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Bangkok Postcard

Forgetting and Remembering "Hok Tulaa", the October 6 Massacre

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Bangkok, October 6, 1996- I met a friend, Darunii, near my house for coffee and to mull over what we would do that day. My plan for the day was to listen to the speeches and music at the 20 Year Commemoration Ceremony of the October 6 Massacre at Thammasat University (or Hok Tulaa as it is called in Thai). Thais do not normally discuss the events of *Hok Tulaa* in public. Additionally, Darunii is a village girl who had to drop out of school early to become a seamstress, so I was a little reluctant to drag her to something which might be either too dry, or too academic. I said something neutral like wouldn't it be "interesting" to go.

To my surprise she was excited to attend. "Hok Tulaa is very interesting", she agreed. "For Thais it is difficult to remember. It was so horrible it seems like it was not part of our history or our culture. Maybe it is something we would prefer to forget."

At the time I was surprised to hear this, dumb struck in fact. Darunii stated clearly and succinctly a set of ideas that were just forming in my mind. That many Thais would prefer to forget the massacre of 6 October was clear, many cultures have events and incidents that they would prefer to forget. But what is it that makes a historical event "difficult to remember". Algebraic equations and your mother's birthday are difficult to remember, how so a historic event?

But Darunii's words would prove themselves true. For a few memorable days this October, during the country's first major remembrance of its darkest moment, many Thais were forced to struggle with their historical memory and, more importantly (and dangerously), the cultural ideas which undergird that same history.

Twenty years ago, on October 6, 1976, between four and five thousand college students and their supporters gathered inside the gates of Thammasat University in preparation to protest the return to Thailand of Thanom Kittikachorn, the dictator ousted by a student protest three years before in 1973. In the dead of night the campus was surrounded by the Thai military, police, and rightist vigilantes making exit impossible. Small arms gun fire was exchanged infrequently between the two groups in the tense hours that followed. At 5:30 AM a rocket propelled grenade and several anti-tank missiles marked the beginning of an assault on the campus.

The year or so preceding the massacre witnessed the sharp polarization of Thai society. Following the successful popular student uprising of October 1973, which established democratic rule in Thailand, an emboldened, activist left emerged on the political scene. Students, artists, activists, and other liberal groups moved throughout the country trying to organize land and labor reform in Thailand. On the international level, they worked to extricate Thailand from the Vietnam war effort and Western political influence. Still heady from their success in 1973, much of the political left felt that it was only a matter of time before major social change swept through Thailand.

The political right was also organizing and was made up of militarists, right-wing Buddhists, and anti-communists. This group inundated the Thai populace with a particularly virulent form of propaganda which played strongly on ethnic and nationalist themes. They painted the left as Marxists sympathizers and radicals (only some were). The radical reformers, they argued, were not even Thai; they were Vietnamese and Chinese in ethnic origin (particularly despised minorities in Thailand at that time) or, at the very least, completely indoctrinated by foreign ideologies. Right-wing Buddhist groups, particularly those led by a monk named Kitti Vutho, argued that killing communists was, in Buddhist terms, a meritorious act as it freed society from suffering. Thailand was a slightly destabilized country in a completely destabilized region. With news of the killing fields in Cambodia and the fall of Saigon added to this toxic mix of fear and insecurity the right-wing's propaganda fell on many sympathetic ears. When a picture, later discovered to have been a forgery, appeared in two Thai newspapers depicting college students hanging the Crown Prince of Thailand in effigy, many people believed that the students had committed an unforgivable act of lese-majesty.

The atrocities which followed the assault on Thammasat are sobering and the total number of dead is still unknown today (46 is the very low official number). The desire of the forces gathered outside the campus was to both crush and humiliate the students and their supporters. Weapons of war were used indiscriminately; students were hung; some female students were

reportedly raped. Several people, alive but unconscious were gathered into a pile and burned with tires and gasoline. Captured students were forced to take off their shirts (women included) and crawl across the campus to the awaiting police vans and buses; many were kicked and beaten along the way. As social critic Sulak Sivaraksa pointed out, the military's aim was to treat the students as if they were pigs.

Awful, unexplainable, and savage, like some primitive scapegoat ceremony, bodies of the dead were dragged to the park across from Thammasat and mutilated in front of cheering crowds. The horror of the right-wing propaganda came to fruition on that day. Those who participated in the assault seemed convinced that the students were the direct opposite of all things good and all things Thai: they were evil, Marxist, a-*dhammic* (anti-Buddhist), Chinese and Vietnamese in origin, and anti-royal. When rightist crowds, stoked as they were with the fire of righteousness, strung several corpses to trees and took turns beating and pounding them with chairs, they were not striking out at the Thai students, they were striking out in defense of the Thai Id.

The end result of the massacre is fairly well known. Survivors fled to the hills to join the Communist insurgents, went into hiding, or fled the country. Thailand itself lurched to the right and tight press control prevented public discussion of the massacre. Yet, as time has passed and press control has all but vanished, the issue of the massacre has still not been publicly taken up...

A recent review of Thai high school history and culture textbooks showed, disturbingly, that 80% do not even mention the Hok Tulaa events. Of the few that do mention the massacre most use very neutral language (e.g., their was an "uprising" that was "suppressed" and many students fled to the jungle as a result). One textbook even takes the rightist side suggesting that the students were indeed anti-royalist and infiltrated by Vietnamese revolutionaries. The only textbook which tackles the 1976 massacre in any depth is (not surprisingly) published by Thammasat University, but even that book dodges the issue of the atrocities. As tame as the Thammasat book seems to be, it still has trouble with the Board of Education censors: a group which must give clearance to all the country's schoolbooks, and whose membership and membership criteria is still, to this day, kept secret.

The Hok Tulaa Commemoration was held on the soccer field inside the Thammasat wall. As participants entered the field they came upon the commemoration's centerpiece/memorial, a 12 to 15 foot golden funeral urn. Surrounding the urn's base were pictures of students killed during the massacre. Many of the pictures would have been familiar to Western students of Thai history or politics, but most had not yet been published or displayed publicly in Thailand. The photos were gruesome and one had to step back from them occasionally and take a breath before continuing around. One elderly woman discovered the true fate of one of her children while circling the urn.

The urn's symbolism was complex. Great pains were taken to give it, and the whole commemoration ceremony, a religious overtone. Six hours of religious rights preceded the

opening of the ceremony including food and robe offerings to 106 monks and wreath laying for the dead. Having been secretly disposed of in the wake of the massacre, the bodies of many students killed at Hok Tulaa had not received a proper cremation (considered an awful misfortune in Thailand). The urn itself was thus meant to give closure to their deaths. Subtly adding to the political meaning was the urn's design: being royal in shape rather than of the commoner's design it attempted to elevate the deaths of Hok Tulaa and give them the image of noble purpose. However, the main message of the urn was to shock open memories-or plant them in the minds of those too young to remember-more like the Jewish Holocaust memorials I frequented as an undergraduate than anything I have ever before seen in Thailand. It spoke clearly to those who could bear to make a full revolution around its base. "Look at this horror and remember," it seemed to say. "Do not ever forget."

The atmosphere of the event hovered somewhere between Woodstock 2 and a college teach-in. On a large stage opposite the urn, aging political rockers and folk stars sang the popular protest songs from the 1970's era, or *dontrii pua chiwit* (music for life) as it is called in Thai. Between acts, Thammasat academics gave speeches about the importance of the day while all around the field booths sold books and video tapes about the 1973 to 1976 era. A first year Thai language student who did not know the phrases "You must remember" and "Don't forget" would have had them down cold by the end of the day. Each person who took the stage spoke these two phrases passionately and emphatically, and all about the field the words "remember" and "don't forget" were written on posters, t-shirts, and placards. One particular booth sold postcards with the face of a murdered student leader on the front and the words "Don't forget Hok Tulaa" on the back. For the price of a postage stamp a fervent rememberer could spread memory to the provinces. The event itself, and the several mini-events that surrounded it, were a great success by almost every standard. Attendance was high and the print media coverage, which lasted for several days, was excellent. For many of the victims the ceremonies were cathartic. For the first time they could share their stories publicly and talk about the events of Hok Tulaa to sympathetic audiences. Yet on the most official level of Thai society, the desire is still to forget-or to propagate forgetting. Even though the event drew both the major candidates for prime minister, Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and Chuan Leekpai, who laid wreaths and spoke to the audience, none of the three state controlled television stations ran a story on the event. Nor was it covered by the state run radio news services. Royal participation in the event was also absent.

More importantly, to date no perpetrator of the Hok Tulaa violence has come forward to discuss the days events. The right-wing mobsters, policemen and soldiers have kept their jaws clenched tightly for twenty years and, in all likelihood, plan to die that way.

So even with all the new and flourishing discussions which surrounded the Hok Tulaa remembrance, the massacre has yet to be understood as a historical event. Only the victims' stories are now known. A journalist might say that the *what*, *when*, and *where* of the story have come to light, but the *who* and *why* are nowhere to be found. More poetic is the summary of Professor Thongchai Winichakul who stated that the Hok Tulaa remembrances succeeded in "making a loud noise at the very edge of silence."

Yet the cry of the remembrance ceremony, "Don't forget" and "Remember," begs a rejoinder that very few seem prepared to answer, and which the first historian brave enough to set the event to paper must struggle with: namely, "Remember what?"

Why have Thais so meticulously avoided discussing the massacre for twenty years? The Thai cultural emphasis on avoiding fractious debate and public arguments may serve as the Introduction to Asian Culture 101 answer to the above question. It is an answer worth mentioning, but avoids the more complex, deeper and darker issues involved in both forgetting and remembering Hok Tulaa. About one week after the Hok Tulaa remembrance, in a packed hall at the Thai Studies Conference in Chiang Mai, Professor Thongchai presented his paper on the ambivalent narratives of the Hok Tulaa massacre. His paper was powerful, direct, and bluntly honest. His whole mode of presentation seemed to be the opposite of what one might call the standard mode of Thai academic address. He named names, zeroed in on the areas of real conflict, and spoke with passion and conviction. Thongchai captivated the audience, and it was clear why he has come to mean so much to people in the field of Thai studies.

In the middle of his talk Thongchai began to list many of the unanswered questions surrounding the Hok *Tulaa* massacre: Why was ex-dictator Thanom Kittikachorn let back into the country? Who OK'd this? Why was he allowed to enter the monkhood at Wat Bowarniwet: the royal monastery? Why did the head monk of the Wat, who was the current King's private teacher and in 1987 became the Supreme Patriarchy, allow Thanom to ordain there? Who produced the doctored photos of students hanging the Crown Prince in effigy (the spark which led to the massacre), and why did the Bangkok Post and a Thai language daily choose to run them? Who ordered the shooting to begin, and did anyone at the top at all try to order the soldiers to stop? At some point in the middle of these questions (there were more which I do not recall) a number of people in the audience began crying, and most participants that I could see were visibly moved.

The gross brutality and wanton torture of Hok Tulaa strikes out savagely at a particularly cherished myth about Thailand: that a fortuitous fusion of Buddhism and culture has created a land of peaceful, smiling people. Yet, this alone does not cause the turmoil that the above questions can stir.

The finger of blame for Hok Tulaa points in all the most troubling directions. It points to a middle class, terrified by the fall of Saigon and the stories seeping out from the killing fields of Cambodia, that could acquiesce to a violent silencing of a strident left. It points to a civilian government too weak or too unconcerned to stop the violence in its midst. It points to a military more than willing to kill its own. It points to the highest religious figures who allowed themselves to be co-opted by political schemers.

And much worse, all the questions beg for another question which simply can not be asked in Thailand: Why, unlike 1973 when the King intervened on the students' behalf, did the palace gates not open? All Thais are taught when they are young, and the vast majority believe, that the three pillars of Thai identity are belief in Buddhism, a love of nation, and love and respect for the

Thai King. One's love for these three pillars is the essence of one's Thainess: it is the very thing that makes one Thai. For many people, questioning the validity of these symbols is a kind of treason and, at the very least, a badge of inauthenticity. So, just asking questions about Hok Tulaa is for many Thais a painful experience. The question of blame casts doubts on the most cherished figures and institutions in the country; figures and institutions which many people both love unconditionally and seek comfort in. To ask these questions is tantamount to shaking the pillars of Thai identity, and possibly bringing the roof down on one's head. Small wonder then that most people find it easier to forget Hok Tulaa.

In my opinion Hok Tulaa will be officially re-remembered. The twenty year remembrance seems to have been a great success in this regard. Academics, journalists, and civic leaders vowed to make the story known. And the massacre, probably one of the most pivotal historical events in the last forty years, can not, it seems, escape from the high school textbooks for too much longer. Hok Tulaa is the axis on which an entire 10 to 15 year piece of history turns; one can not hope to understand the political changes of the 1980's without at least a cursory understanding of Hok Tulaa. How much longer can it be avoided?

Yet, if I had to guess at the future (and here I can only draw on my feelings), I would have to say Hok Tulaa will remain only partially remembered in the textbooks of tomorrow. The rememberers at the Hok Tulaa ceremonies sought to pair the tragic events of 6 October 1976 with the democratic victory of 14 October 1973. Many pleaded for the victims of 1976 to be held in the same high esteem as those who died in 1973 and who are today considered great martyrs for democracy. Their desire seems to be to create a line of continuity between the two events and the present. In this structure Hok Tulaa would become the middle portion of a much larger historical trilogy. Part one of this trilogy would consist of the events of 1973 when the ideals of an egalitarian democracy struggled against the odds and eventually triumphed. The year 1976 becomes the second, and traditionally dark portion of any three-part story, in which democracy faces a terrible set back. The third portion of the trilogy, which is yet to be written, sees egalitarian democracy return even stronger than before. In other words, 1976 is the Empire Strikes Back to 1973's Star Wars in which the forces of democracy, like Han Solo, become deep frozen.

It gives one hope to interpret the events of Hok Tulaa as the nadir of an otherwise rising and irrepressible movement towards democracy. And, it may well even be true. But what is perhaps more important is how much easier the massacre becomes to understand. By contextualizing 1976 inside the event of 1973 the story becomes another (though much more violent) case of an anti-democratic military force trying to crush pro-democratic students. This view, however, minimizes the historical mood characterized by a palpable and, in view of the events in Cambodia, somewhat reasonable fear of the socialist left and the very real de-stabilization and resultant anxiety that de-stabilization was causing in Thailand. It shrinks the ideological forces at play to that simply of anti-democratic militarism and avoids the much more intellectually troubling ideologies of right-wing Buddhism and militant royalism (both of which played significant roles in the massacre). Finally, it shrinks the roll-call of bad guys to the military alone, and avoids looking at the not-so-good-guys and the guys-who-should-have-been-good-

but-weren't.

Vasan Sitthiket, a leading contemporary artist in Thailand, remembers *Hok Tulaa*. His show, entitled Blue October, hung in a small, largely political gallery hidden in the back of the Weekend Market. His series of twenty paintings recreated the graphically violent photographic images from the massacre. Painted in black and white, the nearly life-size images of violence were set over a deep blue, flat background. Three small gold-leaf offerings have been placed over the bodies of the dead as a traditional signal for reverence. The titles, block printed by the artist near the outside edge of each painting, are upside-down. Invitations to the event asked viewers to "preside" and "witness."

The use of the color blue, at first, appears to be a rather primitive artistic touch, but Vasan is much more clever than that. In Thailand, the color dark blue has two generally understood symbolic meanings: as representative of royalty, and/or happiness. By choosing this color I think the artist's work takes on a much more powerful and ironic feeling. Mechanically, the blue works to draw the eyes towards the shocking violence. And for meaning, because one always searches for a meaning in violence, the viewer is left only with Vasan's upside-down, sharply barbed commentary.

"The way to look at Blue October," a sign instructed, "bend your body, turn your head and heart upside down-then you will see."

I was first drawn to a painting near the center of the room. In the newspaper a few days before, a Thai artist described the death of his best friend, Manas Siensingh, at the October 6 massacre. Manas, also an artist, was shot to death by soldiers while trying to hide in a Thammasat building. Manas' body was later dragged from a pile of the dead and, in front of a cheering crowd of onlookers, pierced through the chest with a four foot iron rod. Vasan's painting captures this horrific scene and is titled, "Today if you still take pride in your infamous deeds, please come to take the gold necklace from me."

Other paintings lined the walls:

- a shoe being forced into the mouth of a hanging corpse titled, "For the Nation's Identity" **(Figure 1),**
- a naked dead woman and female students forced to stand in their underwear, "Whoever raped and killed, please come forward and accept a medal of courage,"
- a long row of corpses, "For the State Security" **(Figure 2),**
- three burning bodies, "For the High Culture,"
- a man beating a hanging corpse with a chair while a crowd watches smiling, "This is a Buddhist Country."**Figure 3.**

In some ways, viewing Vasan's work emotionally parallels the problems which surround the Hok Tulaa massacre and memory. To look at both is like looking at the dark heart of Thailand beating. You search for meaning in the paintings or the event when none is apparent. You wonder why, though all the whys are painfully difficult to consider. (You may even began to feel a little dizzy and sick to your stomach, as I did.) In the end you leave the exhibit, and the memory of Hok Tulaa, wishing very much to think about something else. If thought about long enough Hok Tulaa will turn your head and heart upside down. This is precisely why it is an event which is so difficult to remember.

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Cultural Sublimation

The Museumizing of Indonesia

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Notes

Introduction

> Mouse goes everywhere, through rich men's houses she creeps, and she visits even the poorest. At night, with her bright little eyes she watches the doing of secret things and no treasure chamber is safe that she cannot enter and see what is hidden there. In the olden days she wove a story child from all she saw and to each of these she gave a gown of a different color-white, red, blue or black. The stories became her children and lived in her house and served her because she had no children of her own.

The above is an old Eikoi folk tale demonstrating a very sophisticated theory of aesthetics and creative sublimation. I apply this tale to explain Indonesian systems of nation building and methods of enforcing a national hegemony. Indonesia has created its national "story" based upon the many cultures contained within its national boundaries. It chooses from the rich as well as the poor, combining the many found treasures to weave its tale. Not all local "stories" will be deemed appropriate to this national unity, which uses culture as its base. Those elements which fail to be assimilated or appropriated face enforced conscription or obscurity. Such

political control makes the autonomous cultivation of local forms rare.[1] Many peoples of Indonesia have attempted to redefine themselves and their traditions in order to culturally survive, even if this means cooperating with the growing power of Indonesia's New Order government.[2] Yet, other regional cultures have experienced further marginalization.

Control over cultural expression in Indonesia is heavily influenced by the Republic's motto "Unity in Diversity".[3] In order for "Unity in Diversity" to work, each local culture must add to and enhance this greater national culture and identity.[4] The process of selecting the elements to be included in this identity often results in the redefinition and recontextualization[5] of material culture[6] , thus creating miscommunication, miscomprehension, and cultural reconstruction.[7] In this paper I will argue that in the creation of a national culture-theoretically consisting of a combination of high points from all of Indonesia's regional cultures and existing as a hegemonic community which possesses a common language, ideology, a esthetic expectation,[8] history, and goals-many traditional arts[9] undergo the process of cultural hybridization, becoming official "selective traditions"[10] as a result of redefinition and recontextualization.

Political and cultural policies of Indonesia's nation building project dichotomize the national culture thereby creating "other" regional and ethnic cultures.[11] The underlying motivations behind these policies and the dissonance resulting from them are extremely broad and fraught with theoretical complexities. I shall keep my inquiry to a small portion of this discourse. The first section of the paper discusses aspects of policy and state ideology that inform motivations for cultural hegemony and cultural appropriation. The second section takes these ideas and applies them to the politically-driven practices of exhibiting, collecting, preserving, and explaining regional material culture. I begin by examining past and current Western (Euro/ American) methods of collecting and exhibiting Indonesian material culture. Western museums have historically been informed by a colonial imperialist ideology heavily influenced by the ideas of rational science. Rational science established and legitimated the Western propensity for collecting and categorizing the various cultures of the colonies. Such ideology of "museum mindedness"[12] is problematic in post-colonial Indonesia. My investigation of the national and regional museums of Indonesia as well as their static and living exhibitions examines the relationships between expression and control of national and regional cultures, the viability of traditional forms, and the impact of the domestic and international gaze.[13]

Invented Tradition and National Culture

It is a common complaint that the Indonesian central government does not recognize the autonomy of local cultures to create their own criteria for expression. Clifford Geertz argues that, to the present day, Javanese culture remains the axis on which Indonesian life turns. [14] By imposing Javanese aesthetics and politics upon the rest of the country,[15] the central government colonizes within its own borders.[16] This suggests inherent cultural prejudices that impose a Java-centric slant onto the project of creating hegemonic nation. As a consequence of

the central government's push for unity, not all regional cultures receive equal import. Traditional art forms that cannot make the leap into the "Unity in Diversity" do not fare well.[17] Therefore, for our purposes, it is the criteria and process of selection which is of importance.

Currently, a dissonance exists between the traditional past that informs the present and the governmental push for modernization that fossilizes the past.[18] Ideas of modernity now reach every corner of the archipelago through radio and television. Through modern technology the central government promotes state ideology with the aim of preventing regional, ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences from becoming political forces in Indonesia.[19] Symbols of local culture and power must be emptied of independent, anti-national power before they are re-released as part of the modern national culture.[20] Objects of local culture that are in conflict with state ideology risk becoming cultural dispossessed and preserved as "traditional".[21] The state ideology and national motto of "Unity in Diversity" provide license to rewrite history in order to validate the present.

Regional cultures[22] in the 1970's and 80's became the focal point of Indonesian national identity as modernity spread through the archipelago. Those areas of cultural life that have undergone the process of transformation become modernized and accepted as part of contemporary Indonesia. Those elements that do not undergo transformation and remain unaffected become known as "traditional". Yet, tradition is not a relic of the past so much as it is a contemporary construct.[23] According to Kessler, it is usually when the tradition is threatened, and a self-awareness arises, that the reference to the past is consciously advanced. In a nation and world that threatens intensified dislocation, traditional culture provides grounding of personal reality as well as that of the nation: only when the continuity of the present becomes threatened does the past itself become recognizable.[24] This may result in a positive continuation of traditional modes of life that will add prestige to the modern national culture.

Indonesia, as a traditional and modern country, presents a disjunctive modernity instead of presenting a continuity of national culture. Java-centricism has resulted in regional reactions of renewed pride in their local cultures: looking to local traditions to define themselves. These same traditions are also used by the government to legitimize a nation that exists in the present. In other words, local cultures, reacting against marginalization and/or enforced modernization, use their past to set themselves apart from the dominating national culture directed by the central government. Yet, the government subsumes the past of these local cultures in order to establish a hegemonic, modern nation according to Javanese tastes.[25] As a consequence of enforced conformity, local cultures are increasingly self-aware populations. A self-aware culture is potentially a political culture.[26] Therefore, two fundamental elements in the sublimation process are the depoliticization of the past and the reenactment of regional cultures in the context of the New Order state.

Pancasila

Prior to the Dutch consolidation of power (which did not permeate all the islands until the early 20th century) "Indonesia" consisted of separate regions and ethnic groups with their own cultural behavior informing their political agendas. Territorial boundaries were fluid and generally depended upon alliances and migration of manpower.[27] Contemporary Indonesia is a nation of over 180 million people, with over 300 ethnic groups and over 600 dialects.[28] It is understandable that ethnic and cultural conflicts, if not controlled, may potentially arise. Yet from Indonesia's center, Java, a strong military and state ideology stifles overt displays of dissatisfaction. A far reaching element of this central control focuses on the national philosophy of *Pancasila* which forms the ideological framework for the state.

Over 85% of the population of Indonesia is Muslim. Yet, due to the many ethnic groups overlapping along various religious lines, the Indonesian government cannot claim Indonesia to be a Muslim state. *Pancasila* acknowledges the importance of religious diversity by sanctioning the five major world religions of Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity and Judaism.[29] The New Order government promotes the state ideology of *Pancasila*, or five points of national unity, as if it were a state religion: belief in One God; a just and civilized humanity; a united Indonesia; popular rule through policies formed after representative consensus; and social justice for the whole Indonesian population.[30] The primary concern of the five points is that everyone claims membership in one of the five accepted world religions or *agama*.[31]

How does this effect the regional culture? Most regional traditional beliefs are in opposition to the five religions. Most accepted world religions require a change in meaning and function of certain elements of local religious and material culture. The 1985 Cultural Policy states that "care is taken that destructive superstitions are not tolerated in these local beliefs. All local groups must have a belief in God." Due to this conflict between traditional "superstitions" and modern religion, regional material culture selected for Indonesian national heritage often no longer possesses its original religious function.[32] The object chosen to represent the essence of the local culture is no longer viable to that culture in its original ceremonial and ritually significant context. The consequence is a hybrid of traditionalism, Western and national influences, as well as local evolution.[33]

Pancasila attempts to foster a national ethos of tolerance under which official recognition is given to various regional groups and religions. Yet the New Order national ideology, couched so strictly in *Pancasila*, poses a dilemma for many segments of Indonesian society.[34] *Pancasila*'s premise of conformity, and all the contradictions therein, pushes for an artifice of unity. Although acknowledging the diversity of Indonesian culture, the message of *Pancasila* does not support a pluralist society. On the contrary, the philosophy stresses self-control, restraint, and self-denial for the good of the nation.[35]

Cultural Policy

Though the local culture is distinctive, it is contained under the umbrella of the

nation. Diversity in Unity.[36]

Article 32 of the 1945 Constitution states that the government will develop a national culture that expresses the personality and vitality of all the peoples in Indonesia.[37] This concept of national culture is now the cornerstone of Indonesia's nation building project.[38] The Indonesian constitution places cultural development in the hands of the central government that pushes for a hegemonic state.[39] It allows for the preservation of "highlights" of local cultures and local belief systems as elements of national heritage. The traditions which do survive are those that retain a function in the modern context. By the mid-1980's, those local traditions that were perceived as political obstacles to the unity of the nation, its development, and its modernity were slated for change.[40]

Therefore, selective preservation of regional art forms has become part of the larger political process of inclusion that stresses nationalism and the national unity of Indonesia.[41] Indonesia, as a nation, promotes and instills a particular vision of itself to the world while deliberately disregarding all other visions. [42] The means of selection, collection, and categorization utilized by both the producers and viewers of objects are steeped in the politics of this vision. In 1973, the Ministry of Culture called for greater attention to be given to the outer regions for their assistance in the obtaining of Independence. Opposing the fast-paced ideas of modernity, the Ministry advocated for the preservation and collection of material cultural forms that were at least fifty years old. He was the first Indonesian administrator to publicly suggest that the best of Indonesian material culture had either been appropriated by the colonists and housed in foreign museums or sold to outside investors, while Indonesia itself had failed to recognize these objects as national treasures.[43]

Tenets of the cultural policy of the early 1970's differ in their primary concerns with those of the cultural policy of 1985. Unlike the earlier version of national cultural policy, the loss of cultural property due to theft, tourism, and modernity failed to be a strong concern in the mid-80's. The policy of 1985 also lacks encouragement to investigate and acknowledge outer regional social systems, customs, and traditions. By 1985, the cultural policy had shifted its emphasis from the support of histories to the cataloging of culture. This shift resulted in the discouragement of local cultural practices, customs, and traditions that contest the national hegemony.[44] The political dominance of the Javanese has also meant that even the cataloging of culture has predominantly given intense attention to Javanese culture over others.[45]

Even so, Indonesia has experienced a vast growth of museums in the last twenty years, ranging from the National Museum (the inheritor of Dutch architecture and collections) to local and private museums. Presently, the primary role of Indonesian museums is the promotion of "Unity in Diversity." This ideology informs museums and staff regarding the treatment and inclusion of regional culture into its displays. Both the national and regional museums redefine the meaning and function of material objects in order to comply with national and regional expectations. This multiplicity of meaning makes the creation and comprehension of the Indonesian national

cultural project difficult.

Before I begin discussing the current museum system in Indonesia, an explanation of Western collecting and viewing practices of Indonesia should be covered. This is because the system of aesthetics and collecting, primarily by the Dutch in this case, has left a legacy-for better or worse-in its former colony.

Western Museums and the "Other"

> Collecting stems from a need to live intimately allied with one's memories, obsessions with the salvaging of order from disorder.[46]

> Almost nothing displayed in museums was made to be seen in them. [47]

Public forums, such as the national and regional museum and their exhibitions, present contesting ideas about cultural representation and produce disputes over meaning, function, and methods of displaying material culture. Museums create a sense of space, time, and history. Western museums, especially those built specifically to house colonial collections, do not obliterate cultural differences; they demarcate them. Distinction of cultural pasts define for *us* our present and confirm the "Us " and "Them" dichotomy: *our* culture is not *their* culture.[48]

By the 18th century, a time when Europe was itself grappling with its own ideas of nationalism and nation building, the Western aesthetic that linked art and culture together had evolved. Since "art and culture" were equated along class and racial lines, objects of aesthetic value could move within the "white" class parameters, but racism denied the colonized object temporal mobility. An object facing questionable "arthood" can only be elevated to art by sublimating its pertinent contextual information.[49] This framework of sublimation has informed Western strategies of what should be collected and preserved, as well as methods of exhibition for more than two centuries.[50] In the 19th century, colonial ideologies of scientific ethnic group classification gave rise to what we now consider racist and classist categorizations of all aspects of bourgeois society, both at home and in the colonies.[51] Such ideologies also informed the methods of exhibiting cultures within the art institutions. The rise of racism initiated general terms of control, such as "primitivism", as opposed to ethnic arts. By the 20th century the "art and culture" paradigm had been reclassified into categories of artistic genius and the masterpiece. Such categories extended to all the world's peoples.[52] The "primitive" and their objects were then placed upon a pedestal of *Modernism*, and admired for what was missing in Western culture. Thus the "primitive" and their "art" were rendered historically immobile. "Primitivism", in this art historical model, had little to do with the actual living circumstances of the individual and their culture; it was an idea in Western culture by which the "other" is defined.[53] Since the late 19th century, objects of curiosity, "primitive" arts, have been redefined and recontextualized into desacralized objects of art. It is this Western aesthetic paradigm, manifest through the Empire era ideology, that informs museum practices and exhibitions.[54]

Ethnographic versus "Fine" Art Museums

Very interesting things happen when material culture is elevated to "Primitive" art. In order for the object to be art, its inherent function must be co-opted and changed by the collector, dealer, or museum, so that it can plausibly "fit into the underlying assumptions of the primitive art market."[55]

Increasingly, the distinction between "primitive" art and ethnographic artifact is coming into question. Until recently, ethnographic museums focused on contextual facts about the object (material, age, use). The local artist was of secondar y importance to the collecting and cataloging process. However, Paul Taylor argues that *contemporary, decolonized*[56] ethnographic museums invite the local people to consult and participate; the fine art museums' spectators cannot be the same people whose artwork is collected, because then the object does not fit into the art historical notions of authenticity, scarcity, and temporal distance.[57] Taylor describes the ethnographic museums' shift in cultural policy as a breaking down of the hierarchical relationship between the collector/spectator's culture and the culture of the people who produced the artworks.

Originating out of the same Empire era ideology of classification, art museums historically have ignored contextual information. Sally Price, in *Primitive art in Civilized Places*, argues that to display any primitive objects as art is a form of ne o-colonization, and that the culture continues to be appropriated for the Western gaze.[58] Price has called attention to inherent problems in elevating objects to art status. The object, having been elevated to art, becomes a mirror from which we may define our cultural selves. Cultural nuances of sociological and political concerns are mis sing from the object. It acquires a reconstructed history representing the essence, or symbol, of an entire culture. The viewer becomes increasingly aware of his/her own culture, since information about the culture that made the object is lacking or mis sing.[59] The main event ceases to be the exhibition. The event lies in the viewing public's realization that this selected "essence" of culture is not *us*.

Dutch Museumizing of Indonesia

Well into the late 18th century, the Dutch cultural policy concerning indigenous peoples was left much to Dutch administrative organizations. During the late 18th century, the Oriental Studies scientific branch, as well as the Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences (established in 1778), became the centers for cultural sciences that researched the Indies' "primitivism". The Batavian Society, now the National Museum in Jakarta, was established to house the vast collections of confiscated indigenous material culture. Many of these traditional arts and pre-Islam religious monuments had been left to ruin because of the overwhelming influence of Islam throughout the archipelago.[60] Most archeological work on the vast complexes of temples and monuments began in the early 20th century, and the findings were recorded in languages not accessible to the Indonesians.[61] Indigenous cultures, and their fate, were being defined for them. The material

objects were taken out of their context in homes, temples, grave sites, etc., and were recontextualized as artifact in ethnographic museums, or elevated to art status in fine art museums. Today, some material culture in Indonesian museums and monuments are being restored by the central government and are now regarded as national symbols.

Post-Colonial Display of Indonesian Material Culture

The Western approach to collecting Indonesian material culture is slowly changing. Several events have taken place since Sukarno, the first President of Indonesia, announced Indonesia's independence in 1945. These include the decolonization of museums, the blurring of the distinction between ethnographic artifact and fine art (ethnographic and art museums experienced parallel development), and the indigenization of museums within Indonesia.[62] Currently, in both Western and Indonesian museums, Indonesian material culture is increasingly seen, once again, as vested with special meaning, value, and a social structure. Recently, a vast amount of research has focused on the encoded symbolism in the objects.[63]

The term "decolonization" deliberately implies the conscious attempt to disrupt the balance of power that characterized the colonial period.[64] Taylor states that the most important element of decolonization, from the point of view of the museum and its collecting practices, is the recognition that the people who created the material culture are a fundamental part of the museum's spectatorship. As will be explained below, the Indonesian regional museum affords increased participation in the process of assembly and collecting, resulting in an interesting cultural hybridization. Western museums have also begun to reassess their methods of display. The Tropen Museum in the Netherlands, for example, has pioneered the decolonization of Dutch museums They have changed the function of the active colonial institution into a new cross-cultural evaluating forum. The new public forum established a discussion of the past biases and future intercultural understanding. [65] Exhibitions at the Tropen are now designed to involve viewer participation in the overall understanding of the cultural background of the object displayed.[66]

A profusion of large collections of Indonesian material culture has toured the globe since Indonesia's independence: from Barbier's collection (1988), Rockefeller's collection of Asmat material (1976), to the Court Arts of Java (1992). The exhibitions combined art history and ethnography but imposed their own ideas of content and aesthetic to the objects displayed. In the last fifty years of exhibiting Indonesian material culture, a trend to assume material culture as "Primitive" has been on the rise in the Western museum.[67]

Indonesian Museums and Material Culture: Collected, Exhibited and Redefined

Museum-Mindedness

As Western collecting and exhibiting practices in the twentieth century experienced changes regarding Indonesian material culture, so too has Indonesia experienced changes in its

collecting and display of its own material culture. The major change is the act of collecting itself. Indonesia has never collected *us* as we have collected *them*. Those with money, in particular the government, actively collect themselves. Having inherited the Dutch system of categorizing and hoarding practices, the New Order actively collects the diverse material culture from around Indonesia. Indonesia collects from its various cultures in order to make sense of itself as a nation in the present. Traditionally, Indonesians did not collect for the same Western "rational", scientific, or categorizing purposes. Instead, they collected items perceived to possess power. This power would dissipate over time but maintained a binding effect of the common people and the royal house that guarded the collection. These objects would be hidden from sight and viewed only by a very few royal persons, or village chiefs. This is because the power of the objects could only be contained by those who traditionally also possessed divine power. On the other hand , most of the objects exhibited for public consumption were exposed to the elements and left to ruin. When a piece disintegrated due to the elements, another object was made to replace it. Objects were duplicated because it was the intent and the ceremonial function of the object that was most important, not the object itself. This process of duplication confounds Western notions of art, artistic genius, and originality; each piece of work should be an inspired original, and therefore authentic.**68** Until the era of Post Modernism in Art history, items lacking authenticity (arbitrarily assigned), became ethnographic artifacts. Western art museums exhibited only the "authentic": the masterpieces.

The idea of "museum" in the Western sense does not necessarily translate to Indonesian cultural behavior toward material culture. The Western gauge of what a museum ought to be proves problematic when applying the same standard to Indonesian museum systems. Let us not lose sight of the fact that the standardized systems of conservation and preservation of material culture is seemingly new to the Indonesian culture. The preservation of objects is selective and serves a distinct purpose of transforming them into representations of national culture. Most of these recontextualized objects previously possessed plural, culturally specific, ritualistic, religious, and political functions. Therefore, the idea of material culture functioning as a decontextualized "art" object is a rather new concept to Indonesia.

This fundamental lack of what Kreps calls "museum mindedness"**69** helps to explain why so much of the collections in the ethnographic museums, especially the National Museum, is in such disrepair,**70** and why traditional arts are rarely exhibited in fine art museums. It should also be understandable why museums are not promoted as tourist attractions to the same extent as living exhibitions: such as, dance, ritual, and villages. One can readily observe in Indonesia that traditional cultures and objects tend to be better preserved within the villages.

The lack of financial resources, the foreign concept of art objects, and the lack of trained staff contribute to the further decay of traditional art forms contained in the museums. And, although there has been an increase in the number of museums, this does not imply an increase in quality. Even though urban centers have seen a growing number of educated staff, who are semi-trained in areas of Western museology, ethnography, and curatorial matters, many buildings remain unsuitable for display, and the small salaries of the staff remain prohibitive.**71** In many

instances, it is a matter of how the need for a museum is perceived by the Indonesian government and the public. The domestic tourist is increasingly drawn to the live rituals of dance and music and not to objects that have been emptied of their ritual and ceremonial intent. But the conditions of the regional museum and the care taken to safeguard its contents are also influenced by the Java-centric priorities of the Ministry of Culture. Therefore, the museums lack both public and government support.

The current standardized system of the regional museum affords an interesting view of the center (Java) and periphery (outer regions) as they debate their public presentations of themselves.[72] As has been argued, the collection, preservation and exhibition of these various domains cannot be natural, as they create an illusion of an adequate representation of the cultures, or ethnic groups, collected.[73] They link local and national cultural politics with contesting significances of the past and future.

The Regional Museum and Material Culture: Multiplicity of Function

Catholic missionaries established several regional museums in the 1930's. Most of these museums, in their original state, are gone. The missionaries recognized the disappearance of indigenous craft as a detrimental and impoverishing consequence of colonization.[74] The museums housed examples of what little was left of the local pre-Christian material culture. The state took over the missionary museums after 1945. Present day regional museums function as tools for unifying the country as well as affirming local cultural heritage.[75]

One such museum is the renovated Ternate Palace that simultaneously tells two stories: that of the central government-run regional museum of the Moluccas, administered by the Directorate of Museums, and that of a sultan's palace treated in accordance with *adat* (traditional custom and law).[76] Ritual retains its original meaning within the museum/palace[77] , as people continue to bring offerings in honor of the royal regalia hidden inside.[78] The museum is a functioning relic of a now silent sultanate.

Like many of the regional museums, the Ternate Palace Museum also presents two types of viewer involvement: (1) the public (tourist) sphere, which is presented with Indonesian national solidarity, and (2) the private sphere, in which only the last traditional leaders may participate among the objects or regalia.[79] The village regalia consisted of many generations of collecting, dating back to the founding ancestors of the clan or village. The objects exist in two worlds: the world of scientific labeling and preservation and the world of local tradition in which the objects are necessary components to the community which continues to perceive them as aura containing cultural icons.

All of the old palaces have been assimilated into the state and renovated.[80] These provincial museums house objects that in one way or another bind the community together. It is important for the New Order to absorb the old sultanate in order to consolidate governmental power over

the local cultures.[81] Theoretically, by appropriating the supernatural power of the palace and forcing it to behave as state museum, a political obstacle to centralized government is eliminated. No matter what the location of the museum, the message remains the same: " We are distinct as a local culture, but one as a nation." Creating a hegemonic culture must include the local culture's partial or complete encapsulation in the national identity. Although they have been absorbed, this does not mean they have been integrated.

Cultural Hybridization

From the examples given above, it will be argued that the consequences of exhibiting material traditional culture in national and regional museums are: (1) the cultural hybridization of material culture and (2) the transformation of the material culture into a selected tradition representing the entirety of a particular culture.

Cultural hybridization is defined here as the result of the regional museum fulfilling the national requirement as to what a museum is supposed to be: representing "Unity in Diversity"; fulfilling the cultural requirement of the local region; maintaining *adat*; and the functional and representational integrity of the objects exhibited. Unlike methods of "selective tradition", cultural hybridization makes it more difficult to classify the objects within the collection because they retain their original function and possess multiple convictions simultaneously. Cultural hybridization exists in the act of cultural reinvention: an act which incorporates not only national ideologies but also traditional, religious, and tourist ideologies.

Most of the provincial museums have staff who live in the area, participate in traditional events, and are knowledgeable of traditional customs of the region. Except for the training receive from the Directorate of Museums, most have no formal museological training.[82] Therefore, it is quite common for the staff of the provincial museum to consult ritual masters in the proper display of ritual objects.[83] Kreps gives the example of the museum staff and ritual master of Balanga, in Kalimantan, who devise exhibitions that allow the viewer to enter the exhibition as if it were authentic space of everyday or ritual life. Rather in opposition to state ideology, the object performs both as functional ritual (often in pre-"official" religious context) as well as art object.

Another example of cultural hybridization is the Ternate regalia mentioned earlier. The objects contained within the palace walls are rarely seen by the people, but they are revered because of their perceived power to hold the community together. Like objects in national museums, the regalia is taken out of its vault and put into a display case. However, differing from the urban museums, provincial practice maintains that the pieces are often taken out of the cases and ritually cleaned as if they still may possess their original power. Retention of function and supernatural power often oppose not only the national ideology of *Pancasila* but also the village's dominant religion.[84]

Nationalism and the Living Museum: Taman Mini Indonesia Indah

The increased penetration of national culture ideology into Indonesia's regional cultures alters the natural connection of a traditional culture to its material culture. Items highlighted for inclusion in the national culture are redefined in the context of the New Order state. The assertion of national culture and its *Pancasila* ideology looms over every aspect of Indonesian culture. The manipulation of the nation's local cultures for modern usage, also means Indonesia can market the revised version. New cultural forms have emerged to satisfy the international and domestic market, even while local creativity has been enhanced.[85] These extracted bits, such as the stupa, *prau*, longhouse, Torajan house or Nias sculpture, are officially certified as belonging to the cultural traditional of one nation-Indonesia.[86]

No Indonesian state cultural project has been as vast and involved as the Taman Mini park in Jakarta. "The idea of Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature (TMII) recreates Indonesia and everything in it in miniature form."[87] Taman Mini stretches across 100 hectares of land just outside of Jakarta.[88] According to the TMII catalog, the idea for the park originated from inspirational speeches given by President Suharto. His wife, Ibu Tien Suharto, speaks of the park as an avenue to promote national identity within the global arena. The primary aim of the Park was to promote a cultural model of state ideology.

The TMII, containing traditional material culture and replicas of traditional houses built by master craftsmen and supported by the governments of regions from throughout the Indonesian archipelago, is the largest collection of Indonesian regional cultures ever amassed. [89] It is ironic that several of the traditions displayed in the park are rarely practiced any more, and as, in the case of Nias, the houses are seldom made at all. The material and ritual culture is presented as authentic to the public at invented times and often by performers and artists who are not from the particular culture being displayed.

Displacement of Function, Meaning and Natural Space

The Taman Mini, and other museum exhibitions throughout Indonesia, are devised to promote tourism in order to enhance the economic well being of the state. Because tourism has a profound effect on the legitimization of a national culture and identity , the New Order has utilized tourism to help unify the country.[90] National unity exists in the park exhibit as a whole, not in one object. Each ethnic culture and their objects must be chosen carefully so that, when combined with many other cultural objects, they promote the message of unification. It is the curator or administrator who decides what the message will be and runs interference between the true cultural context of the object and the audience. The audience participates in this propagation of misinformation and appropriation of histories and cultures because exhibition and cultural models inherently create illusions both of artificial culture controlled by the dominating culture and of the false relations between things. Authenticity, for the audience, is located in the event or exhibition and not in the culture represented or in the object.[91]

The TMII has museumized the Indonesian nation as a way of absorbing a culture that, due to traditional aegis, opposes economic modernity. The culture and object have been taken out of

the villages and displaced into state projects as national culture and art. For the local culture to be acceptable as an element of national culture, ritual and art must be packaged as commodifiable entities. Therefore, it must be secularized for mass appeal. TMII simultaneously juxtaposes several regions with themes (war dances from throughout the archipelago or the art of Bali) that may be similar to those of Jakarta. Thematically, such juxtaposition is intriguing and allows the visitor to experience-however artificial-aspects of cultures they may otherwise never experi ence. On the other hand, one might argue that such simultaneous exhibition denies the culture its natural space; that is to say that the various cultures would never be seen together in space nor created at the same time. Such display has been encouraged by the governments. The central government manipulates the ritual and material culture of many areas for two main reasons: (1) to attract both domestic and international tourists, the latter leave with a sense of "Indonesian" culture and go home with their skewed, packaged image of a hegemonic nation, and (2) to ensure that, by appropriating culture, the government can eliminate potential obstacles.

The most profound obstacle the government has experienced is the permeating and persistent qualities of *adat* in everyday life. **92** Traditional custom has been institutionalized and ratified by the New Order, as it had been by the Dutch, in that it continues to influence contemporary interpretations of local customs. Now, certain select ethnic customs contribute to the construction of a national tradition. Ritual and material culture are now a national enterprise. For this reason, regions such as Bali have not totally surrendered the meaning of custom and its criteria of cultural expression to government authorization. Instead, the Balinese have begun to create art and ritual in two different contexts: for their own community life and for tourists.**93**

Although local cultures have been assimilated in order to project national unity, positive elements emerge from this process. For example the arts of various regions are allowed to be made and sold in the park. Unfortunately, because the art is made on the park premises, the art object, like ritual in local culture, is secularized. This displacement of function and meaning relegates the object to tourist art. It is the task of the state government to attempt to get the collector to accept the new object as authentic. TMII continuously rotates exhibitions and all of them provide tours or didactic panels heavily textured with national ideology. The government also encourages the recontextualized production of traditional art because the traditional arts present a counterbalance of other things threatening the New Order stability such as religious factionalism, rural vs. urban issues, and the rising middle-class. There is not likely to be a mass movement against the government's goal of a hegemonic nation because it is the government that provides the financial support for the survival of cultural expression.

Selected Traditions

One consequence of secularization**94** and a hegemonic culture is that the material and ritual culture of a region become selective traditions "which, within the terms of an effective dominant culture, [are] always passed off as '*the* tradition', '*the* significant past'." ;**95** The further an object or cultural representation moves away from its locus of origination, the higher the probability

that the object will become the representative or selective essence of that culture. Some of the meanings and functions are reinterpreted and re-released as cultural aspects which confirm, or at least do not contest, the dominant culture. This process of deliberate distancing of an object from its original ethnic and cultural context and location results in confusion and misunderstanding for the viewer (both Indonesian and foreign).[96] The tourist gaze and national governments maintain a long-distance power of legitimization of a national culture through the manipulative process of secularization and commodification of regional material culture.

Taman Mini provides an exemplary demonstration of the selection of cultural "essence". The objective of a cultural model selectively attempts to "portray the best of those tangible, believable aspects of culture upon which the [foreign and domestic] tourist can identify."[97] Stanton goes on to suggest that as a model, and not reality, the process of selecting the cultural elements for inclusion admittedly creates an invented or "fake culture".[98] By emphasizing only the material and performing arts, the Taman Mini cultural model disregards the ideologies as well as the social and world view of these regions.

The function of museum in this paradigm is to collect, preserve, gather information, and present. The national museums (static or living) "essentialize" outer regional culture and do not permit a comprehensive explanation of material objects. Similar to the provincial/regional museum, it recontextualizes and changes the function of the objects. Yet the national/state museum, by placing a great amount of both temporal and spatial distance between the local culture and the object itself, freezes the objects in an immobile history. This immobility is a necessary component of selective traditions. In order for museums to present the "essence" of a culture, the selected element cannot be allowed to evolve.

Conclusion

Art and object, as social fact, contain very powerful social messages. The art and objects of Indonesia continue to possess strong ethnic and community messages specific to a time and place. Because of the suggestive and evocative powers of the traditional arts and cultures, they have become one of the most stimulating powers and topics of debate in Indonesia's national construction.[99]

In the process of creating an Indonesian national culture and identity, many cultural art forms experience cultural hybridization or become "selected traditions", via the process of redefinition and recontextualization of the object's "evocative" ethnic and community messages. Indonesia selects "high points" of the various regional cultures to create a hybrid national culture within the context of the New Order state.

This investigation began with a brief discussion of state ideology and cultural policy, based on *Pancasila*, to suggest motivating factors behind the practices of collecting and displaying of Indonesian material culture within the museum. The constitution of 1945 places the "guidance" of Indonesian culture in the hands of the central government. Therefore, the Ministry of Culture

established that local culture must add to, and enhance the greater national culture and identity. However the central government provides prominence to and actively preserves Javanese cultural elements over others. The cultural policy also interferes in outer regional cultural autonomy by establishing their own criteria for cultural expression.

The cultural policy of the 1970's, recognizing the importance of the varied regional material culture, opened up new areas of conservation. The policy of 1985 shifted away from conservation to cataloging. It also expanded its definition of what local material culture and art was unacceptable in its present form. The aim of the cultural policy is to compel local cultures to modernize and represent the ideals of "Unity in Diversity". Yet, some aspects of local culture are in opposition to the state and cultural policies, such as traditional custom, culturally specific meaning and function of art and object, and an increased cultural self-awareness that has resulted in regional cultures looking back to their traditions in order to define themselves and set themselves apart from the Javanese center.

Increasing numbers of museums were established in the 1970's and 1980's as a consequence of intensified cataloging and assimilating of regional art and object. The notion of museum as a Western construct does not necessarily translate into Indonesian culture. Museum-mindedness in the West possesses a long evolutionary history. Until recently, museum practices were informed by colonial notions of collecting and appropriating objects which the west classified as "primitive". Indonesia is still relatively new to the concept of museum. Currently Indonesia actively collects itself. Traditional ideas of collecting objects for their supernatural meaning have shifted to ideas of collecting in order to present a unified national heritage. While increasing numbers of objects are being appropriated, the lack of official and public support, funds, and trained staff contribute to the further decay of the collections.

By using examples of both national and regional museums, it has been illustrated in general terms that museums present collections of local culture in two ways. As expressions of "we are distinct as a local culture, but one as a nation" regional concerns are promoted and traditional material cultural forms are exhibited as unique. Material cultural forms act as functioning ritual objects, art forms, and examples of Indonesia's richly diverse national culture. On the other hand, as redefined and recontextualized material cultural forms that are both temporally and spatially distanced from the regional culture, the new form represents the entire society in the context of the New Order state. Dissonance often results from the expectations of national, international and local representation of regional art forms.

The discussion of current standardized systems of the regional museum demonstrates that particular regional museums must contend with fulfilling both national expectations of presenting the region's connection with the national culture and local expectations. The regional museums of Balanga and Ternate exemplify the process of cultural hybridization as a possible consequence of this tension between the traditional and the national. Cultural hybridization exists in the act of cultural reinvention that incorporates national, traditional, religious, and tourist ideologies. The Ternate Palace Museum functions both as regional regalia and regional museum; it presents both a national ideology and the specific cultural concerns that bind the

community together. The Balanga museum devises exhibitions that allow the viewer to enter the exhibition as if it were authentic space of everyday or ritual life.

In contrast to the regional museums, the Taman Mini Indonesia Indah park is a vast national cultural model that promotes *Pancasila* and "Unity in Diversity" through exhibiting select art forms of Indonesia's various regional cultures. Unlike the regional museum, the National Museum and TMII appropriate and redefine ritual and material culture. The art form or object represents the "essence" of the regional culture; it has become a selected tradition to be incorporated into national culture. Appropriation on the national scale subsumes original function and meaning by separating the object from its original religious, ritual, and communal functions.

The theory of selective traditions argues that the dominating culture, in this case Indonesian national culture, chooses highlights of marginal cultures and reinterprets these elements to represent an entire culture. The further away an object gets from its locus of origination, the more the original meaning and function lose ground to the dominating cultural assumptions. Miscomprehension of a culture results as the viewer walks away with a false image of Indonesian culture.

Ideals of "Unity in Diversity", *Pancasila*, and cultural policy suggest the importance of regional culture in the formation of national culture. However, the importance lies in possible opposition to the national culture. Through various processes of recontextualization and redefinition, various cultural expressions are reformulated in order to eliminate ethnic, political, and religious opposition to the center. It will be interesting to see if Indonesia continues on its present course, or if it will establish a more open policy that allows autonomy to regional cultures in an embrace of Indonesia's rich "diversity in unity".

Notes

1 Barbara Hatley, "Cultural Expression," in *Indonesia's New Order*, ed., Hal Hill (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 263.

2 The term "New Order" is used to distinguish President Suharto's government from Sukarno's government. Sukarno's "Old Order" ended in 1965. Both governments heavily rely on the *Pancasila* and political conformity. There are various distinctions between the two governments. One distinction that has affected the material culture is the banning of the Communist Party after the failed coup of 1965 which distanced much of the arts, in particular modern art, from the social and political problems of Indonesian society. The second distinction between the Old and New Order governments that largely affected material cultural expression is Suharto's opening-up of Indonesia to the international economic market, which brought with it Western mass media. Such exposure to mass media and Western secular values, with its emphasis on the

individual, challenged Indonesian notions of the individual within Indonesian society.

3 Old Sanskrit in origin, this motto was taken from an 11th century coat of arms of a royal Javanese household. Borrowing from an old Javanese symbol, especially a Sanskrit one, reveals the syncretic nature and Java-centrism apparent in the central government. "Unity in Diversity" has been included in the state ideology since Sukarno declared Indonesia's Independence on August 17, 1945. It is a national symbol of Indonesia's multi-cultural population.

4 Virginia Matheson Hooker in *Culture and Society in New Order Indonesia* states that "in the widest sense, culture embraces spiritual life, values, morality, education, and political processes." (1993), 2.

5 The term "recontextualization" in the field of art history theorizes that art and ethnographic museums often divorce an indigenous object from its original historical and cultural context. This newly decontextualized object then can be given a new historical and cultural context. For the purpose of this paper, I have used the term to argue that regional material objects in Indonesia can be subsumed and given a context within the national culture. Therefore, the original meaning and function, as well as the object's place in history, have been altered.

6 In the context of this paper, "material culture" implies all culturally specific plastic forms of expression (e.g., painting, weaving, sculpture) created in the region. I am reluctant to use the term "art". Although the term is increasingly used in Indonesia, it is not clear to me if it is used as freely as in the West.

7 Paul Taylor, "Introduction" in *Fragile Traditions: Indonesian Art in Jeopardy*, ed. P. Taylor (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994); Shelly Errington, "Unraveling Narratives" in *Fragile Traditions: Indonesian Art in Jeopardy*; James Clifford, "On Collecting Art and Culture" in *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 215-252; and Hatley, "Cultural Expression," 216-262.

8 The idea or understanding of cultural aesthetics can generally be defined as a community's mutual and habituated sense of what is beautiful and what is ugly.

9 In this paper, I use the terms "traditional art" and "material culture" to denote material objects created in the outer regions of Indonesia. Although traditional arts also includes the refined arts of Hindic Java through the 16th century, I am limiting the subject to those marginalized areas, mainly the outer islands and smaller villages of Java.

10 The term "selective tradition" was initially coined in the Marxist cultural theory of R. Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory" in *Problems of Materialism and Culture* (London: Verso, 1980), 39. Although a term used to express the theoretical behavior of the Modernist museum in the West, I find his definition of the process of selective tradition to be

quite applicable to the process of assimilation of regional cultures into the Indonesian national culture.

11 In Postmodernist art historical and cultural theory, the "other" denotes marginalized peoples either ignored or dominated by a mainstream and elitist culture. Historically the "other" consisted of colonized natives dominated by European colonizers. I use the term "other" here to imply that the Indonesian central government on Java marginalizes and dominates its outer regions.

12 Christine Kreps, "Museum Mindedness in Indonesia," *SEASPAN* 9, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 7-10. Kreps employs this term to suggest that Western museum practices of rational categorizing, collecting and redefining of cultural objects established a particular mindset and theoretical framework. She calls this framework and mindset "museum-mindedness."

13 "Gaze" in art historical terms generally refers to the dominance of the white male objectification of the female body in art. I employ this term to imply that the domestic and international gaze objectifies and influences the direction of traditional art forms in Indonesia. For more information about the "gaze" as discussed in art history please see John Berger, *The Look of Things: selected Essays and Articles* (New York,: Penguin, 1972).

14 Aside from the amazing demographic preponderance of Javanese (multiple ethnic groups) in the country, the great flowering of Indic culture occurred on Java. The trade expansion with the Portuguese and Dutch was centered on Java's north coast. Additionally, the rise of nationalism and subsequent revolution against the Dutch took place initially on Java.

15 Through personal conversations with Indonesians in Bali, Sulawesi and Java, it is my impression that many Indonesians throughout Indonesia feel that Java has heavily influenced the rest of the country, both in terms of behavior and traditional structures of politics. Many jokes about the President of Indonesia refer to him as the Javanese Raja.

16 Clifford Geertz, "The Year of Living Culturally," *The New Republic* (October. 21, 1991): 36.

17 Hatley, "Cultural Expression," 253.

18 "Fossilize" in this case refers to the ideas of traditional life and customs as backward. In Indonesia, if something is considered "backward" it is not as viable as the system of modernity. In this case modernity is a sign of development presented to the international community. Kessler, "Archaism and Modernity in Malay Political Culture"; and Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, eds., *Invention of Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University, 1983). The authors painstakingly argue that traditional "pasts" are invented contemporary creations of both ethnic and national projects.

19 Clifford Geertz, "Popular Art and the Javanese Tradition," *Indonesia* 50 (October 1990): 79.

20 David Brown, "Immanent Domains: Cultural Worth in Bone, South Sulawesi" *Social Analysis* no. 35 (April 1994): 84.

21 Hatley, "Cultural Expression," 217; and Kessler, "Archaism and Modernity in Malay Political Culture," 136.

22 "Regional/local cultures" possess their own unique history, values, language, concepts of politics, and sometimes cosmic and world views apart from the hegemonic culture I defined earlier. Culturally specific aspects such as animism and mysticism often oppose the state ideology because they do not conform to the official national definition of religion. For further clarification see sections on Pancasila and Cultural Policy.

23 Kessler, "Archaism and Modernity in Malay Political Culture," 133.

24 Kessler, "Archaism and Modernity in Malay Political Culture," 133.

25 For more information regarding this topic see Virginia Matheson Hooker, ed., *Culture and Society in New Order Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993).

26 Hooker, *Culture and Society in New Order Indonesia* , 135.

27 Kenneth Hall, *Maritime Trade and state Development in Early Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1985), 88.

28 Personal communication with Uri Tadmor, Indonesian language instructor at the University of Hawaii at Manoa.

29 In the last decade, certain pre-religions or *agamas* have been unofficially accepted into the Pancasila religious categories. For instance the Torajan pre-Christian and Muslim religion of Aluk to Dolo, and the Kejawen pre-Islamic tradition of mysticism on Java. For a concise, discussion on the Kejawen in the central government see Margot Lyon, "Mystical Biography: Suharto and the Kejawen in the Political Domain," in *Search of Cross-Cultural Understanding*, ed. Andrew McIntyre, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, no. 28 (Clayton, Australia: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1993), 211-238.

30 Virginia Matheson Hooker, ed., "Glossary" in *Culture and Society in New Order Indonesia,* 1993, xix.

31 The requirement to claim a religion was reinforced and became mandatory after the communist insurgency of 1965. Every Indonesian must claim a religion or be suspected of harboring communist political views. After 1965, the Chinese changed their names into either Indonesian or Christian names. The Chinese were thought to be a major factor in the spread of

communism in the early decades. Religious affiliation is placed on one's ID cards.

32 Both Dutch and Indonesian governments advocated missionary work. Missionaries were not allowed to go into already established Muslim areas. The missionaries in the early twentieth century either burned or confiscated almost all material cultures that appeared to possess a sacral purpose, for example, ancestor figures of Nias and Toraja. These objects were deemed in opposition to Christianity. Large collections of confiscated objects became permanent holdings of the major museums in the West.

33 James Clifford, "Introduction: The Pure Products Go Crazy," in *The Predicament of Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 17.

34 The deeper implications of Pancasila will not be expressed here. For a detailed, and short reading see Amyn Sajoo, *Pluralism in Old Societies and New States* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 31-42.

35 Hooker, "Introduction," 3.

36 Paul Taylor, "Collecting Icons of Power and Identity: Transformation of Indonesian Material Culture in the Museum Context" *Cultural Dynamics* 17, no.1 (Fall 1995): 117. This is a play on words. The motto "Unity in Diversity" is here reversed to suggest the diversity of the many local cultures are incorporated into the unified whole of the nation state.

37 Hooker, "Introduction," 4.

38 Hooker, "Introduction," 4.

39 Haryati Soebadio, *Cultural Policy in Indonesia* (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 13-14.

40 Soebadio, *Cultural Policy in Indonesia,* 18-19.

41 Taylor, "Introduction"; and Takaishi Fujii, "Approach to New Values" in *Art and the Future: Collected Papers of the First International Conference on Art and the Future*, ed. Margaret Alisjahbana, (Bali: Art Center Toyabungkah, 1978), 65.

42 Hatley, "Cultural Expression," 218.

43 Bambang Soebadio, *Sejerah Direktorat Permusiuman* (Jakarta: Departmen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1987), 87; and Indonesia Departmen Pedidikan dan Kebudayaan, *Cultural Policy of Indonesia*, (Paris: UNESCO, 1973), 25.

44 Departmen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaam , *Cultural Policy of Indonesia* (Paris: UNESCO, 1985).

45 Geertz has described this "Javanology" as the revivified scholarly enterprise of applying "scientific" methods of analysis to "indigenous" cultural phenomena: "The scholarly studies consist mainly of efforts to demonstrate the compatibility of the conceptions incarnate in classical art forms (dance, drama, music, textiles, and most especially the shadow play) with those of modern physics, genetics, psychology, or medicine; attempts to develop 'Javanese economics', 'Javanese jurisprudence', 'Javanese pedagogy', 'Javanese linguistics', or 'Javanese psychoanalysis', out of the same materials; evaluations of Javanese folk therapies, excavations of pre-Islamic Javanese archaeological sites, interpretations of Javanese history...." Geertz, "Popular Art and t he Javanese Tradition," 89.

46 Barbara Arendt quoted in Geertz, "The Year of Living Culturally," 34. For a history and psychology of early Colonial collecting practices see Carol Breckenridge, "The Aesthetic and Politics of Colonial Collecting: India at World Fairs" *Society for Comparative Study of Society and History*, 56, no. 3 (1989): 195-216. Breckenridge traces Western collecting behavior as beginning out of a need to rationalize and scientifically categorize material culture.

47 Susan Vogel, "Introduction" in *Art/Artifact* exhibition catalogue (New York: Center for African Art, 1988), 13.

48 In this sense "Us" refers to the cultural community the viewer associates themselves with. "Them" suggests an outsider, not of the "Us" community. In relation to European museum exhibitions, "Us" refers to the European culture influenced by old colonial ideologies that distinguished racially between "Us" the colonizer, and "Them" the colonized.

49 John Young, "Artworks and Artworlds" *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 35, (October 1995). Young discusses theoretical problems of distinguishing what is or is not art. Historically, a small elite group of art history experts distinguished what was "art". "Arthood" of an object depended upon arbitrary and personal criteria. Since material cultures have been collected, the distinction between art object and artifact has been vague. The dichotomy of art/artifact continues to be debated between art history and ethnography.

50 James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Surrealism," in *The Predicament of Culture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 135.

51 Ann Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).

52 For more detailed discussion on this idea see: Rasheed Araeen, "From Primitivism to Ethnic Arts," in *The Myth of Primitivism*, ed. Susan Hiller (London: Routledge, 1993),159-182; and Annie E. Coombes, "Ethnography and the Formation of National and Cultural Identities," in *The Myth of Primitivism: Perspectives on Art* ed. Susan Hiller (London: Routledge, 1994), 190-213).

53 Araeen, "Primitivism to Ethnic Arts," 160.

54 Edward Said coined the phrase "Empire era ideology" in *Culture and Imperialism*, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993).

55 Taylor, "Collecting Icons," 112.

56 In regards to previous methods of collecting, exhibiting, etc., Taylor suggests that current practices have been decolonized. In other words, the practices have been reevaluated and those deemed detrimental to an interregional or cross-cultural exchange have been changed.

57 Taylor, "Collecting Icons," 112.

58 Sally Price, *Primitive Art in Civilized Places* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

59 In the exhibition catalog *Primitivism in 20th Century Art* the "primitive" art pieces that inspired modern art are labeled not by the artist or function but by the collector.

60 By the mid 17th century, Islam was the primary religion in Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi. Islamic tenets forbid the representation of recognizable living figures, and the adherence to syncretic religious elements of Hindu or Buddhism. Although mysticism still persists today, the monuments created by the earlier dynasties of religiously syncretic Java were abandoned and left to the jungle until the late 19th century.

61 The Dutch did not originally begin the restoration of Borobudur temple in Central Java. The English governor Raffles, during his short tenure as British governor, unearthed Borobudur. The Dutch did, however, continue Raffles' archeological work on Borobudur, as well as other unearthed complexes, including on the island of Sumatra. The research was written in the Dutch, German, and English Languages.

62 Taylor, "Collecting Icons," 110. A local and/or Indonesian cultural framework was combined with Western museum practices.

63 Mattiebelle Gettinger, *Splendid Symbols: Textiles and Tradition in Indonesia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Paul Taylor and Lorraine Aragon, *Beyond the Java Sea: Art of Indonesia's Outer Islands* exhibition catalog (Washington: Smithsonian 1991).

64 Taylor, "Collecting Icons," 111.

65 Kreps, "Museum Mindedness in Indonesia," 7-9; and Ivan Karp, "Introduction" in *Exhibiting Cultures: the Poetics and Politics of Museum Display*, eds. Ivan Karp and Lavine, Steven (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Inst. Press, 1991), 1-16.

66 The exhibitions consist of those items acquired during, and after the Colonial era. The

objects displayed are items previously considered "primitive". In other words objects thought to be created for function over form. For various methods of appropriation used by the Dutch see Sally Price, *Primitive Art in Civilized Places* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

67 Price, *Primitive Art in Civilized Places*.

68 Theory of authenticity is too involved to discuss in the confines of this paper. For the purpose of this paper, authenticity depends on an object existing as a unique form. Authentication requires that object be created and used for a specific purpose. Duplicates made for the tourist trade are deemed *not* authentic; they are relegated to the status of craft. Although art museums maintain a certain tendency to decontextualize objects, the actual act of an object functioning in a ritual imbues the piece with power. This contradictory demand of authenticity incorporates notions of expectations that impose immobility on an object. Evolution of style or materials is unacceptable. For further information on how ideas of authenticity affect traditional arts, rituals, exhibitions and the art market refer to: Brian Wallis, ed., *Art After Modernism* (New York: The New Museum of Contemporary Art, 1995); Spencer Crew and James Sims, "Locating Authenticity: Fragments of a Dialogue" in *Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and politics of Museum Display (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991)*, 159-175.

69 See note 11 above.

70 Taylor, "Introduction".

71 There are several classes in Museology taught in the academies, and the system of conservation is getting better. However, the central government is not allotting much revenue for museums. Private foundations often take up the task.

72 Paul Taylor, "The Nusantara Concept of Culture," in *Fragile Traditions: Indonesian Art in Jeopardy*, ed. P. Taylor (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 71.

73 James Clifford, "On Collecting Art and Culture," *The Predicament of Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 222-225.

74 It is ironic that the missionaries carried out their own versions of cultural genocide. The introduction of Christianity created dissonance for the local cultures who found they had to alter their perceptions of material objects which previously held great spiritual power. For instance the Torajan Tau-tau, or ancestor sculptures, no longer house the spirit of the deceased. Now the Tau-tau is merely an effigy. The missionaries also carried out extensive persecution exercises in which much of the local material culture was burned. That which survived became either the property of the colonial museums or was exported to Europe.

75 Other tools of unification are the national language of Bahasa Indonesia; the depiction of various regional cultural aspects, such as costume, dance, local architecture, on the national

paper currency; and short television documentaries highlighting particular cultural expressions from around Indonesia's 27 provinces.

76 For a more detailed study of the contents and history of the Ternate Palace Museum see Taylor, "The Nusantara Concept of Culture," 83-86; and National Museums of Singapore, ed., *Directory of the Museums of ASEAN* (Singapore, 1988).

77 The use of "palace" here is quite intentional. Although the palace is now a museum, the building continues to function in its original role as the center of local life. Many local people continue to view the palace in its original context.

78 David Brown, "Immanent Domains: Cultural Worth in Bone, South Sulawesi,"*Social Analysis* , no. 35 (April 1994) : 84-101. According to Brown, oral traditions of regions such as Bone, in South Sulawesi, state the first regalia was given by the God-rulers. The collection is considered supernatural residue. Regalia of Java, Sulawesi and possibly other regions, originally possessed *keris* (a dagger used in several regions of Indonesia, namely Bali, Java, and Sulawesi. *Keris* are believed to possess supernatural power that may be manipulated by the owner). At times, as in the case of the Ternate Palace, there is conflict between the state, which claims ownership of the regalia, and villagers who maintain that they are the rightful heirs.

79 Taylor, "The Nusantara Concept of Culture," 71-74.

80 The *Kraton* (palace) in Yogjakarta remains a special case. Although lacking concrete political power, its religious duties are still performed, its royal gamelan orchestras continue to play for the officials of state, and it remains the residence of the royal family. The central Javanese palaces were given special status after Independence for their loyal support of the revolution.

81 For more information on the *Kerajaan* (sultanate) system, see A.C. Milner, *Kerajaan: Malaya Sultanate on the Eve of Colonialism*, The Association for Asian Studies monograph, no. 40 (Arizona: The Association for Asian Studies, University of Ar izona Press, 1982).

82 Ministry of Culture. "Indonesian Cultural Policy" (1973): 19; and Taylor, "Collecting Icons," 81-83.

83 Kreps, "Museum Mindedness in Indonesia," 5.

84 Rita Smith Kipp and Susan Rogers, "Introduction: Indonesian Religions in Society," in *Indonesian Religion in Transition*, eds. Rita Smith Kipp and Susan Rogers (Tucson: University of Arizona,1987), 1-29; and Toby Alice Volkman, "Mortuary Tourism in Tana Toraja," in *Indonesian Religion in Transition*, eds. Rita Smith Kipp and Susan Rogers (Tucson: University of Arizona,1987), 161-192. Often, elements of traditional culture are politically placed under the label of "*adat*". This practice has been very useful in preserving many traditional practices deemed by world religions as paganism. One of the main reasons traditional material objects

may be displayed in authentic ways in the regional museums is because of the tricky definition of *adat*. *Adat*, in the simplest terms, encompasses all the pre-Islamic custom and ritual of a culture. This traditional component has recently been dissected by the world religions. Indonesian Islam and Christianity have separated those elements of *adat* deemed religious and those that are traditional custom. The *adat* elements are preserved; the religious elements are recontextualized.

85 Patrick Guiness, "Local Society and Culture" in *Indonesia's New Order* , ed., Hal Hill (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 282.

86 Shinji Yamoshita "Manipulating Ethnic Traditions: The Funeral Ceremony, Tourism, and Television among the Toraja of Sulawesi" *Indonesia* 58 (October 1994): 80.

87 Ministry of Culture, *Apa dan Siapa itu Indonesia* (Jakarta: 1975), 43.

88 The catalog does not go into detail over various obstacles experienced in the building of the park. One can assume that some of the obstacles were the student protests instigated against the state's controversial appropriation and use of this land. The land disputes became a deeper debate of class issues as the land used for the park was to be zoned for landowners to farm.

89 Ministry of Culture, *Apa dan Siapa itu Indonesia*, 43. The catalog suggests that every province is represented in the park. This is not quite true. In response to being excluded from the park, Andanao has created its own "mini-zation" of itself, displaying its traditional cultural wealth.

90 Ministry of Culture, *Apa dan Siapa itu Indonesia*, 43-50. In the 1970's the state implemented the Cultural Tourism Policy. The policy focused on the economic value of tourism in Indonesia. Policies of tourism, as a topic of research, cannot be adequately discussed in this paper. For further reading on tourism's impact on indigenous culture see Kathleen Adams, "Making-up the Toraja? The Appropriation of Tourism, Anthropology, and Museums for Politics in Upland Sulawesi, Indonesia" *Ethnology* 34 (Spring 1995): 143-53; and Miriam Kahn, "Heterotopic Dissonance in the Museum Representation of Pacific Island Cultures" *American Anthropologist* 97 (1995): 324-338.

91 Crew and Simms, "Locating Authenticity," 174.

92 Patrick Guiness. "Local Society and Culture," 300-302.

93 Patrick Guiness. "Local Society and Culture," 281. Through personal communication with several Balinese dancers in the city of Ubud in 1996 I received the consensus that dances had indeed changed due, in large part, to an attempt to preserve the ritual from the effects of tourism. In the 1970's, a welcoming dance, initially reserved for temple ritual, was performed for the tourist. A dissonance occurred and a new non-religious welcoming dance was created and

performed by specially trained dancers. Ironically, the pure ritual form has been usurped in the ritual by this new form of dance.

94 Secularization occurs when the original function of a ritual object is removed. For example, Statues of the Catholic Virgin and Christ were not created for a museum. The "art" was created for a specific, spiritual location. Inside the church, the statues retained their supernatural meaning and function. As soon as these objects are removed from their intended location, their meaning is altered. The object is now serving a secular purpose as a non-spiritual object within a secular context of museum or gallery.

95 Williams, "Base and Superstructure," 39.

96 Theron Nunez, "Tourist Studies in Anthropological Perspective," in *Hosts and Guests* (Penn: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), 207-216.

97 Max Stanton, "The Polynesian Cultural Center," in *Hosts and Guests* (Pennsylvania: University Pennsylvania Press, 1977), 196.

98 Max Stanton, "The Polynesian Cultural Center," 196.

99 S.T. Alisjahbana, *Indonesia in the Modern World* (New Delhi: Office for Asian Affairs, Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1961).

Explorations
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Hydrologic Change and Accelerated Erosion in Northern Thailand

Simulating the Impacts of Rural Roads and Agriculture

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Notes

Introduction

Roads play a significant role in altering near-surface hydrologic response and subsequently accelerating soil erosion in mountainous areas of Southeast Asia;1 however, it is not clearly understood how the hydrological and geomorphological impacts of roads compare to those resulting from other human activities, such as vegetation removal for agriculture. Although erosion and sedimentation in highland areas of northern Thailand have been accelerated by extensive deforestation and changes in agricultural patterns that have taken place over the last several decades,2 much of the sediment delivered to stream systems may be due to expansion of road networks. For example, Pransutjarit reported that road length was the most important variable in increasing amounts of runoff and suspended sediment in the Mae Taeng watershed in northern Thailand.3 Nevertheless, most conservation programs tend to focus predominantly on agricultural practices, ignoring what may be equally or more disruptive processes: the building, maintenance, and usage of rural roads.

In this paper, for one small sub-basin in northern Thailand, we simulate changes in overland flow response and sediment transport associated with

- the transition from closed-canopy forest to a mosaic of swidden agriculture lands
- road expansion

We then compare the changes induced by each activity to determine the respective potential hydrological and geomorphological impacts. The objective of this research is to ascertain the importance of rural roads, compared to agricultural lands, in altering hydrologic watershed function in mountainous Southeast Asia.

Background

Impacts of roads: previous studies

Previous research has identified at least three distinct road features that can alter storm flow response in temperate mountainous watersheds:

- highly compacted road surfaces and disturbed roadside margins reduce infiltration of rainwater, increasing the likelihood of overland flow generation
- cutbanks can intercept subsurface flow, rerouting it as overland flow; [4]
- ditches and culverts capture both subsurface flow and surface runoff, and channel it more rapidly to streams.[5]

To this list we add erosional gullies, which once developed, act similarly to ditches in capturing and re-routing surface water. All of these features effectively extend the channel network and tend to produce a more rapid delivery of stormwater to streams, which may produce faster flow peaks and slightly higher total discharges.[6] Although less work has been conducted on roads in the tropics,we expect these same road features to also be of great significance in modifying hydrologic response in tropical mountainous watersheds.

The erosional importance of roads in tropical watersheds has been described by Rijsdijk & Bruijnzeel.[7] In the Konto catchment in East Java, they estimated that rural roads, comprising about 3% of a basin area, contributed disproportionately to the basin sediment yield. Similar findings were reported by Dunne & Dietrich[8] and Harden[9] in Africa and South America, respectively. Several studies within temperate regions have shown the importance of road location, geometry, and usage on sediment transport.[10] Additional studies have identified several sediment source areas associated with unpaved roads (side cast material from construction, maintenance, or mass wasting on adjacent hillslopes) that provide unstable material which is easily transported into streams during overland flow events.[11]

Importance of Horton overland flow on mountainous roads

Horton overland flow (HOF) is thought to be rare in fully vegetated, undisturbed areas where infiltration rates are high. However, in areas where infiltration has been reduced by human activities, such as vegetation removal or compaction, the Horton mechanism can be a dominant pathway of water movement to stream channels. In this respect, highly compacted, largely bare, unpaved road surfaces are likely source areas for HOF in mountainous watersheds. While roads may also enhance runoff by intercepting subsurface flow,[12] HOF alone may explain most of the increased runoff and subsequent soil erosion associated with roads in many tropical watersheds-if the road infiltration rates are sufficiently low. For example, in several studies conducted in the tropics, rural roads, tracks, and paths were found to be active runoff-generating components owing solely to their low infiltration capacities.[13]

We found support for a HOF-dominated runoff regime on mountainous roads during a preliminary pilot study conducted recently in northern Thailand.[14] Field measurements and simulations of excess rainfall (rainfall - infiltration) showed the following regarding the importance of unpaved roads in generating HOF:

1. saturated hydraulic conductivities were approximately one order of magnitude lower on unpaved road surfaces than on any other land-surface type;

2. during the rainfall collection period, rainfall intensities never exceeded the median saturated hydraulic conductivity of any landuse except road surfaces and highly disturbed roadside margins;

3. during most storms, a significant portion of rain falling on roads does not infiltrate;

4. compared to non-road surfaces, predicted excess rainfall was generated sooner during a rain event on an unpaved road surface- and on nearly all of its area; and

5. for frequently occurring, small rainfall events, road-related surfaces contribute a large portion of simulated basin-total excess rainfall despite their relatively small areal extent (< 0.5% of basin area).

Study Area

Our study site is the area surrounding Ban (village) Pang Khum (19 deg. 3 min., 98 deg. 39 min. E), within the Samoeng District of Chiang Mai Province, NNW of Chiang Mai, Thailand




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

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



inset.

This area, described in detail by Ziegler and Giambelluca,[15] ranges in elevation from 750 to 1850 m asl. It has a monsoon rainfall regime with a rainy season extending from mid-May through October or early November, during which approximately 90% of the 1000-1200 mm annual rainfall occurs. This area is representative of other mountainous regions throughout tropical montane Southeast Asia in that it is undergoing active rural development with an expanding network of unpaved roads.

Pang Khum is a part of the larger Sam Mun study area in which roads comprise less than 0.25% of the total 9600 ha (0.56 km km-2). In contrast, forest (mostly exploited), agriculture, initial secondary vegetation, and paddy fields comprise approximately 72.3, 20.4, 4.6, and 2.1% of Sam Mun, respectively.[16]

It is our belief that roads are responsible for a significant proportion of the increased erosion and sedimentation that is often attributed to agriculture activities in Sam Mun. This erosion results from the interaction of soil, slope (up to 18 deg), road usage, and road maintenance variables.

Furthermore, variations in sediment yield are related to annual cycles in both climate and the supply of erodible sediment on road surfaces. For example, at the beginning of the wet season, the thick layer of fine sediment that accumulates on the road surfaces throughout the dry season is initially flushed by surface flow during the first few rainstorms. Thereafter, daily traffic, although light, detaches sediment and creates ruts where gullies often form. Road maintenance, especially the filling of gullies with unconsolidated material, is another source of erodible material. Because HOF is generated on roads during most rainstorms, [17] surface runoff continually transports the easily entrainable sediment and further incises concentrated flow channels. Hence, erosion occurs throughout the rainy season; and because many road sections terminate at the stream, sedimentation is often substantial.

Methods

Simulation of Erosion and runoff with KINEROS

We used the KINEROS runoff/erosion model to simulate overland flow and sediment transport during seven rainstorms for three landuse scenarios (21 total simulations).[18] KINEROS is a distributed, event-oriented, physically based model that can simulate Hortonian runoff and sediment transport from complex watersheds or hillslopes. Application and testing of KINEROS is well-documented. [19] Detailed description of the KINEROS equations and modeling approach can be found in the works by Woolhiser et al. and Smith, Goodrich et al. from which the following description is adapted:[20]

- Simulating Runoff in KINEROS utilizes the kinematic wave method to solve the dynamic water balance equation:

$$\frac{\partial A}{\partial t} + \frac{\partial Q}{\partial x} = q(x,t) \quad (1)$$

where *A* is cross sectional area, *t* is time, *Q* is discharge per unit width, *x* is distance, and *q(x,t)* is the local source or loss rate. In KINEROS, Equation (1) can be applied to plane, rill, or channel elements, provided a rating relationship can be developed between *Q* and *A* for each. The solution of Equation (1) requires an estimate of excess rainfall:

$$q(x,t) = r(x,t) - f(x,t) \quad (2)$$

where *r* and *f* are time- and space-dependent rainfall intensity and infiltration capacity respectively. The infiltration scheme, which incorporates initial soil moisture and rainfall intensity, is based on the model of Smith & Parlange.[21] A simple microtopography model links runoff and infiltration.

- Simulating Erosion involves the dynamic sediment balance equation:

$$\frac{\partial(AC_s)}{\partial t} + \frac{\partial(QC_s)}{\partial x} - e(x,t) = q(x,t) \quad (3)$$

where *A*, *Q*, *t*, and *x* are as above, *Cs* is local sediment concentration, *e(x,t)* is erosion/deposition rate, and *q(x,t)* is inflow of water containing sediment. The *e* term encompasses both rainsplash and hydraulic erosion detachment processes:

$$e = e_s + e_h \quad (4)$$

where *es* is rainsplash erosion, a function of rainfall intensity *r* and water depth *h*; and *eh* is net hydraulic erosion due to surface water flow, the difference between hydraulic soil particle detachment (dependent on velocity, slope, and depth) and deposition. Sediment transport capacity relations describe concentration (*Cmx*) in terms of hydraulic variables, particle size, and particle density. Hydraulic erosion rate is estimated as being linearly dependent on the difference between the equilibrium concentration and the current local sediment concentration *(Cs = Cs(x,t)):*

$$e_h = c_g(C_{mx} - C_s)A \quad (5)$$

where *cg* is the transfer rate coefficient, a function of particle settling velocity and hydraulic depth. KINEROS does not explicitly separate interrill and rill erosion processes; therefore, these processes must be parameterized by adjusting the two terms in Equation 4.

- Drainage basin representation in KINEROS is accomplished by treating the catchment as a cascading network of elements representing runoff surfaces, channels, and ponds. Channels may receive flow from surfaces on either side of their length or from other channels. Surfaces are rectangular, but may be cascaded or arranged in parallel to represent complex topography or erosion features. For example, gullies can be represented by subdividing a surface into parallel flow planes. Each element is characterized by assigning parameter values that control its runoff and erosion responses.

Model landuse scenarios for Pang Khum

The three model scenarios investigated herein







Figure 3. KINEROS simulation of stream dis-





charge and sediment yield changes resulting from landcover conversion within a small watershed in northern Thailand (Ziegler and Giambelluca, in press). The simulation was conducted for three landcover scenarios during a 40-min storm event (#2). Scenario A represents a hillslope covered entirely with closed-canopy forest. In Scenario B, part of the lower slope has been converted to a mix of agriculture and secondary vegetation, which is typical of the swidden agriculture system in the area. Scenario C represents the area after a road was constructed.

(Figure 2; Panel I) represent the evolution in landuse practices that has taken place within Sam Mun over the last several decades. Scenario 1 is a relatively undisturbed basin of closed-canopy forest, with small, undetectable patches of swidden agriculture. Scenario 2 incorporates intensified landuse, resulting in approximately 25% of the area being in various stages of swidden agriculture, including cultivation, fallow, and secondary vegetation regrowth. Scenario 3 is Scenario 2 with a road constructed through a small lowland portion (0.25%) of the area. Each scenario is simulated for the same 112 ha sub-basin, which lies on the NE side of Doi Mon Ang Get near Pang Khum. All values to build the basin flow planes are based on field observations and measurements, or derived from a landuse map obtained from the Department of Geography, Chiang Mai University. Basin geometry for Scenarios A and B was described with 13 overland flow planes; Scenario C, 17 planes.

Table 1. Parameter values used in KINEROS simulations

Parameter	Agriculture/	Road	
	Forest	Secondary Veg.[a]	Surface
Area (ha)	83.78	28.0	0.28
Saturated hydraulic conductivity (mm h-1)	172.60	65.33	2.40
Bulk density (g cm-3)	0.89	1.10	1.40

Porosity (%)	0.62	0.56	0.48
Soil moisture at saturation (g cm-3)	0.46	0.37	0.39
Particle density (g cm-3)	2.49	2.55	2.57
KUSLE**[b]**	0.24	0.28	0.41
D50 (mm)**[c]**	0.095	0.108	0.129
Note: All values are based on field measurements			
a Values are area-weighted based on secondary vegetation lands comprising about 80% and agriculture lands comprising about 20% of the group area.22 KUSLE and D50 values in this group are based on secondary vegetation measurements only.			
b The Universal Soil Loss Equation K factor was calculated from soil texture values using the Wischmeier and Smith nomograph;23 it is used to calculate rainsplash and hydraulic erosion parameters.24			
cThe soils for the three landuse types fall into the sandy loam texture class; specifically soils in the general area are paleudults, haplahumults, kandiustults, paleustalfs, and dystropepts.25			

Model inputs

Most model inputs (Table 1) are derived from soil physical and hydrological property measurements made in Pang Khum (Figure 1) or nearby Kae Noi during a prior study.26 Rainfall was measured at 10-minute intervals in Pang Khum from March to August, 1993 and June to August, 1995. Seven of the largest storms in terms of total precipitation were used in these simulations. Total rainfall, maximum rainfall intensity, and event durations appear in Table 2. In Figure 3,



these storms are plotted against median values of saturated hydraulic conductivity (Ks) for road surfaces and agriculture/secondary vegetation lands.

Periods where rainfall intensity exceed Ks are first order indicators that HOF may occur. All other input variables were estimated based on literature values, or derived from equations and tables in the KINEROS manual.[27] Each simulated event is independent (i.e., soil moisture was initialized each time to approximately the field capacity).

Table 2. Summary information of simulated storms and KINEROS-predicted Horton overland flow and sediment transport values

		Simulated Storms			KINEROS Results				
Storm	Scenario	TR (mm)	Max I (mmh-1)	D (min)	PFR (m3s-1)	TP (min)	RO (m3)	ROCB %	TS (Kg)
1	C	35.3	106.7	40	0.07	27	98	0.24	2337
2	B	34.8	85.3	50	0.01	63	50	0.12	0
2	C	"	"	"	0.07	30	147	0.37	2134
3	C	30.2	77.7	50	0.05	27	79	0.24	1291
4	C	32.2	12.2	540	0.01	407	43	0.12	80
5	C	25.2	48.8	210	0.02	72	46	0.18	24

6	C	19.8	54.8	170	0.01	12	20	0.11	4
7	C	17.5	35.1	60	0.02	32	27	0.19	134

Note: Only events that produced overland flow are shown in the table.

TR = total event rainfall

Max I = maximum rainfall intensity

D = event duration

PFR = peak flow rate

TP = Time to Peak flow Rate

RO = total basin runoff

ROC = basin runoff / (total rainfall - interception) * 100

TS = total sediment contributed from overland flow planes

Results & Discussion

Simulations of runoff and erosion

Results of the 21 simulations are summarized in Table 2. Peak flow rate, time to peak flow, total basin runoff, basin runoff coefficient (total basin runoff / (rainfall - interception) * 100), and total sediment yield from the overland flow planes are presented only for events during which overland flow was predicted to occur. The following can be noted regarding the simulations:

- **Scenario A.** No overland flow would be produced from this all-forest landscape because calculated infiltration rates are greater than maximum rainfall intensities.

- **Scenario B.** Only one (#2) of the seven storms would produce HOF despite three storms having rainfall intensities greater than Ks on secondary vegetation and agricultural lands. Although HOF was predicted during storm 2, predicted sediment transport from contributing flow planes was negligible.

- **Scenario C.** All seven rain events would produce overland flow and sediment transport because road Ks values are very low compared to rainfall intensities. In addition, sediment transported from road segments into the stream network (TS in Table 2) is predicted to be substantial during the three largest storms.

These results indicate that the hydrological and erosional impacts of roads are potentially greater than those from agricultural lands-at least for storms of this general magnitude.[28] Figure 2 (Panel II) elucidates important differences in hydrologic response and sediment transport between Scenarios B and C during storm 2. In general, the discharge hydrograph suggests that

1. overland flow is generated on road surfaces early in a storm event; and that
2. linear road segments route overland flow to the stream channel more quickly than hillslopes,

thereby reducing the time to peak discharge and increasing the peak flow value. This is an example of the road extending the stream channel network.[29]

The sediment yield graph shows that

1. the sharp sediment pulse generated from the road segments (Scenario C) corresponds with the peak in the HOF hydrograph; and
2. predicted sediment transport from the overland flow planes for Scenario B (no roads) was negligible.

Limitations to the simulations

Although KINEROS was forced with recorded rainfall data and field measurement data of crucial hydrologic and erosion-related properties, it was not calibrated or validated with measured stream discharge or sediment yield data. In addition, the generalized model description of the basin does not specifically include all important landscape features that may influence runoff routing (e.g., gullies, ditches, cutbanks, paths, and discharge points where HOF is directed onto the hillside). The exclusion of paths in these simulations is an especially important limitation as we believe them to be responsible for much of the HOF initiation on steep agricultural fields;[30] their absence is likely responsible for the negligible runoff on agriculture/secondary vegetation lands in these simulations. Therefore, the simulation results only reflect relative differences in responses of HOF and sediment transport resulting from differences in soil physical and hydrological properties.

We can not yet specify confidence bands around the predicted runoff and sediment output values. For example, sediment pulses from contributing road segments appear to be quite high during the larger events (Table 2). While we do believe erosion on road surfaces is significant, these simulations do not account for the event-to-event changes in sediment availability, or to detachment by vehicle traffic or gullying processes. In fact, erosion parameters (*es* and *eh*) for each landuse type are computed from USLE K factor estimations (see note in Table 2), which for this general area of northern Thailand, have been difficult to determine.[31]

Conclusions

This work provides insight into the relative hydrological and erosional impacts of roads vs. those imposed by a mosaic of agricultural, fallow, and recovering secondary vegetation lands.

The simulations suggest that during large rainstorms, overland flow and concomitant sediment transport on roads is greater than that from the agriculture-related lands.

One explanation is that compared to swidden-based hillslopes, roads are linear features, with lower infiltration rates, that channel overland flow quickly/directly to the stream channel.

However, these simulations may not fully describe all hydrological and erosional processes operating in the region as a whole.

For example, in other basins where agriculture is more intense and occurs on steeper slopes than near Pang Khum, the hydrological/ geomorphological impacts of an swidden-dominated landscape may be greater than predicted here.

Nevertheless, this work stresses the need to place greater emphasis on mitigating impacts of road expansion, an inevitable consequence of rural development in montane Southeast Asia.

If roads, as they are currently built and used, are major contributors to surface erosion and sedimentation, soil conservation efforts should include improving the routing, design, and maintenance of existing and future rural roads.

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Subordination and Resistances:

Ethnicity in the Highland Communities of the Cordillera Administrative Region, Northern Luzon, Philippines

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Notes

Introduction

The past debates in ethnicity theory between the antithetically opposed primordialists and circumstantialists and those who attempt to compromise this dialectic, though rooted in discussions initiated decades ago, continue to have lively and intellectually stimulating traces. This paper, in its examination of the ethnicity of the highland communities in the Cordillera Administrative Region, who have been collectively designated as and who often subscribe to the metonym of Igorot, is situated within the primordialist-circumstantialist debate. In it, I examine Igorot (pan)ethnicity within the framework of ethnicity theory and depends heavily on ideas proposed by Max Weber, Brackette Williams, and Dru Gladney. Crucial to my investigation of Igorot ethnicity will be my own understanding of ethnicity and the dynamic discourse of identity construction. In this endeavor, I will be proposing my own model of ethnicity and identity construction, which is now tentatively referred to as the Labrador-Bell amoeba. What this model attempts to capture is the multiple, shifting, relational, relative, situational, and negotiated reality of ethnicity and identity. In turn, I will use this model in my efforts to understand Igorot ethnicity and identity, but will also find utility in my attempts to articulate what I claim as the

ethnogenesis of the Igorots.

Echoing Brackette Williams, ethnicity, and in this case Igorot ethnicity, is a label of the subordinate, of the subaltern. The main focus of this paper, however, will be an investigation into the formation of a hegemonic "Igorot" or pan-Cordilleran consciousness and ethnicity, arguing that this regional consciousness is a result of colonial and post-colonial governments' "colonization" attempts manifested in missionizing and "civilizing" efforts, administrative planning, and economic incursions embodied by large-scale development projects. In other words, the constructions of Igorot ethnicity are a consequence of government encroachments into the area, particularly those occuring during the Marcos regime, and as a defense against these intrusions. Several disparate, but not isolated, communities attempted to construct an identity needed for collective political and social action which engendered the rise of self-conscious awareness and pride that eventually paved the way for the calls for the rights to ancestral domains and self-determination. However, this neither suggests that there existed only a single interpretation of Igorot ethnicity nor does it deny the existence of internal debates concerning the construction of this ethnicity (i.e., debates among Igorots themselves as to the definitions and interpretations of their ethnicity). On the contrary, I would suggest that multiple narratives and interpretations co-existed (and continue to co-exist), often in competitive interactions. Yet within the contexts of the Chico Basin Development Project and struggles for autonomy, one master-or meta-narrative, though not comprehensively representative of the multiple, overlapping, and co-existing narratives, seized dominance within the discourse between the state and the highland communities of the Cordilleras.

Additionally, I will argue in this paper that the reversion, reconstructions, and reinterpretations of the colonial category of Igorot was part of the mobilization efforts to combat state impingement and thus secure the survival of the highland communities. In short, the calls for consolidation and unity (and eventually autonomy) were attempts to confront the common external and oppositional threats to survival and the possibility of extinction. Integral to these mobilization efforts and forging of alliances were the remembrances of shared experiences, shared histories, shared descent, and shared land claims. Simply put, these were attempts to recognize, articulate, and construct a common ethnicity.

History and Background

The Cordillera Administrative Region, established by Executive Order 220 in 1987, covers over 6,000 square miles of mountainous terrain and is popular for its lush pine trees, numerous waterways, and lavish and elaborate rice terraces. The region is composed of five provinces: Benguet, Ifugao, Bontoc, Apayao, and Kalinga. The total population of the five provinces is approximately one million. The most populous of the highland communities are the Ifugao, Kalinga, Tingguian, Isneg, Bontoc, Kankanaey, and Ibaloi. Since the Spanish colonial period, integrating the highland communities has been a steady policy of the Philippine government (colonial or otherwise). For the Spanish, the Cordillera region was an area to be economically explored; its populations were heavily exposed to Christianizing missions of friar. The discovery of gold, mining reserves, and an active trading network in the area brought Spanish colonizers

and fortune seekers in the late sixteenth century. Gold and other mineral resource-hunting expeditions were pursued in hopes of helping to satiate Spanish hunger for precious metals to feed the galleon trade. Military campaigns were conducted in order to establish military posts and to pacificy the area. Spanish encroachment into the region, however, encountered vigorous resistance from various highland communities. According to Tauli, "they harassed the Spanish troops as they established forts in their mining areas-by refusing to supply them with food, threatening to massacre them, and actually attacking these forts....The Spanish troops were forced to withdraw." [1]

Spanish colonial policies towards the Cordilleras were not solely driven by economic motives, These policies also called for the Christianization, and hence "civilization" and advancement, of the population. Often accompanying the Spanish troops during their expeditions were Catholic missionaries-in a sense, the sword and the Bible went hand-in-hand. The Spanish categorized the diverse communities of the Cordilleras under the homogenized heading of "Ygorrotes" and later "Igorots," a term literally defined as "people from the mountains." However, for the Spanish, Ygorrotes signified the multiple resistances of the peoples in the region. Stressing cultural differences between the Ygorrotes and other Filipinos and thus constructing a highland/lowland divide to justify the civilizing missions and economic pursuits, the Spanish administrators and missionaries (as well as other Filipinos) depicted the highland Igorots as uncivilized, backward, violent, lacking industry, etc. (what often has become the stereotypical, racist images of cultural minorities): antithetical characteristics of the lowland, Hispanized (and therefore, Christianized) Filipinos. In these portraits, the Igorots were dehumanized and depersonalized: inferior objects ready to be exploited and dominated. Other negative generalizations portrayed the Igorots as fierce, head-hunting savages who needed to be controlled and pacified. As Scott notes,

> Augustinian Fray Antonio Mozo, who never set foot in Apayao, reflected the attitude of both Spaniards and Filipinos in the more acculturated society by describing the Isnegs as bloodthirsty savages who lay in wait along the highways to cut the heads off unwary travelers.[2]

Furthermore, Spanish civilizing missions sought to bring their advancements to these backward peoples and uplift them from their ignorance. Meeting opposition to Spanish land and resource intrusion, these missions were largely unsuccessful. Not until the American colonial period, beginning at the turn of the twentieth century, did integration policies begin to penetrate deeper into the region and adversely affect the peoples of the Cordilleras.

Before the arrival of the American colonizers, the process of Igorot minoritization and marginalization was well under way. In his article "The Creation of a Cultural Minority," Scott illustrates this process of minoritization in his account of contacts between the Isnegs of Apayao and Spaniards. Similar to the history of subjection to missionizing efforts and military campaigns I have described above, Scott's account reveals the multiplicity of Igorot responses to the Spanish presence in the area: resistances, co-optation, acculturation, and assimilation. However, due to the hostile resistances and rejections of assimilation attempts, the Igorots were

collectively classified as different from other Filipinos, thus instituting the routinization of their minoritization and inferiorization. To this end, Scott makes the following remarks:

> [Spanish Colonization] had steadily divided the Filipino people into two categories - the submissive and the unsubmissive, the faithful and the faithless, the good and the bad. The Isnegs of Apayao clearly belonged to the latter group. No longer simple indios like everybody else...they were now outcasts, brigands, and savages. They were different from other Filipinos, and therefore deserved different treatment. They were, in short, a cultural minority.[3]

At the turn of the century, the American colonizers inherited this Spanish legacy of minoritization. By appealing to their own experiences with Native Americans and to Spanish-established images of the Igorots as lazy, fierce, wild, and backward to legitimate the enactment of discriminatory laws, the American colonial period saw the institutionalization of "internally colonizing" the Cordillera region and the further marginalization of the Igorots. In 1901, the American colonial government created the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes whose investigations into the region produced numerous laws, bills, and policies which directly affected the region. One principal recommendation from the Bureau was the organization of the area into one administrative region, Mountain Province, enacted in 1908. As part of the American policy of separate highland development, the creation of one administrative territory to govern a diverse number of peoples was pursued, combining the communities all under the Spanish-initiated category of "Igorot." (After intensified exploitation of rich mineral deposits and other markers of economic potential, this policy of separate development shifted to one of assimilation.) Two other significant recommendations from the Bureau affecting the Cordilleras dealt with land registration and mining restrictions. In 1902, the Philippine Bill and the Land Registration Act were passed, requiring the registration of landholdings and proof of ownership through land titles. Contrary to indigenous ideas of land use and ownership, these laws enabled lands to be legally appropriated and acquired by those able to obtain land deeds and titles. These laws, in addition to the Spanish-introduced Regalian Doctrine that placed all territories within the Philippines into the hands of the state, were founded on the idea that the highland communities had no concept of land ownership and, therefore, the lands they occupied were free to full exploitation. The American colonial government also passed two mining bills (the Mining Act of 1905 and 1935) which further eased the acquisition of Cordillera land and limited "native" mining. These laws effectively took land from the indigenous inhabitants, restricted their economic activity, and further aggravated both the division between the region and the central government and that between the highlanders and lowlanders.

According to Gerard Finin, American colonialism marked a significant period in the construction of the highlander/lowlander divide and the formation of Igorot ethnicity. He argues that, during the American colonial period, there emerged a sense of Igorot ethnicity arising both from externally-imposed designations and self-ascription. For Finin, "self-conscious images of territorial and social oneness may over time emerge from the ways in which state planning and policies are imposed via administrative grids."[4] He contends that American colonial policies, especially those of defining administrative grids or territorial boundaries, fostered the evolution

of regional consciousness in the Cordilleras. In other words, it was the imposition of territorial administrative boundaries which helped to diffuse the idea of the Igorot inside and outside the region. Finin writes:

> The American administrative grid was imposed on the Cordillera in a manner that either directly or indirectly influenced the thinking of virtually all highland residents. Over the course of some four generations, the grid served to reorganize highlanders' identities and memories across space and time.[5]

Pursuing a policy of separate highland development (as opposed to integrated development with the lowland communities), American planning strategies established Mountain Province, a single administrative region governing the diverse populations in the Cordilleras. The creation of Mountain Province was founded on the perception that the various highland communities comprised only one "type" of people, and thereby could be assembled into one political and social classification: they were the "Igorots" who occupied the territories collectively known as Mountain Province.

By clustering once autonomous communities into "reservation-like territorial boundaries," social interaction between previously separate groups increased, effectively influencing the mountain community cultures and their existing social systems and institutions. For example, the sponsoring and privileging of particular rituals, like the canao (or ritual feasting), which were thought to be representative of "Igorot" culture served to bring the highland communities together. Competitors and representatives from throughout the region participated in these ritual "performances" and in this way, they were gathered in an invented social setting. It was in these gatherings that the separate highland communities could observe similarities in their cultures and, in a sense, forge a type of cultural unity. Additionally, the introduction of the American education system (the establishment of the Trinidad Agricultural School) was an important factor in developing regional consciousness. Following Benedict Anderson, Finin observed that the school and administrative systems (and their "pilgrimages") prepared an integral way for imagining an "Igorot" community. He writes:

> Based on map-like thinking embodied in the grid, admission was limited to highlanders from the Mountain Province. American officials subsequently gave preference in appointment to administrative and teaching positions to graduates they classified as "educated Igorots." Since the administrative grid restricted career advancement to positions only within the Mountain Province; i.e., highlanders could never be assigned to another part of the Philippines, this reinforced the new highlander intelligentsia's consciousness of themselves as "Igorots," a different kind of people destined to belong to the special highland domain that was "theirs".[6]

The early years of the Marcos era marked the push for national economic development, especially in "less-developed areas," in order to integrate the nation-state into the larger global political economy and meet the demands of the international market. Marcos' "New Society" called for modernization, industrialization, and the intensification of agricultural production. In

this regard Dorall and Regpala write:

> The regional development model implicit in the New Society's plans to reform the Philippines is essentially a centre-periphery one in which core-regions (urbanized regions already experiencing rapid development) would initiate the building of a dependency relationship with their peripheries....It was to be in the context of this core-periphery framework that modernization and development would penetrate into the outer peripheries from the national core regions, thus bringing about a greater measure of regional equity, and the advancement of "backward" peoples.[7]

For the Cordillera region, the Marcos development vision perceived the "opening up" of the region's agricultural frontier for intense cropping, the building of hydroelectric dams as alternative sources of energy, the exploitation of its rich mineral deposits, and the logging of its forested mountain areas. Such development schemes were further attempts to integrate the "cultural minorities" and to bring the highland communities into a relationship with the central government, where the latter had the exploitative advantage and control of both the region's population and its natural resources. However, these development schemes resulted in the massive displacement, dispossession, and disempowerment of many of the highland communities.

Consequently, Marcos' projects were met with opposition and dispute. One of the most controversial was the Chico River Basin Development Project which involved construction of four dams on the Chico River. The building of the dams had many stated purposes. It was intended to increase rice production with better irrigation systems, to transform water energy to electrical energy, to contribute economically to the region, and to increase the living standards of the region's inhabitants thereby preserving their culture. The four dams were to generate a potential power capacity of 1,010 megawatts annually (enough power to maintain most of northern Luzon's electrical needs), but they would have also inundated ancestral territories which would dislocate over one hundred thousand Bontoks and Kalingas.

Another promise of development came from the Cellophil Resources Corporation. The Department of Agricultural and National Resources granted land concessions to the company, covering an area of approximately 200,000 hectares. The project was to meet foreign demands for paper, logs, and timber while promising industrialization, economic opportunities and alternatives, and an increased standard of living for those in the region. But by the late 1970's, it faced firm opposition and united resistance. The promises of development never materialized.

The struggle of the highland communities in the Cordillera region has been examined and understood largely as a question of land rights-who "owns" the land, and, therefore, who controls its natural and mineral resources. For both the government and the highland communities, the Cordilleras (and Northern Luzon, in general) is an important region to control because of its economic productivity and potential. According to Malanes, Northern Luzon houses one of the world's largest gold mines. The Cordilleras is home to six major mining firms,

the biggest of which is owned by a United States investment bank.[8] Based on data gathered by Baguio's Center for Nationalist Studies in Northern Luzon, there is an estimated total of 1.8 billion tons of mineral reserves in the region, containing 38% of the Philippines' gold, 22% of the country's copper, 100% of its cadmium, and 61% of its molybdenum. Moreover, the region contains silver, iron, coal, and oil reserves.[9] The area is also the site of lucrative logging and tobacco industries, it stores the greatest hydroelectric potential, and it is a major source of food. However, the wealth of the area is monopolized by a regional elite and foreign-owned corporations. In short, the majority of the highland communities have not benefited from the region's abundant economic resources. This disparity has been the cause of the economic and social marginalization of the these communities as well as a basis for their struggles for regional autonomy. Economics has served as the battleground between the central government and the highland communities with each using land rights as their weapon in the conflict.

The highland communities argue that, because they are the indigenous peoples of the area, they are the true owners of the land because the region falls within their ancestral domain. According to June Prill-Brett:

> Ancestral domain is a concept applied to the territory occupied and recognized by an indigenous group since time immemorial, and in many instances, long before the existence of a Philippine Republic. The concept of ancestral domain includes (a) the indigenous peoples right to avail of the direct benefits derived from the exploitation of resources within its territories and (b) the right to directly decide how land, water and other resources will be allocated, used, or managed.[10]

Closely linked to the idea of ancestral domain is self-determination, the concept which in one sense states that indigenous peoples have the right to determine the pace and type of development in their particular residential area. According to the United Nations Declaration of Indigenous Rights (drafted in 1985), as discussed in Maranan's "Development and Minoritization", self- determination means:

> ...the right to whatever degree of autonomy or self-government they choose. This includes the right to freely determine their political status, freely pursue their own economic, social, religious, and cultural development, and determine their own membership and/or citizenship without external interference.[11]

Key in this declaration is the phrase "without external influence". For the highland communities, this is often understood to mean "without government or foreign intrusion". The rights to self-determination and ancestral domain, as emphasized by the United Nations and re-emphasized by the 1986 Constitution, has been the driving and guiding principle for regional autonomy and opposition to perceived threats to their survival, manifested primarily in national development strategies and projects.

Although the situation in the Cordilleras has been examined as resource competition between

the highland communities that inhabit the area and the government of the Philippines, it is also a discourse on issues of subordination, resistances, and ethnicization. Even though one could analyze the history of the Igorots in terms of political economy, that is not my intention here. Instead, I examine the Igorots within the framework of ethnicity theory, focusing on the historical subordination and resistances and the implications of these dynamic interactions on Igorot ethnicity (or ethnicities).

Framing Igorot Ethnicity

Particularly useful in framing Igorot ethnicity is Max Weber's notion of ethnicity as the "subjective belief in a common descent". According to Weber, ethnic groups are:

> ...those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists.[12]

Fundamental to ethnicity, in this perspective, is the perception of common descent, regardless of reality or invention. Ethnicity is also based on the perception of shared experiences or memories of a common history, whether from migration or a colonial past. What is important is not so much the accuracy of those rememberings but the purposes for which they are employed: in this case, for remembering a shared history and subscription to a common descent. Using these terms, Igorot ethnicity can be defined (using Weber) according to the Igorots' subjective beliefs in their common descent, their shared histories of colonial resistance (as "unconquered peoples"), and their common experiences of national oppression.

However, when examining Igorot ethnicity according to the ideas proposed by Weber, several critical questions arise. If descent is culturally defined as ancestry, how far back does one need to go in order to legitimate one's descent? Is descent a matter of blood quantum or simply rooted in subjective belief? Who defines and interprets descent and ethnicity? How many definitions and interpretations are there? Implicit in these questions is the interactional and discursive nature of ethnicity (and other types of identity) and the power relations within which these interactions and discourses occur. These interactions and discourses place claims of descent and ethnicity under constant threat from within and without. For each claim of common descent, one can expect alternative claims, counter-claims, repudiations, or outright rejections and denials from those who subscribe to the same claims (or make similar claims) as well as from external agents involved in this discourse of metonymization. In short, ethnicity is a negotiated reality, an interaction and interplay between self-ascriptions which co-exist and often compete and external categorizations and classifications. In this way, interpretations and definitions of Igorot ethnicity are contested and challenged among Igorots themselves as well as between Igorots and non-Igorots. What is also missing in Weber's discussion is a discourse of power embedded in the discourse of ethnicity.

The discourse of power, lacking in Weber, is an integral component in Brackette Williams' discussion of ethnicity. Within her convoluted review of previous ethnicity literature, we find her definition: "ethnicity labels the politics of cultural struggle in the nexus of territorial and cultural nationalism that characterizes all putatively homogeneous nation-states. As a label it may sound better than tribe, race, or barbarian, but with respect to political consequences, it still identifies those who are at the borders of the empire."[13] In other words, ethnicity is contextualized within the power relations of the nation-state (and the larger global economy) and is constructed as a label of the subordinate as measured against the dominant group which is characterized by an "invisible" ethnicity: "not all individuals have equal power to fix the coordinates of self-other identity formation. Nor are individuals equally empowered to opt out of the labeling process, to become the invisible against which others' visibility is measured."[14] By subscribing to Igorot ethnicity, the highland communities attest to and orient themselves within the nation-state but at the margins of Philippine society. Referring to the Cordillera Peoples' Democratic Front (CPDF) General Program and Constitution, this idea of inclusion and marginalization is captured by the following statement:

> We, the peoples of the Cordillera which include non-indigenous inhabitants belong to the democratic classes and sectors of Philippine society....We are among the oppressed and exploited majority....We, the peoples who inhabit the Cordillera, are Filipinos. We know that the problems we face are linked with those that confront the entire Filipino nation.[15]

For the CPDF, ethnicity labels their incorporation into Philippine society though it is a position of peripheral weakness among the exploited and oppressed. Interestingly enough, included in this declaration of subordination are the non-indigenous peoples of the Cordillera. One can understand their inclusion as an attempt to forge an alliance with the more populous collective of "peoples of the Cordillera" in an effort to confront a common opponent: oppression (and hence, the Philippine government). Also intriguing is the omission of the term "Igorot", demonstrating the CPDF's rejection of the colonial category, which is laced with negative connotations. This omission further illustrates the internal debates concerning the collective term to be applied to the peoples (in the CPDF case, indigenous and non-indigenous) of the Cordilleras. The multiplicity of self-definitions will be elaborated on later, but it is important to note that the CPDF represents only one of many resistance-type organizations and movements in the Cordilleras.

Also interesting in Brackette Williams' analysis of ethnicity is her insistence on the subordinate's seeming inability to shed their marginalization. She writes:

> Such a categorical unit cannot be dissolved by the acts of persons so labeled. They cannot eradicate the category-either by process of individual material assimilation to different class strata or by their shedding of inappropriate cultural enactments across generations, or by a socialization process that directs individuals to apish acculturation of a national mainstream to which their

contributions ultimately are calculated by those who metonymize the nation.[16]

Perhaps here, she overemphasizes the idea of subordination, where the subordinated are completely disempowered, acting only in passive acceptance of derogatory labels and exploitative relationships. She seems to discount resistances and the ability to change the relationship between the subordinate and dominant. In Williams' analysis, Igorot resistances could be ignored because of their inability to effect change in the subordinate-dominant relationship. Lost in this analysis, however, is the subordinate's historical agency; regardless of resistances, the Igorots have not been able to eliminate their category of subordination. But, by neglecting these resistances as well as the alliances and oppositions associated with them, Williams glosses over an important aspect of ethnicity: the interactional and discursive contestations among the subordinates themselves and between subordinate and dominant. Furthermore, in viewing the dominant and subordinate as categorical units, Williams ignores the multi-level and multi-vocal internal debates within these categories. In other words, ethnic categorizations and formulations involve self-self, other-other, and self-other interactions.

A model which more sufficiently captures the dynamic interaction in ethnic categorizations and identity formations is the relational alterity model proposed by Dru Gladney (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Relational Alterity Model.[19]



Drawing from Evans-Pritchard's classic study of the Nuer, Gladney's relational alterity model incorporates the idea of nested hierarchy and stratification within the context of dialogical social relations. The relational alterity model is based on Gladney's personal observations and interpretations of social histories (particularly of the Hui Muslims) and is diagrammed in hierarchical segmentary nodes of alterity. In this model, "people *subscribe* to certain identities, under highly contextualized moments of social relation."[17] Gladney explains this as follows:

> ...when "A" and "B" encounter a higher level of opposition "D," they form "C," moving a node up the scale to form higher-level relations, or conversely, down the scale when the higher-level threat subsides. While this scheme is binary, it is always constructed in the field of social relations, and is inherently ternary in that A and B are always in union or opposition depending on their interaction with D.[18]

The relational alterity model is particularly useful in understanding Igorot resistances to Marcos-imposed Chico Basin Development Project as well as in the examination of the autonomy issue in the Cordillera Administrative Region. Like Brackette Williams, the relational alterity model contextualizes Igorot ethnicity and resistances within the power relations of the nation-state.

Although the issue of resistances will be elaborated upon later, here, I will give a brief account of the applicability of this model to Igorot ethnicity within the context of these resistances. If we take "A" to represent the Kalingas and "B" as the Bontocs, we can suggest that the construction of "C", which I will equate with the Igorots, is the result of the union or opposition in response to "D", the state as manifested materially in the proposed Chico River Dams and symbolically as the threat to sociohistorical survival. When construction of the dams commenced, various alliances were forged, based upon the traditional bilateral peace pacts or *bodongs*, in response to the perceived threats; consequently, there emerged constructions of a "higher-level" identity which I call Igorot ethnicity. With the postponement of dam construction in the mid-1980's, after years of resistances, this threat subsided, yet the constructions of Igorot ethnicity persisted. The persistence of this ethnicity, however, does not discredit the value of the relational alterity model. On the contrary, it further validates its applicability in that a newly emergent context demanded similar union and opposition. It was within the context of the struggles for autonomy, the rights to ancestral domain and self-determination, that Igorot ethnicity persisted: "D" was now interpreted in terms of national oppression. Although "C" or Igorot ethnicity was not interpreted in the same way, it found similar expressions within the demands of autonomy. It was the hegemonic interpretation of "C" which found its way into a discourse with the state and became crucial to the inclusion of the autonomy provision in the 1987 Constitution.

The relational alterity model applies conveniently to the way I have interpreted Igorot resistances. However, one should be critical of the relational alterity model and my application of it in the Igorot context. Gladney, himself, in anticipation of criticism provides a series of disclaimers. He notes:

> ...there is nothing determinative in these relations. They are merely reflections of

> what I have observed in the field. The hierarchy of segmentation is not fixed; it is determined by the local context of difference, as defined by specific constellation of stereotypical relations, of hierarchy, power, class, and opposition, that are often shifting and multifaceted, but never arbitrary....The relational alterity approach seeks to map out the significant fault lines of relation, opposition, and nodes of hierarchy-a heuristic way of depicting this phenomenon. It does not, of course, pretend to have predictive or universal, dehistoricized explanatory value.[20]

Even with these disclaimers, the relational alterity model's emphasis on the hierarchy of segmentation generates a sense of naturalism and determinism. Although Gladney admits to other types of identity subscription within the dialogical and social relations of identity construction, the stratified hierarchy of segmentary identities indicates a rigid inevitability in identity subscription. What is quite useful in the relational alterity model is the idea of oppositions and alliances and the inherent fragmentariness of identities. The model itself represents one of the primary ways in which individuals and communities align themselves according to the conditional and situational particularities of a contextualized historical moment. In order to avoid the seemingly situational essentialism of the relational alterity model, I propose the use of the Labrador-Bell amoeba, as first proposed by Thomas Bell.



Figure 2. Labrador-Bell Amoeba

The Labrador-Bell amoeba (Figure 2) avoids the normative and deterministic construction of ethnicity with its semi-permeable dotted boundaries and a conditionally changing nucleus. Neither completely hermetic nor absolutely penetrable, the Labrador-Bell amoeba not only

embodies fluidity and transformation but also salience. The amoeba moves constantly, changing shape with each motion. It has neither a particular center nor a privileged core. But this is not to deny that a core exists. Its fluidity does not deny its existence, nor does it scream for consistent cognitive constructions and prescriptions of identity. Instead, the Labrador-Bell amoeba negotiates its space and location within an embroidered weave of external and internal forces and stimuli. This is not to say that the Labrador-Bell amoeba functions only in reaction to the forces and conditions that surround it, but it is engaged in a discursive navigation and interaction with them and within itself. It is a discursive negotiation within the context of nondeterminative alterity. In the end, the Labrador-Bell amoeba embodies the shifting, relational, relative, situational, and negotiated reality of identities. It is within the framework of a contested terrain of co-existing and often competing definitions, interpretations, and narratives that the Labrador-Bell amoeba resides. The construction of ethnicity and identities is discursive, in the sense that it is different from a dialogue. Identity construction is not necessarily a conversation between two (or more) equal agents which are diametrically opposed. Instead it is a multi-vocal conversation in which the agents may or may not be diametrically opposed to one another. The seemingly binary construction of the amoeba is averted by its flux and fluidity. In this way, the project of binary subversion or co-optation is itself subverted by the amoeba's proclivity for anastomotic multi-level and multi-vocal co-existence and intercommunication, rather than a field of relational turmoil and unrest with clear and determined hierarchies.

The Labrador-Bell amoeba is central to understanding Igorot ethnicity. The amoeba takes into consideration the multiplicity of Igorot interpretations of ethnicity. If we take, for example, the amoeba to represent Igorot ethnicity, we see, by way of the arrows within the amoeba, that Igorot ethnicity is an internally contested reality, in which multiple voices co-exist and often challenge one another. Yet, there exists (or at least appears to be) a hegemonic voice within the multi-vocality. The dominant voice does not suggest that the other voices are non-existent or have been co-opted and appropriated; rather, it is privileged within the highly contextualized historical moment. During the resistances against the construction of the Chico Dams, for instance, there appears (arguably) a dominant narrative, a master-narrative of ethnicity, one privileged by historical documentation. This dominant narrative stresses common descent, the importance of ancestral domain, and the shared experience of oppression. **21** The appearance of this dominant narrative does not deny the existence of alternate interpretations of Igorot ethnicity, but it demonstrates how an interpretation can dominate within a particular time and specific conditions. Additionally, what this suggests is that the organized and institutionalized Igorot resistances are not unitary and monolithic but instead involve a multiplicity of narratives and interpretations of history and identity.

Conclusion: The Ethnogenesis of the Igorots

The 1970's and 1980's in the Philippines was a time of great social change and unrest. The country experienced several energy crises, attempted coups, the increased dependence on IMF-World Bank financial assistance which resulted in these institutions' involvement in national development strategies and the deafening international demands for economic development

both through modernization and export-oriented industrialization. It was within this context that development efforts began to concentrate in the Cordilleras (many other parts of the country, like Mindanao, also felt these demands), the home of numerous disparate, but not isolated, highland communities. In response to these development projects and the threats they posed to the communities' survival, these communities began to forge alliances, based on traditional peace pacts, in opposition to the perceived external challenges. From this process emerged "higher-order ethnic collectivities where once there were disparate peoples or dispersed populations,"[22] what I have claimed as Igorot ethnicity. Following these alliances and resistances to development projects was the movement for autonomy and the claims to both ancestral domain and self-determination. This movement was ethnopolitical in nature but with the underpinnings of an ethnic nationalism. But more than an ethnic nationalism, it was an ethnogenesis in the sense of a resurgence and aestheticized revitalization of ethnic pride resulting in the heightened collective self-consciousness of the highland communities. Igorot resistances and the movement for autonomy were also the re-assertions of historical agency. In this paper, I have examined Igorot ethnicity in terms of subordination and resistances and have argued that awareness of this subordination and the resistances to this subordination, historical marginalization, minoritization, exploitation, and oppression have served as sources of cohesion. It is in the examination of resistance, or more accurately resistances, where I have attempted to delineate Igorot ethnicity and the ethnogenesis of the Igorots.

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Explorations
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Dissertation Abstract:

Systematic Qualitative Comparison of Sources of Power in Presidential Foreign Policy Decision Making by Presidents Diosdado Macapagal, Ferdinand Edralin Marcos and Corazon Conjuangco Aquino

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One may usefully distinguish between two approaches to the analysis of presidential foreign policy decision making in the Republic of the Philippines (RP). The first approach emphasizes the role of context or *precedent* in RP foreign policy. In the present study, *precedent* refers more broadly to the force or power of existing international agreements, economic interactions, treaty ratification provisions, external allies, domestic political institutions, and the president's previous political commitments, as well as the degree of reliance on the Department of Foreign Affairs. Some aspects of this dynamic milieu may even otherwise be classified as elements of political culture. More than the dead weight of the inherited past, precedent embraces the lively synergy of the contextual variables. Moreover, not all precedents have equal force. Thus, conceptualized as an initial step towards operationalization, precedent sometimes stimulates dynamic interactions in the milieu confronting a presidential foreign policy decision maker during each of the focused time frames in this dissertation.

The second approach emphasizes *presidential initiative* by decision makers pursuing their preferences in external affairs. Presidential initiative includes domestic and international articulation of issues prior to accession to the presidency, as well as gender, proposals diverging from precedent, and utilization of political resources in both Philippine political culture and relevant foreign political cultures. Presidential initiative can also refer to (and result from) the

way in which a candidate (or incumbent) became (or remained) president. This consideration, in turn, may sensitize the researcher to the possibility that an atypical road to presidential power or to extended incumbency gave the chief executive unusual impetus, as in two of the four cases. The impetus, however, is not always appreciated by presidential decision makers, and their initiatives are not always effective. Those initiatives may be counterproductive blunders. To the extent that psychological factors actually come into play, presidential initiative may also include them.

Despite lively clashes over normative agendas and style, both approaches use similar kinds of evidence. Where the two approaches are in competition, they emphasize, respectively, the causal role of precedent and presidential initiative. Differentiating the two approaches from one another is not intended to inflate them into constantly clashing schools of disciples. Without discounting the specific impact of precedent and presidential initiative, this dissertation focuses on their *combined* effect on foreign policy outcomes.

Stretched organizational pluralism is a third possible source of power in achieving foreign policy outcomes, and it is linked to both precedent and presidential initiative. Stretched organizational pluralism can generate problems for decision makers, as Graham Allison's "bureaucratic politics" model suggests. Stretched organizational pluralism generically refers to the extent to which the foreign policy making power is shared, willingly or unwillingly, with other individuals and institutions. Unlike Dahlian "polyarchy," stretched organizational pluralism does not necessarily imply a high degree of representation or contestation in the larger polity. As with precedent and presidential initiative, sharing of the foreign policy making power may occur on any level of analysis.

Stretched organizational pluralism sometimes overlaps but is not isomorphic with Dahlian polyarchy. But, whereas Robert Dahl's polyarchy refers to the widest possible contestation and representation, stretched organizational pluralism includes both democratic and authoritarian social movements and constitutional systems. Alternative concepts, like democracy, democratization, and pluralism, are narrower in connotation and scope and, therefore, unsatisfactory. Dahl himself, in his 16 May 1984 Rokkan Memorial Lecture, underlined problems associated with using his notorious concept of *polyarchy*, noting (1) that the term "does not appear to have a standard meaning" and (2) that he, Dahl, has "doubtless[ly] contributed to the confusion of usage" during the previous thirty-one years. Stretched organizational pluralism includes interactions with close advisors involved in making foreign policy. But stretched organizational pluralism also refers to the impact of institutions such as the press, the risk of foreign policy discussions during an election campaign, and the utilization of constitutional provisions by citizens or governmental officials influencing foreign policy. In this sense, stretched organizational pluralism is sometimes the most important determinant or channel of influences on foreign policy decision making outcomes.

Figure 1, below, introduces the four cases and their focused time frames during 1962-1987.

Figure 1. Scope and Character of the Decisions in the Sample of

Foreign Policies

Case 1 (1 March 1962-31 December 1963)	Case 2 (1 March 1966-31 August 1967)
Macapagal: Renewing & non-violently promoting a territorial claim to Sabah/North Borneo first raised by the Philippines in 1950.	**Marcos I:** Expanding the infrastructure for regional inter-governmental cooperation (participating in ASA;s revival, proposing an "Asian Forum" & joining in co-founding the Association of Southeast Asia).
Aquino Postponing a crisis in RP-USA military relations by rejecting immediate abrogation of the Military Bases Agreement, denying the US early, explicit public reassurances of future support for a renewed treaty & favoring a referendum on any extension.	**Marcos II:** Early response to the First Oil Crisis (deepening the RP's pro-Arab tilt in the United Nations with implications for the Israeli-occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip & for the militarized crisis in Muslim areas of Mindanao) while seeking diverse sources of oil and beginning to develop other types of energy for industry & domestic consumption).
(25 February 1986-16 December 1987) Case 4	**(1 September 1972-28 June 1974) Case 3**

The four cases include a territorial claim, the formation of an international organization, energy sourcing and diversification, and military affairs. Yet they share several key similarities. All were consequential at the time of their implementation. The effects of those policies continued to be felt by successive presidents long after the closing dates in the focused time frames for this study.

Identifying sources of power is a prerequisite for constructing a causal model of foreign policy decision making. But the overarching objective is to characterize the precise linkages and dynamics between precedent, presidential initiative, and stretched organizational pluralism, as well as their impact on foreign policy decision making outcomes. Retrospective hagiography or demonology of the presidents' preferences is better pursued in a different kind of study.

Simply expressed, the question asked in this dissertation is: In the focused case studies, did Presidents Macapagal, Marcos, and Aquino do what they said they would do? To the degree that they succeeded, what accounts for their ability or inability to do so? Conversely, what accounts for foreign policy outcomes that were less than what they preferred? Asking these questions is

altogether different from asking whether one retrospectively prefers that the president had pursued a course of action closer to some critic's own preference.

Although this study is still underway, tentative inferences can be made from the four case studies in the nonrandom quarter-century sample of foreign policy decision making (1962-1987). While it is fair to characterize all three presidents as anti-communist and favorable to the United States, President Macapagal's re-introduction in 1962 of the RP's claim to Sabah challenged the status quo in Southeast Asia more so than occurred in any of the other three cases. In the first of the two Marcos cases, success in co-founding of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) rested at least as much on precedents of commitment to regional cooperation by previous administrations as on initiatives by President Marcos in 1966-1967. In responding to the First Oil Crisis, President Marcos faced grave threats to his martial law regime and may have succeeded better than expected, but Marcos's claim to have acted "independently" from the United States in Middle Eastern relations in 1973-1974 is not supported by the evidence. And during 1986-1987, President Aquino achieved her RP-USA military relations preferences partly because of her initiatives, partly because of the manner in which those preferences were nested among her prior commitments to re-democratization (despite her dismissal of the legislature) and "demarcosification," and partly thanks to inept tactical errors by her opponents on the left and right. In all four cases, the role of the press as adversary or supporter looms large. Overall, mutually reinforcing interaction between components of presidential initiative and stretched organizational pluralism appears to account for some foreign policy outcomes in all four cases. But not for all outcomes.

Methods and materials for tracing foreign policy decision making processes in this study include published and unpublished RP and foreign sources-primarily verbal but also including some quantitative data. Table 1 specifies the methodological pathways and documentary materials.

Table 1. Pathways, Methods and Materials for Tracing Philippine Foreign Policy Process

1. Analysis of public and declassified government documents.
2. Thematic analysis of memoirs of foreign policy decision makers & their advisers.
2b. Selective extraction of data from biographies of foreign policy decision makers.
3a.Contemporaneous statements for mass communications media (print) by RP foreign policy decision makers.
3b. Contemporaneous statements for mass communications media (print) by other foreign policy decision makers.
3c. Analysis of printed transcripts of contemporaneous statements by decision makers for radion and television broadcasts.

3d. Thematic analysis of contemporaneous videotaped statements by key decision makers for television broadcast.
3e. Contemporaneous statements for mass communications media by non-governmental critics of RP policy.
3f. Journalistic summaries of foreign policy decision making process during the focused time frame.
4a. Oral histories of key decision makers & their advisers.
4b. Oral histories of other participants in politics during the focused time period.
4c. Oral histories of astute observers (scholars, activists) of the political scene.
5. Chronology.
6. Aggregate data.
7. Reanalysis of scholarly treatments (monographs, articles, theses, dissertations).

In the interest of replicability, Gary King and his Harvard colleagues have recently asserted that "taking advantage of privileged access without seeking access for others precludes replication and calls into question the scientific quality" of one's research. In accord with that sentiment, I have deposited 833 pages of United States Department of State documents, declassified after my 1992 dissertation-related submission of a Freedom-of-Information Act request, in the Asia Collection of the Hamilton Graduate Research Library at the University of Hawai'i-Manoa. And, upon publication of the book based on this dissertation, copies of interview tapes will be made available to the Philippine Research Resource File in Hamilton Library.

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Batavia Through the Eyes of Vietnamese Envoys

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Notes

Introduction

Ever since John Smail called on scholars in the early sixties to leave behind the Eurocentric writings of colonial-era historians and create an "autonomous history" for Southeast Asia, historians have been faced with a major conundrum: how to write about the past from a "native" perspective when there are few (if any) extant, indigenous sources.[1] Scholars have thus done their best to write accounts based on the more numerous Western records, that nonetheless give primacy to the local perspective. While such works invariably still receive criticism, they are nonetheless becoming ever more sophisticated.

One type of source that has not been as extensively employed in this endeavor, however, are the accounts that fellow Southeast Asians have made of their neighbors. To be sure, such works are not free of their own biases. Nevertheless they can provide us with a valuable picture of "how the world was viewed from specific places." [2] In this paper I will discuss just such a "view": specifically, how Batavia was seen from Viet Nam in the mid-nineteenth century. I will do so by examining two accounts made by Vietnamese envoys who traveled to Batavia in 1833 and 1844, respectively. Before looking at these two texts, however, I will begin with a quick overview of Vietnamese relations with island Southeast Asia in the early nineteenth century. Following that,

I will introduce the two envoys and examine how some of their observations were biased by the influence that the Chinese world-view exerted on their imaginations. Having covered this important background information, I will then move beyond these considerations to determine what particular insights the two accounts provide into conditions in mid nineteenth-century Batavia. The main argument of the paper will be that the discrepancies between these two travelogues indicate the influence of the changes that were taking place in Batavia (and the larger Asian world) at the time.

Nguyên Viet Nam and Island Southeast Asia

During the first half of the nineteenth century the Nguyên dynasty adhered to a rather indecisive foreign policy. Harboring no Chinese-style illusions that their country could be economically self-sufficient, the dynasty was still unsure if Vietnamese society could withstand the pernicious influences that would slip in alongside Western commerce. Thus, they wavered between policies of prohibition that called for "closing the gates and locking the harbors" (bê môn tõa cãng) to encouragement of foreign commerce and what came to be known as "bread and milk studies" (hoc bánh tây sua bò), that is, the study of Western languages, technology, and culture.[3]

Through all of this time, contacts with island Southeast Asia, both official and illicit, served as a crucial link between Viet Nam and the outside world. Official Nguyên missions to the south began as early as 1788 when Nguyên Phúc Anh, the future emperor Gia Long, sent military men to Melaka and Penang to purchase arms to aid in the fight against the Tây Son rebels. Once the country was unified and the dynasty's position had become stable, Gia Long ceased sending missions to the south, but illicit contacts continued. In particular, Vietnamese merchants from the south illegally exported rice from the Mekong delta to the islands, and in return, smuggled in opium. Those who succeeded undoubtedly reaped great profits, for even some officials engaged in this illicit trade after missions to the south were resumed under Minh Mang.[4] These later missions differed in character from those that Gia Long had commissioned. Under Minh Mang, and later under Thiêu Tri, the purpose of these missions was not to procure arms, but information. In particular, the court was interested in finding out whatever it could about the activities of the Western powers in the region. In keeping with this change in focus, the envoys who went south under Minh Mang and Thiêu Tri were increasingly from the civil bureaucracy, in contrast to the mercenaries that Gia Long had sent to purchase weapons.[5]

Thanks to a recent study by the late Chen Jinghe, we can now see that this effort to understand what was happening in the outside world was a major endeavor on the part of the Nguyên dynasty. Professor Chen meticulously combed through the Veritable Records of Imperial Viet Nam (Dai Nam thuc luc chánh biên), the records of the day-to-day business of the Vietnamese court, and based on citations found there, put together a chronology of official missions to the islands to the south between the years 1788-1846. He was able to identify 49 such missions, the vast majority (40 missions) taking place from 1823-1846.[6] Hence, these 23 years can be seen as a period of intense information gathering, and it is in this period that the two travelers to be discussed here made their journeys to Batavia.

Phan Huy Chú (1782-1840) and Cao Bá Quát (1809-1854)

Phan Huy Chú was born in 1782 in the village of Thuy Khê in Son Tây province, approximately 26 kilometers to the southwest of Hà Noi. He was the product of the union of two prominent scholar-official families, the Phan's and the Ngos. These influential family members, however, were still not powerful enough to prevent his father's (Phan Huy Ích) past service to the Tây Son from hindering Phan Huy Chú's prospects in the early years of Nguyên rule. Thus, until Emperor Minh Mang appointed him to a position in the bureaucracy in 1820, Phan Huy Chú devoted the preceding years to study and research, ultimately culminating in the completion in 1821 of his monumental Reference Book of the Institutions of Successive Dynasties (Lich triêu hiên chuong loai chí). Over the following thirteen years, like the careers of many other officials during this period, Phan Huy Chú's rose and fell, taking its most precipitous dive after returning from an embassy to China in 1832 when Minh Mang demoted Phan Huy Chú and the other three ambassadors for failing to compose a detailed account of conditions in China. Phan Huy Chú's trip to Batavia at the end of the same year was thus an opportunity for him to redeem himself, and his report, the Summary Account of a Sea Journey (Hãi trình chí luoc), did precisely that. Rather than continuing to serve the court, however, Phan Huy Chú decided to retire to his home in the countryside, where he passed away seven years later, in 1840.[7]

While Phan Huy Chú was a scholar who found it difficult to adapt to the requirements of bureaucratic life, Cao Bá Quát, on the other hand, was a brilliant gadfly whose mere presence in the bureaucracy was a threat to its very existence. Born into a prominent scholar-official family in Bac Ninh province, he was a precocious child. It was undoubtedly his exceptional intelligence that made him impatient with the stagnant formalities of the examination system. As a result, he repeatedly failed the metropolitan exams at Huê, his insolent wit always making his exam books both recognizable and unacceptable. Nonetheless, his fame as a literary star ultimately allowed him to bypass the exam process and enter the bureaucracy by means of an imperial appointment to the Ministry of Rites.[8] However, he was soon implicated in a scandal that emerged around the examination of 1841, and was imprisoned. Thus, like Phan Huy Chú, Cao Bá Quát's journey to Batavia in 1844 was an opportunity to return to graces with the emperor, and Cao, like Phan, was successful in this respect. However, following his return, Cao Bá Quát did not live out his days in retirement as Phan Huy Chú had done, but continued to act as a gadfly until he was finally executed in 1854 for having supported an insurrection against the court.[9]

From these two brief sketches it should be clear that we are dealing with two very different personalities. Phan Huy Chú was a scholar who desired to clear his name before retiring to a life of study, and Cao Bá Quát was an iconoclastic firebrand who stood by his convictions until the tragic end. These differences are invariably reflected in the content of their writings. In fact, not only does their content differ, but the actual literary genres that they chose to record their observations in differed as well. Traditional Chinese travel accounts, of which the Vietnamese were heirs and proponents, constitute a variant of writing that is exceptional in Chinese literature in that it combines both poetry and narrative.[10] Hence, in their works Chinese and Vietnamese travel writers acted as both historians and poets. They "objectively" recorded the facts of their trips; then subjectively commented on their experiences in verse. In the two

accounts examined here, however, these styles are not in their usual combined form. Phan Huy Chú chose to write an "objective" narrative of the conditions prevailing in the islands to the south while Cao Bá Quát composed thirty-six poems to record his understanding and feelings of the same.[11]

Influence of the Chinese World-View

Woodside has discussed how the Nguyên court adopted the framework of the Chinese world order and attempted to fashion an imitation tributary system with itself as center. One symptom of this phenomenon, he notes, was how the Vietnamese appropriated derogatory geographical terminology from the Chinese to refer to the surrounding areas: thereby reinforcing the image of Huê as the civilized center.[12] Ha châu, a term that was used by the Vietnamese to refer to slightly different parts of island Southeast Asia at various times, is a good example of this.[13] "Ha," meaning both "below," as well as "lesser" or "inferior," clearly placed the islands, "châu,"[14] to the south in their proper egographical and moral relationship to the Hue court to the north.

While Woodside emphasized the superficiality and inconsistencies of this attempt on the part of the Vietnamese to adopt the Chinese world order, the travel accounts of Phan Huy Chú and Cao Bá Quát suggest that this world- view was much more deeply ingrained in the Vietnamese imagination than Woodside had suspected. In fact, their writings show that the similarities between the way that the Vietnamese regarded island Southeast Asia and the way that the Chinese had traditionally regarded their own "south," (that is, the entire area south of the Yangzi River, including Viet Nam) went far beyond the mere use of geographical terminology. To take one example, the Chinese had always perceived a direct link between imbalances in the southern environment and the inferior moral stature of the southern peoples. Hence, when the Chinese monk Dashan traveled to southern Viet Nam in 1694 he noted how many of the lotus plants there had flowers but no deep roots, which he then said was analogous to the Vietnamese "people who, lacking inner virtue, try to decorate their exteriors."[15]

In his Summary Account of a Sea Journey, Phan Huy Chú made similar observations about the environment of the Indonesian archipelago, however, with the important distinction that his objects of comparison were uniquely Southeast Asian. Take first, for instance, his comments about the produce in Singapore:

In Tân Gia Ba (Singapore) there is little rice, so they mainly eat wheat. As for fresh produce, there are many different kinds of vegetables in the markets. Duck and chicken are expensive. Pork, however, is cheap. There is not much betel, however there is a lot of areca. The incompleteness of the goods is perhaps a result of the environment.[16]

No Chinese traveler to the south would ever take areca and betel as standards for testing the environmental balance. To the Chinese, these items were uniquely southern, and thus, their very existence indicated a world out of balance. The areca palm, after all, was the home of the horrible, serpent-eating zhen bird and had no place in a world where yin and yang were in equilibrium.[17] Phan Huy Chú, however, coming himself from mainland Southeast Asia, where

betel was the "daily social lubricant," was well aware that this custom required the interaction of the three essential ingredients of betel, areca, and lime, and was thus quick to notice if any one of these three elements was lacking.[18]

To be fair, Phan Huy Chú did later note that the betel and areca in Batavia were "top rate," and that the markets there were generally filled with an abundance of the same goods found in Viet Nam. However, even with all of its fresh produce, Batavia was still lacking in some respects. Phan noted that "since there is no fish sauce, the food does not taste delicious."[19] This comment is especially interesting when we contrast it with a remark that a Chinese was to make two years later in Viet Nam. Cai Tinglan, in noting what was lacking in Vietnamese culinary habits, mentioned that, "They also do not have soy sauce. Instead, they use 'fish sauce' which has a real stench to it."[20] Thus, here again we see Phan Huy Chú describing these new lands in much the same way that the Chinese described his own land (i.e., in terms of what was lacking); the important difference being that his criteria were uniquely Southeast Asian.

Another way in which the archipelago was perceived to be lacking was in its climate. Just as the Chinese complained of Viet Nam's heat and miasmas, so did Phan Huy Chú comment about the islands' sweltering temperature and the ease with which visitors could fall gravely ill. The only remedy, according to Phan, was to bathe both morning and night in the river, as the locals did, to "wash away the poisons." This practice was apparently well-accepted, for as Phan noted, "The people who arrive do not dare to go against this custom, and all follow it."[21]

Bathing in the rivers or canals, however, meant slipping into waters infested with crocodiles. To Phan Huy Chú there was nothing shocking about the mere presence of crocodiles, for unlike Chinese travelers to the south who found these animals fearsome and repulsive, Vietnamese were familiar with these creatures. What alarmed Phan, however, was the docility of the crocodiles in Batavia. They would lie in the river without batting an eye while bathers and boats passed by. Phan explained that according to local tradition these animals were tame because of talismans that the people placed in the water. However, Phan dismissed this explanation by asking rhetorically, "How could the magical powers of these barbarians possibly tame these animals?" Instead, he concluded that the sea spirits in the area must be particularly powerful, for the crocodiles' behavior was something which was beyond the ken of human control.[22] In any case, it was yet one more indication that the archipelago was a land out of proper balance.

Another sphere in which environmental imbalances were traditionally manifested in the Chinese world-view was in the realm of gender relations and sexuality. Stevan Harrell has recently referred to this phenomenon in Chinese writings as the "sexual metaphor," and has argued that it is part of a common strategy where certain civilizations "have seen peripheral peoples as both erotic and promiscuous in their behavior, as being at a lower level of culture where they have not yet learned the proper civilized morals of sexual repression and/or hypocrisy."[23] Again, to the Chinese this went hand in hand with environmental imbalances. Thus, the south, over-endowed as it was with the feminine yin essence, in contrast to the masculine yang essence of the north, was traditionally famous for its seductive women. They were usually depicted in exotic/erotic terms that featured their supposed promiscuity. This is precisely the kind of imagery that Cao Bá

Quát employed to depict women from the Indonesian archipelago in his short poem, "Ballad For a Barbarian Woman" (Man phu hành):

Truong san thôn dâu man tieu cô,	In a country tavern, a young barbarian lass,
Lâu tru nhu diên thê nhu phu.	With a face like a sow's and skin pitch black.
Bãn kiêu du biên mô quy khu,	Across the plank bridge she roams, returning at dusk,
Tiêu hoán tân nhân tán co phù.	Laughing and calling to her new man, while still praising her ex.[24]

The strength of Cao's disdain for local women becomes all the more evident when one compares this poem with another ballad that he wrote: "Ballad For a Western Woman" (Duong phu hành). In this poem Cao displays his infatuation with the novel beauty of a Western women and longs for her companionship:

Tây duong thieu phu y nhu thuyet,	A young Western mistress, her garments like snow,
doc bang lang kiên toa thanh nguyet.	Sits in the clear moonlight leaning on the shoulder of her beau.
Khuoc vong Nam thuyen dang hoa minh,	Toward the bright lanterns on the southern ships she gazes,
Ba due nam nam huong lang thuyet.	Grabbing his sleeve, she turns to him and whispers.
Nht uyen de ho thu lan tri,	Her hand nonchalantly holding a dish of milk
Da han vo na hai phong xuy.	The night is cold with the wind coming off the sea.

Phiên thân canh thien lang phu khoi,	Turning, she stretches and he helps her up,
Khoi thuc Nam nhân biet li?	How could she know that this Southern man is separated from home?[25]

Phan Huy Chú did not share these views. Instead, his account from eleven years before that of Cao's identified more with the Javanese than with the Europeans. This is clear from the following passage where he discusses the differences in appearance and behavior between the "Red Hairs" and the Javanese:[26]

The Red Hairs have scarlet hair, dragon whiskers, big noses, and sunken eyes - appearances that are quite detestable. As for the do Bà[Javanese], although their skin and faces are black, in appearance they are otherwise no different from the people of our own country. In general, the majority of Red Hairs are aggressive and crafty, while the do Bà are simple and docile. Hence, that "the five directions have different characteristics" is because of the different natural essences (khí/qi) in the respective areas.[27]

These examples thus indicate the extent to which Chinese patterns of comprehending foreign lands and peoples had been assimilated by the Vietnamese. At the same time, I have also tried to both point out some of the ways in which the Vietnamese also modified or "Southeast Asian-ized" this world-view, and the ways in which Cao and Phan exhibited their own preferences, for these are all factors that we must keep in mind as we examine their accounts further in the next section.

Perceptions of Batavia

Phan Huy Chú and Cao Bá Quát made precious few comments about the native Javanese population. The bulk of their accounts deal with the Europeans and the Chinese. The reasons for this bias are quite simple. Their missions were both to find out about the activities of the Europeans in the region, and their main sources for this information were the resident Chinese. Nonetheless, Phan's and Cao's comments about the Europeans and the Chinese are not uniform. This may partly be explained by the fact that the genres that they employed led to emphasis of different elements. More likely, however, is that they were able, through their talks with the local Chinese, to get a sense of the changing dynamics in the area and, in particular, the changing relations between the Europeans, Chinese, and Javanese.

The period in which Phan Huy Chú and Cao Bá Quát visited Batavia was, after all, a time of transition on many different fronts. Scholars have discerned, for instance, a move at this time towards more clearly defined boundaries between ethnic groups: the beginnings of what would later become a "plural society." Jean Gelman Taylor, in tracing the contours of this process as it related to the Dutch in Batavia, has illustrated that starting in the eighteenth century, there was

a persistent attack on local mestizo culture from the European elite; first under the Enlightenment-influenced ideas of Governor-General van Imhoff, then later taken up during the break in Dutch rule at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Governors-General Daendels and Raffles, and finally, continued with the resurgence of the old order after the restoration of Dutch rule in 1819. Over time this crusade succeeded in privileging pure European culture over the mestizo culture that had prevailed under the Dutch East India Company (VOC).[28]

At the same time that the Dutch elite were seeking to maintain their distinctiveness from this hybrid Eurasian world, certain tragic events also placed a greater distance between the Dutch and the Javanese elite. In particular, the Java War of 1825-30 marked a watershed between the trading era of the VOC, when Dutch relations with the central Javanese kingdoms were similar to ambassadorial links, and the colonial period of the Cultivation System (roughly 1830-1870), when these kingdoms found themselves in clearly subordinate positions to the Dutch.[29] On a more popular level, it was also during the Java War that many disparate social elements experienced a stronger sense of their own Javanese identity and united under the charismatic anti-European, and conservative leadership of the "just king" (ratu adil), Dipanagara, and through the anti-European sentiments and conservative agenda of Dipanagara's struggle.[30]

The Java War and its immediate antecedents also marked a watershed in Javanese-Chinese relations, for much of the anti-Chinese bitterness and suspicion that can be found during the colonial years began at this time. As for the Chinese, their experiences during this period likewise made them aware of their vulnerable position in Javanese society. This awareness steered them away from assimilation into the Javanese world towards the maintenance of their Chinese identity, along with which came certain legal privileges that the Europeans provided them.[31]

Given this background, it is interesting that Phan Huy Chú did not give any indication of there being strong distinctions between the various groups in the archipelago. He did note that the Chinese and Dutch lived separately and were under their own respective administrations: an arrangement that mirrored the general practice in Viet Nam at the time. However, he also noted how the Dutch did not differentiate between officials and commoners in many social situations. This, to Phan, was a great fault, leading him to conclude that "They [the Dutch] do not know the teachings of Chu [the Zhou kings of Chinese antiquity] and Khong [Confucius], and therefore, although they may be skillful at many different things, they are still barbarians."[32]

As for the Chinese and Javanese, Phan noted that time invariably led to the mixing of these two groups, for in discussing the Chinese population he noted that, "there are those who after two or three generations can speak the local language, and although they still wear northern clothes, their customs are entirely the same as the do Bà [Javanese]." [33] What is more, this intermingling was leading to disastrous consequences, the import of which became clear to Phan when he visited what he said was the only Confucian academy in Batavia, and made the following remarks:

The only place where Master Chu [34] is worshipped is the Minh Thành Academy However, this

place is deserted and in ruins; its doors and walls already covered with moss. I went with a scholar from Mân [i.e., Fujian], Truong Nhuan Bá. We passed through the weeds, opened the gate, and went into the entry hall to have a look. I saw that the tablets and ritual instruments were all cold and abandoned. This spectacle moved me to great sadness, and I asked Nhuan Bá what the cause of it was. He answered that "The administration of the school has always been under the control of the Giáp dai Hán [kapitan]. The current one is the offspring of a Ba [35] woman. He does not understand anything about studies and, therefore, has let the school go to ruins. The other people of Mân do not know what to do about the situation." Goodness! The way of the former kings has spread all over so that among Chinese and Barbarians there are none that do not respect it. Mân is the birthplace of the Teacher, and yet, the merchants who come south think only of profit and forget righteousness. That these long accumulated evil effects have led to this is tremendously regrettable.[36]

Visiting Batavia twelve years later,Cao Bá Quá;t, In contrast to Phan Huy Chú, could see clear lines distinguishing not only the main ethnic groups in the archipelago but also the hierarchy of relations that they occupied. Nowhere is this more evident than in the first of his three "Miscellaneous Poems from Ha châu" (Ha châu tap thi):

Lâu cac trung trung giap thuy tân,	Storied houses layer upon layer by the water's edge,
Tung âm luong xu do hoa xuân.	In the cool spots under the shade of pines strange flowers bloom.
Thiet ly vo toa quy xa nhap,	Through unlocked steel gates the returning carriages enter,
Ca ca o nhân ngù bach nhân.	Each with dark-skinned men driving the white.[37]

While this verse was inspired by what Cao Bá Quát saw in Singapore, he recorded comparable images of Batavia. For instance, in one poem Cao recalled how he "discussed high matters" in the home of the Chinese kapitan, Tô Tiên Ti (Su Tianbi, or Souw Tian Pie), with its "library like a divine palace." This he then contrasted with what he imagined was transpiring in the nearby Dutch residences where, devoid of any culture, "those others gazed at their white, storied homes."[38] Hence, in Cao Bá Quát's poetry we get a sense that the Europeans are clearly segregating themselves from all non-Europeans, be it through the exploitation of the native Malays/Javanese or through their cultural incompatibility (at least from Cao's Sino-Vietnamese perspective).

In addition to describing the existence of stricter boundaries between the Europeans and other peoples in the region than Phan Huy Chú had noted, Cao Bá Quát also described the Chinese

community in Batavia in more positive terms than Phan had done. In fact, Cao visited the exact same Confucian academy that Phan had so sorely lamented, but had a completely different reaction. The following comments come from the introduction that Cao wrote to three poems he composed for the academy:

As for Ba[tavia]'s Minh Thanh Academy, the Fujianese established it as a site to pay homage to the Confucian patriarch Master Chu. Recently in China heterodox teachings have gnashed at each other like snarling canines. However, the way of the sages has fortunately not declined thanks to the fact that the teachings of Master Chu have already illumined all under heaven. The city of Ba[tavia] is in a remote spot beyond the seas, and its customs are very different from those of China. How wonderful it is then that Fujianese who arrive here and become, to a certain degree, barbarized still know to honor their predecessors, and thereby maintain the proper Chinese rites. Is this not proof of the depth to which the way of the sages has penetrated these people?[39]

The contrast between Phan Huy Chú's and Cao Bá Quát's impressions of this academy provide much food for thought. If Phan's description is to be taken literally, then it is obvious that the academy was renovated sometime between 1833 and 1844. Was this because a new kapitan came to power who was more interested in maintaining the academy than the son of the Ba woman had been? Or is the renovation a sign of Carey's claim that the Chinese began to move away from assimilation at this time towards a more conscious maintenance of their own Chinese identity? Without more in depth information about the Chinese community during these years it is still impossible to say for sure, but it is obvious that changes were taking place.

Just as Phan Huy Chú and Cao Bá Quát depicted differing degrees of separation between Europeans and non-Europeans, so did they appraise the potential threat of the Europeans differently. Phan generally harbored a mixed view of Westerners. He was often baffled by their skill in some fields, and utter barbarity in others. Dutch writing techniques, for instance, were a clear indication of their barbarity:

The Hollanders' writing is all slanted and tied together. To look at it is like looking at worms. When superiors and inferiors report to each other they write on paper, horizontally, and do not employ seals. The writing of barbarians is thus negligent.[40]

However, their artistic skills were unsurpassed by even Wang Wei (699-759) and Wu Dazi (8th cent.), two of China's greatest painters. What is more, Phan added, "the Hollanders appear to have acquired this skill naturally, that is, they did not learn it from China."[41]

Comparison with China was the main yardstick by which Phan Huy Chú appraised the strength of the Westerners. With the imperfect information he often received from his informants, this could easily turn the scales in favor of the West, as it did when Phan explained the Western method for recording years:

The regimes of the Great West do not have reign names and they do not mark the year that their monarchs ascended to the throne. Whenever they record some event they just write at the bottom of the page, "the Holland year of 1833, such-and-such a month, such-and-such a day." This is a general practice among the Red Hairs and the Hollanders. And when they translate Chinese documents they also do it in this style. They probably count from the year that the Hollanders established their country. If we reckon back 1,800 years that would be the beginning of the Han [dynasty] in China, and the time of An Duong Vuong in our own country. In that time the Chinese have gone through so many different dynasties, while these Hollanders have perpetuated through that time.[42]

Even with such signs of strength as a 2,000-year unbroken history, Phan still did not impart any sense that the Westerners were a particular danger to the region. Indeed, he devoted as much space in his travelogue to discussing the Chinese in Batavia as he did to the Dutch. It seems evident that Phan saw the Dutch in Batavia as simply a part of the society, not its master. They were, to be sure, an important force to reckon with, but they were not (as of yet) the sole authority.

Cao Bá Quát, on the other hand, came to the realization during his journey that the Europeans were a tremendous threat to the region. This realization came about as his prior opinions mixed with both what he learned from the various Chinese he talked with during his trip, and with what he saw with his own eyes. One event that had invariably colored Cao Bá Quát's perceptions of Westerners by the time he set off on his journey was the Opium War in China. This brief Sino-British conflict had inflicted a disastrous impact on the Vietnamese economy. Forced, after the settlement of the war, to pay in silver for opium imports, the Chinese turned to external sources to make up for the great outflow of the metal that was pouring from their own country. Certain Vietnamese then saw this as an opportunity for self-enrichment and began to illicitly accumulate and export silver to China to meet the demand; a situation which led to inflation and hardships in Viet Nam. In addition, the war upset the usual prosperous trade between Viet Nam and southern China in numerous other commodities including certain items, such as Chinese drugs, that the Vietnamese obtained only through import from China. Thus, by the time Cao Bá Quát set off on his trip, Westerners were seen by many in Viet Nam as great disrupters of the usual patterns of trade and livelihood.[43]

This having been said, in the early stages of his trip Cao does not seem to have felt that the changes taking place in the world were irreversible. Only after he had met and discussed these issues with a number of Chinese in the region, and had seen the Western steamships plying the waters, did he understand the seriousness of what was occurring. In fact we can see in his poetry how he went from questioning what was happening to a sense of total despair when he realized that the changes were very likely to be permanent. An example of his early questioning is evident, for instance, in a poem that he offered to the Chinese merchant Hoang Lien Phuong (Huang Lianfang) in Riau, where he ends with the four lines:

Hai thuy dong luu qua Bét Ne,	The sea waters flow to the east, passing Borneo,
Van trung châu d bích the the.	And ten thousand islets of luxuriant verdure.
Thinh quân thí v n châu tien nguyet,	Please, sir, let me inquire about this moon above these isles,
Ha sù nien nien canh huong tây?	Why is it that from year to year it faces more toward the west?[44]

While in this poem Cao is still wondering why the West is becoming ever more powerful in the region (i.e., why the moon is facing more and more towards the west), it appears that he soon began to realize the irreversible nature of the changes that were taking place. In a later poem that Cao presented to a Chinese merchant, Hoang Lien Phuong, Cao concluded with the lament:

Ngã thi Trung Nguyen cùu nhân vat,	I am likewise of old from the Central Plain,
Tây phong hoi thu le phân phân.	Before the west wind, I turn my head as my tears fall.[45]

As Cao continued on his journey toward Batavia he had chance to see many Western steamships plying the seas, and it appears that the presence of these ships only increased his sense of impending doom. In his "Ode for a Red Hair's Fire Ship" (Hong Mao Hoa Thuyen Ca) he marvels at how fast these vessels could move, sailing as they did "without sails, without oars, without people to push." He also began to remark on the unequal relationship between Westerners and the natives, as can be seen in the same poem when Cao notes how some Westerners acted after anchoring ship:

Hoan nhi ung ty dàm tieu lai,	They call a lad over, noses held high, talking and laughing,
Tuyet khóa nga cân nghieu tuong lap.	Seeing their snow-white trousers and high caps, they crowd around the ship.[46]

The power of these ships that "puffed up black smoke into hundred meter piles" which then

stretched and curved in the sky "like celestial dragons," as well as both the haughty behavior of the Westerners and the naiveté of the locals, all produced in Cao a sense of impending danger. He accordingly warned in the last lines of the poem:

Khai châm dông khu than tù gioi,	When you set your compass to the east and go, be careful,
B t ty tây minh trieu mo trào.	For unlike in the Western seas, here the tides are in danger.[47]

This sense of urgency, however, was not reciprocated by the Chinese he met in Batavia. In fact, Cao Bá Quát's most biting criticism in all of the poems composed on this journey is of the attitude of the Chinese in Batavia toward the changes taking place in the world. He does this by describing a Chinese opera performance in Batavia, and contrasts the valiant behavior of the protagonists in the drama with the Chinese spectators' total disinterest toward the tragedy that had recently transpired in their homeland (the Opium War). This poem, entitled, "In the Evening, watching Qing men perform at a theater" (Da Quan Thanh Nhân Hí Truong Dien Hí), is as follows:

Liet cu thoi minh toi thuong dan,	Torches arrayed dazzle the high stage,
Nhat thanh ham khoi da phong han.	A sudden cry, and the night wind turns cold.
Kích tu trang si phuong hoanh giap,	The bearded brave man, armed from top to bottom,
No muc tuong quân di cu an.	With crossbow and fierce eyes, mounted haughtily on the saddle.
Xu the khoi vo chân dien muc,	Out in the world, how is it that such true appearences are absent?
Phung trung lang tieu co y quan,	People come to the theater and laugh unrestrained at the old gowns and caps.
Ho Mon can su quân tri phu?	Have you, sirs, not heard of the recent incident at Ho Mon?[48]

Than tuc ha nhân ung ti khan.	Oh pity! What kind of people can just keep watching, their noses upturned![49]

Having spent a good deal of time observing the European presence in the area and having sounded out the local Chinese response, Cao Bá Quát was astounded to find that the Chinese were not as outraged as he was. They, however, had other matters to worry about. In the changing dynamics of Java, a society recently rocked by a popular uprising and now entering a period of harsh colonial rule, the local Chinese were doing their best to find a safe niche. They knew that it would take more than the bravado of a Chinese opera star to resist the Dutch. Given their limited means, the better option was to make the best of the changing times, an option which Cao, the firebrand, could not accept.

Conclusion

Anthony Reid, in his perennial quest to create a meaningful periodization for Southeast Asian history, has recently suggested the label of a "Chinese Century" for the period from 1740-1840, for it was during this time, he explains, that the Chinese government overcame its "disabling antipathy towards the overseas enterprise of its emigrant population" and began to, if not encourage, at least condone the junk trade and the practice of sojourning abroad.[50] While Reid did not explain why he chose 1840 as a closing date for this period, the travel accounts of Phan Huy Chú and Cao Bá Quát certainly appear to confirm that important changes regarding the Chinese in Batavia took place around that date.

While Phan and Cao were both influenced by a Chinese world-view which tended to belittle foreign peoples and societies, by comparing their two texts, and taking into account their individual personalities, we can still get a sense of certain developments. Phan, the scholar, may have understated the power of the Europeans in his narrative, and Cao, the iconoclast, may have overstated the same in his lines of verse. However, when we remember that much of their impressions were filtered through the medium of the local Chinese,we also have to ask to what extent Phan's and Cao's differing remarks were a result of changing opinions among the Chinese in the area. Perhaps by 1844, the changes in relations between the Dutch, Chinese, and Javanese that the Java War inaugurated, and the Cultivation System exacerbated, had become quite clear to them. The local Chinese had realized that their century had come to an end and were now continuing on as best they could. Yet to an outsider like Cao Bá Quát, that was shocking news.

Notes

1 John Smail, "On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Southeast Asia," Journal of Southeast Asian History, 2, no. 2 (1961): 72.

2 O. W. Wolters, *The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), ix.

3 Alexander Barton Woodside, *Vietnam and the Chinese Model: a Comparative Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971; reprint, Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 1988), 264-65.

4 Woodside notes that by the 1930's the smuggling of opium on official ships was a common offense, and that after 1836 the Boards of Finance and Public Works, as well as the Censorate, all had to send representatives to the returning ships to jointly confer and investigate before the passengers were allowed to disembark. Woodside, 266-67.

5 Chen Jinghe, Les Missions Officielles dans les Ha châu ou 'Contrées méridionales' de la Première Période des Nguyên, Bulletin de L'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient, 81 (1994): 102, 105, 113-15.

6 In terms of their destinations, the missions can be broken down as follows: 19 to Ha châu [This term changed in meaning over the years. At first it appears to have indicated Melaka and Penang (1788-1801), then until 1823 it was how the Vietnamese referred to Singapore, and finally, from 1826-1840, it was a designation for Singapore, Melaka and Penang, i.e. the Straits Settlements.], 13 to Batavia, 6 to Singapore, 3 to the Small Seas to the West, 2 to Penang, 2 to Semarang, 2 to Luzon, 1 to Johor, and 1 to Goa and Melaka. Chen, 119.

7 Phan Huy Lê, Claudine Salmon and Ta Trong Hiêp, trans., Un Êmissaire Viêtnamien à Batavia, Phan Huy Chú "Récit Sommaire d'un Voyage en Mer (1833) (Paris: Cahier d'Archipel, 1994), 7-19.

8 At the same time he was also invited to join a select poetry society that included imperial princes among its members. His response to this invitation augured the difficult times ahead, for Cao Bá Quát not only declined the invitation, but went on to state in a poem that their poetry was reminiscent of the stench from the rotting fish and shrimp carried by the ships from Nghê An (where fish sauce was produced). Woodside, 225-26.

9 Claudine Salmon and Ta Trong Hiêp, L'Émissaire Vietnamien Cao Bá Quát (1809-1854) et sa Prise de Conscience dans les 'Contrées Méridionales,' Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient, 81 (1994): 126-28.

10 Richard E. Strassberg, Inscribed Landscapes, Travel Writing From Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 12.

11 Phan Huy Chú es account is presented in the Chinese original, as well as in French and Vietnamese translations in Phan Huy Lê, Claudine Salmon and Ta Trong Hiêp, trans., Récit

Sommaire. Hereafter, all citations to this text will be to the Chinese original and will be abbreviated as Htcl. As for Cao Bá Quát's poems, reference hereafter will likewise be to the originals as they are found in Cao Bá Quát, Cao Chu Thân thi tâp (The Collected Poems of Cao Chu Thân[i.e., Cao Bá Quát]) (Sài Gòn: Bô giáo duc, Trung tâm hoc liêu, 1971) Vol. II, which will be abbreviated as CCTtt. To aid in translating, I have also consulted, in addition to the works mentioned here and in note 9, the following two works: Nguyen Khac Vien and Huu Ngoc, eds., Anthologie de Litterature Vietnamienne, Tome II (Hanoi: Editions en Langues Etrangers, 1973), and Pham Thiêu and Đào Phuong Bình, eds., Tho Di Su [Embassy Poetry] (Hà Nôi, Nhà Xuât Bãn Khoa Hoc Xã Hôi, 1993).

12 Woodside, 234-46.

13 See above, note 6 for the areas that this term referred to.

14 "Châu" literally means "continent", but it was often used by the Chinese in the names of archipelagos or island chains.

15 Dashan Hanweng, *Haiwai Jishi [Record of Overseas Events]* (Taibei: Guangwen shuju youxian gongsi, 1969), 64. Dashan Hanweng was a Chan Buddhist monk who traveled to Viet Nam by invitation of the southern king, Nguyên Phúc Châu, in 1694 to spread the dharma.

16 Htcl, 189.

17 Edward H. Schafer, *The Vermilion Bird, Tang Images of the South* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 245.

18 Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680, Volume One: The Lands Below the Winds* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 42.

19 Htcl, 203.

20 Cai Tinglan, *Hainan Zazhu [Miscellaneous Notes from the Southern Seas]* (Taibei: Taiwan yinhang yinshuasuo, 1959), 55. Cai Tinglan, the director of an academy on the island of Penghu in the Taiwan Straits, was blown off course in a typhoon in 1835 when he was returning to the island from the Fujianese port of Xiamen. After landing in central Viet Nam, he traveled overland to China, recording everything of interest along the way.

21 Htcl, 204.

22 Htcl, 207-8.

23 Stevan Harrell, Introduction to Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers, ed. Stevan Harrell, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), 10.

24 CCTtt, 446.

25 CCTtt, 446.

26 "Red Hairs" (Hông Mao) was actually the Chinese appellation for the British. Throughout his account, however, Phan repeatedly confused this term with that for the Dutch: Hòa Lan, or, Hollanders. In this passage he is again using the wrong term and should instead be referring to the Hollanders.

27 Htcl, 187.

28 Jean Gelman Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia: European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1983).

29 P. B. R. Carey, The Origins of the Java War (1825-30), *The English Historical Review*, 91, no. 358 (Jan. 1976): 52.

30 P. B. R. Carey, Waiting for the 'Just King': The Agrarian World of South-Central Java from Giyanti (1755) to the Java War (1825-30), *Modern Asian Studies*, 20, pt. 1 (Feb. 1986): 60-1.

31 P. B. R. Carey, Changing Javanese Perceptions of the Chinese Communities in Central Java, 1755-1825, *Indonesia*, no. 37 (April 1984): 41.

32 Htcl, 202.

33 Htcl, 204.

34 Master Chu is Zhu Xi (1130-1200), the Song dynasty scholar who synthesized various strands of thought into what we now refer to in the West as Neo-Confucianism. Zhu Xi was born in Fujian province, and thus, the reference later in this passage to the Teacher is likewise to Zhu Xi.

35 Ba here indicates a mixed-blood Chinese-Javanese: what would now be referred to as a baba or peranakan. Thus, the current kapitan of the Chinese community was the son of a Chinese father and a mixed, Chinese-Javanese mother.

36 Htcl, 206-207.

37 CCTtt, 444.

38 CCTtt, 459.

39 CCTtt, 456.

40 Htcl, 202.

41 Htcl, 200.

42 Htcl, 188.

43 Woodside, 276-281.

44 CCTtt, 448.

45 Here the "Central Plain" refers to the Chinese Central Plain, the area where Chinese civilization originated. As for the west wind, it is another reference to the West. The title of this poem is, Moved while talking with Hoàng Liên Phuong about overseas events, I brushed out a verse and presented it to him (Du Hoàng Liên Phuong Ngu Câp Hãi Ngoai Su, Triêp Huu So Cãm, Tâu Bút Du Chi). CCTtt, 448.

46 CCTtt, 445.

47 CCTtt, 445-46.

48 Hô Môn (Chinese, Humen) is the area near Canton that is known in English as the Bogue. It is here a general reference to the events of the Opium War.

49 CCTtt, 459.

50 Anthony Reid, Historiographical Reflections on the Period 1750-1870 in Southeast Asia and Korea, Itinerario, 18, no. 1 (1994): 83.