relationship of the king with his subjects and, more generally, between superiors and inferiors.[6] The ideal kawula-gusti relationship is one of mutual respect and concern accompanied by a contract in which the lord protects and the servant pledges his total devotion.[7] In the Dewa Ruci Lakon, a Javanese shadow puppet play, Bima submits to his teacher's commands despite their obvious intention of bringing about his death. This story provides an ideal example of the degree of loyalty expected in such a relationship.

In order to fulfill his end of the contract, the king required a force of bureaucrats to carry out administrative matters. The pangreh praja (rulers of the state) were in this sense precursors of the modern pegawai negri (civil servants). Their primary function was to maintain peace and order within the state.

Actual administrative matters were carried out by the abdi dalem, the servants of the king, known also as punggawa (officials). These positions initially were the exclusive preserve of the aristocracy. During the later Mataram period, however, the ranks of the ruling elite opened to those of common descent.[8] The elite priyayi class, which was traditionally comprised of only punggawa, opened up its ranks to include the family and descendants of punggawa.[9] In order to join the elite, one with no royal blood whatsoever had to spend much time in the service of the king, cultivating personal ties and seeking the king's favor.

Although one could not seriously state that these changes spelled out a society free of hierarchy and oppression, changes were nevertheless occurring. Likewise one need not resort to the impossible and tired "what if" questions, nor set up a tally sheet enumerating the pluses and minuses of Dutch rule. The point is that the Dutch, in a panoptic gesture, cast their gaze on what they saw as a static feudal society. Their next step was to define what they saw, fixing a distorted and essentialized picture of the Javanese.

Recently, John Pemberton has argued quite compellingly that much of what is considered to be "traditional Java" is, in fact, a construct that emerged during the colonial era.[10] This figure of Java was fashioned within the newly formed discursive milieu of rule. Pemberton goes beyond the more obvious effects of colonial intrusion, demonstrating that not only did the Dutch presence refashion the figure of "Java" from without, but also, as a result of this new discourse, fundamentally altered from within the articulation of Javanese identity. New ideas of identity emerged, on the one hand adaptations from the Dutch, but more significantly as a deliberate contrast vis a vis the Dutch. Clearly hybrid identities were emerging, identities which were more than simply the sum of those from which they were formed.

Foucault has shown how, from around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, power in Europe came to be produced through ever more efficient and insidious methods.[11] Regimes of discipline and normalization increasingly proliferated through society, necessarily marking off the normal from the perverse. Similarly, Stallybrass and White have persuasively suggested that in Victorian Europe a discourse emerged regarding the "low" elements of society.[12] Although this discourse was ostensibly an effort to understand the "low," they argue that it was actually little more than an attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie to define themselves. Furthermore, in an overtly Freudian gesture, Stallybrass and White argue that the bourgeois classes suppressed their nefarious impulses and projected them on to the "low." The European subaltern was defined, therefore, in purely negative terms as what the bourgeoisie was not.

I want to posit that a similar, though certainly not identical, process was occurring in the Dutch East Indies. Indeed, as Stoler has argued regarding Foucault's History of Sexuality, the colonial experience, to which Foucault paid scant attention, was an integral part of this process of the European "high" discourse of self-definition.[13] To this end, I want to focus on the stubborn maintenance of the status of the bupati, or regent, by the Dutch in the face of nationalist disdain for the institution. First, it is useful to adumbrate the historical fashioning of the bupati by the Dutch without, however, ignoring the role of the nobility in the process.

The Colonial Refashioning of the Bupati

The Dutch made it their policy in Java to proceed with as little interference in local politics as possible. The status of the bupati was deliberately maintained in order that they could become the central administrative tool through which the Dutch extracted profits. They reasoned that the volkshoofd (traditional chief) would be able to maintain authority far more effectively than could be expected through any structural changes to the system. In the words of Sutherland:

> [The Dutch] insisted only that the Bupati acknowledge its suzerainty, abstain from political or trade relations with foreign powers, keep the peace, and collect and deliver the required produce. The pomp and ceremony of the native chiefs was retained, and they continued to live according to their own traditions.[14]

The bottom line for the Dutch East India Company was, indeed, the bottom line. Interference was avoided wherever possible.

When the activities of the company were taken over by the Dutch government in 1800, the general policy toward the regents was maintained. A committee looking into "Indian Commerce and Administration" found that export crops could best be grown under the influence of the regent. In maintaining their authority, the regents would remain loyal to the Dutch government while the populace would remain loyal to the regent; the Dutch, consequently, would avoid the need to set up its own elaborate administration.[15]

Eight years later, however, the authority of the regents was sharply curtailed under the reforms of Daendels, and Raffles after him. Daendels essentially reduced the regent to a subordinate, salaried official of the Dutch government. He brought about increased centralization, cut the revenue of the regents, and made it illegal for them to acquire extra income through taxes or "gifts." He placed heavy demands on the regents who, in turn, passed them onto the populace.[16]

The British interregnum in Java from 1811 to 1816 saw further reductions in the importance of the regent. Raffles, as governor-general of Java during that period, implemented reforms to reduce the distance between the state and society. Under his direction, an assistant resident and other lower-ranking officials would work directly with the populace, a move that flew in the face of the indirect methods of the Dutch.[17] As with the reforms of Daendels, the changes advocated by Raffles were never fully realized because of the brevity of his tenure. Nevertheless, between Daendels and Raffles, the reforms that were carried out did significantly affect the position of Dutch officials in Java.

When the Dutch returned, the position of the regent reverted back to near pre-Daendels importance. The Java War from 1825-30 dealt a devastating blow to the Netherlands and caused the Dutch to re-evaluate the regent's position.[18] Under the "Cultivation System," introduced in 1830 and made compulsory in 1834, the position of the regent as the direct head of all Javanese officials was restored.[19]

The Cultivation System was the brainchild of Van den Bosch who strongly advocated a return to the kind of regent who commanded respect from both Javanese and European administrators. They were accorded all the trappings of royalty they had previously enjoyed, including the right to demand services from villages and the restoration of their hereditary rights. The regents were then expected to ensure that the villages would participate in government cultivation projects. In the words of Van Neil, the regents were persuaded to cooperate "by applying both the stick and the carrot: prestige, profit, power, and physical persuasion were present in various degrees."[20]

Under this system, excesses on the part of the regents went unchecked. The burden of the system was passed on to the populace while the regents benefited from the unreasonable demands they often placed upon their subjects. The European administration in Java turned a blind eye to the regents' abuses of power as the regents' status climbed higher perhaps than ever before.[21] Two discourses regarding the role of the indigenous rulers were coming into conflict. The Dutch administrators felt they were preserving the traditional domain of indigenous rule while at the same time extracting profits through the maintenance of the system. From the Javanese side, however, the indigenous philosophies of power relations were put in jeopardy. The regent was in a position where he no longer could fulfill his end of the kawula-gusti relationship discussed above. Indeed, with the outside power of the Dutch backing him up, he no longer had to.

Soon, however, the regents once again found their power being dismantled as the Cultivation System was replaced by a putatively more ethical Agrarian Law. While their rights to services rendered by their subjects and to the land were being abolished, detailed descriptions of their job requirements were being formulated. At the same time, the regents were being forced to make increasingly unrealistic demands on their subjects.[22] The prestige of the priyayi was in a tailspin from which it would never wholly recover.[23]

A number of other events that would affect the priyayi were occurring during the second half of the nineteenth century. One of these was the increasing availability of European education to priyayi families. The Dutch were in a dilemma. On one hand, they were requiring higher levels of education in the administration: on the other, many were worried about the possible social consequences of too much native education. To protect the nobility of the regents, the Dutch separated them from all practical matters and essentially reduced their role to a symbolic one through which Dutch interests were promoted.[24] Practical matters were handled by the district chiefs (wedana), ministers (patih), and the regent's assistant.[25]

The nobility was rapidly losing whatever popularity it once commanded among the Javanese. Its members were increasingly being seen as puppets of the Dutch government, particularly by an emerging Western-educated class, many of whom, ironically, were of priyayi families.[26] A nationalist movement took root in Java at the dawn of the twentieth century, and the priyayi found themselves rapidly becoming a prime target for indigenous criticism toward the colonial government.

Although the role of the bupati did undergo significant transformations, this synopsis clearly points to a deliberate manipulation of its role at the hands of the colonizer. The Dutch, in as much as their rhetoric emphasized indigenous rule, were in the position of privilege that allowed them to define and redefine what that role should be. Throughout these changes, the Dutch maintained that they were simply trying to preserve the indigenous system of rule, and by the early twentieth century had, in effect, created a class of rulers who had become more extractive in their relationship toward their subjects, and at the same time demanded ever more deferential treatment from them. At this point I want to look at how the Javanese elite reacted to the changes imposed on them, emphasizing their contributions to the refashioning of "tradition."

Indigenous Responses

The Dutch intrusion on the indigenous methods of rule meant a sudden loss of absolute power for the bupati. Although the Dutch were keen to maintain the status of the bupati vis a vis their subjects, they forced them into the position of becoming a large cog in the colonial machine: in a sense turning them into tools of Dutch administration. Because the Dutch needed to maintain the legitimacy of the bupati in the eyes of their subjects, the trappings of royalty-the pomp and the ceremony-were retained. Indeed, the very absence of real political power caused the Javanese to turn increasingly to these outward displays of aristocracy.[27] A "Victorianization" of sorts occurred as the elite "further elaborate[d] already complex trappings of traditional power in a symbolic, indirect, and increasingly hollow assertion of political primacy."[28] Thus, we find the figure of the "hormat-crazy" regent that Minke encounters.

Hormat in its superficial forms mimicked, but did not reproduce, traditional ideas such as the kawula-gusti relationship discussed above. Up and down the ranks of the colonial civil service ran a sense of the necessity of devotion, or at least the display of it toward superiors. This devotion or, more appropriately, sycophancy, was more a manifestation of the dependence one had on a superior, rather than an attempt to achieve harmony within the kingdom or imitate a mystical union with the ultimate reality.[29] This sycophancy became increasingly elaborate and institutionalized during Dutch colonization as a result of the personal dependence on superiors.[30]

The Dutch placed themselves within this hierarchy, often demanding that the same deference be paid to them as one would pay a high-ranking Javanese official. This added to the resentment on the part of Western-educated officials. A Javanese official would often find that he was required to show deference toward those who would, in the absence of racial distinctions, be his social, intellectual, and political inferiors.[31] Although the government in Batavia opposed this and issued a number of circulars to that effect, the local Dutch administrators continued to demand deference.

Before proceeding further, it should be noted that indigenous responses to the Dutch refashioning of the regent were multifarious, even, as was noted above, within the Javanese aristocracy. The priyayi were divided into an old school, seeking to hang on to all the vestiges of power they could, and a group which came to be known as the "new priyayi," who despised the

traditional rulers for their complicity in the Dutch colonial project. The new priyayi attacked the arrogance and feudalism, as they often referred to it, of the traditional rulers. The question of language provides an illuminating example of this schism.

One of the most striking aspects of hormat was the use of a higher language, a form of deference still widespread in modern Java.[32] Javanese consists of two basic language levels. The levels differ from each other in both vocabulary and tone. Ngoko is the lower level. It is the language first learned by Javanese children and the one in which most Javanese think. Krama is considered to be much more refined and is the language of deference. A middle level, madya, is sometimes considered a separate level, but can also be seen as a less refined variant of krama.[33] To show even greater deference than allowed simply through krama, one may choose words from a more limited vocabulary of krama inggil (to indicate an even higher status of the person to or about whom one is speaking) and krama andhap (for elegant self-effacement).[34]

Madya had long been considered to be the krama of the uneducated commoners. One mark of "priyayiness" was the mastery of krama and the ability to control the use of speech levels to fit the situation. As Western education became increasingly available to the priyayi, Dutch emerged as the language of status for the educated. Many children of priyayi families found that the ability to speak Dutch opened many doors for advancement within the civil service. The result of this was an inability to speak krama among many of the younger priyayi.

The threat posed to krama by Dutch became a major concern of the more conservative priyayi. Madya was shunned with greater conviction, and the traditional elite attacked with more fervor the inability of other priyayi to speak krama. For the traditional elite, the ability to speak krama became the primary sign of "priyayiness." The use of madya to them was a sign of poor breeding. It became a rallying point-symbolic of the distance between them and the new elites.[35] Among the younger elites, Dutch was becoming increasingly fashionable, and the ability to speak it brought its own status.[36]

The nationalist movement, along with cries for independence, also solicited objections to the status-laden Javanese language. The creation in 1918 of Djawa Dipo, a group advocating the exclusive use of ngoko for all situations, was a manifestation of this.[37] Earlier, some advocates of krama as the language of all occasions had emerged, but their efforts went largely unnoticed. According to Tjokrosoedarmo, the central figure of the Djawa Dipo movement, ngoko was the language of one's inner thoughts whereas krama was a thing of the unenlightened past.[38] Javanese, however, has survived into the present with all the levels and nuances it had under the Dutch. Perhaps it was the availability of the neutral language of Indonesian which saved it from a harsher attack.[39]

Conclusion

With the recent emphasis on discursive hegemony in the colonial era, the pervasiveness of the influence of the colonizer has been, perhaps, somewhat exaggerated. No hegemony is total, and

despite fundamental alterations at every level of colonized society, the colonized always found discursive spaces in which they contested this hegemony, or in which they could temporarily tend to their own matters which lay beyond the pale of the colonial context. An Indonesian historian, Umar Kayam, has recently published a novel in which he explores the changing identities of a priyayi family as it moves from Dutch rule to political independence.[40] The colonial context in which this family lives clearly has a bearing on how they perceive themselves in the world. However, most of their time is spent attending to more cultural and personal matters that have little to do with that colonial context. This paper, one should bear in mind, is concerned primarily with the outward structural changes of elite indigenous institutions, and in this way is guilty of an overly pronounced emphasis on changes brought about by the colonizer.

Yet, the intrusion in and manipulation of, the role of the bupati by the Dutch points to the presence of a power discourse that must always win. Barred from participation in the official discourse about themselves, the bupati responded through other, even if not particularly noble, means. It was to them that the Dutch pointed in dismay when nationalists called for independence, claiming that the East Indies clearly remained incapable of self-rule. This claim echoed throughout the colonial world: a claim that the nationalists, having found their own discourse, would challenge along with all its contradictions and tautologies.

Notes

1 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Anak Semua Bangsa (Melaka, Malaysia: Wira Karya, 1982), 107-108.

2 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, This Earth of Mankind, trans.,Max Lane (New York: Avon Books, 1990), 121 - 123.

3 Jan Wisseman Christie, ***Raja and Rama: The Classical State in Early Java,***; Centers, Symbols, and Hierarchies, ed. Lorraine Gesick (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Program, 1983), 17-18.

4 Christie, 23.

5 The use of the word ***feudal***; in this context may be legitimately contested. I use it tn the sense that much early Indonesian nationalist writing uses it to designate undesirable aspects of ***traditional***; society.

6 Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1968), 16.

7 Moertono, 26. The wayang stories are also packed with examples of the total devotion expected

from the subject. During the royal audience scenes in particular one gets the sense of this from the elaborate response elicited by the king's enquiry into the subject's feelings upon receiving his summons.

8 Moertono, 94.

9 Moertono, 94.

10 John Pemberton, On the Subject of 'Java' (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

11 See in particular, Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prisons, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979), and ***Truth and Power,***; in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1927-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980): 108-133.

12 Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).

13 Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).

14 Sutherland, Making 7.

15 Leslie H. Palmier, ***The Javanese Nobility Under the Dutch,***; Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2, no.1: 210.

16 Palmier, 210-211.

17 Sutherland, Making 8.

18 Palmier, 214.

19 Palmier, 215.

20 Robert Van Neil, Java Under the Cultivation System (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1992), 96.

21 Palmier, 216

22 Palmier, 216.

23 The loss of prestige of the priyayi was also a function of the gradually widening definition of priyayi.

24 Pemberton provides a fascinating example of how the tradition of the ruler's circumambulation of the kingdom was reduced to a brief march down the road to meet the Resident. 61-63.

25 Sutherland, ***The Priyayi,***; 72.

26 Sutherland, ***The Priyayi,***; 73.

27 Sutherland, ***The Priyayi,***; 73.

28 J. Joseph Errington, Language and Social Change in Java (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No. 65, 1985), 2.

29 Although it probably would be rather idealistic to propose that this was usually the case in precolonial times.

30 Sutherland, Making 37.

31 Sutherland, Making 37.

32 In fact, high Javanese may be more widely spoken now than ever. See James T. Siegel, Solo in the New Order: Language and Hierarchy in an Indonesian City (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 20.

33 Javanese is frequently said to have three basic levels. For instance see Ward Keeler, Javanese: A Cultural Approach (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No. 69, 1984), xviii - xix; and Geertz, 248 - 60. For Madya as a form of krama, see Siegel, 15, 21.

34 Krama inggil, meaning ***high krama***; is often incorrectly defined as simply a more refined level. Keeler explains these different levels quite clearly, xviii - xix.

35 Errington 48-49.

36 Anderson, ***Languages of Indonesian Politics***; 132.

37 Errington 49.

38 Anderson, ***Politics of Language and Javanese Culture***; 216.

39 Anderson, ***Politics of Language and Javanese Culture***; 218.

40 Umar Kayam, Para Priyayi (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1993).

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A Journal of the Southeast Asian Studies Student Association
Vol 2, No. 1 **Spring 1998**

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Damar in the Pasar of Manado, North Sulawesi

A Search for Resins in an Indonesian Market

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Notes

In the summer of 1997 I conducted a short research project which consisted of the collection of commercial tree resins[1] (damar) in the markets (pasar) of Manado, North Sulawesi, Indonesia. The objective of the study was simply to determine the local name(s) (Indonesian as well as local), intended use(s), and perceived source(s) (botanical, geographic and/or ethnic locality) of each specimen. Upon successfully completing that phase of the project, I returned to the University of Hawai'i at Manoa where I conducted a follow-up library investigation of the data I had gathered. Results from both phases of this on-going research are provided here together with a synthesized version of my fieldnotes.

Introduction

As raw materials, resins have played a role in most cultures.[2] This is true for three principle reasons. First, they occur in a diversity of enviroments and are, therefore, accessible to the many people who use them. Second, on the whole, they travel and preserve well. The same properties which allow them to protect plants also allow them to be packaged and transported long distances without harmful effects. The third and most important reason for their ubiquity in the

material culture of the world is their extensive array of functional attributes. Adhesiveness, insolubility in water, inflammability, healing and poisoning properties, fragrance, plasticity, vitreosity, colorability, and pigment mediability are qualities that apply, to a greater or lesser degree, to all resins.[3] "Taken altogether, the employment of resinous substances has been exceedingly varied and extensive from time immemorial."[4] Thus, this class of raw materials is deserving of far more attention than it has received in the anthropological literature.

The western third of the vast and diverse floral region known as Malesia,[5] situated on the Sunda Shelf and including the major landmasses of Sumatra, Malaysia, Borneo, and Java, houses a rich dipterocarp tropical rainforest which is particularly abundant in resiniferous trees. Resins have long been known to be a significant resource there.[6] Intra-regional trade in resins, collectively referred to as damar, may date back to Neolithic times.[7] Recent historical and anthropological studies have gone on to suggest that an interdependence based on trade of certain resins between interior and coastal entrepôt settlements may have even contributed to the development of complex societies in Southeast Asia. As a resource, resins were not only valued by the locals, but also by peoples living some distance away. The Chinese in particular were willing to pay high prices for many kinds of aromatics and drugs, such as frankincense, asafoetida, benzoin, and gaharuwood (which in good-quality pieces contains more resin than wood).[8]

Although there is only scant evidence in the Chinese and Arabic sources concerning either volume or the profitability of the trade in damar before the sixteenth century arrival of the Europeans to Southeast Asian waters, it is clear that damar was in great and constant demand throughout Asia and that trade in them remained highly lucrative even at times when political and economic circumstances at one or more points in the Asian trading network were adverse.

A major shortcoming of ancient texts which contain data concerning Southeast Asia and its people, and recently written histories based on those texts, is that they often neglect, due to their reliance on second or third-hand reports, a view of certain processes from the local perspective. Although there are references in the ethnographic literature to resin use in many regional contexts, the data are fragmented and dispersed.[9] Therefore, if further progress is to be made, an investigation which focuses on contemporary resin use in Southeast Asia is required.

Damar in the Pasar: Method in Manado

While any successful ethnological study of a culture needs to focus in particular on one or a few aspects of that culture, often the focus is on a domain of culture (kinship or political economy) which is likely to be central to its social organization. The study of resins in the material culture of an area offers a means of reflecting other aspects of culture: for example, the economic and symbolic. Any adequate investigation of resin use--in trade, traditional medicine, ceremony and asssociated ideology--inevitably requires a knowledge of the larger system within which these processes occur. As a research topic, the pasar provides valuable access to a number of issues relating to the local system: the structure of goods offered, the typology of traders, the enterprises, the customers, even the economic and social organization of trading, market prices,

credits, selling and buying strategies, the communicative and cultural aspects of the market-day, and so forth. For the purposes of this study, which focuses more on the identification and uses of resins than on markets, the pasar provided a uniquely local environment for the collection of cultural data.

My project, specifically, was to collect a set of damar specimens in the pasar of Manado. Each item in the collection was to be labeled with its local name(s), intended use(s), and perceived source(s). A condensed version of my fieldnotes are provided below. They are based entirely on information gathered in the pasar of Manado. Information gathered from a post-field library investigation has also been provided so as to relate the data to a wider ecological, cultural and historical context. Where the name of a substance is given in parentheses, this represents the local (i.e., Malay and/or Minahasan) word for the substance (as opposed to the standard Indonesian).

Results

Pasar Ikan Tua

Damar dari Lolak

description: a long (16in.) stick of hard, dark resin wrapped in a yellow coconut leaf.
use: For calking boats.[10] The damar is mixed with coconut oil until it becomes a gel and is used to fill seams between planks of wooden boats
source: Gathered in the village of Lolak[11] by local farmers.
price: Rp 250 per stick.

Damar Kayu Ting

description: Redish oleo-resin.
use: For tanning nets. White nets are dyed red so that fish will not see them, thus tricking the fish to swim into the net.
source: From bark of the *kayu ting* tree which grows along the coast.
price: Rp 250 per stick.

The substance is most likely a product of mangrove swamps which occur along the shoreline. Mangroves have long been known as a source of tanning materials in western Malesia. Burkill mentions several species of tree producing a resinous bark used for tanning fishing-nets. The bark of Eugenia palembanica, for example, was used for tanning nets and caulking boats in Penang, and the oleo-resin minyak keruing was used throughout Malaya (in combination with Melaleuca bark) for caulking boats, coating wood (as protection from weather), making torches, and for medicinal purposes.[12]

Damar Turi

Description: Opaque gummy resin.
use: For strengthening fishing nets. Fishing nets are coated directly with the damar with resists deterioration and increases the net's durability.
source: From the bark of turi tree (pohon turi)
price: Rp 250 per piece.

Pasar Bersehati

Damar Kuning
description: A clear/yellow piece of glass-like resin containing several impurities.
use: (1) to fasten knife blades onto wooden handles, (2) to coat and seal earthenware pots,[13] and (3) as an *obat* (traditional medicine) to treat "allergies."
source: Gathered in Gorontalo[14] by local farmers.
price: Rp 250 per piece.

For gluing surfaces together, a range of plant substances have similar adhering properties as some resins and are sometimes avaiable and used by preindustrial peoples; however, except for latex, these alternatives are water-soluble (as opposed to resins which are not). Resins are used as a prime material for hafting points and blades,[15] and for gluing pottery appliques[16] in many parts of the world, including Southeast Asia. They have also been used to coat, seal, and waterproof containers of all kinds, including earthenware pots, in Europe,[17] Egypt,[18] North America,[19] South America,[20] and Southeast Asia.[21] Damar has long been used throughout the Malay world as an adhesive agent in the making of kris daggers, and is often included as part of the rituals and complex mystical ideology associated with the kris and the kris-making ceremony.[22]

Toko Utama

Damar Mata Kucing (Damar Kuning)
description: Small, yellow pieces of fossilized resin, sold in packets (with some sediment).
use: An obat (traditional medicine) to relieve pain after childbirth. source: Gathered by "Dayak people" in East Kalimantan.
price: Rp 100 per packet.

Damar mata kucing, literally translated as "cat's eye resin" is a clear to yellow crystalline resin produced by certain dipterocarp species such as Hopea (including H. dryobalanoindes Miq. [Malaysia, Sumatra, Borneo] and H. celebica Burck. [Sulawesi]) and Shorea (including S. javanica K. and V. [Sumatra], S. lamallata Foxw. [Malaysia, Sumatra, Borneo], S. virescens Parijs [Borneo, the Philippines], S. retinodes Sloot. [Sumatra], S. guiso (Blco) Bl. [Thailand, Malaysia, Sumatra, Borneo, the Philippines] and S. robusta Gaertn. f. [India]). It is obtained by tapping the tree and is mostly produced in South and West Sumatra and West Kalimantan. In South Sumatra, damar mata kucing is often obtained from Shorea javanica agroforests (kebun damar). According to Gimlette and Thompson, damar mata kucing is used as a treatment for loss of virility among Malays and also as a topical in the early stages of leprosy. The damar is

pounded and mixed with coconut oil before it is rubbed into the patient's skin.[23]

Jadam (Damar Hitam)
description: Small, dark pieces of glass-like resin sold in packets.
use: An obat (traditional medicine) in the treatment of certain allergies.
source: Saudi Arabia.
price: Rp 100 per packet.

Jadam is an extract of Aloe vera (Linn., var. chinensis): an herb of African origin which spread by cultivation throughout the tropics. According to Burkill, "the Malays rely for medicine on the imported extract" rather than on the cultivated plant. It is also known as jadam arab, in confusion with myrrh. [24] The name clearly indicates the source, as the extract is carried eastward, and probably has been so carried through the whole period over which Persian and Arab dhows have sailed the Indian Ocean. Laufer in his Sino-iranica explains how the Chinese, during the Tang Dynasty (618-907 C.E.), received both aloe-extracts and myrrh via western Malesia and erroneously assumed that both were produced in western Malesia.[25] Jadam is noted as being used in Malaysia to treat wounds and swelling of the abdomen after "confinement." In Ambon it is mixed with sugar and taken for asthma; for coughs, poulticing burns and on the forehead for headache in Java; in India for poulticing boils; and in the Philippines it is applied to contusions. M. Grieve notes in A Modern Herbal that preparations of aloes (e.g., jadam) are rarely prescribed alone, but rather require the addition of carminatives to moderate the tendency to "griping."[26] Gimlette and Thompson note several preparations of jadam in which asafoetida [27] and sandal-wood are used.

Inggu (Tai Setan)
description: Small, tears of reddish-brown, strong-smelling resin.
use: An obat (traditional medicine) for the treatment of (1) high blood pressure in men, (2) mata tinggi (epilepsy?) in children below the age of five (anak balita[28]), and (3) nuisancing evil spirits (burned as a fumigant).
source: India, from pohon inggu (inggu tree).
price: Rp 2000 a portion.

According to Gimlette's Dictionary of Malayan Medicine, Inggu (sometimes hinggu[29]) is the Malay word used to refer to asafoetida, a fetid oleo-gum resin obtained from the roots of plants of the Ferula family which are indigenous to "Persia, Afghanistan, and the Punjab." The word "inggu" comes from the Persian word "anghozeh," or as Wolters suggests, from the Iranian word "angu" or "angwa,"[30] and in Hindi it is often referred to as "hing." The English word "asafoetida" is derived from the latinized form of the Persian "aza" or mastic plus "foetida" which is the feminized form of "foetidus," meaning ill-smelling or stinking. In Manado, as in many other parts of the Malay world, it has acquried the name "tai setan" (devils dung). Gimlette notes that "the product is imported into Malaya via Bombay in masses composed of dull-yellow tears set in a darker-colored softer gum resin...the medicinal properties depend upon the presence of a volatile oil which contains oil of garlic...in English medicine asafoetida is prescribed as an adjunct to aloes and as a stimulant to the intestinal muscles." Gimlette writes that the Malays

give inggu in pill form (coated with flour to mask its foul taste) for amenorrhoea which is associated with chronic constipation, and as a the purgative given for megrim. For sakit pedas hati (heartburn), inggu is mixed with air limau nipis, the juice of the common, green, thin-skinned lime. For external uses, it is combined with cloves and yellow sandalwood in a paste used to induce sweating in fevers. It is also applied to the gums for aching teeth accompanied with bleeding and suppuration.[31]

Kemenyan Api (Kamania)

Grade A
description: Dark grey, rock-shape with impurities and sediment.
use: (1) Catholic church ceremonies: (a) in the remembrance of the birth of Jesus Christ, (b) in funerals and other rituals honoring the dead. (2) Burned in the mesjid (mosque) before prayer.
source: Sumatra
price: Rp 1500 per piece.

Grade B
description: Similar to Grade A but more glassy and of a lighter color.
use: Same as Grade A but less formal due to inferior quality
source: Sumatra
price: Rp 1000 per piece

Grade C
description: Whitish tears embedded in a matrix of reddish-brown resin. [32]
use: By "opo-opo" (indigenous "priests" or "shaman") to create an environment conductive to "spiritual activity".
source: Sumatra
price: Rp 750 a packet.

All three of these substances I believe to be benzoin, a balsam obtained from trees of the genus Styrax. There are two types of benzoin in Southeast Asian commerce: Siam benzoin from S. tonkinensis and Sumatra benzoin from S. benzoin. Burkill notes that Sumatra benzoin is divided by gatherers into three grades and mentions a kind which when broken glistens more than the others and is less scented, known as "Penang benzoin" (grade B), and another kind called "Palembang benzoin."[33] In Indonesia, Sumatra benzoin is called frankincense, although in English this term is usually taken to mean the resinous exudate from Boswellia spp. of Arabia and Africa. Wolters suggests that by about 500 C.E. western Indonesian benzoin was regarded in southern China as a substitute for myrrh (Commiphora mukul Engl.),[34] known in Sanskrit as guggulu and in the classical world as bdellium. A study of the use and trade in the ancient old world of frankincense and myrrh highlights the important role these resins have played in religious ceremonies around the world. Valued as precious commodities, they were offered as gifts to honored personages: in the Bible frankincense and myrrh were two of the gifts the wise men of the East brought to the infant Jesus.

In association with concepts of purity and pollution, incense resins play a major role in purification rites and customs of nearly all religious practices. Incense smoke is used for these purposes because of the transforming powers of fire, as well as the seemingly purificatory powers of sweet smells. Because its fragrance is thought to be pleasing to the gods, incense has played an important role in worship and is used in prayer, intercession, or purification ceremonies. In Manado/Minahasa, local opo-opo use "Grade C" kemenyan to attract the attention of, or establish a connection with, a deity and also to exorcise evil or harmful forces. The red color of the incense is reportedly what gives it its "magical" power. Based on what what I heard in the markets and elsewhere in Manado/Minahasa, the mystical opo-opo rituals are still widely practiced throughout Minahasa, particularly in the area of Tombulu.[35] In Minahasa, the local shaman can be recognized by the red sashes worn around their waist. The sympathetic practice of attributing spiritual "potency" to the color red in Minahasa is an interesting subject worthy of follow-up investigation. It is interesting to note also that in Manado, which is predominantly Christian, the "same" kinds of resin are used in Catholic, Muslim, Chinese Buddhist/ Confucian/Taoist, and indigenous religious practices, often in similar application (death rites and/or ancestor worship).

Pasar Touminting and Pasar Paal II

Kemenyan Api (Kamania)
description: Same as Grades B and C from Toko Utama [36] but smaller portions.
price: Rp 250 a packet.

Damar Kuning
description: Same as *damar kuning* found in *Pasar Bersehati*.
price: Rp250 a packet.

Dupa Mekah
description: Small, granular pieces of amber-colored resin.
use:As incense with no apparent ceremonial purpose.
source: Originally from Mecca. [37]
price: Rp500 a packet.

Toko Besi (Iron Shops) in Tomohon and Manado

Damar Batu
description: An orange-colored, stoned-shaped resin, solid (hard) with some residue.
use: For making varnish and for soldering and metallurgy.
source: Sumatra.
price: Rp750/oz.

Most of the resin used for varnish making in Indonesia is obtained from Pinus mekusii, which grows in abundance all-over North Sulawesi. The pine resin is usually collected and shipped to Java for processing, and local use of it is minimal. Some local use of "raw" resin as varnish

occurs in Minahasa, such as with this "damar batu" found in the iron shops. This kind of resin is used in conjunction with processed varnishes in cottage furniture industries found in Minahasan villages, such as Lelem, where it is use to cover nail holes/heads and gaps in newly built wooden furniture. In Central Asia,[38] Central America, and elsewhere resin has been used as a flux in metal-working although this would be more because it is an organic substance that can react with oxides that form on the surface of metals when heated.

Conclusion

Most of the data gathered in the pasar of Manado concerning the names, uses, and sources of certain resins seems to correlate with information found in other textual sources concerning western Malesia. It should be noted, however, that North Sulawesi is not part of the same botanical zone (i.e., western Malesia), but rather lies to the east of the Wallace Line, an imaginary border which marks a clear distinction between the respective flora and fauna. Most of the resins I found were not produced in North Sulawesi; rather they came to the area from outside sources. The presence of these resins seems to suggest the existance of what once must have been a very active inter-island trade in resins and resin culture which seems to have declined with the onset of "modern" technology and development. It seemed more likely that I would find damar from Pinus merkusii, which grows in abundance in North Sulawesi and is often exploited by Javanese businessmen who extract it via local farmers and ship it to cities in Java for processing to make varnish and paints. A study of these historic and present-day trade links and trading networks would certainly provide a fascinating study of inter-state activity and how culture spreads.

The most-commonly reported use for resins in Manado was undoubtedly as an obat in the "traditional" medicine system (obat makatana). Apparently, the obat makatana system employs many resins and other tree "exudates" which are not sold in markets but, rather, are obtained directly from the botanical source. The collection and use of commercial and non-commercial resins in Minahasa, particularly as medicinal technologies, is something I would like to explore more deeply in the future. Also, a study which compares the functional properties and attributes of resins in nature to their corresponding uses by humans would be an interesting topic for study as well. For instance, one or more of the "non-commercial" plant exudates in Minahasa can be used to heal wounds or punctures in human skin much like the resin "heals" the "wound" inflicted by tappers to the bark (kulit) of a tree. This stretching analogous investigation might also consider the role of resins in the marketplace (both local and global) which have continually "resisted deterioration" in terms of demand through the millenia, much like they "resist decomposition" in nature.

The most fascinating and, by far, the most confusing aspect of resins concerns the issue of names, terms, and classification. The long commercial history of resins in the Malay world resulted in long-distance adulteration and corruption of terms and, sometimes, of the products themselves. This in turn led to frequent mis-naming and false identification of substances: sometimes for the sake of making a sale, other times to make up for depleted (or no longer available) sources.

A good example of the general confusion that can arise when talking about resins and their names in different places can be found in O.W. Wolters monumental work on early Indonesian commerce.[39] In his chapter on "pine resin," I believe that Wolters was mistaken when he said that resin from Pinus merkusii was substituted for frankincense (from Boswellia spp.) in trade with China. He is almost certainly correct in asserting that substance a was substituded for substance b, and that these were referred to as "pine fragrance" and "frankincense," respectively. There is very little evidence, however, supporting the use of Pinus mekusii resin as incense anywhere. I believe that the "pine fragrance" the Chinese (and Wolters) were referring to was, in fact, benzoin which is obtained from Styrax spp. trees in Sumatra (and "Siam"/Laos), not from pine trees. Furthermore, his assertion that benzoin may have been used as a substitute/ replacement for "guggulu" or myrrh (from Commiphora spp) may be slightly mistaken as well, mainly because of the names. "Guggulu" is not myrrh but, rather, a type of frankincense which in India is known as "salai guggul" (from the Boswellia serrata Roxb.). Basically, Wolters was right about the fact that frankincense and myrrh (from Commiphora mukul Engl.) were substituted with western Indonesian substances, but the term "guggulu" should be applied to frankincense, not myrrh, and the source of the "pine fragrance" was not a Pinus (which grows in much more abundance in eastern Indonesia) but perhaps a Styrax (which is found in western Malesia).

I may be guilty of contributing somewhat to this confusion with my less-than-precise use of the term "damar" (as a catch-all term for resins of the Malay world). Nevertheless, the thought of producing a comprehensive study which aims to clarify the general confusion and lack of specificity involved in dealing with substances such as frankencense, myrrh, benzoin, pine resin, gaharu, aloes, etc., is something that deserves consideration, and is a topic that I intend to continue to pursue.

Notes

1 The idea to look for tree "exudates" in the pasar of Manado came from Dr. Michael R. Dove who served as research advisor to the project and provided the funds with which the fieldwork was carried out.

2 Thomas Hedley Barry, Natural Varnish Resins (London: Ernest Benn, 1932); F.N. Howes, Vegetable Gums and Resins (Waltham, Mass: Chronica Botanica, 1949); Ernest J. Parry, Gums and Resins: Their Occurrence, Properties and Uses (London: Pitmann, 1920).

3 Rosemary Gianno, Semelai Culture and Resin Technology (New Haven: The Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1990).

4 Karl Dieterich, Analysis of Resins, Balsams, and Gum Resins, and Their Chemistry and

Pharmocognosis: For the Use of the Scientific and Technical Research Chemist (London: Scott, Greenwood, 1901), 23.

5 I.H. Burkhill, A Dictionary of the Economic products of the Malay Peninsula, 2d ed. (Kuala Lumpur: The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 1966).(London: Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1935); Museum voor Technische en Handlelsbotanie, Bogor, Java). K. Heyne, De Nuttige Planten van Nederlandsch Indie (Batavia:Ruygrok, 2 ed. 3 vols. 1927): D.G. Moon, "Development of Naval Stores and Pulpwood Supplied from Pinus Mercusii of Northern Sumatra" in Science and Scientists in the Netherlands Indies, eds, P. Honig and F. Verdoorn (New York: Board of the Netherland Indies, Surinam and Curacao, 1945).

6 Malesia is a plant-geographical term developed to cover the Malay Archipelago, the southern portion of the Malay Peninsula, New Guinea, and, to a lesser extent, the Solomon Island. see M. Jacobs, "Botanical Panorama of the Malesian Archipelago (Vasular Plants)" in Natural Resources of Humid Tropical Asia (Paris: UNESCO, 1974): 263-9.

7 F.L. Dunn, Rain-Forest Collectors and Traders: A Study of Resource Utilization in Modern and Ancient Malaya, Monographs of the Malysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1975), 120-37.

8 Paul Wheatley, "Geographical Notes on Some Commodities Involved in Sung Maritime Trade," Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society: 32.2, 1959, 5-13; F. Hirth and W. W. Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Entitled Chu-Fan chi (New York: Paragon, 1966).

9 H.N. Ridley, "Dammar and Wood Oil", Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 34 (1900) 89-94; Walter William Skeat and C. Otto Blagden, Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula (London: Macmillan, 2 vols. 1906); Nicholas N. Dodge, "The Malay-Aborigine Nexus Under Malay Rule", Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde, 137, no. 1 (1982): 1-16.

10 Resins have been used to seal canoes and ocean-going wooden ships for centuries in many parts of the world, including Southeast Asia. See L. Basch and H. Frost, "Another Punic Wreck in Sicily: Its Ram," International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 4, (1975): 201-28; Harry A. Franck, East of Siam: Ramblings in the Five Divisions of French Indo-China (New York: Century, 1926), 98; Erna Gunther, Ethnobotany of Western Washington: The Knowledge and Use of Indigenous Plants by Native Americans (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973), 17; Russell Meiggs, Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 467-71; G.H. Monod, Le Cambodgien (Paris: Larose, 1931) 54-55; Lucien de Reinach, Le Laos (Paris: A. Charles, 1901), 50; Paul Wheatley, The Golden Khersonese: Studies in the Historical Geography of the Malay Peninsula Before A.D. 1500 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1961), 322; John White, A Voyage to Cochin China (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1824; reprint, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972), 56-57.

11 Lolak is located in the neighboring Bolaang Mongondow regency.

12 Burkill, Dictionary of Economic Products , 838-39, 972.

13 In Minahasa, earthenware pots made from tanah liat clay (tana lilin in Manado Malay/ Minahasan) are produced in the village of Rembokan, located between Lake Tondano and Tomohon. In the final stages of the pot-making process damar is used to provide a waterproof coat and seal. This small production center and its traditional resin technology provides an interesting topic for future investigation.

14 Gorontalo is the name of the western-most regency in North Sulawesi. Various types of damar, in particular the resin from the conifer Agathis, are produced there,

15 Lewis R. Binford, "An Alyawara Day: Flour, Spinifex Gum, and Shifting Perspectives," Journal of Anthropological Research 40 (1984): 157-82; J.G.D. Clark, Prehistoric Europe: The Economic Basis (London: Methuen, 1952), 110; G.B. Gardner, Kris and Other Malay Weapons (Singapore: Progressive Publishing, 1936); Alfred Lucas, Ancient Egyptian Materials and Industries (London: E. Arnold, 1962), 12; Jens Yde, Material Culture of the Waiwai (Copenhagen: Nationalmuseets Skrifter, 1965), 78, 107.

16 Clark, Prehistoric Europe, 208.

17 Daniele Arroba, "Analisi Pollinica di una Resina Fossile Rinvenuta in un Dolia Romano," Pollen et Spores 18 (1976): 385-93; Clark, Prehistoric Europe, 276.

18 Lucas, Ancient Egyptian Materials and Industries, 27.

19 Lydia Wyckoff, "Hopi Ceramics of the Third Mesa: A Study of the Ceramic Domain" (Ph. D. diss., Yale University, 1985).

20 Warren R. DeBoer and Donald W. Lathrap, "The Making and Breaking of Shipobo Conibo Ceramics," in Ethnoarchaeology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 120; Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Nambicuara," in Handbook of South American Indians (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1948), 365; S. Linne, The Technique of South American Ceramics (Gotesborgs: Flanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1925), 148-58; Yde, Material Culture of the Waiwai, 177, 182.

21 H. D. Conklin, Ethnographic Atlas of Ifugao (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 31-32; Roy F. Ellen and I. C. Glover, "Pottery Manufacture and Trade in the Central Moluccas, Indonesia: The Modern Situation and the Historical Implications," Man 9, no. 3 (1974): 357-8; Ivor H. N. Evans, "Bajau Pottery," Sarawak Museum Journal 6 (1955): 287-300; George M. Foster, "Resin Coated Pottery in the Philippines," American Anthropologist 58 (1956): 732-33; William A. Longcare, "Kalinga Pottery: An Ethnoarchaeological Study," in Patterns of the Past: Studies in Honor of David Clarke (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 49-66;

Theodore Stern, "Resin-Glazed Pottery in the Chin Hills, Burma," American Anthropologist 59, no. 4, (1957): 711-12.

22 G.B.Gardner, Kris and Other Malay Weapons, 85.

23 This method of preparation was often mentioned by those whom I had questioned in Manado. J.D. Gimlette, A Dictionary of Malayan Medicine (London: OxfordUniversity Press, 1939), 48.

24 Burkill, Dictionary of Economic Forest Products, 108-9.

25 Berthold Laufer, Sino-Iranica: Chinese Contributions to the History of Civilizations in Ancient Iran (Field Museum of Natural History, Publ. 201. Anthropological Series, 15, no. 3, 1919), 480; also see O.W. Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967)141-42.

26 M. Grieve, A Modern Herbal: The Medicinal, Culinary, Cosmetic and Economic Properties, Cultivation and Folk-Lore of Herbs, Fungi, Shrubs and Trees With all their Modern Scientific Uses (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), 29.

27 This was also found in the same store which sold me the jadam.

28 The term "anak balita" is an Indonesian acronym for children (anak) "di bawa lima tahun" (lit. "under five years").

29 This word is used in West Java and other areas.

30 Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce, 136-37.

31 Gimlette, 48.

32 According to the shop owner from whom I purchased it, this type of resin is treated with a chemical additive to produce a reddish tint.

33 Burkill, Dictionary of Economic Products, 2102.

34 Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce, 111-127.

35 On July 13, 1997, I conducted an interview with the head of the provincial forestry department in Teling, Manado. He provided a detailed description of the opo-opo rituals that occur in Minahasa.

36 The owner of Toko Utama is the sole supplier of kemenyan and damar mata kucing in Manado.

37 The man who sold it to me said he got it from a friend who had brought it to Indonesia upon his return from haj (pilgimage to Mecca).

38 Laufer, Sino-Iranica, 340.

39 Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce.

Explorations
in
Southeast Asian Studies
A Journal of the Southeast Asian Studies Student Association
Vol 2, No. 1 **Spring 1998**

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From "You, Toradja" to "We Toraya":

Ethnicity in the Making

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Notes

Introduction

A hundred years ago, the Toraja people did not exist. "Toraja" was merely a derogatory term applied by the Bugis and Makassarese living in the lowlands of the southwest peninsula of Sulawesi (then called Celebes) to any of the many different peoples living in the mountainous regions of the peninsula and central Sulawesi. Today, Tana Toraja (Toraja Land) is an administrative district in the province of South Sulawesi, the people living there comprise one of the four official suku bangsa (ethnic groups) of the peninsula, and the Toraja are celebrated (at least amongst anthropologists, tourists, and television crews) for their fantastic architecture and elaborate funerals. People who have been born in the area of Tana Toraja now call themselves Toraja, bringing this identity with them in their migrations throughout Indonesia and the rest of the world.

This paper is an attempt to trace how a pejorative turned into a people. There are no primordial justifications for the Toraja to have come into being as a people; theories of how ethnicities arise by contrast to obnoxious others are only a little better fit. Nevertheless, it is clear that today the

imposed identity has become one which many people born in Tana Toraja use. I hope to show how this has come about by contrasting the particulars of the Toraja case against various theories of ethnic construction (primordial; ascribed; relational alterity). In so doing, I find no definition of "ethnicity" or "ethnic group" by which I can abide. Though I use these terms rather freely, I am hesitant to draw lines around what can and cannot be considered ethnic. I might say that ethnicity is an identity which incorporates a group larger than a family or clan and which is seen by the people involved as including some commonalties. In Toraja this sense of commonalty might never have come about if not for the arbitrary territorial and political distinction imposed by outsiders.

The particulars begin in the first section of this paper, "You, Toradja", which presents some history of the idea of Toraja.[1] This ranges from lowland/highland relationships in the seventeenth century to Dutch administrative and linguistic categorizations at the beginning of the twentieth century. The second part, "We, Toraja?," looks more closely at what kinds of identities (including family, class, and religious affiliations) were most salient for the people living in what is now Toraja Land, reflecting on some of the conflicts such identities had with the imposed one of being Toraja. The third section, "We Toraya...," shows how being Toraja has crystallized as a tool and an ethnic identity for people over the last few decades. Out-migration, tourism, and being seen as subjects of ethnographic study have all contributed to a new self-consciousness as Toraja. The remarkable flexibility and savvy many Toraja have shown in negotiating this new identity with older, still meaningful ones will become particularly apparent. By the end of the paper I will have presented one account of how Toraja has come to be constructed. The ambiguities and contradictions of this story point towards the only theoretical position I find acceptable: one which assumes no single identity, ethnic or otherwise, in any individual or group, but, rather, a multiplicity of constantly shifting interactions amongst various possible identities and against the expectations of others.

You, Toradja

A hundred years ago, no one could have predicted that someday an ethnic group called Toraja would form from the highlanders of south and central Sulawesi. None of Geertz's oft-quoted givens of blood ties, race, language, religion, region, or custom could be applied to any group larger than a village.[2] There were no fixed identities other than family; the rest of the "givens" were highly adaptable to changing circumstances. The Sulawesi highlands were and remain remarkable for their extraordinary diversity. Thousands of hamlets, including groups of hunter-gatherers, swidden farmers, and wet-rice agriculturists, were scattered about the mountains: barely accessible to one another. Dialects were plentiful: some barely mutually intelligible just a few villages away. Linguists continue to argue over how many distinct languages exist in the area.[3] Although turn of the century ethnographers attempted to type groups by physical appearance, differences were so vague and overlapping that their efforts at racial demarcation had to be given up. Religion varied from a miscellany of animist practices to Islamic and Christian groups. Most significantly, the whole area was divided into adat communities.[4] Adat, or local customs, included ceremonies, costume, sexual practices, inheritance patterns, customary law, land sharing, architecture, and so on, and differed widely from village to village.

Each village stood alone, with ties between villages based on marriage and reciprocity between kin. Neighbors from nearby villages without such binding ties were often feared as raiders and headhunters.

As the Indonesian government based their smaller administrative districts, lembang upon the indigenous adat territories, these autonomous communities have maintained definition until today. Tana Toraja alone has 65 lembang. In 1978, a student in Bandung, Java, referring to himself as a "son of Tana Toraja," noted the problems in speaking about Toraja as a whole, when "social groups are based on families or kinship, inhabiting certain areas, and where one group and the next have a different adat and social structure. For example, we can see that there are several villages that claim the existence of a noble rank, commoners, and slaves. But in other areas (villages), such ranks are not known, or have a different status."[5]

In such a situation of extreme diversity, Geertz's givens could at best only apply to each adat community, which in many cases included just one or two villages. A primordial argument could then be made for there being hundreds of ethnic groups in the Sulawesi highlands, rather than the few now officially recognized. The frustration of Western scholars in attempting to define groups in such a situation is reflected in historian Henley's derogatory reference to central Sulawesi as a "patchwork of hitherto subordinate or entirely irrelevant ethnicities."[6] Each small community did (and still does) refer to itself as "To'"(a people), usually followed by the name of the ancestor who founded the village. Definitions of clan and ethnic group, if they are to mean anything, have to operate on different levels. An ethnic group must be an umbrella bringing together smaller groups, such as families. If, as Keyes maintains, ethnicity "derives from a cultural interpretation of descent" then the Toraja never would have come to be seen as a group because descent was not generalized to include people outside of family trees.[7] Even relatives could not take their family ties for granted; they had to be maintained through ongoing, sometimes onerous, reciprocal duties.[8]

Though lacking a uniting political structure which might have, as Weber puts it, inspired a belief in common ethnicity, there was one broad demarcation between people: lowlanders and highlanders.[9] This rough division is one which occurs throughout Southeast Asia. Generally, lowlanders have more arable land, larger settled populations relying on wet rice agriculture, and more hierarchical social structures, including kingdoms, than highlanders. Throughout much of Indonesia, it is the lowlanders who have converted to Islam while highlanders have retained animist and Hindu traditions or become Christian.

In the southwest peninsula of Sulawesi there were two lowland kingdoms. The Bugis, famous sailors and traders (or rapacious pirates and slavers from a highland perspective), inhabited the east coast and northern part of the west coast of the peninsula, while the Makassar were in the south end and west coast. These two kingdoms surrounded the lower end of the mountain range on three sides. Over the centuries both kingdoms periodically invaded the nearby highland communities. Through contact by trade and attempts to mollify various kings, the southern mountain communities (such as those around the Sa'dan river) came to more closely resemble these lowland kingdoms in some respects than did the communities further north. Like the

lowlanders, they engaged in wet-rice agriculture and were stratified into a three-tiered social system of nobles, commoners and slaves. Sometimes they raided villages further up in the highlands. Their nobles often intermarried with the Bugis and Makassar, paid tribute to their kings, sometimes converted to Islam, and learned to read and write by importing lowland tutors. But each family head did these things on his own; villages rarely banded together either for trade or to defend themselves against lowlanders.

Any demarcation between the lowland kingdoms and the southern mountain communities is muddied by the tendency amongst Indonesians to characterize people according to lifestyle rather than by innate characteristics. This is also common throughout Southeast Asia. As Leach argued, two north-east Burmese peoples (Shan and Kachin) who had been classed as racially (read "ethnically"[10]) separate should be considered the same people who use different names depending upon circumstance.[11] The Kachin/Shan identity shifted according to location of residance (highlands or lowlands), political structure, and agriculture system. For example, a Kachin who gained wealth, moved downhill, became more autocratic, and practiced Buddhism would then be known as Shan. Similarly, attempts to define the Bugis separately from their highland neighbors is complicated when highlanders who convert to Islam are said to become Bugis; and Bugis who move to the mountains become Toraja. Children from other areas were readily adopted and even slaves taken in war could eventually take on the identity of the family that owned them. Religious affiliation was and remains in many ways more salient than ethnicity. Kennedy, an early ethnographer trying to sort out the various "races" of the highlands, held the opinion that in Luwu (a Bugis kingdom bordering the mountains on the northeast side), the "Buginese were originally very few. Then gradually the Toradja became Mohammedanized and the area became 'Buginese.'"[12]

Despite evidence for much intermingling, Bugis and Makassar certainly considered themselves separate peoples while regarding the highlanders as an undifferentiated mass of cannibalistic barbarians running around in loincloths: an assertion repeatedly made to the Dutch. Their views of the mountain people as insignificant and backwards have remained until quite recently. When Bigalke mentioned to a Bugis colleague a few years ago that he was working on a history of the Toraja, the other haughtily replied, "Oh? Do they have one?"[13] Such a dismissive attitude is also apparent in the etymology of "Toraja," a term the Dutch borrowed from the lowlanders. The Makassar version, "to" and "raja", means simply "people up north." The Bugis "to ri aja" means "people of the uplands," or "people up river." Neither imply an outside perception that the highlanders comprised a unified group, only that there were people living "up there" somewhere.

In fairness, I should point out that there was one occasion when some of the highland communities did unite. This happened in 1683 when some 120 villages[14] around the Sa'dan river basin formed an alliance to repel the invasion of a Bugis leader, Arung Palakka. His attempt to control all of southwest Sulawesi meant a much larger invasion of the highlands than the usual raids. An encroaching Bugis army required a correspondingly fiercer response. Some oral histories suggest that the Sa'dan area people might not only have held a joint purpose for this brief time but may have even been applying the term Toraja to themselves. From these traditions emerges a story in which the gathered highland war council swore an oath against the

one village that had not joined them: "You people of the Karunanga, from this day onward you will be killed with the spear by all the groups in the Toraja lands."[15] But I remain suspicious of the appearance of the term Toraja in this context. Early ethnographers and historian Bigalke repeatedly state that no one called themselves Toraja until at least the 1930s; it was strictly a term imposed by outsiders. I suspect that the use of the term here is part of a retelling by modern Toraja who have been actively defining themselves over the last few decades.

Weber suggests that a "politically unorganized tribe" can live on a memory of having "once engaged in joint political action, typically a single conquest or defense" and that such political memories may then constitute the tribe.[16] It is true that the descendants of the Sa'dan river area peoples today comprise the inhabitants of Tana Toraja and now recount this war as the most significant event in their history. Was this alliance a first glimpse of the potential for ethnic affiliation? It seems unlikely to me. The alliance disbanded following a few weeks of guerrilla warfare against Arung Palakka's 50,000 men with each community choosing whether or not to negotiate with Arung Palakka. Some of the headmen approached Arung Palakka with cloth, rice, knives, and young girls. Other communities refused to make peace and over the next eleven years continued small uprisings resulting in several more invasions to put them down. There were no more alliances between communities in the area.

More significant than this one-shot group effort was that the Sa'dan area, at the southernmost tip of the mountains, continued to suffer depredations by the Bugis and Makassar. While they may only have allied once, all the villages shared a common experience of fear of the lowlanders. Reluctance to travel and fear of strangers characterized the Sa'dan area peoples.[17] This fear got worse around the late nineteenth century. Coffee had been introduced to the highlands and was found to grow much more satisfactorily there than in the lowlands and as a result lowlanders stepped up their highland raids. In addition, during the colonial era, slaves became sources of cash rather than simply war booty and debt settlement. The Bugis increasingly went to the highlands to steal people and sell them abroad. There was no single response to such attacks. Some highlanders fled their villages, some allied with the Bugis, and some developed the Ma'bugi trance ceremony which was supposed to drive away evil and prevent Bugis incursion.

The Bugis were not the only ones preying on the highlanders. Quite a few highland headmen also took part in the slave trade, with two (Pong Maramba and Pong Tiku) remembered for extreme greed and violence. Each established major coffee and slave trade routes and dominated wider highland areas than was usual. Villagers that could neither stand against them nor wanted to submit often abandoned their homes, retreating north into the mountains or moving into caves. Bigalke finds it surprising that, although Southeast Asian leaders "typically sought to maximize the number of their followers," so many highland chiefs were ready to "let their people go" into slavery.[18] But there is no contradiction here. Bigalke has forgotten that the Toraja did not yet exist as a people or common identity. The slave traders were not snatching and selling "their people" but others with whom they had neither family ties nor treaties.

In such a situation, a simple "us/them" model of ethnic formation does not apply very well. Although the lowlanders posed an ongoing threat to highland communities, the highlanders

were also fighting and taking slaves from mountain villages. While the Sa'dan communities shared a language and some ritual practices, sufficient to have allowed an alliance once, there was no "us" to be a part of when at any moment one of the "us" might behave like a dangerous "them."

Enter the Dutch, in the form of missionaries and Dutch East Indies company officials. The Dutch had been a colonial presence on Sulawesi since the seventeenth century but had mainly ignored the inaccessible and agriculturally unproductive mountain areas. In the late nineteenth century, however, they became increasingly worried about the growing Islamic influence in Sulawesi. The animist highlanders were viewed as a pool of potential Christians; the company mandate was to convert as many as possible, thereby aligning the highlands with the Dutch should lowland Muslims get too obstreperous.

Starting in 1906, the Dutch influenced the formation of Toraja in four main ways. First, they abolished slavery, bringing peace and relative safety to the area. Second, they introduced Christianity, which would later be adopted as a defense against lowland Islamic fundamentalism. Third, they furthered the cash economy by demanding taxes. And, finally, they drew a line around the Sa'dan area and named it Tana Toraja, calling it a subdivision of the Bugis state of Luwu.[19] This naming is a curious fluke, for two Dutch linguists, Adriani and Kruyt, who had spent thirty years in the highlands had more or less decided that there were three distinct groups of Toraja in the central highlands, not including the Sa'dan river villagers. The Sa'dan were determined to be closely related linguistically and culturally to the Bugis. I find it surprising that the new Dutch territory was not named Tana Sa'dan instead. Perhaps it was because Dutch authorities were relying on Bugis rather than scholarly categories. Another scholar, Kaudern, (in Sulawesi from 1917-1920) became interested in the migrations of the Toraja. He felt that the Sa'dan were the "original" Toraja, who had then moved on to inhabit the central highlands. He classified the people of the highlands into four main groups: Paloe Toradja, Koro Toradja, Poso Toradja, and the Saadang (Sa'dan) Toradja. Scholarly arguments notwithstanding, the Sa'dan label never took hold. The Sa'dan peoples were administratively classed as Toraja. This is the label which has been accepted and has become an identity for the people of that district. Meanwhile the central highlands have been divided into fourteen other official ethnicities; some scholars maintain these are the only true "ethnic" Toraja.

Whatever hand the Dutch had in creating Toraja, they were not necessarily made welcome in the district. Although some people in Tana Toraja saw them as bringers of peace, others were angered by their illegalization of slavery. Those who profited from the slave trade sided with nobility who considered having slaves a proof of status. Many nobles were jailed or killed by the Dutch for refusing to submit to colonial authority. Other peoples' lives were disrupted when they were forced to relocate from their high mountain strongholds to lower areas more accessible to Dutch control. Taxation was resented as an outrageous imposition which undermined reciprocal relations and jeopardized the wealth of the nobility. Most village heads continued to maintain autonomous authority despite the influence of the Dutch.

Though Bigalke states that by the 1930s people had begun to call themselves Toraja, this was

probably a recognition of a common political territory, not an ethnicity. Kinship and rivalry between noble families remained paramount concerns. Problems of religious affiliation also took precedence as, first, lowland Islamic anti-nationalists and, later, anti-communists threatened the animist highlanders.

In this section of the paper, I have covered a lot of history, showing that in a complex situation of highly autonomous, kin-based communities theories of primordial ethnicity could not have predicted the construction of Toraja. Nor does a relational alterity model, where groups combine at "a higher degree of political complexity in order to respond to perceived challenge" apply to the incipient Toraja.[20] The hundreds of autonomous communities in the highlands rarely joined against any threat, despite a long-term and ongoing opposition to an "Other," the lowland Muslims. Rather, each small community made its own decisions, some paying tribute, others fleeing, some fighting, some selling their neighbors. Due to the multiplicity of possible vertical and horizontal oppositions and ties, a theoretical model that employs binary, or even tripartite oppositions, will inevitably be inadequate. When villages united in opposition to lowland kingdoms, it implies relational alterity. However, some villages were as likely to unite with the lowlanders against other villages in different circumstances. Some villages sided with the Dutch against the lowlanders; others fought the Dutch. Noble Toraja were mainly concerned with maintaining family status, while slaves and commoners adopted the Toraja identity more readily. Traditional animist and Christian Toraja might unite as Toraja against all Muslims. Yet, at another time, all Toraja (including Muslims) defend themselves against Bugis. Toraja side with the national government against their closer cousins, the Bugis, in some situations. In others, being from South Sulawesi--Toraja and Bugis alike--is a uniting feature in contrast with the nation. Being Toraja, then, is not a higher order of political complexity, but a newly added factor to a whole complexion of identities, all of which are operating simultaneously. Similarly, the opposing groups are also in flux in relation to the Toraja, sometimes providing boundaries and meaning to a definition of ethnicity, sometimes fracturing ethnicity in favor of other identities.

In the next section I will explore a few of the most salient other identities and in the third section look more closely at how they continue to interact and sometimes conflict with perceptions of Torajaness. In taking this tack, I am agreeing with Gladney that no "attempt at a final definition of the meanings of these representations" is appropriate. Rather "an examination of the conditions of relationality" lead to understanding when and why being Toraja is relevant and necessary.[21]

We, Toraja?

At least three kinds of affiliation have been more salient than that delineated by the boundaries of the new Tana Toraja district. These were family, class, and religion. Family was the primary political and social unit of highland life. The family seat was the tongkonan, a house founded by a male or female ancestor. The name of the ancestral house was also the name of the village and its residents. The family group branched into several houses, but intermarriage between cousins kept these affiliations from proliferating too much. The importance of kin ties is reflected in the

language in which parents are refered to by the names of their children, children are named after dead relatives, and aunts, uncles, and cousins are commonly referred to as mothers, fathers, and siblings. Genealogy determined who might marry whom.

Children inherited house affiliations from both mother and father along with land and family debts. Such affiliations had to be maintained in active reciprocity by helping each other farm and through sharing sacrificed meat at rituals. This reciprocity led to indebtedness towards each house with which one was affiliated. The worry over saddling children with debt meant that highlanders took care not to remain actively involved with too many ancestral houses.

Maintenance of the status of the family/village was closely tied to class stratification in those areas influenced by lowlanders. Class was inherited through the mother, leading to a strong taboo against women marrying "down". In some villages, the class level of the mother and father were averaged together, while in the more northern communities such stratification had never taken hold. Generally, however, there were at least three gradations: nobles, commoners, and slaves.[22] The nobles lived in the tongkonan, while commoners had less lavish houses. Slaves lived in little huts around the tongkonan, providing visible evidence of family prestige. Commoners might marry fairly freely, but nobility tended to marry in-family or with Bugis and Makassar nobility. Commoners and even slaves all claimed some small part of noble blood in their family trees and, hence, a share in the tongkonan (including land and rights to meat at funerals).[23] They were prohibited, however, from having death feasts upon their demise: a point which until recently was moot as few could have afforded such expensive ceremonies. Despite the emphasis on "blood"--family and status being inheritable--the system was flexible. People could marry or adopt into families; class status changed as people gained and lost wealth.

Wealth (ownership of water buffalo) was important for personal prestige and in funerals where the "wealth" was slaughtered to provide meat to the protein-hungry people. People sometimes voluntarily became slaves rather than go hungry. Slaves could vary from a man pledging to work for life for a relative in return for having his debts paid off, to people captured during wars or raids, to those who were being bought and sold.[24] Debt and voluntary slaves could buy back their freedom; but their children, who inherited their status, could not and remained attached to the owner lineage from then on. Slaves had much lower status than free people. Amongst the Sa'dan, slaves were the only people who ate dogmeat. They were forbidden to wear gold or bronze, to have carving on their houses, to eat from the same dishes as their owners, or have sex with a free woman (the last crime punishable by death).[25] Although the Dutch officially abolished slavery in 1906, as late as 1950 the nobility still had plenty of hereditary servants waiting on them which they freely referred to as "my slaves."[26] Contemporary anthropologists have also noticed the extreme coolness with which the nobility treat other Toraja and the deference with which Toraja, particularly those whose ancestors were slaves, respond.[27]

Family and class identities continue to be manipulated and negotiated in Toraja today. Ethnic identity, on the other hand, has been more problematic. This is particularly true for the nobility, who were satisfied with their power and status under the old system. Lower class Toraja have been less conservative, taking advantage of the egalitarian mores of Christianity, the

opportunities presented by education and the cash economy, and the political implications of ethnic identity to contest the authority of the nobility. This will be discussed in the third section of the paper. First, however, I will describe the third important affilitation: religion. I will then explain how Christianity has been increasingly popular as an avenue towards modernity and gaining a transnational identity.

As mentioned earlier, religious affiliation was a primary marker distinguishing lowlanders from highlanders. The polytheistic animist practices, called aluk in Tana Toraja, included rituals, social customs, ways of dealing with ancestral and other spirits, agricultural practices, and so on. Aluk was law, religion, and habit combined, the details of which varied from village to village. To minaa (aluk priests) were the authorities on the proper words to be said and actions to be taken for each ritual associated with life (agriculture) and death (funerals). Life and death rituals had to be kept separate, as death rituals might ruin crops. Aluk also maintained social structure, through affirming status and reciprocal relationships.

Islam ignored or violated these aluk practices. Volkman points out that Muslims, because they did not eat pork, "removed themselves from the sphere of ritual exchange."[28] Highlanders who converted to Islam became, for all practical purposes, Bugis or Makassar, abandoning the customs which had defined them in terms of their local community. Conflicts with Muslims (called to sallang, "enemy people") have continued well into this century and still pose a threat. In the 1930s there were several attacks by Muslim lowlanders against the highlanders. A spate of conversions to Christianity by Torajans occurred as they sought to align themselves with the Dutch for protection. Following national independence, Sulawesi was host to the Darul Islam movement in which Muslims and disgruntled Buginese launched a rebellion against the nationalists in an effort to establish Indonesia as an Islamic state. They succeeded in controlling South Sulawesi from 1951 to 1965, during which time they killed at least 10,000 Christian and aluk Toraja. Many more Toraja converted, and Christians throughout the highlands worked together to fight off lowland Muslims in 1953 and again in 1958.

For the Toraja, aligning against the lowlanders with the new national government of Indonesia has been no guarantee of safety. The Indonesian Pancasila, principles of the nation's unity, states that Belief in One God is first and foremost. All citizens of Indonesia are expected to belong to one of the five state approved world religions, or else they are labeled as being "yet without a religion." Animists on all islands were classed in this last group. During the attempted communist coup of 1965, and subsequent retaliatory massacre, anyone who was an atheist (without religion) was liable to be killed as a communist sympathizer. For Toraja, this meant a period of mass conversions to Christianity, as well as some to Islam. Meanwhile, others engaged politically at the national level. An aluk priest was instrumental in convincing the national government in Jakarta that Torajan animism was actually a sect of Hindu-Dharma, one of the five officially recognized religions. In 1969, consequently, aluk was legalized.

I have so far mentioned conversions to Christianity as motivated only by the necessity to band against Muslims or be legitimized in the eyes of the nation. Christianity has also represented a movement into a larger physical, economic, intellectual and political world. Today, over ninety

percent of Toraja are Christian. This shift has not proceeded smoothly, however. The first Dutch mission was established in Tana Toraja in 1913, but by 1942 less than ten percent of the population had been persuaded to convert. Those that had converted were almost entirely drawn not from the people around the missions and Christian schools, but from the borders of Islamic territories. Christianity was seen as an identity in contrast and preferable to Islam. Further inland, missionaries were looked upon suspiciously, especially by nobility who considered Christian egalitarianism a threat to their position. One missionary got himself killed in 1917 through first an overly enthusiastic habit of rounding up truant noble children to go to school and later preaching an end to "heathen" funeral rituals. Christian missionaries finally recognized that the Toraja were not about to give up all aluk rituals. They then separated religion from custom, forbidding aluk while accepting adat. Funerals survived while all life giving rituals were outlawed as superstitious beliefs in plant spirits.

A core issue surrounding the aluk/adat problem was animal sacrifice. As an affirmation of status, system of debt repayment, and a method of sharing wealth and providing protein throughout a community, it was absolutely crucial to the Toraja. Missionaries finally allowed it, provided everyone agreed that it was only done in order to feed guests of the funeral party, not as sacrifice to ancestral spirits. Similarly, missionaries forbade making effigies as ancestor worship, but Christian Toraja have recently reinterpreted effigies as memorial likenesses, similar to photographs, and begun making them again. Long standing social practices have been able to continue, though stripped of symbolic meaning.

Separating aluk from adat gave the Toraja an intellectual tool for objectifying themselves as a "culture." Previously, aluk had been a more or less unquestioned "way of the ancestors." It might have been negotiable, but transgressions carried the risk of endangering crops. Muslims, who did not know or follow aluk rules, were incorrigibly "other." When aluk and adat were separated, however, adat was seen as the practices which made Toraja unique.[29] Aluk was now comparable to other religions. Aluk became a personal choice instead of something with which one was born. One might convert to Christianity or even Islam, and still be Toraja. Torajaness began to be defined in terms of those adat customs that most resembled each other throughout Tana Toraja. This started the perception of ethnicity as essentialized through such things as architecture and animal sacrifice.

The aluk/adat split made it possible, but not necessarily preferable, to convert. Only ten percent of Toraja were persuaded to convert until the mid-1960s, when it became politically expedient to do so. Since then, more and more children have grown up Christian or been converted in school. In some areas there are no more to minaa alive and no young people willing to learn aluk rites.

With the to minaa nearly gone, villagers are free to discuss previously inviolable aluk rules. Christian Toraja often negotiate with more conservative community members to rationalize a conflict between Christian and aluk practices. In one village, they declared that a certain coffee rite (which used to be life giving) was purely Christian and so would not conflict with an aluk funeral that same day.[30] Mutual aid programs and village activities have gradually been taken over by the Church. A few decades ago, Christians risked being left out of the reciprocal labor

and debt arrangements of village life. Now it is the aluk who complain that they cannot fully participate in social organizations.

If Christianity has been politically expedient, it has also, as Volkman argues, been a path to modernity: "School children are taught to feel disdain for their parents' backward ways and for the 'irrationality' of a 'not-yet religion' that worships 'demons.'"[31] The young deride the old for believing in aluk as a system of necessary and natural laws rather than superstitions. Christianity, on the other hand, is an international religion. Becoming Christian made it possible for the previously insular and fearful highlanders to travel safely, going even to Europe, Australia, or America. Torajan Christians are thus a part of the world community, while aluk Torajans are only of Tana Toraja. Furthermore, Christianity is considered easier to learn and carry out than the old aluk practices. Christians only have to remember Ten Commandments; aluk followers must contend with thousands of obscure rules dictated by the to minaa. Christianity means education, employment, and acceptance by the national government. Furthermore, Christianity is egalitarian. It allows non-nobles to have funerals. Christianity has enabled commoners and hereditary slaves to achieve wealth and status and to question noble authority. Finally, as Christians, Toraja remain distinct from Muslims when living in Muslim dominated cities while still garnering more respect than if they admitted animist beliefs.

These many benefits do not mean that it is obvious to Toraja that they should be Christians. Those who become Christians only to gain better luck through a new god may change their minds and convert back if their lives do not improve. Hollan and Wellenkamp report that "many Christians say that they and the community as a whole pay a price for the freedoms they enjoy under the new religion. They claim that falling rice production, decreasing human longevity, and infestations of rats, insects, and other pests are part of the general decline in the quality of life that has occurred during recent years as Christian and modern influences have penetrated the region."[32] Some Toraja remain stubbornly aluk, even hoping that anthropological studies and tourism will encourage people to return to their traditional religion. Whether this will happen remains to be seen. What is sure, however, is that anthropologists, the tourist industry, and the new migration of Toraja to the lowlands and abroad have all contributed to defining Torajaness for the people of Tana Toraja. This definition has been increasingly reified in terms of language, location, adat, and artefacts. Yet despite such reifications, Toraja as an ethnicity retains soft boundaries, in Duara's sense.[33] That is, some cultural practices identify the Toraja ethnicity without excluding other affilitations or preventing the Toraja from adopting other practices. The adaptable Toraja are still far from a bounded ethnic nationality. Despite some attempts to create a "historical narrative of descent and/or dissent" for purposes of tourism and to bolster village pride, they do not impose such narratives on their neighbors or homogenize their diverse adat systems.[34]

We Toraya...

The movement of the formerly sedentary, xenophobic Toraja to the lowlands and to cities throughout Indonesia and the Western world represents a fracture in their social history. Recent times are spoken of as "before merantau" or "since merantau": "merantau" meaning to go

abroad or journey away.[35] "Before merantau" was a time of dangerous travel, threatening outsiders, slavery, poverty, ignorance, and insularity. "Since merantau" has been a time of peace, cash, education, and egalitarianism. While nobility still attempt to rule village life, cities provide opportunities for low-status people to become wealthy and enjoy higher status in non-traditional contexts. Status markers have begun to shift from a blood (family inheritance) to money base as common Toraja have returned from abroad with plenty of cash. Such wealth may be used up in a single funeral, a ritual formerly forbidden to non-nobility, but their status is heightened. Thus out-migration and the cash economy contributes to a disruption of the traditional ways as well as opens the door to contesting elite authority.

In the 1940s, few Toraja had ever left their village and almost none had left the Indonesian archipelago. By 1978, however, sixty percent of the population was spending extended periods outside Tana Toraja. Many never come back except for the occasional family funeral. Toraja have eagerly pursued education and now work outside Tana Toraja as government officials, professors, medical professionals, and lawyers. At the same time, they have never been above manual labor and so also work in mining and lumber operations on far-flung islands as well as in furniture and clothing manufacture closer to home.

Out-migration has led simultaneously to a greater identification with the Toraja suku (ethnicity) while at the same time facilitated alterations in that identity. On the one hand, Toraja abroad go to great lengths to retain links with family. They follow all the funerals and attendant gossip. "Their consistent interest in ritual at home," writes Volkman, "is one way of retaining a vital link to their Torajaness and asserting it to a community that comprehends it."[36] This is by contrast to living amongst outsiders, lowlanders and Muslims in particular, who find Toraja ritual incomprehensible and lavish funerals a foolish waste of wealth. Being Toraja can also have less meaning outside Tana Toraja. Some Toraja adopt a more national identity, especially if they work in the government. Christianity is now almost universal amongst Toraja outside Toraja-land. Many Toraja marry non-Toraja now. By the same token, cross-status marriages, formerly forbidden, are growing more commonplace. During merantau people of old slave families may end up marrying nobility. The consternation is terrible at home but hardly matters in new urban areas far from the old class structure.

Just as out-migration has both altered and bounded what being Toraja means, so has the in-migration of tourists to Tana Toraja. Tourism was officially countenanced in Indonesia's first Five Year Plan in 1969. Yamashita considers tourism "a new form of Indonesian nationalism" in that ethnic cultural heritages are situated within "the regional framework of the nation." The diversity of Indonesia is represented by non-threatening local adat. Through exploiting exotic customs, "tourism is an attempt at the 'Indonesianization of Indonesia.'"[37] This is shown by the fact that nearly 95% of tourists to Tana Toraja are now other Indonesian nationals. In 1971 the first few tourists arrived in Toraja via a single terrible road. But in 1991, Tana Toraja, with a total population of approximately 350,000, was host to some 215,000 tourists. An airport and better roads have made it relatively easy to reach this part of the highlands and accommodations have grown apace. In 1993, Travel Indonesia magazine reported that Toraja had two three star hotels, 30 others hotels, and a four-star hotel nearing completion.[38]

All of this attention has not necessarily brought the Toraja together. On the contrary, consciousness of family status still leads to inter-village rivalries. Today these have been sustained through contestation over which villages get put on tour guide maps. One clear example is in the story of Ne' Duma, as described by Adams. Ne' Duma perceived that in the new economy, family prestige depended upon outsider attention. A village that did not have tourists would lose its name and be forgotten. He was particularly anxious on account of the government seat having been established near the rival adat community of Sangalla. Accordingly, he worked to arrange to have Kesu' (his ancestral family name and adat community) put on the map as an important turis obyek (tourist object). He then began writing histories of his family's ancestral tongkonan and "presenting papers at tourism seminars on the historical significance of Kesu'."[39] He also became a lecturer at tour-guide training sessions and established the tongkonan as a museum. In 1985 the Indonesian government officially awarded him the title of "founding father" of Tana Toraja. From this example, it is clear that being Toraja is not necessarily the only or even most important identity operating in any given circumstance, even today. The dynamic of incoming tourists does not merely contribute to an "us/them" dichotomy of insider/outsider. Rather, tourism occurs in a context of multiple interacting identities. Torajaness may well be seen as less salient than the far more ancient adat/family identities at any given moment.

Tourism has also confounded the rush to modernity that accompanied Christian conversion. Tourism closely followed upon the anti-communist massacre, at a time when many Toraja were rapidly abandoning or at least questioning traditional adat. Those same outmoded and anti-Christian practices were precisely what strangers were willing to pay to see. Tourism has thus been seen by many aluk conservatives as a potentially positive development. They hope that through tourism some of the religious traditions will be preserved towards a future return to aluk. They see tourists as lending proof to the young that the aluk ways are valuable and constitute the Toraja identity.

At the same time, there are complaints that the rituals are no longer authentic or "true". Fewer Toraja can reach a consensus on what aspects of funeral ceremonies are fixed and what can be reinterpreted. There is no longer a shared expectation and experience of ritual. As ritual defines Toraja to the outside world, it is also changing to accommodate outsiders tastes. Some students from Toraja consider having tourists at funerals a travesty and feel tourists should be treated only to staged shows of songs, chants, dances, even sacrifices that are not part of any meaningful ritual. Others feel that removing the ritual practices from the ritual, doing it at inappropriate times or in inappropriate places, is the travesty. The ceremonies should be whole or abandoned, not carved into bits for tourists' eyes. Discussion groups, seminars, and arguments abound as Toraja try to sort out how they can abide by Church authority and please the tourists while maintaining some meaning in their traditions.

In practice, much has given way to tourist desires. Animal sacrifice is being included in rituals where once it had no place, as tourists who arrive when there is no funeral scheduled are sure to go away disappointed at missing the slaughter. The Toraja have never been known for their handicrafts but now sell miniature carved tongkonan, beaded necklaces, statues (in the Balinese

style), and weavings which have pig, buffalo, and rice barn motifs to show they are "authentically Toraja," although background designs come from other islands. Ancestor effigies, which once graced cave mouths overlooking villages, were stolen for sale to Western art dealers and museums. Now they have been replaced with statuary dressed in white tuxedos and dark sunglasses, the signs of modern living. Artefacts are interpreted to tourists in novel ways, as tour guides learn what tourists like. Abstract carved designs are pointed out as proof of the "Torajan veneration of nature," reflecting a Western obsession with the "natural" exotic.[40]

Modernity and the Christian influence have also had their consequence in how Toraja view their traditions and rituals. Urban Torajan guests complain of boredom and monotonous ritual food. One son and chief mourner refused to sleep in the funeral hut and, instead, retired to his hotel where he "joined in 'karaoke' instead of the 'ma'badong' dance!"[41] Buffalo are increasingly given away rather than slaughtered so that, instead of sharing meat, villagers can ultimately sell the buffalo to raise money for village improvement projects.

With tourism has also come increased interference in the affairs of Tana Toraja by government officials. This, more than the onslaught of tourists, has been significant in strengthening a sense of Torajan ethnicity. Their struggle to maintain control over the use of tongkonan and the timing of ceremonies has been seen as an ethnic struggle. Where Buginese and Javanese consultants only see marketable exotica, the Toraja still revere their houses and rituals as not only a connection to the past but as the right way of doing things. Typical of their new self-consciousness, some Toraja analyze their interactions with government officials as problems in cross-cultural negotiation. One man told Adams that the Javanese believe the government represents the will of the gods while Toraja consider the aluk rules to be directly linked to the gods and, therefore, unchanging.[42] For a few days in 1987, several villages closed their doors to tourism when the government wanted to forbid people to alter tongkonan or live in them because they might ruin them.

Perhaps the main effect of tourism has been to reify what being Toraja means in terms of a very few symbols and practices. This is already apparent when Toraja students, living on Java, write letters defending the "death ritual" as essential to the continuing "identity of the Toraja people" and their "unique culture."[43] The tongkonan is a symbol which has come to assume new import. The entrance to Tana Toraja on the road from the south includes a full-sized tongkonan atop the gateway, along with the sign "Welcome to Tana Toraja." Tongkonan are the ubiquitous emblem of Tana Toraja, featured on t-shirts and sold in miniature carvings. These miniatures are not only sold to tourists. Before Toraja who had to travel abroad took with them a handful of dirt from their front yard; now they bring along model tongkonan to put in some prominent place in their modern urban homes.

The architecture, which once meant family ancestry, now also means Toraja. Toraja who had begun modernizing their tongkonan by making the roofs out of tin instead of bamboo, were stopped. New houses incorporate architectural elements of tongkonan, sometimes quite absurdly. A white stucco house may be burdened with a huge bow shaped roof on top or a complete tongkonan as a second story. Many Toraja live in Bugis style houses next to their

traditional houses, which go unused except for ceremonial occasions. New tongkonan are even built without hearths, showing that they are never expected to be inhabited. While many Toraja complain that these changes mean the culture is being lost; they also agree that the tongkonan, originally designed as small fortresses to protect the family from intruders, are too dark and small to be comfortable living quarters.

Some scholars pose the new focus on house as tourist symbol as proof that identification with family ancestry has been superseded by ethnicity. Volkman writes, "A notion of Torajaness supplanted the idea of 'house,' and 'house' eventually came to be an emblem of 'Toraja.'"[44] Schefold agrees that "a more direct transformation of ethnic consciousness of 'being an Indonesian, that is a Toraja' can hardly be imagined than the crowning of a modern villa with a tongkonan-like structure."[45] I maintain that ethnicity (as cultural practice) is a new but equal identity. Tongkonan are now both ancient and modern, just as a modern house under a tongkonan roof is a combination, not a replacement. For, as Waterson points out, while Christians might willingly do away with the funeral ceremonies altogether, everyone is horrified if that means also destroying the ancestral homes around which the ceremonies revolve.[46] The tongkonan now symbolizes both ancestral seat and ethnic Torajaness, not one or the other.

For the sake of tourism, Toraja have also begun to reinvent themselves in Hobsbawm's sense of "invented traditions." [47] One effort at reinterpretation has been supplying new etymologies for the originally pejorative roots of the term Toraja. Some Toraja admit that the word derives from the Buginese, but rather than "to ri aja" (uplander), it comes from "to" and "rajang" meaning "people from the West." This sets up a horizontal opposition to "people from the East," the kingdom of Luwu, while implying that both existed at the same political level. Another favorite derivation, especially amongst tour guides, is that Toraja comes from the indian word "raja" meaning grand, princely, and magnificent. Toraja then means a princely people. These etymologies are not accepted by all strata of society. Noble Toraja particularly disapprove of the latter derivation, as it undermines their special status. One nobleman complained to Adams that, "Many people here like to say our name means kingly people because it makes them seem more majestic. But this invented meaning is like a balloon; you start out with a small piece of rubber and, if you keep inflating it, it will finally burst and have no value at all."[48] He was not so much concerned that outsiders should be misled, but that the Toraja commoners might come to believe they were in the same class as nobility.

Toraja have also rejected outside labels for their language. The Sa'dan label given by linguists has simply been ignored. Toraja call their language Basa Toraa or Toraya, avoiding the "j" sound that does not exist in their langauge. This is not the only way the "Toraya" have been reworking outsider's descriptions. They respond to lowland stereotypes of themselves as crude, backwards, non-religious ex-slaves by characterizing themselves as pork-eaters, pacifists, honest, delicate, quick-witted, hard working, and thrifty. At the same time, they discuss at length their own foolishness in racking up huge debts and then wasting wealth on funeral ceremonies.[49]

Just as traditional architecture and funeral ceremonies have come to epitomize what it is be Toraja, so have the writings of outsiders narrowed the Toraja identity to a few cultural tropes.

Some of these outsiders have been government officials and tour guides. But the main contributors to this essentialization have been anthropologists. Western ethnographers have been as thrilled as tourists with the spectacles offered in Tana Toraja. This is shown by their neglect of those areas of the highlands which do not have big boat shaped houses and fantastic mortuary practices. While ignoring the many diverse groups living in south and central Sulawesi mountains (some of whom also call themselves Toraja) they have defined the Toraja not as a multitude of adat practices but only in terms of a very few similarities. Each article, even when based on a short study in a single village, claims to describe the Toraja, ignoring differences in all other adat communities.

The change in designation of Torajaness is made apparent simply by following ethnographies over time. Early ethnographers emphasized the diversity of the central and south Sulawesi mountain regions, made it clear that Toraja was an imposed term (one never used by any highlanders), and even called into question whether or not, given the complexity of the situation, there was any such thing as "Toraja" as a category. Later ethnographers, from the 1950s through the 1970s, would note the diversity of the area in brief, then concentrate on the "Sa'dan" or "Sa'dan Toradja" exclusively.[50]

Volkman is typical of anthropologists today. Although she considers "Toraja" an "ethnic fiction" she contributes to the reification by only studying the Sa'dan region by focusing on the same weird houses and wild rituals for simplicity's sake. Ethnographers such as Hollan often do not even nod towards the diversity of the area but simply call everyone in Tana Toraja "the Toraja" as a necessary and obvious category. They ignore people speaking the same language and with similar adat who live outside the bounds of Tana Toraja. Most anthropologists have also ignored everyone living further up in the hills who call themselves Toraja though they speak entirely different languages, practice swidden agriculture, or live in longhouses instead of tongkonan.

Because scholars have ill-defined assumptions of Toraja as ethnic group, their statements of how many ethnic groups exist in the highlands tend to be contradictory. They confuse territorial designations with cultural and linguistic similarities. Clearer than most is Andaya's description of the four ethnic categories of South Sulawesi: the Bugis, Makassaar, Toraja (Sa'dan Toraja), and the Mandar in the mountain areas of the north.[51] This is simple enough, until he notes that the Mandar are actually two groups: those who live on the coast and those who live in the mountains: the mountain ones being ethnically Toraja!

While scholars confound themselves with the impossibility of applying simple categories to a complex and fluid part of the world, people in Tana Toraja make the most of anthropological attention. Some use anthropological studies to make arguments for the continuance of Torajan traditions. One Toraja leader, "a devotee of anthropological literature" often cites Ruth Benedict, as well as anthropologists who have studied the Toraja, in making his arguments against indiscriminate development of Toraja for tourism.[52] Meanwhile, the nobility make use of visiting anthropologists to play out family rivalries. Adams reports how she was recruited as a pet anthropologist by one family who asked her to "write a book about the real Torajan identity and history." What this really meant was a history of that particular family. She came to realize, only

later, that she was a pawn in an ancient game. She writes:

[A] rival aristocratic family from another Torajan district visited our village and my Torajan hosts introduced me as "their anthropologist"....To this, the visitors responded that they, too, had an anthropologist live with them and write about them. After these guests departed, my Torajan family disparaged the other anthropologist's understanding of Torajan culture and proclaimed that my "book" would be "much bigger and better."[53]

Later she reports that local tour guides added her to their itinerary, pointing out to tourists that a real anthropologist was studying this ancient culture. Her hosts would rush out to serve tea to the tourists and show her off. In similar vein, Toraja throwing big funerals have written and published pamphlets describing their family history and the meaning of the funeral. These small books, published usually in English and Bahasa Indonesia rather than Basa Toraa, serve as further proof to outsiders of the long history and descent of each particular family.

I find this all a curious spin on Anderson's use of print capitalism, museums, and maps to create a sense of nation. The Toraja are not thereby building a sense of ethnic unity. Instead, they have readily borrowed print and other institutions in order to maintain the salience of their smallest unit of political autonomy, the adat community. As Duara writes of nationalism, Torajan ethnicity is not something so much inborn as constantly in flux, existing as only one among other identities, while remaining "changeable, interchangeable, conflicted, or harmonious with them."[54]

Conclusion

In this paper I have suggested that there is little primordial basis for the Toraja to exist as a single ethnic group. Tana Toraja is an arbitrary political boundary imposed from without that has led to a new identity for the people living within the territory. Other aspects of society which were already in place in some communities--family structure, class hierarchy, and ritual practices--have remained salient even as being Toraja has come to have meaning. These adat communities have retained customs and autonomous identities. Even as Toraja begin to define themselves as Toraja, other affiliations fracture their definitions or offer alternatives. History has shown that theories of binary opposition can hardly be applied to the unpredictable ways in which these affiliations interact.

Perhaps this is because such oppositions are a habit of Western scholarship more than a reflection of people's lives. Though the Toraja have consistently feared and occasionally fought lowland Muslims, they have mostly done so as small village communities. They have also intermarried with lowlanders, traded with them, joined with their elite in contrast to commoners, and now live with them as equals in urban areas. They react to protect themselves against religious and political opposition when necessary, but rarely assume that the opposition is obvious or absolute. They remain fiercely determined to maintain control over their own lives. This determination has not lent itself to an overriding push towards a common Torajan ethnic identity or political unity. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Toraja have partially consented to, or

at least made use of, outsider views of them as ethnic and political group.

I would have preferred it otherwise. A grand theory of Torajan ethnicity would have been a nice way to finish this paper, but the details have confounded me. I am only comforted in that other scholars seem as confused about what being Toraja really means. The people of the Sulawesi highlands have so far proven themselves highly resistant to outside attempts to categorize or control them. Despite stereotypical representations by the national government and anthropologists, the people there choose which identities to subscribe to, within, as Gladney puts it, "highly contextualized moments of social relation."[55] For now, at least, what it means to be Torajan is much discussed both within and without the Sa'dan area. Communities which do not lay along tourist routes are still virtually ignored by outsiders. I can hardly hazard a guess as to how much any of those far flung communities have a sense of belonging to an ethnic group. But this could yet change, should the government begin rigidly typing ethnicities or selectively providing benefits to "ethnic nationalities." The eruption of a religious war in which highlanders find themselves again under fire from lowland Muslims could also lead to an intensified sense of common purpose and ethnic identity amongst the highlanders. Then again, they might choose to group along religious lines or return to adat communities in which each community decides who to affiliate with and how to protect themselves. I would tend to bank on the latter. All my readings have supported the view that these are people who tolerate diverse views and actions, fluidly negotiate a variety of identities and respond creatively to different cultural representations. The highland Toraja, to borrow Duara's words, seem highly "resistant to totalizing ideologies," whether imposed by the nation, religion, scholarship, or created internally.[56]

Notes

1 This paper is based on limited source materials. As I cannot read Bahasa Indonesia or Dutch, Dutch colonial, Indonesian national, and first-hand Toraja perspectives are mostly missing. I have had to rely upon American ethnographers who did not ask the questions I would have asked and historians who too often repeated the surmises of earlier scholars. What I found most irritating were the essentializations of Toraja in terms of a few cultural artefacts (albeit, spectacular ones), while leaving out of the picture the perhaps less astonishing, but by all accounts extraordinarily diverse, peoples living in the central highlands. These peoples continue to be referred to in passing, without explanation, as also "ethnically" Toraja.

2 Geertz was not himself a primordialist. In the *Integrative Revolution*, he was writing about how people rationalize ties to nationality rather than how ethnic affiliations might be created or defined. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press, 1963).

3 Recently, linguists have identified 62 distinct languages on Sulawesi: the central highlands

area being the most diverse part of the island.

4 *Adat,* meaning custom or tradition, is originally an Islamic term incorporated into the standard Indonesian language. Indonesia, with 88% of the population now at least nominally Muslim, is highly influenced by Islamic concepts and vocabulary."Adat" probably did not exist as a word or concept in the local languages of Tana Toraja. It is instead an imposed concept.

5 From Volkman's translation of an article in *Dinamika,* the Media Bulletin of the Bandung Family of Toraja Students, October, 1978. Toby Alice Volkman, *Feasts of Honor: Ritual and Change in the Toraja Highlands* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 192.

6 David Henley, *The Idea of Celebes in History*. (Victoria: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1989), 31.

7 Charles F. Keyes, "The Dialectics of Ethnic Change," *Ethnic Change,* ed. Charles F. Keyes (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), 5.

8 In practice no individual could maintain involvement with more than a few ancestral houses, at most half a dozen if one was very ambitious. Distant, poorer, and less prestigious associations were usually let go.

9 Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1978).

10 Leach was discussing social characteristics rather than physical attributes.

11 Edmund Leach, *Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954).

12 Raymond Kennedy, *Field Notes on Indonesia South Celebes* 1949-50 (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1953), 122.

13 Quoted by Volkman.

14 This estimate may have become inflated in oral history. If it was 120 villages, that would have been a grouping roughly the same size as Tana Toraja today. Leonard Andaya, *The Heritage of Arung Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi (Celebes) in the Seventeenth Century* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal, Land- en Volkenkunde, 1981), 261.

15 Andaya, *The Heritage of Arung Palakka,* 261.

16 Weber, *Economy and Society*, 394.

17 This is in contrasted to the central highlanders who were not flanked by invading kingdoms.

Many central highlanders were quite mobile and expected their men to go on extended trading expeditions early in their adult life.

18 T. Bigalke, "Dynamics of the Torajan Slave Trade in South Sulawesi," in *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia*, ed. Anthony Reid (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 352.

19 This was probably because the Bugis told them the area belonged to their kingdom. In 1946 the Dutch granted the "regency" of Tana Toraja autonomy from Luwu.

20 Dru Gladney, "Relational Alterity: Constructing Dungan (Hui), Uygur, and Kazakh Identities across China, Central Asia, and Turkey," (draft copy). Recently published in: *History and Anthropology* 9, no. 2: 445-477.

21 Gladney, "Relational Alterity."

22 I will go along with H.J. Nieboer's definition of a slave as any person "who is the property of another, politically and socially at a lower level than the mass of the people, and performing compulsory labor." Quoted in A. Reid, "Introduction: Slavery and Bondage in Southeast Asian History," in Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia. ed. Anthony Reid. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 2.

23 Kennedy, *Field Notes*.

24 Although highlanders kept slaves much as lowlanders did, there was a qualitative difference between being attached for generations to a highland family and being captured by lowlanders and sold to slave owners who were complete strangers. Bigalke, "Dynamics of the Torajan Slave Trade," 350.

25 A. Reid, " 'Closed' and 'Open' Slave Systems in Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia," in *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia* ed. Anthony Reid (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 163.

26 Kennedy, *Field Notes*, 140.

27 "Tana" (blood) was broken up into fractions depending on how people married. People were graded as gold, bronze, iron, sugar palm, or common sawah plant. Gold Tana was then 100% noble blood, bronze 80%, etc. This was reflected in what kinds of ornaments people were allowed to wear. Barley describes an acquaintance who "was a member of the Torajan nobility or as he put it, 'gold class.' This was apparent in his bearing. When talking to non-Torajans he was easy and relaxed. When Torajans spoke to him, he was instantly stiff and referred to them in the third person or simply ignored them completely." Nigel Barley, *Not a Hazardous Sport*. (New York: Henry Holt, 1988), 173.

28 Toby Alice Volkman, "Great Performances: Toraja Cultural Identity in the 1970s," *American Ethnologist* 11 (1984): 155.

29 Objectification was no doubt also lent a hand through contact with radically "other" people--the Dutch--who were imposing a new political structure. Linnekin points out that "selfconscious reflection about one's own culture is certainly intensified where perceived cultural or ethnic differences are politicized." Jocelyn Linnekin, "On the Theory and Politics of Cultural Construction in the Pacific," *Oceania* 62 (1992): 253.

30 Volkman, *Feasts of Honor*, 10.

31 Volkman, *Feasts of Honor*, 132.

32 Douglas Hollan and Jane C. Wellenkamp, *Contentment and Suffering: Culture and Experience in Toraja* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 40.

33 Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History form the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).

34 Duara, *Rescuing History form the Nation*, 66.

35 Volkman, "Great Performances," 158.

36 Volkman, *Feasts of Honor*, 138.

37 Shinji Yamashita, "Manipulating Ethnic Tradition: The Funeral Ceremony, Tourism, and Television Among the Toraja of Sulawesi," *Indonesia* 58 (1994): 81.

8 "Toraja Taking Off," *Travel Indonesia* (September 1993), 23-28.

39 Kathleen M. Adams, "Making up the Toraja? The Appropriation of Tourism, Anthropology, and Museums for Politics in Upland Sulawesi, Indonesia," *Ethnology* 34 (1995): 149.

40 Adams, "Making up the Toraja?," 146.

41 Yamashita, "Manipulating Ethnic Tradition," 75.

42 Kathleen M. Adams, "Cultural Commodization in Tana Toraja, Indonesia," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 14 (1990): 33.

43 Volkman, "Great Performances," 162.

44 Toby Alice Volkman, "Visions and Revisions: Toraja Culture and the Tourist Gaze," *American Ethnologist* 17 (1990): 92.

45 Reimard Schefold, "Toraja Houses and Batak Statues: Different Expressions of Common Development," in *Socio-cultural Impacts of Development: Voice from the Field*, ed. Abdul Aziz Saleh and D. Flud van Giffen. (Padang: Andalas University Research Center, 1990), 194.

46 Roxana Waterson, *Ritual and Belief among the Sa'dan Toraja* (Canterbury: Centre of South-East Asian Studies, University of Kent, 1984), 59.

47 Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

48 Adams, "Making up the Toraja?," 146.

49 Hollan and Wellenkamp, *Contentment and Suffering*, 78.

50 Nooy-Palm, after attempting to categorize the many groups within and outside the Sa'dan area, wondered if there ever had been unity amongst the "Toraja," or if it was only a unity based on "language and cultural practices (not forgetting, however, that local variations exist)." Hetty Nooy-Palm,*The Sa'dan-Toraja: A Study of their Social Life and Religion, vol. 1, Organization, Symbols and Beliefs* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 8.

51 Andaya, *The Heritage of Arung Palakka*, 9.

52 Adams, "Cultural Commodization," 33.

53 Adams, "Making up the Toraja?," 145-48.

54 Duara, *Rescuing History*, 8.

55 Gladney, "Relational Alterity."

56 Duara, *Rescuing History*, 16.

Explorations
in
Southeast Asian Studies
A Journal of the Southeast Asian Studies Student Association
Vol 2, No. 1 **Spring 1998**

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Creating Modern Traditions in Balinese Performing Arts

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Notes

Introduction

> In this view, tradition is not simply the surviving residue left undisturbed by advancing yet incomplete modernization. Rather, it is essentially new, modern, contemporary, a recent construct. The recognition of and an attachment to the ***pastness*** of certain cultural materials (what we come to call ***traditions***) is itself, in this view, a product of modernity.[1]

The discourse on modernity in Bali concerns the issues related to the processes of cultural transformation that have been reshaping the living traditions of Bali since the last years of the colonial period early this century. What is often implied by the notion of ***modern*** Bali, is the complex of practices, trends, and ideas introduced from the West during the time of Dutch colonial rule,[2] and later adopted and enhanced by the Balinese themselves. It was during the colonial period that certain types of transformations of Balinese artistic life, which have often been labeled as ***modern,*** have begun to occur. In this sense, the idea of Balinese ***modernism*** refers specifically to a certain time frame. On the other hand, ***modernization*** also implies certain qualities of the transformations which have first appeared during that time. The concept

of ***modernization*** generally assumes that pre-colonial Bali was a ***traditional*** society, relatively untouched by the outside influences, and thus relatively unchanged. It was only with the encroachment of colonial rule that the Balinese began transforming not only their ***traditional*** art and practices of everyday life, but also their way of experiencing the world, often by looking toward Western models.

In this essay I intend to present a different view of the development of Balinese performing arts, and to clarify what the often misleading concepts of ***traditional*** and ***modern*** may mean in the context of Balinese culture. I will focus solely on Bali, sometimes within a broader context of old Javanese kingdoms or the contemporary Indonesian state. Hence, I will not draw on Western theories of modernity and modernization. While Western notions of modernism imply a general trend in the methods, styles, and philosophy of modern artists, involving a break with the traditions of the past and a search for new modes of expression, modernity in Bali concerns a particular way of dealing with the cultural heritage of that area, a way specific to Balinese culture. Western Modernism overlaps only historically with modernism in Bali, and the discourse and paradigms that have been built around it are not applicable to the Balinese setting.

The modern and traditional in Bali exist side by side. On the one hand, Balinese culture is famed for its resilience in keeping traditional art forms preserved through the centuries, especially in the face of rapid modernization in this century. On the other hand, a history of Balinese arts, including performing arts, points toward a dynamic of constantly changing artistic forms and styles. A historical analysis of the development of various art forms in Bali shows that the Balinese have always been open to integrating foreign influences into their tradition, and that they have always placed a high value on dynamic innovation. This apparent paradox which juxtaposes the Balinese role as guardians and preservers of tradition with that of creative innovators, is the main focus of this essay.

By using the term ***modernism***, I will discuss the transformations that Balinese culture has undergone in the twentieth century. In this understanding, modernism in Bali refers to the process of cultural transformation that has spread over the island in three successive waves during this century. The first wave occurred in the late colonial period in the 1920s and 1930s with the opening of public schools, the rise of modern (Western) education under Dutch colonial rule, and early tourism. The second wave followed the proclamation of Indonesian independence, when Bali became part of the Republic of Indonesia and began contributing to the development of the new national culture. The third wave occurred in the 1970s and 1980s with the expansion of tourism and the emergence of new experimental productions brought about and inspired by Western artists, Balinese artists and scholars educated in the West, as well as by a new generation influenced by TV, film, and the advancement of technology.

Each of these waves was followed by a major scholastic discourse on the processes of transformation of the traditional arts, since early in the twentieth century, the changes within the tradition that were considered ***modern*** were seen as forces that threatened to destroy or uncontrollably and irrevocably change the most valuable aspects of that tradition. Thus, since the early anthropological writings on Bali in the 1930s, until the present day, modernity and

tradition have been considered contesting and mutually exclusive powers. However, this polarization can be mitigated by another perspective which perceives ***tradition*** not as a relic of the past, but as a contemporary construct.[3] According to Kessler, in what we may call ***traditional*** societies, there is no conscious, ***ideologized*** attachment to the legacy of the past. It is usually when tradition is threatened that a self-awareness arises, and that the reference to the past is consciously advanced. Hence, ***a view of the traditional' past is invoked to serve as an alternative to disruptive modernization.***[4] It was not until the threat of modernity appeared (and was articulated as a threat) that the Balinese began consciously advancing the notion of tradition as an alternative. While in the analyzing and defining tradition one can see an attempt on the part of the Balinese to define their identity in the face of rapid cultural change, the ongoing discussion on modernity shows their effort to control and channel these changes.

To understand what is modern in Bali, it is necessary to establish some understanding of what is traditional. What is it that makes Balinese theatre Balinese, be it modern or traditional? Is a ***modern*** Balinese production less Balinese than a ***traditional*** one, and if yes, why? In this essay I will explore possible answers to these questions by looking at the Balinese past as well as the present.

In the first two sections I will investigate the social and artistic mechanisms that are historically innate to the Balinese performing arts. If by modernism we assume a process of continual change, it is important to understand what it is that is being changed and what are the social and artistic implications of those changes. In the first section I will investigate the social function of the traditional Balinese arts, presenting Balinese performing arts as ***applied arts*** or ***arts in service***, primarily in service to religion and politics. In the following section I will investigate the mechanism of cultural appropriation, or localization of foreign elements into traditional Balinese culture. These two sections will thus present a paradigm of traditional Balinese performing arts as they relate to Balinese society and to the influences and models imposed by or imported from the outside world. The last section of this essay will investigate the changes that have occurred within the Balinese society in this century that have affected these two aspects of Balinese performing arts.

Thus, I will focus on the function of the performing arts in society and their relation to foreign influences, rather than the form of any particular theatrical genre. In other words, I intend to contribute to the discussion of the ***Balineseness*** of the performing arts in Bali historically rather than aesthetically.

Social Functions of Traditional Performing Arts

Throughout its history Balinese theatre has had two main social functions: one religious and one political. Even though the early twentieth century saw the introduction of an element of self-conscious art which was not ***art-in-service*** of something but rather an artistic expression of an individual, this tendency never became fully integrated in the Balinese artistic tradition. Rather, the performing arts are still considered to be (as they have been throughout history) a

communal, collective obligation to create beauty in service to society and religion.

The religious function of the performing arts is evident in the religious ceremonies in the temples, and in the private ceremonies most often concerned with the various rites of passage (birth, wedding, tooth-filing, etc.). In both instances, the dances, dance-dramas, or other theater forms presented are regarded as both individual and communal offerings to the gods. Together with food offerings and prayers, these performances are given for the enjoyment and entertainment of the divinities and ancestral souls as a sign of loyalty and devotion to this invisible realm whose protection is indispensable for the well-being of the community. In doing so, the performers and those who commission the performances are serving a specific religious function in constantly preserving the ***symbolic universe*** of the Balinese people.[5]

The political function of Balinese theatre is similar to its religious function. From the ninth or tenth century until the early twentieth century the Balinese courts played a primary role in the development of performing arts. It did so through the training of dancers and musicians, the organizing and financing of performances, and the creating of new performing styles as well as new norms for their execution. Although court performances always followed the religious calendar and thus served religious functions as well, their content and form reflected their political purpose in showing the strength and splendor of the kingdom and legitimizing the rule of a particular dynasty by showing its links to old kingdoms of the ***golden era*** of Balinese history (Majapahit or Gelgel) and, indirectly, its links to the gods.[6]

The vast range of performing art forms in Bali have always had this dual function of preserving the symbolic (religious) universe of the Balinese people and legitimizing an image of a social and political order of a particular kingdom or dynasty. These two functions have always been inseparable in that a particular king or dynasty could only legitimize their rule by showing themselves as perfect embodiments of traditional values, norms, and regulations that were codified in the religious universe. In this way, the political reality constantly strengthened the symbolic one, for only a strong symbolic reality could give confer legitimacy on any given political reality.

These two functions have been singled out because they are the pillars on which the performing arts tradition of Bali is based. They are the key factors which make a Balinese dance, dance-drama, or a wayang performance recognizable as Balinese even when a specific form is penetrated by foreign (usually Western) influences. They maintain strong ties between social life, the political structure and religion on the one hand, and performing arts on the other. Just as the Balinese have managed to preserve their religion more or less intact through the centuries,[7] they have guarded their traditional arts with the same enthusiasm to assure that they remain ***Balinese*** regardless of the continually changing social context.

Three main challenges emerged in the twentieth century. The first was the process of modernization of Balinese performing arts which started in the 1920s with the expansion of tourism. Western artists and scholars from this period introduced the idea of a self-conscious art that functions as an artistic expression of an individual. This idea triggered a new fashion among

the Balinese artists who turned to creating new dance forms by looking toward Western models. Just as a number of Western scholars and Balinese artists began to fear that the traditional Balinese arts were in serious danger of washed away by the tide of rapid modernization, a second challenge appeared: the commercialization of the arts. This commercialization actually prevented the decline of traditional arts, for the authorities (first Dutch, then Indonesian) launched organized efforts to preserve the traditional art forms as economic commodities for the tourist market.[8] Many traditional art forms were preserved as a result, although this preservation often entailed serious threats to the arts in the form of standardizing, categorizing, and museumizing a large part of a living tradition within Balinese theater. Many traditional forms were taken from the villages and temples, recontextualized for the tourist market, and then assimilated back into the villages and temples. The third challenge chronologically overlapped with the first two: the demise of the courts and the decline in power of most of the Balinese nobility who were the major patrons of the performing arts. This problem was successfully ameliorated, if not entirely solved, by the foundation of two major government sponsored performing art schools in Bali: The College of Indonesian Arts and The High School of Indonesian Music in Denpasar.[9] These institutions took over the role of preserving the traditional art forms, a role formerly exercised by the courts.

From the perspective of the 1990s, one may conclude that Balinese theater does not seem to be any less Balinese than it does in earlier descriptions in the writings of Miguel Covarrubias, Walter Spies, or Margaret Mead. Nevertheless, Balinese theater did undergo significant changes. In this essay I will argue that what makes these changes less apparent are the two functions that the performing arts play in society, the religious and political. These functions keep the theatrical tradition inseparable from its religious and political contexts. In serving these two functions, the Balinese performing art tradition appears to be virtually the same as it was centuries ago. The demands of Balinese social organization (the basis of which has also remained more or less intact through the centuries) placed upon the artists (themselves part of that organization) have likewise contributed to the resilience of the performing arts, both socially and aesthetically.

Whether they are in service of politics, religion, or economy, the performing arts of Bali may be categorized as applied arts, or arts-in-service. The fact that the Balinese do not have the word for ***art*** supports this theory. Artistic creativity in Bali has always been subordinate to the demands of its social and political order.

Modern Traditions: Interculturalism and Tradition

Although material evidence is scant, Balinese artistic tradition can be traced back to pre-Hindu times. Animism, with its complex network of rituals, was one of the major preconditions for the early development of performing arts in Bali. Animistic spirit belief gave rise to numerous rituals that were direct or indirect predecessors of numerous theater forms of a later origin.[10] These practices, carried out through various rituals, established the basis on which the performing arts would later develop, more often than not keeping their ritual roots strong in their content and salient in their style and form.

The primary sources of information about performing practices in pre-Hindu Bali are several ritual-dance-dramas still extant today. These dance-dramas, such as the Berutuk rite or the Sang Hyang rituals, have preserved strong animistic elements and show little or no Indian influence. These ritual performances do not directly correspond to the Western conception of ***theater.*** They are religious rituals full of magical meaning to the performers and other members of the community. If the fine line between theatrical action and reality can be defined by understanding the first as a symbolic action and the second as primarily an instrumental action, Balinese dramatic rituals blur this distinction. Although they include elements of theater (primarily music and dance), they are meant to serve religious and magical purposes and are not intended for the aesthetic pleasure of the audience in the Western sense of the term (although elements of aesthetic pleasure and entertainment are always present).

The later development of Balinese performing arts may be described as a continuous transformation of this indigenous tradition under the influence of elements imported from foreign cultures. The Hindu elements in Balinese religion and social and political organization are imported from India, arriving in Bali through Java. Even the Sang Hyang ritual dances which are the closest to what may be considered indigenous Balinese culture still show some Indian influence: the basic body position (agem) with legs wide open and turned outward, the angular break of the elbows, closeness to the ground, and the focus on the upper torso with the emphasis on hand, head, and eye movements.

Between the tenth and the fifteenth centuries, when the histories of Bali and Java overlapped, and when the cultural life of the courts of both islands were united, the assimilation of Hindu-Javanese culture took place. The Ramayana and Mahabharata were imported from India in their kakawin version; Malat together with various other Panji legends, the wayang kulit, elements of dance costumes and accessories were all imported from Java. Hence, what we now consider to be the traditional Balinese performing art heritage is, seen in hindsight, a confluence of indigenous Balinese animistic traditions, Indian religion, literature and elements of social organization, and Javanese court traditions.

Here we encounter another important factor that contributes to the famed resilience of performing art traditions in both Java and Bali: the mechanism of cultural appropriation, or the localization of the elements of the foreign cultures into the indigenous Balinese or Javanese tradition. For the Javanese, the Pandava brothers -- the main protagonists of the Indian epic Mahabharata -- are no less Javanese than prince Panji.[11] The story, of course, occurs in Java, not in India. This is not to say that a more educated Javanese or Balinese is not aware of the origin of the two epics. However, the historical fact that a particular art form originated in India does not make it any less Balinese or Javanese.[12]

Intercultural borrowing and the localizing of foreign elements into the indigenous tradition so that they gradually become an intrinsic part of Balinese culture are thus not new to Bali and were introduced well before the expansion of tourism and advancement of Western culture in the twentieth century. The history of Balinese performing arts is the history of intercultural

exchanges and borrowings, the history of creating and changing traditions, or simply the history of continually creating modern traditions. The Ramayana and Mahabharata were just as modern when they first appeared as a dramatic source in the area as wayang listrik in Java and Bali is today. The process of ***modernization*** that has spread through the island in this century is, in this sense, fully a continuation of what is known as the history of ***traditional*** and ***intercultural*** Bali.

It was not until the 1920s that the image of Bali as a paradise and as a repository of ancient Majapahit and old pre-Hindu Balinese culture first appeared. Adrian Vickers points out how untenable and misleading this view of Bali is:

> The idea, adhered to both Westerners and Balinese, that the island's culture was traditional, and hence unchanged, masked the changes taking place in the Balinese society. Bali has been caught up in the modern' world since the Dutch first came in the sixteenth century... The changes of the 20th century simply accelerated the process of change.[13]

Bali's first contacts with the West Portuguese and Dutch explorers, merchants, and missionaries began early in the sixteenth century. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Dutch had established a complex trade network with the whole archipelago. The common assumption that Bali played but a minor role in this trade network led to another mistaken assumption that Balinese culture was spared from changing under Western influences until the final encroachment of the Dutch colonial rule in the late nineteenth century.

In his analysis of the period between the fall of Majapahit until the establishment of the Dutch colonial state in Bali, Clifford Geertz argues that the common assumption about Bali's isolation from both Western and Islamic influences during these five centuries has been exaggerated by scholars. This common assumption is based on the fact that Bali was marginal to the complex trade economy which played a crucial role in the history of the Indonesian archipelago at that time. Geertz argues against the idea that ***modern Bali is a "museum"in which the culture of pre-colonial inner Indonesia has been preserved intact.***[14] There is no reason to believe, Geertz continues, ***that Bali, for all its isolation from the mainstream of Indonesian development after the rest of the archipelago was Islamized ... did not change for 350 years after the destruction of Majapahit.*** Geertz's theory of ***endogenous*** development of Balinese society in this period may prove valuable for the study of the arts and culture that developed during this time:

> In the first place, although Balinese life did change significantly between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries, the change was to a very great extent endogenous. In particular, two revolutionary events that elsewhere radically transformed the social and cultural order, Islamization and intense Dutch domination, did not occur in Bali. Thus, though the island's history is no less dynamic than that of the other Indicized regions of the archipelago, it is far more orthogenetic and a good deal more measured. Bali in the later half of the

> nineteenth century may not have been a mere replica of Bali in the middle of the fourteenth, but it was at least fully continuous with it.[15]

Geertz's theory of endogenous development of Balinese culture during these five centuries is valuable in that it refutes the common assumption that Balinese society remained intact during this period, since it was on the periphery of major trade routes. Although Balinese society and culture did change, these changes are less apparent because of the relative absence of foreign influences and the lack of substantial historical documentation from this period.

The performing arts also flourished and, although seemingly untouched by Western or Islamic influences, they nevertheless underwent significant changes. The seventeenth through nineteenth century court dances, according to the generally accepted taxonomy of Balinese performing arts, belong to the balih-balihan category. These are secular dances although they may be presented in the temple as part of a religious ceremony. In such a case, the context determines their religious significance. When performed in the temple they are meant to entertain both celestial and human audiences.

Legong is one of the most important and the best known dances from this period. In its present form, Legong incorporates elements of various performing art traditions: pre-Hindu ritual dances (especially Sang Hyang Dedari) and Hindu Javanese traditions (Gambuh) combined with the early twentieth century kebyar music style. Its dramatic material is drawn from Lasem, another version of the Panji stories.

In his essay about modern Balinese dance, I Wayan Dibia points out that the process of creating new performing art forms by adopting elements from foreign cultures, or rearranging elements of older forms into more modern creations, can be traced back to (at least) the sixteenth century.[16] Three prominent traditional Balinese dance-dramas can be used as examples: Gambuh, Wayang Wong, and Calonarang. Gambuh is one of the oldest dance-drama forms in Bali, and is generally accepted as a heritage of ***premodern***, traditional Bali. However, Dibia reminds us that Gambuh was born in the process of acculturation between Java and Bali, and its iconography and music and dance style belong to the Hindu-Javanese tradition, not that of old Balinese. Wayang Wong (seventeenth century) is the result of combining elements of Gambuh with those of wayang kulit, while Calonarang (nineteenth or early twentiethth century) is but a more recent composite of elements of Gambuh (pagambuhan), legong (palegongan), and Barong dance (babarongan).[17]

Gambuh itself is an interesting example of the process of intercultural borrowings in pre-twentiethth century Bali. Gambuh stories are taken from four major sources: the Panji cycles: stories about an East-Javanese prince who searches for his lost love Candra Kirana; Malat, a Balinese variation of the Panji stories in which the prince is shipwrecked in Bali and marries a Balinese princess; Rangga Lawe, the historical account of the revolt of Rangga Lawe against King Hayam Wuruk (Hindu Java, fourteenth century); and Amad Mohammad, a Javanese account of the life of Mohammad (Islamic Java). The last story is rarely performed today. It, however, stands as but one among a number of examples of Islamic influences in the performing arts of

Bali.

These three examples (Gambuh, Wayang Wong, and Calonarang) point toward a mechanism of development of Balinese performing arts which is in this essay defined as a perpetual creation of modern traditions. It can be assumed that all three dance-dramas were just as modern and non-traditional at the times they appeared as Drama Gong or Sendratari were in the 1960s. The major difference is that Gambuh has long been granted the status of a representative of Balinese ***tradition***, while Sendratari and Drama Gong (both often criticized by Western scholars for not being traditional enough) are still in the process of waiting to be acknowledged as traditional, and more important, as Balinese.

Once again, I would like to ask what the real meaning of modernism or modernization is when applied to Balinese arts, and what aspects of the modern development of the performing arts are still considered to be a threat to Balinese ***tradition***? In the previous section of this essay I have pointed out that it is the social functions (primarily religious and political) of the performing arts that bring us closer to the meaning of ***traditional*** and ***Balinese,*** not iconography or dance and music styles which, as we have just seen, have been changing throughout Balinese history. In the next section I will analyze the ***modern,*** twentieth century developments of performing arts in Bali in regards to their changing function and place in society. In this understanding, negative aspects of Balinese modernism (or modernisms) are related to the processes of commercialization and individualization of the arts which resulted variously from the growing tourist industry in Bali, the more frequent and more intimate contacts with the West, urbanization and the spread of modern technology.

Modernization: Cultural Tourism and Experiments with Tradition

Colonial Bali: 1900s - 1940s

The war with the Dutch in the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century together with the puputan rites in 1906-1908 were marked by some of the greatest massacres in Balinese history.[18] After the Klungkung puputan in 1908 the last direct descendants of the Majapahit emperors were gone. The aristocracy who survived the puputan were deprived of their main sources of income and power, and were no longer able to sponsor large ceremonies. Many court gamelan were ***handed down to village music and dance organizations, which were eager to add the royal splendor of superb artistic performances to their community, by having the support of musicians, dancers and teachers, who were previously employed by the court.***[19]

By 1912 Dutch colonial rule in Bali was firmly established. The Dutch intended to display Bali's culture in all its splendor to the outside world in order to create a positive image of their colonial policy and to atone for the blood bath for which they were responsible. The result was the so-called ***Ethical Policy*** which was to preserve traditional Balinese culture and protect it from changing under Western influences. This policy led to the expansion of tourism in the 1920s and 1930s, forever changing the cultural life of Bali.

Colin McPhee, one of the scholars and artists who frequented Bali at this time, described Balinese dance as ***pure, impersonal art.***[20] According to McPhee, in Balinese dance ***the individuality of the dancer is of no importance. His performance may have unusual finish and personal charm, but with these he does not seek to express himself.*** It is exactly this quality of Balinese dance that began changing in this century. The art, which was never intended to be a means of expression of an individual, but rather of the community, became highly individualized under Western influence. Painters and sculptors started signing their work. For the first time certain dances and musical compositions became as famous as the artists who created them.

A new musical form appeared early this century and created a trend which spread across the whole island in less than a decade: kebyar. It was embraced with such an enthusiasm and in such a short period of time that very quickly it became not only ***traditional*** , but its sounds soon evolved into an aural synonym for Bali. But how traditional is kebyar?

A number of ethnomusicologists have already pointed out that kebyar developed at the expense of the older musical genres of Bali, especially the gamelan gong gede and semar pagulingan. Tilman Seebass wrote that ***kebiar was ruinous for the traditional gamelan genres, because everywhere it led to the dismantling of old gamelans through the melting down and recasting of old gong kettles and gangsa keys.***[21] Seebass adds that it was a mistake to promote kebyar, ***since it brought about almost everywhere the destruction of the gong and the semar pagulingan, the main pillars of the ritual and ceremonial life in villages and courts.*** [22] Although developed at the expense of old gamelan forms, kebyar quickly crossed the bridge from being modern and revolutionary to being traditional and authentically Balinese.

New dances appeared providing adequate visual accompaniment for the new musical style. The most famous name in the performing arts of the time was I Mario, the father of the kebyar dance. His famous creations (Oleg Tamulilingan and Kebyar duduk are the most well-known) were but the first in a series of new creations of kebyar dances which are now generally accepted as the very essence of the ***Balineseness*** of the Balinese performing arts. These dances are neither religious nor narrative in nature, and can be performed merely for the enjoyment of the audience without any adherence to the religious calendar. Their musical style, iconography, alphabet of movements, and movement styles are so unlike those of Gambuh, Legong, or Wayang Wong that the concept of the ***traditional*** in Balinese performing arts (and they all belong to this category) appears to make little or no sense at all.

The move from the ***traditional*** to the ***modern*** is somewhat easier to understand through an analysis of the changing social and cultural functions of particular forms than through the contemplation of their aesthetics. Besides the development of new forms, many old rituals and religious dances were performed outside of their religious context. In some villages various ritual dances came to be performed on a daily basis, again without regard for the religious calendar or festivals.

The period between the 1920s and the 1940s was also significant for Bali's integration into a new nation and acquiring a new identity as part of a modern, cosmopolitan and independent republic. A new generation of educated Balinese shared in the excitement of the nationalist movement that was growing in other Indonesian provinces. The Balinese began to take part in what was emerging as a national, Indonesian art.[23] The tension between traditional customs (adat) and modern ideas and practices appeared for the first time as a main topic of literary and dramatic works in Bali. As Bagus noted, ***the Surya Kanta movement, with its related journalistic and literary activities, was the most important of the early attempts by Balinese intellectuals to transform their society into a more modern one.***[24] In his essay Bagus discusses the play Woman's Fidelity, one of the very few examples of literary or dramatic works in Bali reacting immediately and explicitly to the changing social and political context in the country. This play was concerned with caste ideology. It was written as a reaction to the 1910 marriage law imposed by the Dutch, which forbade men of lower caste to marry women of higher caste. The play is only one example of the spirit of the Surya Kanta movement whose participants were commoners opposing both Dutch colonial rule and the injustice of the Balinese caste (and class) system. However, since the problems of everyday life never found an important place on the Balinese stage, this lonely attempt to dramatize contemporary problems in theatre was quickly abandoned, and the Surya Kanta movement as a whole quickly lost its momentum.

During the revolution, Bali experienced another major bloodshed. When, after Japan's capitulation, the Dutch forces returned to Bali on March 2, 1946, they found the island in a state of turmoil. Around 2000 KNIL troops landed in Sanur, expecting to be welcomed by the Balinese, but about two weeks later, fighting broke out. According to Robinson, ***Over the course of the Revolution (1945-1949) roughly 1,400 Balinese died on the Republican side alone, and a further 700 died fighting on the side of the Dutch.***[25]

Robinson describes his article as ***a modest response to the provocative silence*** which surrounds this period. It should be noted at this point that neither this nor other devastating moments of Balinese history have ever found their way into the literature or drama in Bali. In the Western world periods of great disaster, like wars and major social conflicts, have always been the most valuable sources for dramatic and literary work. Unlike Western artists, the Balinese are silent about the dark moments of their history. No matter how horrifying the social reality may be, Balinese art always responds with its eyes closed to reality by evoking the splendors of Majapahit or Gelgel courts, or the universal values prescribed by the great Indian epics. If we keep in mind that the traditional function of Balinese art is to maintain the symbolic universe and to legitimize the political one, it may be understandable why theater in Bali is unfamiliar with tragedy. The performing arts in Bali are never subversive, they are devotional and reifying.

Contemporary Bali: 1960s - 1990s

In the mid 1960s, after an attempted communist coup, Bali underwent another dramatic

political and social transition. This episode in Balinese history never reached the theater. Again, the performing arts responded to this reality with the usual silence, turning instead to the distant past and recalling the splendors of the old kingdoms. The political turbulence of 1965-1966 did, however, bring about a new theater form: Drama Gong. Vickers explains its origin:

> drama was created as an antidote to the political factionalism of the time. It was a new entertainment that filled the space of the speechmaking and political rallies which were ended when any forms of leftism and overt political activity on behalf of the masses were eliminated. Rightist Balinese were involved in its establishment, and dangerous political speeches became harmless theater, paralleling the ***depoliticization*** process in politics and the new doctrine from Jakarta of the ***floating mass.***[26]

One of the priorities of the New Order government was to promote international tourism as one of the best ways to minimize the federal budge deficit. Bali was the perfect place for this. In the 1970s ***tourism became a top economic priority in the province, second only to agriculture.***[27] For the Balinese tourism meant prosperity; it also meant a serious threat of cultural pollution. Still, the goal of the Cultural Tourism Policy seemed to be clear: ***It was expected to develop and promote simultaneously culture and tourism ... by taking advantage of Balinese culture to attract tourists, while using the economic benefits of tourism to foster Balinese culture.***[28]

According to the Balinese authorities, this policy brought a cultural renaissance to the island. It revived the Balinese interest in their own traditions, and stimulated their artistic creativity. Many authors, however, would argue that the benefits of tourism were nullified by the desecration, simplification, and popularization of the traditional performing arts. Others believe that the proved resilience of Balinese culture would keep it safe from threats of cultural pollution.[29] They believed that the influx of tourist performances was strictly reserved for the tourist audiences, while the economic benefits from them would help to maintain indigenous Balinese art, reserved clearly for the Balinese audience, free from the negative aspects of tourism. Picard, however, fears that the Balinese can now no longer tell the difference. He questions ***whether the Balinese are actually in a position to discriminate between their cultural performances according to the audience for whom they are intended.***[30]

Some of the popular dances are those which have been removed from their religious and dramatic contexts, and transformed into solo dance (Baris, Topeng, Jauk); some are simplified versions of court dances (Legong); others are original works created for tourists (Panyembrama, Oleg Tamullingan). These dances are often performed in a package, simply called Legong Dance.

In the 1950s, Bali Beach Hotel started opening each ***Legong Dance*** with Pendet, as a welcome dance for tourists. However, ***this caused a great distress to the Balinese religious authorities, shocked that the tourists were being treated in the same way as the gods.***[31] Thus, a new ***welcome dance*** was created, entitled Panyembrama. It replaced the old

traditional dance in greeting the tourists. The problem was that this new creation eventually made its way back to the temple festivals, replacing the Pendet.

In Kaja and Kelod, Bandem places on the kaja side of the Balinese universe [32] all the dance forms which have been preserved as traditional, and which in turn serve as forces of preserving the tradition. Those elements that are still considered modern and unwanted by those Balinese who carry on the mission of preserving traditional art forms are placed on the kelod side of the spectrum. As a consequence, the closer to the kaja side a particular form is, the more likely it is to be called traditional or pure Balinese. Of the various forms on the kaja side, the Sang Hyang rituals provide the best example. On the other hand, the more modern the trends, ideas, and forms are, the closer they are to the kelod extreme. Modern disco clubs eximplify this extreme, often associated with the demonic underworld. Still, this is only a static consideration of the kaja/kelod paradigm. The dynamic aspect of this model views the negative aspects of modernization as an ongoing shift from kaja to kelod, from sacred and traditional to secular, modern, and Western. The Balinese reality shows that the process of modernization also implies a potentially dangerous shift from kelod to kaja, with the Pendet/Panyembrama phenomenon offering a perfect example. These dynamics may be illustrated by any other example from the history of Balinese performance when a new (modern) idea or form is fully assimilated into the culture so that it becomes a tradition. In the nineteenth century, Legong was a modern dance form although it has its roots in Sang Hyang and Gambuh. Due to its popularity it gradually began to influence its own source, with the Sang Hyang dances incorporating many elements from Legong. In this example the kaja-to-kelod traffic happened without the stimulus of any foreign influence and did not evolve into a controversy. The displacement of the sacred Pendet by the Panyembrama in the temple ceremonies is but another darker and more dangerous side of the same process.

The secular Kecak was created in the 1930s. Although a relatively modern form, it is considered to be a traditional Balinese dance, for, like Legong, it has its roots in the old Sang Hyang ritual. Since the time of its origin, Kecak has undergone numerous changes. As I Wayan Dibia has noted, ***While the essential elements of the production, the multi-layered, interlocking, rhythmic voices and the primal look and spirit have remained basically the same, many other aspects have been stimulated by other contemporary performance practices.***[33] I Wayan Dibia has been one of the most enthusiastic pioneers in experimenting with this form. In 1979 he directed a large scale Kecak production involving a chorus of 500 men. This production was commissioned by ***the regent of Badung as a highlight to a formal ceremony celebrating a special award from the Indonesian government.***[34] In 1982 Dibia directed another experimental Kecak production on the beach, involving some 250 performers, some of whom chanted while afloat in the water.[35] I Wayan Dibia holds a Ph.D. degree from UCLA and is a famous and respected dancer and dance teacher (currently the Dean of STSI Denpasar). He experiments with tradition without losing interest or respect for it, injecting fresh enthusiasm into the living tradition, presenting valuable examples of how to make traditional art forms more accessible to the modern audiences. The example of Dibia's work demonstrates that it is not necessary to keep the traditional forms locked in a museum in order to preserved them--an approach that leads to a

museumizing of the culture. Such strict adherence to tradition also risks alienating the young who, faced with the rigidity of the tradition, may cling even tighter to the more exciting challenges from the West.

Conclusion

The process of commercialization of the Balinese performing arts is usually seen by scholars as a disease that threatens to destroy the tradition of Balinese art and is rapidly reducing the artistic values of traditional art forms. Two arguments can be advanced against this negative view of the process of modernization and commercialization of the performing arts in Bali. First, the period of Cultural Tourism introduced a new economic function to the arts. It was easily adopted by Balinese artists because this economic element was simply added to the first two functions of the performing arts, the religious and political. Criticizing the commercial aspects of the arts means criticizing it from a Western point of view which considers all art forms to be symbolic expressions of creative individuals bringing their intrinsic emotional and intellectual responses to bear on the reality around them. This idealized view of the arts is unknown to the Balinese. What they know as ***art*** is what we would call art in service, or applied art, which always servs a specific function in the society and is thus instrumental rather than symbolic. In this sense, performing for the gods in the temple or for the kings in the palace is not much different to a Balinese than performing for the tourists. Picard points this out in a sarcastic composite of quotes: "***In the temple we ask for a blessing, and at a hotel we ask for money***," and "***It's a ritual dance to ask the gods for a lot of tourists***"[36]

The second argument concerns the artistic values of the tourist performances as opposed to those given in the traditional context. A famous Balinese dancer and dance teacher once told me that it takes more skills and a higher level of training of to participate in a performance for tourists than is required in a temple performance. In a temple, a performer always gives his best and the gods do not judge his talent but the depths of his devotion. Tourists are not as tolerant as the gods and they want to get what they paid for. Also, tourists want to see the ***real Bali*** on the stage, the pure Balineseness as was described in their coffee table books. They do not care for experimental work which often involves adoption of the elements of Western art. This has kept the Balinese tradition alive, for it is traditional work that has a market value. On the other hand, this has led to a danger of ***museumizing*** the Balinese art, depriving it of the ability to change and develop according to its natural laws.

It seems that in the 1960s Balinese artists finally adopted the Western- derived idea of theatrical performances being intended and created solely for the aesthetic pleasure of the audiences. That is, they adopted the idea of theater as ***art*** which allows for (and indeed, often calls for) an intentional artistic creativity on the part of a choreographer and performer, and is not meant as an instrumental action in any sense other than to entertain the audience.[37] Still, modernism, in this specific sense of advocating individualism (as opposed to the communal tradition) is still confined to the two major government sponsored performing art schools--STSI and SMKI--and has not, as yet, affected the living tradition in Balinese villages.

It is not possible to predict what the future generations will bring into the existing layered whole of Balinese performing arts. Old kingdoms have long been replaced by the modern Indonesian state, and many old state rituals have been replaced by the new ones. Theater as entertainment has long been competing with television and film, while theatre as an educational tool has been overpowered by the mass media and the increasing availability and variety of printed literature. Despite the ongoing debate concerning the dangers of modernization, and despite the continual changes in the forms and styles of particular dances, dance-dramas, and musical compositions, the theater of Bali, by and large, seems to have preserved at least one of its inherent qualities: its intricate connection with the religious life of the Balinese.

In the first part of my paper, I have suggested that as long as the religious foundation of Balinese culture remains strong and relatively unchanged, the modern era may affect the form of particular performing art genres (and that only to a certain extent), while their innermost quality of serving the religion will remain as strong as it has been throughout history. The styles and forms of various performing art genres, as I have explained in the second half of this essay, have been continually changing. Hence, even the most recent and most experimental changes seem to be fully continuous with the pattern apparent in the history of Balinese performing arts in which change seems to be the only constant factor. Bearing in mind the tremendous importance of religion in Balinese society, one may sarcastically ask whether a Balinese dance piece heavily influenced by rock music or jazz dance movements, if performed in a Balinese temple with appropriate spiritual preparation and offerings and as a gift to gods, would eventually come to be considered a legitimate part of Balinese tradition. A few Balinese artists, with whom I reluctantly shared this concern, simply shook their heads with the explanation that the Balinese gods would still prefer to hear gamelan. As long as the gods are those who dictate the degree and the quality of change of Balinese artistic life (and the gods in Bali are of a very discriminative taste, and not always easy to please), the Balinese traditions will remain Balinese, despite the fact that these traditions will continually change, as they always have.

Notes

This paper was presented under the title Penciptaan Tradisi Moderen Dalam Seni Pertunjukan Bali at the conference: "The Cultural Concept of Bali" in August 1997 at the Ngurah Rai University in Denpasar, Bali. The conference was organized by the society for Balinese Studies (Lembaga Pengkajian Budaya Bali).

1Clive S. Kessler, ***Archaism and Modernity: Contemporary Malay Political Culture,*** in Joel Khan, and Francis Loh Kok Wah, Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), 134.

2 From the middle of the nineteenth century, until 1942, Bali was under Dutch colonial rule which was gradually imposed over the whole island. In 1868 the Dutch occupied the northern and western parts of Bali, and established a center for their colonial government there. By 1908

they occupied the rest of the island.

3 Kessler, ***Archaism and Modernity: Contemporary Malay Political Culture,*** 134.

4 Kessler, ***Archaism and Modernity: Contemporary Malay Political Culture,*** 135.

5 The idea of ***symbolic universe*** is taken form Bruce A. McConachie's article ***Towards A Postpositivist Theatre History*** in Theatre Journal, 37, no. 4 (Dec. 1985): 479. In this section of his article, McConachie further develops Kenneth Burke's perception that man makes symbols to ameliorate the chaos of existence: The symbolic universe shapes time and history, places a contemporary social hierarchy into a context of transcendental order,locates the meaning of death and shelters the individual from the terror of formless experience. (p. 479)

6 According to Geertz, history in Bali is seen as a gradual decline from the classical ***golden era*** to the present. Many Balinese court ceremonies and performances were, in effect, ***re-creating*** an ***exemplary center*** on the model of these classical kingdoms. See Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 13-19.

7 By religion I do not mean the system of religious beliefs only, but the rich network of practical applications of these beliefs into a complex system of daily rituals and temple ceremonies, together with the regulations of social behavior which are still inseparable from the religion itself. By religion here I mean the everyday life of the Balinese.

8 These efforts started with the ***Ethical Policy*** under the Dutch, and were enhanced in the early 1970s under the policy of ***Cultural Tourism.***

9 Sekolah Tinggi Seni Indonesia (in further text STSI) and Sekolah Menengah Karawitan Indonesia (in further text SMKI).

10 Animism assumes the existence of spirits and demons that reside in everything in and beyond the physical world. These spirits (called buta or leyak in Bali) are believed to be charged with magical power which can either harm individuals or communities, or bring them prosperity. To assure the cooperation of spirits people needed to establish some kind of communication with them. This communication could be carried out by people who possess a special kind of ***magical power*** necessary to establish contact with this invisible realm, in order to propitiate gods or appease demons for the betterment of the community.

11 The Kurawas would probably belong to a foreign kingdom which is at war with Java or is in any other way annoying the good Javanese. The tendency on both Java and Bali is to present the ***bad guys*** as foreigners.

12The Sultans of the Central Javanese Mataram kingdom identified themselves as descendants

of the heroes in the Mahabharata as they were represented in the wayang kulit. During this period several genealogies were written that traced the lineage of these Javanese rulers all the way back to wayang purwa epics (Serat Kanda and Babad Tanah Jawi).

13 Adrian Vickers, Bali, A Paradise Created (Singapore: Periplus Editions, 1996), 131-132.

14 Clifford Geertz, Negara, 7.

15 Clifford Geertz, Negara, 8-9. Adrian Vickers in his introduction to Being Modern in Bali: Image and Change. supports Geertz's theory: ***The view of Bali as somehow apart or cut off from the rest of the archipelago was largely a colonial construction, a combination of divide-and-rule policies and the idealization of Bali as a cultural paradise.*** See Being Modern in Bali: Image and Change, ed. Adrian Vickers (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1996), 8.

16 I Wayan Dibia. ***Dari Tari Tradisi ke Tari Kreasi/Moderen,*** paper presented at the Indonesian Dance Seminar in Mataram, Lombok, July 1997.

17 I Wayan Dibia. ***Dari Tari Tradisi ke Tari Kreasi/Moderen,***4.

18 When faced with the more powerful and better armed Dutch army early this century, several Balinese rajas chose to exercise the rite of puputan rather than suffering the humiliation of being defeated and enslaved. When the Dutch surrendered Denpasar in 1906, they were welcomed by a strange, solemn procession that emerged from the main gate of the court. Hundreds of court officials, guards, priests, their wives and children, led by the raja, dressed in white ceremonial clothes, came out to fight to the end, and to die with dignity. When they approached the startled Dutch army, the entranced men and women began attacking the well-armed soldiers with golden daggers (kris) or with bare hands. The soldiers answered with the fire. When the raja was killed, all of his wives stabbed themselves to death over his dead body; the others either followed them or ran towards the soldiers, only to be killed by the guns. At the end, the way to the palace was free to the Dutch, except for hundreds of corpses that covered the way. The same rite was repeated in other Balinese courts. After the Klungkung puputan in 1908 the last direct descendants of the Majapahit emperors were gone. Only a few survived.

19 Martin Ramstedt, ***Indonesian Cultural Policy in Relation to the Development of Balinese Performing Arts,*** in Danker Shaareman, ed. Balinese Music in Context, (Winterthur/Schweiz: Amadeus Verlag, 1992), 61.

20 Colin McPhee, ***Dance in Bali,*** in Traditional Balinese Culture, ed. Jane Belo, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 290.

21 Tilman Seebass, ***Kebiar in the 1920s and 1930s,*** in Vickers, Being Modern in Bali, 86.

22 Seebass, ***Kebiar in the 1920s and 1930s,*** 86.

23 I Gusti Ngurah Bagus, ***The Play Woman's Fidelity: Literature and Caste Conflict in Bali,*** trans. Hildred Geertz, in Vickers, Being Modern in Bali, 92.

24 Bagus, ***The Play Woman's Fidelity: Literature and Caste Conflict in Bali,*** 92.

25 Geoffrey Robinson, ***State, Society and Political Conflict in Bali, 1945-1946.*** Indonesia no. 45 (April 1988): 2.

26 Adrian Vickers, ***Modernity and Being Modern: An Introduction,*** in Vickers, Being Modern in Bali, 25.

27 Michel Picard, ***Cultural Tourism*** in Bali: Cultural Performances as Tourist Attraction. p. 41.

28 Michel Picard, ***Cultural Tourism in Bali,*** 42.

The others are primarily Indonesian artists and scholars. In most of his work I Made Bandem emphasizes the positive intentions as well as the results of the policy of Cultural Tourism.

30 Michel Picard, ***Cultural Tourism in Bali,*** 44.

31 Michel Picard, ***Cultural Tourism in Bali,*** 52.

32 Kaja and kelod, in Balinese language literally mean ***toward the mountains*** and ***toward the sea***, respectively. Aside from indicating the spatial orientation, kaja and kelod symbolize the spiritual orientation in Balinese universe. In this understanding, kaja, the direction toward the mountains, especially the sacred mountain Gunung Agung which is believed to be the abode of the gods, symbolizes the sacred aspects of this universe. Kelod, direction toward the sea, which is believed to be inhabited by demons and evil spirits, is the symbol of demonic forces and spiritual impurity. Kaja is, thus, sacred, divine, and pure, while kelod is demonic, impure, and often profane.

33 I Wayan Dibia, Kecak: The Vocal Chant of Bali. (Denpasar: Hartanto Art Books Studio, 1996), 53.

34 I Wayan Dibia, Kecak, 61.

35 I Wayan Dibia, Kecak, 61.

36 Michel Picard. ***Cultural Tourism in Bali,*** 37.

37 One may add that these new productions also serve an educational function in that they make the audience more familiar with the old epic literature, as well as Balinese history and the legends which are dramatized on the stage. However, it is hard to say that creators of these new productions have this in mind when thinking through their art work, and that they are deliberately aiming their performances to serve an educational purpose.